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ABSTRACT

From November 1942 until May 1945, the Allied nations fought a series of campaigns across
the Mediterranean. Ever since, historians have debated the role and impact of the Mediterranean
theater upon the greater war in Europe. Through analysis of official archival documents, unit
histories from the period, and personal memoirs, this dissertation investigates the impact of US
Army service forces on each of the campaigns and operations conducted across the
Mediterranean theater. Additionally, this study examines how the campaigns of the
Mediterranean shaped and informed the 1944 landings in France and the subsequent drive into
Germany. This dissertation argues that the Normandy invasion of 1944 and victory over
Germany did not just happen. The success that the Allied forces enjoyed in France and Germany
had its foundation set in the learning and experiences of the Mediterranean that began in
November 1942. Additionally, the Allies (particularly the US) would not have achieved victory
as quickly as they did if it were not for the development of the administrative and logistical
systems, organizations, equipment, and doctrine that occurred within the Mediterranean. Simply
put, the Mediterranean was an essential Petri dish that allowed US service units to test new
concepts and develop the experience necessary to win the war against Germany. This was the
laboratory in which the US military, particularly the support units, could learn and adapt with
minimal risk. Considering the alternatives, the Allied strategy of conducting operations in the
Mediterranean and then shifting the priority to the European theater proved the approach that
produced the shortest end to the war. This indirect approach provided the time to train a
conscript army and modernize the military. Most importantly, the US Army learned how to
support ground and air forces deployed in an overseas theater.
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Figure 1: The Major Approaches to Europe from in the Mediterranean 1

1
Source: The University of Texas library, http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/historical/s_approaches_1942-1945.jpg (accessed
December 22, 2010).
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Chapter I: Introduction
The handling of the supply problem is of no less importance than operational
and tactical command.
--Field Marshal Kesselring, Concluding Remarks on the
Mediterranean Campaign, 1946

In November 1942, the United States initiated its first offensive actions against forces of the
European Axis nations. For the next two and a half years, the US and its allies engaged in a
series of battles across the Mediterranean that had a profound impact on the outcome of the
Second World War. However, victory in the Mediterranean was the result of more than good
generalship, an effective strategy, or unit engagements. Allied success also depended on the
ability to support Allied military forces thousands of miles away from their home bases.
The Second World War was one of material. The armies, navies, and air forces of the midtwentieth century were growing ever dependent on the machines and technology of modern war.
Tanks, mobile artillery, aircraft, and large ships all needed vast amounts of fuel and ammunition.
Most American divisions were motorized or mechanized, meaning that they moved by some type
of vehicle and could cover hundreds of miles in a week. Fighter and bomber aircraft developed
ranges and capabilities that were unheard of in the First World War. However, the forces of
modern war also needed other types of supplies and support to perform on the battlefield. Men
needed medical supplies, clothing, tents, water, uniforms, and individual equipment. Units
needed trucks, jeeps, typewriters, binoculars, and a host of other gear. Along with this
equipment came the need for supply and transportation units, as well as repair parts and
mechanics.
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War, in the 1940’s, was more than just fighting. Indeed, war was also about producing all of
the units, equipment, and supplies needed for combat and then shipping these halfway across the
world to a predetermined remote beach or port. Once at the port or beach, an administrative
organization had to offload, organize, and transport the material. Support units had to build
installations and buildings, establish factories for the assembly of vehicles, and create an
administrative bureaucracy to manage the entire administrative effort to support a war zone twothirds the size of the United States. Added to this, the Allied militaries had to provide food and
medical care for the civil populations as well as house and care for prisoners of war. The
divisions on the front lines were important, but increasingly important were the support units
operating in the rear areas, which handled all of the administrative functions. Service forces,
such as Quartermaster, Transportation, Ordnance, Medical, Women’s Army Corps, and Engineer
units set the conditions that enabled the combat units to fight and win.
This paper explores the efforts and impact of the US Army service forces in the
Mediterranean theater of war, from November 1942 until the end of the war in Europe, May
1945. Specifically, this work seeks to establish the role performed by these support units and
assess their specific overall impact on the war in the Europe. The paper will argue that the
Allied operations in the Mediterranean were indispensable because these campaigns provided the
time and experience needed to develop the support capabilities and corresponding administrative
doctrine. Additionally, operations in the Mediterranean provided the opportunity for US
commanders to establish how best to balance forces for an amphibious assault with building a
base of operations in southern Europe that could later serve as a separate line of communications
into southern France. Finally, considering the alternatives, the Allied strategy of conducting
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operations in the Mediterranean and then shifting the priority to the European theater proved the
approach that produced the shortest end to the war. This indirect approach to warfare provided
the time to train a conscript army and modernize the military. Most importantly, the Army
learned how to support ground and air forces deployed in an overseas theater. The Allies,
especially the US units, would not have achieved the same levels of success had they agreed to
cross-channel assault in 1943.
Evidence will show that the US Army was not capable of supporting a direct invasion of
France in 1942 or the first half of 1943. Instead, the US needed the experiences of North Africa,
Sicily, and Italy to build its support organizations and train its senior officers. Indeed, rather
than serving as a sideshow in the greater aspect of the war, the Mediterranean was a necessary
step towards victory against Nazi Germany because the Mediterranean provided an opportunity
to build a foundation of administrative support, which enabled the larger fight for Europe. In
short, the battles of the Mediterranean allowed the US to refine its support concepts and build a
base of support in the Mediterranean, which led to the shortest possible end to the war in Europe.
Even though the service forces played an important role in defeating Germany, researchers
tend to focus primarily on the major combat operations that occurred across the theater
throughout the war or on the histories of major combat units, such as the famed Seventh Army or
the First Infantry Division. Other research has focused on senior military commanders, such as
Generals Eisenhower, Patton, or Montgomery. An area that deserves additional attention,
however, is the subject of the Allied military theater, the area that included the combat zone and
a supporting communications zone for that particular part of the world. Despite the volumes of
research on the Second World War, few works address the details of how the Allied
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Mediterranean theater was organized and controlled or of the service units that were responsible
for the theater’s support.
At first glance, the story of the Mediterranean theater may not appear as glamorous or
exciting as that of a combat unit engaged in major battle. Perhaps this explains the dearth of
theater-related studies. Logistics and support-oriented works simply do not attract much
attraction and will rarely top a best-seller list. However, the type of modern war experienced
during the Second World War was not simply about two opposing forces facing off on the field
of battle. Rather, it included the totality of a complex structure of industrial production, the
allocation of national resources, operations across the globe, and a dependency on civilian
infrastructure. As the Allies discovered in North Africa, contemporary warfare was as much
about what occurred behind the combat zone as the battles that took place within it.
Figure 2: The Mediterranean 2

Although the Mediterranean theater was a joint venture between American and British
forces, each nation established independent organizations for support of their respective forces.
Due to a variety of reasons, not the least of which was an incompatibility between supply
systems, each nation supported its own forces with parallel administrative systems. Thus, two
2

Source: Campaign Atlas: Europe and the Mediterranean (West Point Department of History, 1979). 33.
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different national support systems operated simultaneously within the Mediterranean theater.
This project focuses on US theater operations, although the research will address select aspects
of the British and German theater systems as well, to serve as points of comparison.
Operation Torch was the first major US/British operation of the Second World War and
represented the opening of the Allied Mediterranean military theater. Commencing on
November 8, 1942, the first Allied troops landed in Algeria and Morocco at three major landing
sites. Less than two years later, by the fall of 1944, there were over 918,000 US forces in the
Mediterranean theater. 3 Of this total, about one-third was combat forces (infantry, armor, and
artilleryman), one-third was in the Army Air Force, and the final one-third was service forces.
These service forces, specifically the forces assigned to theater support units, represented the
bridge between the national (strategic) level of supply and the unit (tactical) level of supply.
These theater service forces ran the ports, which allowed forces, equipment, and supplies to land
within the theater. Theater support units then moved men and materiel to depots or centers, and
then forwarded these resources to the combat units when, and where, needed. This is a story that
deserves to consideration because it is one of heroic efforts, missed opportunities, tensions
between organizational cultures, and strategic consequences that helped shape the modern
geopolitical world. Ultimately, the theater support units set the essential conditions that allowed
combat units to perform their mission. What made this so critical? Perhaps it is the fact that the
theater support forces might not have won the war by themselves, but they could have singlehandily lost it. Whether the Allies understood the significance of the theater they were about to
build in 1942 is a question open for debate.

3

Logistical History of NATOUSA, MTOUSA (Naples: Mediterranean Theater of Operations General Staff, 1945), 12.
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Significance of the Military Theater
An area of agreement among many historians is that the resource and industrial capacity of
the United States contributed significantly to the Allied victory in the Second World War. The
argument one often hears is that the industrial might of the US during the first half of the
twentieth century simply allowed the nation to overwhelm its enemies through a vast volume of
war production. Authors, such as Michael Howard, argue that American strategy “consisted
largely in the mobilization and concentrated application of their overwhelming industrial
strength.” 4 America did possess great industrial strength, however this hypothesis only accounts
for part of the story of Allied success. America’s industrial capacity meant little if the necessary
equipment and supplies were not already within the theater and positioned to support the plans
and operations of military leaders. Service forces had to receive the material through an air or
seaport, verify quantities, and record its receipt so they knew what was on hand and where
specific items were located. These forces also had to develop systems and capabilities to identify
support requirements and then meet these requirements by the distribution of material across the
theater in a manner that supported the operational pace.
To support military operations the theater had to occupy, build, or improve facilities such as
ports and warehouses to receive and store materiel. Transportation infrastructure was needed to
move men, supplies, and equipment from ports to depots, and, ultimately, to the units that needed
these resources. Any disruption in the support system had the potential for adversely affecting
operations. All of the nation’s industrial might meant little if the forces in a theater could not
receive and distribute sufficient men, supplies, and equipment to sustain the combat forces.

4

Michael Howard, The Mediterranean Strategy in the Second World War (London: Greenhill, 1968), viii.
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The military theater was the organization that linked combat units to the national resource
base. Combat units focused on defeating the enemy, however, the theater dealt with supplies,
installations, and civilian infrastructure. The theater set the foundation upon which everything
else rested. A shaky theater foundation resulted in limited support, which ultimately translated
into limit resources for combat units, reduced operations, and missed opportunities. Analysis of
both Allied and Axis operations shows that success of the different campaigns directly related to
the flow of materiel from the mother nation, as well as the capabilities of each nation’s theater
structure. Each link in the supply system had a role to play and the system was only as strong as
the weakest link.
This study seeks not only to tell a story that has been missing in public discourse, but also to
inform future military operations. The following questions are central to understanding US
operations in the Mediterranean theater: How was the theater and its support force organized?
Did logistics shortfalls occur? If so, why? Were these shortfalls the product of systemic
problems in theater-level planning, organization, individual decisions, or capabilities? Did
tensions exist between the different forces (combat, air, and support); if so, what were the
sources of these tensions? Did the theater learn from any support problems so they would not
have similar problems in future operations? Were US logistics doctrine and systems sufficiently
capable and flexible to deal with the battlefield of the mid-twentieth century? Finally, what role
did the Mediterranean have in shaping the 1944 invasion of France? The answers to these
questions will help determine the impact of the Mediterranean campaigns on the eventual
invasion of northwest Europe and resolve whether the loss of life in the Mediterranean indeed
served a purpose in the overall war effort.
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The Mediterranean theater was unique because it represented a number of firsts for the
United States. This was the first instance in which US military units deployed from two different
continents and converged on a combat area located on a third continent. This was the first time
that US forces had to establish a theater base structure capable of sustaining large-scale
amphibious, air, and mechanized operations in an austere environment. Additionally, this was
the first time in which the United States found itself in a major war as a primary arms and
material provider for military forces other than its own.
In 1917, the American Army had to rely on Great Britain and France for the much of its
equipments needs. President Wilson had not fully mobilized American industry for the war
effort so items such as rifles, artillery, ammunition, and vehicles were in short supply. The Army
enlisted, trained, and shipped men to France at a faster pace than that of their associated
equipment. In order to get the additional manpower to the war zone faster, the other Allies
agreed to subsidize America’s war needs.
The Second World War saw a reversal of this arrangement. By the summer of 1941,
America was fast becoming a major supplier of the Allied war effort, even though the nation was
not yet at war. The Lend-Lease Act of 1941 allowed President Roosevelt to provide muchneeded supplies and equipment to nations such as Great Britain, France, China, and the Soviet
Union. This also served to mobilize American industry (unofficially), thus setting the foundation
that allowed a quick increase in rates of production once America officially joined the conflict.
As the war progressed into 1942, the US found itself in a position of being a major
contributor of supplies and equipment. Some Allies, such as the Free French forces largely
depended on the US for the materials of war, essentially becoming just another customer of the
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US support system within the Mediterranean theater. Other nations, such as Great Britain, would
rely on the US for some supplies and equipment, but used their own service organizations and
systems to distribute these items within the theater. Either way represented a new role for the
US, one that was significantly different from that of the previous world war. History shows that
the United States and its allies were ultimately successful in supporting the forces afield, but an
untold story remains of the details it took to support almost a million Americans and their
associated equipment in areas characterized by long distances, limited infrastructure, and few
local resources.
A goal of this project is to identify enduring insights regarding how US forces adapted to
support a series of expeditionary operations, how they adjusted to changing conditions to provide
a viable base of support, and how they maintained effective control and oversight of theater
logistics organizations. Perhaps these enduring lessons can serve to inform the national security
community about examples of administrative support concepts that worked well, others that did
not work as planned, while identifying lasting sustainment imperatives that might arise while
supporting large-scale operations with long lines of communication. This project should help
contextualize the challenges the Allied forces faced in building and maintaining multinational
and multi-service forces in a foreign land at a time when doctrine, tactics, technology, and
equipment rapidly evolved.
This topic is still relevant today as the U.S. military continues to develop and modify its
doctrine of theater organization, command and control, and theater sustainment. Technology and
equipment continue to adapt. Future conflicts most likely include multi-national operations, a
requirement to support forces over long distances, and the potential for austere environments.
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Potential adversaries are working on measures and means to negate America’s ability to project
military force and establish secure bases from which to operate. In short, all of the challenges
facing the Allied powers in 1942 (establishing and maintaining a theater base of support)
continue to exist today.

Review of Literature
The majority of research on the Second World War tends to focus on the European or Pacific
theaters because these represent a direct thrust into the heart of German or Japanese aggression
and ultimately led to capitulation of the main Axis partners. A few works focus on a single
aspect of support, such as supply, engineering, or transportation, but tend to combine the
Mediterranean and European theaters in overall assessments. A number of works focus on the
combat aspects of a single campaign or operation within the Mediterranean, such as Operation
Torch in North Africa, Operation Husky in Sicily, and Operation Avalanche in Italy, but do not
go to any great depth into logistics or theater support.
On the larger question of the importance of the Mediterranean, the traditional view of many
researchers is that the Mediterranean was essentially a secondary effort in the greater fight
against Germany. Russell Weigley notes that the decision to invade North Africa severely
slowed the buildup of US aviation in Great Britain and the campaign in Italy tied up thirty Allied
divisions, compared to twenty-two German divisions, a “disproportionate investment for the
Allies.” 5 Additionally, the fight in Italy failed to keep Hitler from reinforcing the coast along the
French Channel and negated any Allied equipment advantages. John Keegan writes about the
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Russell Weigley, The American Way of War (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1973), 327.
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“marginality” of the Italian campaign, stating the Allies “were denied any sense of fighting a
decisive campaign.” 6 For many authors the Mediterranean was merely a sideshow taken on for
political reasons - an opportunity to open up a second European front while building up the
strength needed for a cross-channel invasion. According to these historians, the Allies fought
here because of convenience, necessity, or a failure of strategic vision; they did not fight in the
Mediterranean because it was necessary to achieve victory. If this is indeed true, then the
hardships and loss of life experienced by all the belligerents, as well as the civilian casualties,
have little meaning.
Some historians have a different outlook, believing that the Mediterranean was not
necessarily decisive, but was important nonetheless. In The Path to Victory, Douglas Porch
argues that the Mediterranean was the pivotal theater in Europe, one that had to occur before the
landings in France because the Mediterranean was critical “to develop the fighting skills and
leadership needed to invade France, as well as to develop the “technical, operational, tactical,
and intelligence systems required for success in Europe. 7 For Porch, the Mediterranean was the
rehearsal that enabled success in Operation Overlord. 8 As such, the loss of life in the
Mediterranean indeed served a purpose and was part of the price required for a later victory over
the Axis nations.
Porch provides a compelling argument that deserves consideration. However, there is
another aspect to the Mediterranean campaigns that support his overall argument. Besides the
need for combat leaders learning their trade and for intelligence systems to develop, the US
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John Keegan, The Second World War (New York: Penguin, 2005), 368.
Douglas Porch, The Path to Victory: The Mediterranean Theater in World War II (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux,
2004), xii.
8
Ibid.
7
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Army also needed to refine how it provided administrative support to a deployed force. Leaders
needed to learn combat skills and knowledge, but theater leaders also needed to learn how to
establish and build up a military theater that could support large, mobile forces. The
Mediterranean was important not only because it honed the Allied fighting skills, but also
because it forced the development and maturation of US sustainment systems, organizations, and
equipment. The US Army not only needed to learn how to fight, it needed to learn how to
support the fight. Both were equally critical and one could not succeed without the other. The
modern military theater was only as strong as its weakest link. A capable combat force meant
little if the rear area units failed to provide the vast quantities of fuel, ammunition, bombs, food,
water, and repair parts needed for mechanized warfare. In 1942 and 1943, the US Army
sustainment organizations simply lacked the experience or capacity needed to support a crosschannel assault against the German military on the European mainland. The Mediterranean
therefore, was pivotal, but for more reasons than Porch mentions.
Martin Van Creveld provides a chapter on the support for the Allied drive across France in
1944 in his book Supplying War: Logistics form Wallenstein to Patton. 9 Creveld notes all the
problems encountered by the advancing Allied 12th and 21st Army Groups, but focuses his
attention on the northern line of communication running from the ports in northwest Europe and
does not address the Sixth Army Group coming up from the ports of Marseilles and Toulon.
This fails to consider a full one-third of the Allied operating strength in France during 1944-1945
and does not address any impact that the Mediterranean had on support of operations in France.
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Several references do contribute to the topic of theater support within the Mediterranean,
either directly or indirectly. Henry Eccles provides a good starting point to assess the change in
US logistics during the Second World War. In Logistics in the National Defense, Eccles
describes the setting in 1942 when the Army had shrunk the ratio of its service forces compared
to 1919. 10 At the end of the First World War, almost 34 percent of the American forces in
France consisted of Army service troops. 11 This is a significant percentage of the force,
especially considering that the battlefield was largely static, with few mechanized, motorized, or
air forces compared to the battlefield of World War II. By 1942, however, only 11.8 percent of
the force consisted of service troops. 12 The nature of warfare had changed during the interwar
years, but America’s ability to support its military forces failed to keep pace. Operations in
North Africa proved that combat units needed commodities such as fuel, ammunition, and repair
parts at rates unseen in the First World War. Supplies and equipment had to move quickly and
effectively across growing distances to keep up with advancing units. Failure to do so resulted in
an “operational pause” that forced commanders to curtail or limit combat operations until
logistics forces could catch up to more mobile combat units. This led to a debate within the
Army and the War Department on the proper mix of combat and service forces, not just in the
overall force, but within the theater of operations as well. If a commander deployed insufficient
combat forces to an operation, the mission might fail. However, if too few service forces were
deployed the combat forces might not have the required replacement of supplies, or equipment,
thus degrading the commander’s combat power. Deploying truck units took up a lot of room on
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Henry Eccles, Logistics in the National Defense (US Marine Corps Manual, NAVMC 2799, 1987)
Ibid., 134.
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Ibid.
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limited merchant shipping, but these same units might provide the mobility needed to move a
greater number of combat units more quickly, catching the enemy off-guard. Eccles shows how
the mix of combat forces with adequate service forces was a balancing act at the theater and
national levels and that any attempt to deploy excessive combat force without adequate service
forces introduced risk to any operation.
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This question of the right balance of combat and

support forces was not a new problem- US forces faced the same issues during the First World
War. Due to the complexity of the issue, however, this question was never resolved. The
argument on the balance of forces would continue throughout the Second World War.
Examples of Allied logistics support in the Mediterranean are in several works describing US
military logistics throughout the Second World War. Richard Leighton and Robert Coakley
provide a comprehensive view of US logistics in Global Logistics and Strategy 1940-1943 and
Global Logistics and Strategy 1943-1945, part of the official US Army history series of the
Second World War. 14 Leighton and Coakley provide in-depth detail on logistic aspects of the
war, primarily from a strategic, or national, point of view. The authors describe significant
decisions and actions, concluding that many of the logistics problems encountered in the North
African landings were products of indecision and late decisions made by commanders and their
staffs prior to the invasion. Leighton and Coakley propose that the initial supply difficulties in
North Africa were the result of poor decisions made in America and Great Britain. Lieutenant
General Leroy Lutes, Director of Operations in the Services of Supply, attributed this situation to
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a lack of logistics training in Army schools. 15 Despite the challenges, in support, Allied
operations in North Africa were successful, leading Global Logistics and Strategy to conclude
that Operation Torch was a lesson in disorderly planning and “brilliant implementation.” 16 The
brilliant implementation was not something that occurred at the strategic level, but rather at the
operational level of operations within the Mediterranean theater.
These two works also discuss logistics challenges in Sicily and Italy from a national
perspective, providing a good reference from which to approach the issues faced by the military
theater. However, the authors attribute logistic challenges to strategic issues, such as a
worldwide constraint in shipping and competing demands for critical supplies, with little
discussion of the operational or tactical logistics support to the force. Nonetheless, the two
volumes of Global Logistics and Strategy set forth the strategic foundation, which provides a
framework within which one can grasp how senior leaders made decisions in the operational
theater.
James Huston’s The Sinews of War: Army Logistics 1775 to 1953, describes how logistics
shaped the strategic options available to Allied leaders in the Second World War.
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Huston

provides a historical reference regarding development of army theater organizations, noting that
the essential elements of theater logistics organizations first came into existence in the First
World War. 18 The dynamics and nature of the force significantly changed how logistics
organizations operated in the two wars, but the concept of a communications zone behind a
combat zone and the commitment of service forces were not new concepts in 1940. The author
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shows that there was a significant change between the invasions of North Africa and Sicily,
noting that the loading for Operation Torch was one of chaos, while the combat loading for
Operation Husky went much smoother. 19 The author does not detail what caused the difference
between these two operations.
The Sinews of War provides a useful overview of the different operations of the
Mediterranean Theater. This work does include some information on theater-specific logistics
issues, such as the fact that, in Sicily, the US Seventh Army had no supporting theater Base
Section to support operations and the army had to organize its own rear area by forcing an
engineer brigade to operate supply depots. 20 Other lessons are significant, i.e. the landings in
Italy at Salerno demonstrated the feasibility of extended over-the-beach resupply of a major
force and how the Allied could upgrade minor ports to support major operations. 21 These proved
to be important considerations in the planning of the 1944 amphibious landings in Southern and
Northwest France.
The Big L, American Logistics in World War II, edited by Alan Gropman, provides seven
perspectives on logistical aspects of the Second World War. 22 One essay in particular,
“Materialschlacht: The Materiel Battle in the European Theater” describes logistics within the
European theater of war and notes that the objective of the cross-channel assault in 1944 was not
on securing a combat objective, but on securing a lodgment base from which to build up combat
strength. 23 Gropman describes the two competing theories of theater support within the
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European Theater: First, the tactical commander has complete and absolute control over
sustainment of the forces. The second theory was that a separate commander should be
responsible for all sustainment actions and the battle commander should focus only on combatrelated issues. 24 This raises the issue of whether this same question arose in the Mediterranean
Theater, and if it did, how did the theater handle it? If the issue of logistics responsibility did not
arise in the Mediterranean, then, why not?
Much of the literature addressing US theater logistics focuses on the cross-channel invasion
into Normandy and the subsequent offense across northwest Europe. Steve Waddell wrote a
dissertation, later published as United States Army Logistics: The Normandy Campaign, 1944, in
which the author concludes that significant problems existed in the American supply system in
1944. Waddell notes that US operational logistics in the European Theater experienced one
crisis after another caused, in part, by competing staffs and personalities, a complex and
inflexible supply plan, and inefficient functioning of the Army Service Forces. 25
The book details the different interpretations regarding responsibility for logistics planning of
the operation – First Army believed it had responsibility to plan the operation and that the
European Theater Services of Supply (SOS) had responsibility for the actual execution of the
plan. Lieutenant General C.H. Lee, the headstrong and ambitious commander of the European
Services of Supply, believed that his organization had responsibility for both planning and
executing the logistics plan.
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The result was bickering and confusion, which required General
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Eisenhower’s personal intervention during the first weeks of Operation Overlord, but even that
did not resolve the misunderstandings.
Waddell does not specifically address logistics in the Mediterranean, but the book and its
conclusions raise the question: Given the experiences of the Mediterranean, why did issues like
confusion over planning responsibility arise in planning for Operation Overlord? Eisenhower
had been the supreme commander in the Mediterranean and had been through the planning
process for the invasion of North Africa, Sicily, and Italy. The Normandy Campaign concludes
that had logisticians in the European theater developed a better supply system with adequate
flexibility, along with a better consideration of the unique terrain found in Normandy, many of
the Americans’ operational logistics problems could have been avoided. 27 Did the US military
not learn from its experiences in the Mediterranean, or was the situation in Europe somehow
different and/or more complex?
Roland Ruppenthal provides a slightly different perspective in the logistical challenges of the
European offensive in The European Theater of Operations, Logistical Support of the Armies. 28
Ruppenthal describes a “logistic depression” that slowed the Allied offensive between
September 1944 and February 1945. The author concludes that there were several factors
underlying the European theater’s critical supply shortages: a complicated and inefficient
command structure created within the European theater, a shortage of supplies and logistics
manpower caused by War Department decisions (and inter-theater competition), and the lack of a
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proper depot system within the theater. 29 There is little disagreement that logistics limitations
constrained tactical operations by late 1944; however, the question remains regarding why the
support structure to which Ruppenthal refers was incapable of meeting the operational demand?
If Ruppenthal’s conclusions are accurate, then do they imply that the Allies failed to learn the
logistics lessons of the Mediterranean, or did the operations fail to support logistics by failing to
seize and open key infrastructure, such as the Port of Antwerp, sooner?
On the question of learning, Carter Magruder argues in Recurring Logistic Problems as I
have Observed Them, that innovation and learning were hallmarks of the American military in
the Second World War. 30 Magruder served as the Director of Logistics, G4, for Fifth Army
during the Allied drive up Italy and notes that no logistics doctrine from the First World War
included any aspect of the need for special equipment or construction materials, such as
amphibious assault craft, rail rolling stock, assault pipeline for petroleum pipelines, or steel
planks for beaches and runways. 31 If this is true, then the US military and its civilian industrial
partners had a considerable task ahead of them in 1942 to develop the doctrine, units, equipment,
and training that could enable logistics support of the force.
Recurring Logistic Problems as I have Observed Them offers that many logistics problems
are recurring despite the best planning, but it was the innovation inherent in the American
military which provided the means to overcome these challenges or mitigate the effects. A
number of Allied innovations resulted from difficulties seen in the early amphibious landings of
the war, such as North Africa and Guadalcanal. Theaters created specialized units, such as
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special engineer brigades, to provide landing craft and clear ports. The War Department
developed new equipment, such as the Landing Ship-Tank (LST) and the DUKW, a six-wheeled
amphibious truck, to improve the logistics capabilities of the landing force by getting men and
material ashore faster than ever before. 32 Innovation was prevalent at all levels and evident in all
operations.
Recurring Logistic Problems as I have Observed Them offers the hypothesis that at least
some operational logistics problems are a function of requirements determination inefficiencies
and lack of sufficient planning time. 33
Rick Atkinson does include some logistics information in his two works: Army at Dawn and
Day of Battle. 34 These books provide an excellent description of Allied combat operations
throughout the Mediterranean, but do not specifically address the logistics systems, structures,
and organizations that enabled administrative support to the theater. The logistical history
included within the works helps illustrate the challenges and problems that arose during the
different Mediterranean operations and shows how sustainment problems constrained combat
operations.
Each of these different works provides a slightly different focus and conclusion on theater
support of American forces during the Second World War. The central issues focus on questions
of the right balance of combat and support forces, as well as on the command and control of
theater logistics planning and execution. In most cases, theater sustainment was a prisoner of
physics and time. A finite quantity of service units, ships, or trucks could move only a limited
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amount of supplies over a certain distance within a specific time. Commanders that failed to
consider this did so at their own risk. Sometimes the decisions were deliberate and informed, but
at other times, they were not.
Authors such as Huston and Magruder show that concepts of theater sustainment in the
Mediterranean were under constant development and modification. Despite these changes, each
major operation, including the cross-channel offensive into Normandy, experienced some
logistic challenges. Were the problems ones that the theater could not predict, or were they
repetitions of earlier problems that should have been avoided? Additional research into this topic
can answer this question and can help inform logistics planning for future large-scale military
operations.
A number of organizations within the Mediterranean theater produced unit histories
immediately after the cessation of hostilities to document their activities. One such work, The
Logistical History of NATOUSA/MTOUSA, 35 has served as the main reference for logistics
support in the Mediterranean theater. The book provides information on the military support
operations within the Mediterranean theater, but does not provide much assessment on logistical
command relationships, tensions between forces, or the transition of operational logistics from
the assault phase to the sustainment phase of operations. Nor do these unit histories provide a
critical analysis of how the theater solved operational logistics problems or whether units applied
these lessons to future operations.
Considered in total, the existing literature provides a good understanding of strategy and of
the national-level logistics initiatives from which to construct the theater story. These works also
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highlight a number of questions to pose to the Mediterranean theater: how and why was the
theater and its support force organized as it was? Could the theater have prevented logistics
shortfalls from occurring, or were these inevitable? Were shortfalls the product of systemic
problems in theater-level planning, organization, individual decisions, or capabilities? What was
the impact on logistics of decisions made by senior combat commanders, such as Eisenhower or
Patton? What was the relationship between the different forces: ground, air, and support? Did
the theater learn from any support problems to prevent repetition in future operations? Finally,
were US logistics doctrine and units sufficiently agile and flexible to deal with the battlefield of
the mid-twentieth century? These questions are the focus of this study.
For context, Chapter II describes the American experience with theater support in the First
World War and the development of sustainment doctrine during the interwar years. This serves
to provide a reference for the thinking and decisions of senior commanders, such as Eisenhower,
Bradley, and Patton. The subsequent chapters of this study center on the major assaults and
expansions within the Mediterranean theater during the Second World War.
Chapters III, IV, and V deal with North Africa. Chapter III focuses on the planning and
execution of Operation Torch, the Allied amphibious assault of North Africa. The invasion of
North Africa illustrated just how unprepared the US was for conducting amphibious operations
and for supporting mechanized forces once they were ashore.
Chapter IV lays out the establishment and subsequent build-up of the US military theater in
the Mediterranean. Once in North Africa the US military needed a capable support organization
that could sustain forces and enable combat operations across wide distances. Chapter V finishes
fight for North Africa by detailing the effort needed to support the Tunisian campaign.
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The experiences of North Africa clearly demonstrate the level of inexperience of the US
combat and support forces, as well the inexperience of senior theater leaders, such as Generals
Eisenhower and Clark. In essence, the landings and missed strategic opportunities of North
Africa show just how unprepared the US was in late 1942 to conduct modern warfare against a
capable foe.
Before facing the German military in France, the US military would need to refine its support
concepts and learn how to work alongside its British partners. Senior officers working for the
North African Theater headquarters would need to learn their roles and develop the techniques of
establishing and running a military theater. The battles for Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia
provided a checklist of deficiencies that drove US efforts for logistical improvement over the
next two and a half years.
Having secured North Africa by May 1943, the Allies then turned their attention to east.
Chapter VI deals with the campaign for Sicily. Coming at the heels of Allied victory in Tunisia,
the Sicilian campaign shows some improvement in how the US organized the theater, resulting
in a more balanced invasion force. New amphibious equipment made its premiere in Sicily,
greatly aiding the amphibious assault and later sustainment efforts. New beach units provided
greater control over the landing sites. However, Sicily also showed that the US needed to
improve its doctrine further concerning responsibilities for supply, transportation, and
engineering. The experiences of Seventh Army demonstrated that there were still problems
managing the support effort occurring behind the divisions. However, the loading and support of
Seventh Army from the shores of Tunisia provided invaluable experience to the supporting base
sections, experience that would pay off in future amphibious assaults.
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The Allied invasion and subsequent combat operations in Italy, along with the maturing of
the Mediterranean theater organization in North Africa, are in Chapter VII. By the time of the
Italian invasion in the fall of 1943, the Mediterranean theater had come far. The difficult task of
staging and conducting amphibious landings had become almost routine and the theater made a
seamless transition in developing Italy into a combat area with a supporting communications
zone. Engineers gained valuable experience in clearing destroyed ports - a skill that would be of
great value in France, as well as in the drive north of Rome. The supporting Services of Supply
matured as an organization as base sections across North Africa, Sicily, and Italy grew or shrank
in response to the changing situation. Theater support units learned how to extend rail lines,
roads, and pipelines on a scale not seen before in North Africa or Sicily. Italy represented the
campaign in which administrative equipment, forces, and doctrine all came together to form a
viable, efficient theater structure. The lessons of Italy directly informed the planning for the
upcoming invasion of northern France, as well as helped enable the invasion of southern France.
Chapter VIII deals with the invasion of Southern France and the issues associated with
transferring the Sixth Army Group and its line of communication to the European theater.
Named Operation Dragoon, the invasion of southern France represented the high point of
operations within the Mediterranean. During the fall of 1944, the US Mediterranean theater
would support over 1.2 million US and coalition troops, divided between France and Italy.
Operating as a secondary theater, the Mediterranean would make a significant contribution to the
fight in France and Germany, allowing Eisenhower to flow in more forces and support than
otherwise would have been possible, thus allowing a quicker end to the war in Europe.
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Chapter IX concludes the study by looking at the end of the war in Italy, and explores the
impacts and influence of the Mediterranean theater on the European theater. The chapter also
compared the levels of administrative support achieved during the Second World War in Europe
and compares them to the levels achieved during the First World War. The results show just
how far US support organizations and doctrine had improved since 1918, largely because the US
theater was a learning organization that took advantage of the opportunities afforded in the
Mediterranean.
Considered in total, these nine chapters tell the story of a US military that was ill prepared to
conduct large-scale amphibious assaults at the beginning of the war and just as unprepared to
effectively and efficiently build and run an overseas military theater. Through circumstance and
chance, however, the combined Allied strategy of making the first attacks into the Mediterranean
provided an opportunity to shape and build US forces, something much needed in the newly
conscripted force. Thus, the Mediterranean provided the chance to identify deficiencies, work
out solutions, and rehearse procedures before engaging on the primary objective - a direct assault
into France. A look at the US experience in the First World War shows how great an impact the
theater has on an army and just how far the US had to go to fix a broken system.
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Chapter II: Lessons not Learned- The First World War and Interwar Years

The First World War provided insights into the nature of modern warfare, offering
opportunities for western militaries to learn and adapt. Technological developments, such as
machine guns, large caliber artillery, trucks, and aircraft provided a glimpse into what future
battlefields might entail. Large armies traveled across oceans and needed a supply chain back to
their home nations because they could not live off the land. Militaries were increasingly reliant
on ever-increasing quantities of fuel, ammunition, and repair parts. Trucks were beginning to
replace horses for supply activities in the rear areas. Additionally, militaries provided
administrative support to the forces of other coalition partners. There were many lessons to
learn, but the US largely failed to take advantage of the opportunity. This situation directly led
to the problems experienced in the support of US military forces at the start of the Second World
War.
This chapter looks at the experiences of the First World War and the interwar years to assess
what lessons were there and whether the US took advantage of these lessons. Exploring the First
World War is important because this represented the beginning of modern warfare in terms of
the size of the armies, and addition of aircraft, and the sizeable amounts of material needed to
sustain the force. Additionally, the First World War included the requirement for a separate
support force that could establish a base of support on foreign soil and then receive, organize,
store and transport the supplies and equipment needed at the front lines. Importantly, a tension
developed between the combat and support forces, which became one of the central problems in
modern warfare- a problem militaries had to overcome in order to achieve their full potential.
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The experiences of the First World War support the argument that the US had developed the
initial organizations and structures necessary to operate a full theater of war, but leaders lacked
any appreciation or experience in how to run such organizations. Indeed, the US military theater
in France never developed the capabilities demanded of it and was on the verge of collapse in
1918. This was partly due to a lack of resourcing, combined with a lack of support from military
and civilian leaders. Commanders had little regard for the work performed by the troops in the
rear; soldiers could only find glory on the front lines. Finally, the US theater commander,
General John Pershing, proved to be a talented leader and tactical commander, but was a lessthan-effective theater commander. Command of a theater requires a focus on both the forward
combat area as well as the supporting communication zone. Although he has a tremendous
reputation, Pershing was a commander that tended to focus his attention solely on the combat
area, but failed to fully appreciate the effort needed to build and resource a viable support
structure in the rear areas. As such, the US communications zone and its associated forces never
received the resources needed to enable them to do all that the nation asked of them. Officers
serving under Pershing, that would later command theaters in the Second World War, would take
away the wrong conclusions on how to build a force and resource a theater of war.
Finally, this chapter will also argue that the US could have done more during the interwar
years to build on the lessons of the First World War. The War did confirm the doctrine for
dividing a theater into two distinct zones (combat and communications), but shrinking budgets
and a diminished Army prevented the military from actually exercising this doctrine. America
developed a sense of isolationism between the wars and Congress was not interested in paying
for an Army that could deploy and sustain itself overseas.
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By 1942, the Army was steadily working to modernize its units. Trucks replaced horses.
The new force included large tanks, fighter aircraft, and bombers. However, there was
insufficient consideration on the ramifications of trying to support this new force, especially an
Army deployed overseas. Unit exercises during the period were modest and focused on tactics,
not support. Military and civilian leaders still viewed combat troops as being more important
than service troops. The Navy was more interested in building battleships than convoy escorts or
assault craft. As such, the US military of late 1942 had the necessary doctrine required to
establish a theater, but no real understanding of how to put this effectively into practice. As
chapter III will vividly demonstrate, the ominous consequences of this detriment of logistics
personnel and capability would become clear during the invasion of North Africa and would
ultimately result in thousands of additional Allied casualties and add (up to) six months onto the
Allied Tunisian campaign.

Evolving Warfare
There was a constant balancing act throughout both World Wars as combatants worked to
gain an edge over the opposing side through the modification of tactics and the equilibrium
between combat forces and support forces. There was an underlying note of tension during both
the wars as theater support commanders argued for more support personnel to sustain the
growing armies, while battle commanders demanded more combat troops to throw against the
enemy. The side that balanced its requirements best had a marked advantage over the adversary.
To complicate matters, the First World War showed how modern warfare demanded greater
amounts of supplies and equipment, but developments in industry and technology continued to
change the nature of the battlefield. Navies could now engage in battle over the horizon with air

29

power. Men, artillery, and animals had dominated the battlefields of the First World War;
however, by 1939, motorized vehicles, armor, and air power ruled. The defensive battles of
1914-1918 had given way to a new, more mobile, offensive way of war. Armored warfare meant
that breakouts through the front lines could happen with greater frequency and extend for greater
distances at a pace previously unknown. The growth of air forces produced an increased demand
for resources along with greater operational ranges. Perhaps most significantly, by late 1942 the
Allied forces were engaged in a multi-theater war that spanned the globe. Considered in total,
the increased number of military theaters, combined with new capabilities within the armed
forces, produced an exponential demand on the respective support structures. Warfare had
continued to evolve, but Army planners had not fully realized the extent of the transformation.
As a result, the US did not have the necessary support units required to sustain planned
mechanized and air combat operations at the beginning of the war. 36
However, not everything that characterized modern battle had changed by 1939. Artillery
was still the king of battle and was a major part of almost every major engagement. Armies still
lived on their stomachs, requiring food and water. Navies and merchant ships transported bulk
supplies to the theaters and the army then further had to move these over land to the combat
units. Combat forces fought on the front, while service units worked in the rear areas to sustain
the fight. In short, the two wars had some elements of commonality, but fundamental differences
in equipment and tactics increased theater support requirements exponentially.
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Theater Support and the First World War
Army doctrine published immediately prior to the beginning of the First World War called
for the creation of a “line of communications” to connect the combat forces at the front with the
supplies and equipment sent from ports within the United States. 37 This line of communications
consisted of the service units, ships, roads, railways, and other infrastructure needed to move
men and materiel. Included in this were ports of debarkation (getting off the ship), military
camps, and bases. Additionally, the doctrine of the time called for service units to form bases in
the rear area, which served as the main support areas for the deployed army.
Prior to Pershing’s arrival, an advance party from the American Expeditionary Force (AEF)
arrived in France in the summer of 1917 with the mission of identifying a line of communication
that could support an American army of several million men. This area needed to have suitable
ports, and be located in an area suitable for offensive operations and for training. Commanders
selected the Lorraine region due to its available port facilities, sufficient rail network, and
locations suitable for the establishment of supply and personnel depots. 38
Over the previous three years, the French had established a system whereby the theater
divided into two distinct zones – the Zone of the Interior and the Zone of the Armies. The
former was the source of supplies for the armies and the latter was the user of these supplies.
When the AEF arrived in France, they overlaid an American system atop the French design,
largely following the French system of support for the combat forces. 39 Thus, the US experience
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of theater support in the First World War was one of units operating out of static locations and
using a system that had already been in place for several years.
Although the doctrine of 1917 called for a line of communications to support combat forces
in a theater of war, there was no doctrine to specify a specific type of command or organization
to operate and oversee such an operation. The AEF established a Line of Communications
organization under a general officer on the AEF staff on July 5, 1917; however, as the size of the
American contingent increased in France, the administrative responsibilities to care for the force
soon overwhelmed the AEF Headquarters staff. Over 20 different agencies had direct access to
Pershing and the AEF General Headquarters Staff. 40 The administrative system was complex
and terribly inefficient. Pershing realized that in order to focus on the enemy, he needed to
divest the general headquarters of at least some of its administrative duties. 41
On September 6, 1917, the First Section, G1, prepared a study on the subject. Titled the
“Service of Rear Project,” the study recommended the creation of a separate organization to
consist of quartermaster, medical, ordnance, signal, aviation, engineers, and other support forces
operating within the line of communications. Pershing approved the creation of the organization
on September 18, 1917, although the AEF later changed the name to something less odious – the
Services of Supply (SOS). 42 Pershing’s intent was to relieve combat commanders from all
possible problems that did not directly involve the enemy and to place matters of administrative
support into a different command chain, albeit one that still fell under control of the AEF.
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Pershing’s headquarters issued General Order number 31 on February 16, 1918. This order
redesignated the rear area from a Line of Communications to the Services of Supply. More
important than a name change, the order also charged the Services of Supply commanding
general with the responsibility to coordinate all administrative duties in the rear areas, except for
Adjutant General, Inspector General, and Judge Advocate. The newly formed organization
established its headquarters in Tours and the AEF ordered all administrative and technical chiefs
within the army to coordinate their activities through Services of Supply headquarters. 43
This was an important development in the doctrine of theater support—one that would
remain contentious for the next 37 years. Technical chiefs, such as the Chief of Transportation,
Ordnance, or Quartermaster, were traditionally senior officers with vast powers and direct access
to the overall commander. Now, the theater headquarters was shedding itself of most
administrative responsibilities and the technical chiefs found themselves still on the AEF staff,
but with less power and less direct access. This change also represented a significant
philosophical change in command responsibilities. With the creation of the Services of Supply,
the combat commanders were to focus on the enemy and leave the details of administrative
support to a new group of theater administrative commanders.
Pershing’s creation of a theater administrative headquarters that was geographically and
organizationally separate from the overall theater headquarters established a precedent that
Eisenhower carried on 25 year later. As both Pershing and, later, Eisenhower discovered, the
arrangement simplified the workload on the general headquarters, but raised other issues, such as
identification of specific responsibilities and authorities for administrative planning, staffing of
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the rear and forward areas, and prioritization of support efforts. The move looked clear on paper,
but in both wars, it raised unforeseen challenges for the theater commander, his staff, and the
Services of Supply.
The creation of the line of communications and Services of Supply led to the distinction
between two areas of the battlefield: one focused on combat operations and one on the
administrative actions necessary to build and sustain combat forces. 44 This also led to the
distinction between two different types of forces within the theater-- one routinely engaged with
enemy forces and one that was not. Tensions developed as front-line soldiers and commanders
noted the difference and treated the service forces in disdain compared to the combat forces.
Even Pershing, who knew the importance of the sustainment effort, diminished morale among
Services of Supply officers and men by viewing the efforts in rear areas as “not exactly doing the
work of soldiers.” 45 Pershing’s reward for a Services of Supply soldier that exemplified himself
was not a promotion or a medal, but, instead, a set of orders for a combat division. 46 This
illustrates what Pershing and his top commanders felt about the Services of Supply – the
organization had an important duty, but glory and rewards came by engaging with the enemy at
the front.
The differentiation between combat and support forces had long existed on the modern
battlefield, but for the American army the First World War amplified this distinction greater than
ever before. It is not too difficult to explain why this happened. Certainly, the combat forces
developed some level of resentment against the support forces. As combat units arrived at the

44

Votaw, 57.
Brian Neumann, “Pershing’s Right Hand: General James G. Harbord and the American Expeditionary Forces in the First
World War” (doctoral dissertation, Texas A&M University, 2006), 368.
46
Ibid, 370.
45

34

French ports and moved forward to the combat areas, they passed support forces that operated in
a relatively secure area with access to many of the comforts lacking at the front. These same
visions of a soft and secure life in the rear areas contrasted sharply with the harsh realities of the
trenches.
Perhaps the nature of the war affected attitudes as well. The battlefield of the First World
War was far more lethal and raw than anything previously experienced. The American Civil
War had ended 52 years earlier. For the first time in modern warfare, there was a significant
possibility of large-scale death, dismemberment, or blindness due to machine-gun fire, outsized
artillery, and chemical munitions. How could the troops in the infantry, cavalry, or artillery not
help but feel some level of resentment toward their Services of Supply colleagues? The attitudes
of Pershing and other senior commanders in the AEF show that leaders viewed the combat forces
in a different light than that of the service forces. These attitudes ultimately had a negative
impact of AEF operations and contributed to a situation where, by the middle of 1918, the
Services of Supply was unable to meet its administrative tasks.
In the summer of 1918, three critical factors led to the near-collapse of the AEF supply
system. First, the War Department and AEF Headquarters decided to delay the shipment of
scheduled service forces to France in favor of additional combat divisions. The original plan
called for the War Department to ship an entire corps as a package – support forces accompanied
combat forces so the ratio of forces would remain constant as the American force grew in
France. However, as the situation at the front grew more desperate, the other Allied powers
pleaded for an increase of infantrymen and artillerymen. In response to this demand for
additional combat power, the US War Department scheduled an additional 420,000 Americans to
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arrive in France during May and June 1918, but the Services of Supply did not have sufficient
personnel or equipment to support this increased force. Additionally, Services of Supply troop
deployments were less than half of the planned amounts, even though the overall level of
requirements was increasing. The Services of Supply found itself in a position where it did not
have enough service forces in France to support the force already deployed; yet additional
combat forces were surging onto the continent to meet the spring German offensives. Despite its
best efforts the Services of Supply was in a position where it could only fall further and further
behind as the demand for resources increased, but the level of service units did not increase at a
corresponding rate.
As the surge of forces grew, the Chief of American Railroads, General Wallace Atterbury,
argued that he needed 5,000 more locomotives and 30,000 additional rail cars just to handle the
influx of combat forces scheduled to arrive that summer. 47 This additional equipment never
fully arrived in France because it had to compete for shipping space from the US. No additional
rail equipment was available on the Western Front or in England. Further complicating matters,
the British planned to turn four divisions over to the AEF in June, without any theater support
units, which only further added to the supply shortfalls. 48
The result was that the theater did not have the right makeup of forces to support itself and
the quantity of materiel offloaded at the French ports fell substantially in relation to the number
of US forces on the ground. The AEF had plenty of bayonets, but not enough howitzers. There
were not enough signal units to string wire and establish communications and not enough
engineers to build and maintain the roads. There were not enough medical personnel or
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stevedores. The AEF was short of ambulances, locomotives, wagons, and horses. The effort to
speed up the arrival of combat forces by delaying the shipment of service personnel unbalanced
the force and overworked existing service forces. 49 By replacing service forces with combat
units the AEF had created a situation where it had enough combat forces to form divisions, but
not the right mix of forces to form the higher-level organizations of corps and armies. They had
plenty of tooth, but little tail, meaning that that the AEF lacked the necessary forces with
specialized skills and equipment to execute all the tasks required of an independent force. 50
A second problem for the Services of Supply, one that plagued the AEF throughout the war,
was an overall shortfall in ground transportation. The American service units simply had
insufficient equipment and trained personnel to move the quantities of supplies from the ports of
debarkation forward to the combat forces. The Services of Supply did not have the rail engines,
wagons, rails, ties, or construction equipment to develop port terminals and rail lines. There
were not enough lorries available to move men and supplies to locations beyond the reach of the
railways. There were not enough trained stevedores, rail engineers, or mechanics to efficiently
offload and transport materiel. Finally, the theater lacked an organization that could manage all
of the transportation requirements and capabilities. Without the right transportation system, units
or supplies might be physically located within the theater, but not be at the necessary place
within the specified time. 51
The AEF had little control over shipments of equipment from the US, other than prioritizing
requisitions, but it did establish a new Transportation Department within the AEF to manage
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available transportation assets. The Department started out as a semi-autonomous organization
but, by July 12, 1918 it was fully amalgamated within the Services of Supply. 52 The centralized
management of transportation was a step in the right direction, but the physical limitations from
the lack of equipment greatly constrained resupply efforts throughout the war.
The third factor that led to a near-collapse of the supply system within the AEF was the low
morale of Services of Supply troops and officers. Pershing often spoke of the invaluable service
rendered by service forces; however, AEF personnel policies did not reflect this attitude.
Services of Supply units were often undermanned. Additionally, the AEF assigned personnel to
these units with little regard for any civilian experience or expertise. By the time of the
armistice, the Services of Supply had only 1,170 officers assigned out of 4,000 authorized. 53
The Services of Supply had little control over assignment or promotions. The AEF based
promotions on seniority and not on performance or competence, thus limiting talented officers
from advancement and preventing the Services of Supply from utilizing their full capabilities. 54
Ultimately, the lack of assigned manpower, plus limited opportunities for advancement,
produced a support organization that was simply not motivated or capable to doing everything
asked of it.
To further compound the problem, the Services of Supply found itself the dumping ground
of officers that were too incompetent to remain at the front, but not so incompetent as to force
their immediate return to the US. Many of the officers assigned to the Services of Supply were
senior officers that had effectively failed in combat units and no longer had the confidence of
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their commanders. Supply shortages and incompetent officers reassigned from the front
tarnished the reputation of the Services of Supply. 55 As an example, in August 1918, the
Services of Supply received seven American brigadier generals from the front. Pershing judged
these men as being unfit for command in the front, but was unable to send them home because
their faults were not sufficiently abhorrent. Unfortunately, many of these relieved officers had
little experience in administrative operations and were unsuited for positions within the Services
of Supply, doing little to improve morale of the soldiers. Major General Harbord, the Services of
Supply commander, usually reduced these generals to the permanent rank of colonel and used
them somewhere in the Services of Supply. Some worked out; some did not, while others went
back to the front for another chance. The AEF even reduced a few of these relieved general
officers to the rank of major. All of this contributed to a level of ineffectiveness and inefficiency
within the Services of Supply and degraded unit morale and esprit de corps. 56 In the final
assessment, an imbalance of combat and service forces, a lack of ground transportation, and the
poor personnel policies of the AEF toward service forces all contributed to the poor performance
of the theater administrative support structure.
The history of the Services of Supply in the First World War provides a baseline from which
to judge Allied Force Headquarters (AFHQ) efforts to establish a theater of operations in 1942.
The AEF recognized the need for a separate administrative headquarters to run the administrative
functions of the theater and developed a theater support organization, but the utility and
effectiveness of this new organization were questionable. There was a good chance that, given
the imbalance of forces, shortage of transportation assets, lack of personnel, and other limiting
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factors, the AEF support system would have imploded had the armistice not occurred when it
did. 57 Despite this, the Allies won the war, the US demobilized its army, and the world moved
into the interwar years.

Interwar developments: the US Army before Pearl Harbor
The First World War had shown that theater logistics organizations were an important aspect
of modern warfare. The concepts and structures that Pershing tested in France, such as the
Services of Supply, became widely adopted throughout the American military between 1940 and
1942. In a significant move that affected the entire force, the Army also eliminated most horse
transportation and remount units in favor of motorized and mechanized units. The capability to
achieve speed and operational maneuver replaced the all-terrain capability afforded by horses
and mules. The demand for fuel and repair parts replaced the need for fodder.
Based on the experiences of the previous war, doctrine in the interwar years still dictated that
theaters divide into two spheres, a combat zone, and a communications zone. Combat operations
occurred in the forward areas, support activities took place in the rear. Administrative troops
might be found anywhere in these two zones, but were mostly assigned to a special Army
Service Command that operated from the communications zone. 58
The manual that dictated the organization of the theater was the Army’s 1940 Field Service
Regulations: Administration, otherwise known as FM 100-10. 59 This manual served as the basis
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for identifying organizations, responsibilities, and definitions. Some useful definitions that are
essential to understand the story of theater support include: 60

Administration: All phases of military operations not involved in the terms “tactics” and
strategy”. It consists of supply, evacuation, sanitation, construction, maintenance, replacements,
traffic control, salvage, graves registration, movements, quartering, military government, martial
law, and other allied subjects.

Combat Zone: The forward area of the theater of operations, an area typically divided into
army, corps, and division areas.

Communications Zone: The territory between the rear boundary of the theater and the rear
boundary of the combat zone. The communications zone typically includes supply,
transportation, maintenance, medical and other administrative units and functions.

Day of Supply: The estimated quantity of supplies used in one day of operations.

D-Day: The first day of an invasion or ground operation. In amphibious operations this is the
day assault force come ashore. Subsequent days are numbered, i.e. D+1, D+2, etc. Days prior to
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the operation may have a negative number, i.e. D-3 is three days prior to the start of the
operation. 61

Depot: A storage facility that receives, classifies, stores, and issues supplies or replacement
personnel.

Dump: A temporary stock of supplies issued by a corps or division, typically organized by
the type of supply, i.e. ration dump.

Line of communication: the network of roads, railways, and waterways that connects the
zone of the interior to the communications zone and the communications zone to the combat
zone. This can also be the formal designation of a British support unit with responsibilities for
operating the communications zone.

Railhead or Truckhead: A supply point where loads are transferred from a type of
transportation, i.e. Ammunition Railhead.

Requirements: The estimated needs for a military force to include supplies, maintenance,
equipment, and personnel.
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Theater of operations: Land, sea, and air in an area that is desired to invade or defend. There
may be several theaters of operations.

Unit of fire: The estimated quantity if ammunition that a particular unit might expend during
one day of combat.

Zone of the interior: National territory exclusive of the theaters of operations, such as the
continental United States.

The theater commander was the single individual responsible for all US Army combat and
support activities within the theater of operations. His duties included making strategy,
defending friendly territory, and providing for administrative support of all US forces. 62
Depending on the situation, the theater commander could also have responsibilities for coalition
forces as well, but the specifics were determined on a case-by-case basis and could vary as the
situation changed even within a theater. Pershing, for example, was the theater commander for
US forces in the First World War, but he had no responsibilities over the forces other Allied
nations unless those forces were attached to the AEF for a specific operation or period of time.
General Eisenhower, on the other hand, served as not only the US Army and joint theater
commander in the Mediterranean, but also as Supreme Allied Commander over all Allied forces.
In short, the responsibilities of a theater commander remained relatively unchanged for US Army
forces, but could vary greatly in regards to authorities over joint or Allied units.
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A final note concerning the role of the theater commander is that he was also responsible for
“such civil government as may be appropriate under the situation.” 63 Later chapters will show
this responsibility to care for and govern local populations was not merely a minor task or
afterthought, but instead, placed considerable demands on the Allied force and especially on the
theater support system.
Within the Mediterranean, the US and Great Britain held similar views on the role of the
theater commander. The US commander of the North African Theater of Operations, US Army
(NATOUSA) and the British Commander in Chief Middle East essentially had the same
administrative responsibilities for their respective forces. In addition to providing administrative
support for combat forces, each of these commanders was also responsible for the ports, bases,
cities, civilians, and political problems within the theater. 64 Authority over other Allied combat
forces depended on whether the theater commander also served as a supreme allied commander,
such in the case of General Eisenhower.
Not every theater of war subscribed to this arrangement of a single supreme commander,
with individual theater commanders for each of the major Allied nations. The Pacific theater, for
example, split itself between two sub-theater commanders: Nimitz and MacArthur. For the
Mediterranean, however, the system of a single theater commander for each of the major Allies
worked well and was eventually carried over to northwest Europe for the cross-channel assault
later in 1944.
While the theater commander had overall responsibility for the administrative support of US
forces, it was the theater general staff and Army service forces that actually did the planning and
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carried out the actions necessary to sustain the force. On the theater staff, the G4 had
responsibility for planning sustainment operations and establishing priorities among the units for
movements and essential supplies.
The communications zone contained all of the administrative units and agencies necessary to
sustain the theater. This included ports, civil facilities, railways, supply activities, hospitals,
transportation centers, and maintenance facilities. The communications zone, or COMZ as was
sometimes abbreviated, did not have a set organization, but instead, could be designed and
modified to fit the situation. Typically, the forward area of the communications zone contained
stocks of supplies to sustain units within the combat zone. The rear area of the communications
zone was usually focused on receiving items from the US or Great Britain (also called the zone
of the interior) and procuring items from local sources. 65
Army doctrine in 1940 intentionally provided for a flexible command structure within the
communications zone. Recognizing that differing situations called for different structures, the
Field Service Regulations simply specified that the communications zone was to have a
commanding general, general staff, and special staff. Specifically, “the communications zone
will therefore not be organized in the same manner in every theater of operations; each case will
present a different problem.” 66 This meant that it was up to the theater commander and the
commanding general of the communications zone to develop the theater support organization
that made the most sense for a particular theater. This serves as a caution against attempting to
make direct comparisons between different theaters. Personalities, geopolitical considerations,
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coalition preferences, terrain, mission, and the enemy all played a role in how each theater was
organized.
The US system called for supplies to move from the rear to the front. Each echelon, starting
in the zone of the interior, pushed materiel forward to the next lower echelon, until these supplies
eventually reached the front. However, the commander at each level had to predict the accurate
needs for his unit and forwarding those needs to the next higher level as a requisition.
Commanders were also responsible for drawing supplies and then distributing then them within
their own commands. This meant that the collective requisitions from all units formed the
overall needs of the force within a theater. As such, the accuracy of the requisitions coming
from the front had a direct tie to the workload placed in the theater support forces. Theater
support units might order supplies up to six months in advance to allow for production and
shipping timelines. Inaccurate forecasts or unanticipated demands could easily result in supply
shortages of one item and overproduction of another.
The experiences from the First World War had shown that transportation was a major part of
the modern battlefield. In 1940, the US Army viewed railways as the principal means of
transportation to and from the combat zone due to the tremendous capability of rail cars
compared to that of aircraft or cargo trucks. 67 However, rail was limited to existing lines or
construction capability, as well as available equipment and trained personnel.
Motor transport served as the bridge between the end of rail lines and the front lines. Cargo
trucks were in all major units within the US Army throughout the theater. The theater
consolidated unassigned truck units and formed these into a Motor Transport Service to support
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the communications zone and the priorities of the theater commander. The theater assigned
some of these truck units to armies and assigned others to support the myriad ports, supply
dumps, and hospitals. 68 Realizing that these assets were limited, doctrine allowed for the
consolidation of all vehicles within the Motor Transport Service to meet a specific priority or
need. Examples of this consolidation, such as the Red Ball Express in the European theater,
occurred throughout the war in several different theaters and serve as examples of the flexibility
of US support doctrine.
Ever since 1918 there was an on-going debate within the US Army on whether commanders
at different levels should have responsibility over administrative matters, or should they instead
focus on issues dealing solely with combat operations. To resolve this debate the Army decided
that, under normal conditions, regiments would use their own transportation to draw supplies
from army supply points. Divisions would carry a reserve stock of supplies sufficient only to
meet unforeseen requirements. Corps, when attached to armies, had no administrative functions
other than to support corps troops (those forces assigned to a corps, but not to a division or
regiment). 69 Most of the administrative burden within the combat zone fell on armies. Armies
were the largest administrative unit in the combat zone and it was the army commander’s
responsibility to organize and conduct sustainment operations. The army received its supplies
from the communications zone as well as from local sources within the army area.
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commanders below that of the army level normally had only a limited responsibility for
administrative support.
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This was the state of US sustainment doctrine in 1942 and it remained largely unchanged
during the Second World War. These concepts were common knowledge throughout the force
and served as the basis for subsequent administrative planning throughout all of the
Mediterranean operations. Most importantly, the doctrine assigned specific responsibilities to
different levels of command; responsibilities that determined how the sustainment system should
work.
A critical component of the doctrine is that it provided for a flexible and practical motorized
logistics capability at all echelons, from the communications zone to the front. This proved to be
a contributing factor to Allied victory because it allowed the theater logistics organizations to
maintain the flow of supplies to the forward areas. The support units of the communication zone
were not always successful in maintaining pace with the lead divisions, especially in breakout
and pursuit operations, but the supplies always eventually caught up. Had the Army not pursued
as vigorous an effort in transitioning from horses to trucks the results would probably have been
quite different, as the German Army discovered during the course of its operations.

The German Approach to Support
While the United States was pursuing a mechanized approach to modernization of its military
forces during the interwar years, Germany took a slightly different tack. Although a
considerable amount of historical attention has focused on Hitler’s armored forces and their
Blitzkrieg tactics, a significant percentage of the German army relied on horse-drawn vehicles
throughput the Second World War, especially in German logistics units. Only a few German
units were motorized, typically these were the first-line mechanized divisions. Only the German
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armored divisions with their accompanying motorized infantry divisions were totally free of
horse-drawn vehicles. 71
Of the 103 German divisions that existed in 1939, only 16 were fully mechanized or
motorized. Additionally, the Germans had just three motor transport regiments in the entire
Army with a combined cargo capacity of 19,500 tons. In comparison, for the invasion of
northwest Europe in 1944 the Allied forces landed a motor transport capability of 69,000 tons. 72
German industry worked to field additional transport units during the war, but they were never
able to divest the military of its dependence on horse transport.
The German dependence on horse-drawn vehicles meant more than a loss of cargo
capability; it also meant an increased requirement for supplies and support. While horses did not
require gas or oil to keep moving, they did need fodder and veterinary support. The requirement
for fodder placed a sizeable demand on the German transportation system since it is relatively
bulky compared to its weight. A first-line infantry division in 1939 had to feed an average of
4,800 horses a day. Second and third-line divisions maintained over 6,000 horses each. 73
Germany ultimately fielded almost twice the number of horses during the Second World War
as it had in the First - 2,700,000 for the former and 1,400,000 for the latter. 74 The Allied forces,
in comparison, had virtually no horse-drawn transport in their armies during the Second World
War and relied on pack mules only for use in terrain that was unsuitable for wheeled vehicles.
The German reliance on horse transport makes some sense when considering the High
Command’s assumption that the war was going to be of short duration. During the early years of
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the war Germany was largely able to operate on internal lines of communication over good roads
and, more importantly, with an established and sizeable rail network. German logisticians
estimated that one 200-mile stretch of double track railway equaled the capacity of 1,600
trucks. 75 As such, Germany could afford to assume risk by not motorizing its field armies and
support organizations. Railroads were capable of quickly moving men and materiel between the
fronts. However, the war developed into a conflict of attrition involving great distances. Allied
bombers systemically targeted the railways and factories that supplied rail equipment. Rail
capabilities in German territory fell and the German Army lacked sufficient cargo trucks to make
up for the difference. Given the reliance on horse-transport, German supply organizations were
simply not equipped as well as they could have been to sustain large mobile armies in a war of
attrition.

Conditions Leading to Torch
By the time of the 1918 armistice, nearly 34 percent of the two million members of the AEF
in France were in the service forces and this number had proven insufficient for the task of
supporting US forces along the Western Front. The need for service forces dropped during the
interwar years and by 1942 service forces comprised less than 12 percent of the US Army. 76 The
War Department had recognized that the nature of warfare had changed, but it failed to recognize
the role that service forces played in supporting a type of warfare that involved mechanized and
air forces capable of moving quickly across vast distances. 77
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Analysis of the 1941 Victory Plan shows just how far off the mark the War Department was
in terms of predicting the types of forces the Army needed. The plan’s main architect, Major
Albert Weidemeyer, used the World War I ratio of 1:1 for a division – meaning that for every
ground combat soldier the army needed an additional soldier for other support or administrative
duties. Accordingly, Weidemeyer planned for a division-slice (the total combat and non-combat
force needed for each division) of 30,000 men. This represented 15,000 men in the division and
an additional 15,000 in support. 78 Operations would prove this number hugely inadequate.
Unbeknownst to Weidemeyer, equipment modernization and the proliferation of military
technology on the battlefield had altered the ratio of combat-to-support forces. Mechanized
warfare depended on motor vehicles, which, in turn, needed fuel and specialized maintenance.
During the First World War, there was one vehicle per every 37 soldiers. By 1945, the ratio was
one vehicle per 4.3 soldiers. 79 Additionally, other new equipment, such as tanks and selfpropelled artillery, required specialized support as well, meaning that the combat unit end
strength in the divisions remained relatively stable, while the number of required support forces
steadily increased. In 1941, the Army had planned on a ratio of 1:1, but the actual ratio needed
for modern combat was closer to 1:3. By 1945, only one-fourth of the Army consisted of ground
combat soldiers. 80

The ratio between combat and support forces changed greatly during World

War II, but it took the lessons of actual combat to force the needed changes.
The inability of the War Department to anticipate the correct ratios of combat to service
forces produced a number of consequences. First, planners failed to account for the number of
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service units needed to deploy to support early operations, such as Operation Torch.
Additionally, the Army failed to form, train, or equip sufficient service units to support the
number of fielded combat units. This produced a situation in which commanders sailed to
overseas theaters without sufficient support forces and there were no reserves available in the US
to meet the shortfall.
The European Theater of Operations first identified this shortage of service forces as the
Army began to deploy forces to Great Britain in 1942. Supplies and materiel flowed to England
simultaneously with combat units, meaning that there were insufficient theater logistics units at
the ports to receive, sort, and record supply arrivals. The demand for service forces increased as
more theaters became established. By the middle of 1942, the Army was sending units to the
Pacific, European, and Persian Gulf Command. 81 Theater commanders needed more service
forces than the War Department could form or train. The European theater finally created a
Services of Supply in May 1942, but, as in the First World War, there was disagreement over the
division of responsibilities between the Services of Supply and theater headquarters. 82 As US
forces in the British Isles built up, the theater Services of Supply worked to simultaneously
establish its internal organization, find a consensus on responsibilities, and receive the flood of
men and material arriving from the US. However, the situation was not entirely bad. In Iceland,
the Army’s main complaint was displeasure over the stated beer ration. 83
The War Department worked to respond to the need for additional service forces. By the end
of 1942 the Army Service Force (ASF) contained over 1,800,000 men; almost 35 percent of the
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total Army strength. 84 Not all of these individuals had sufficient training or in occupied
positions that capitalized on their civilian experiences, but it was a start.
However, not everyone was satisfied with the growing size of the service forces. In a
reflection of the First World War debate about the balance of forces, General McNair, the Army
Ground Force commander, noted that the additional service forces were a “dissipation of
manpower to non-combat functions.” 85 Even Churchill took issue with the size of the required
support force. The Prime Minister focused on the numbers of combat forces and expected the
majority of the Army to be directly engaged in the fight at the front. Churchill did not
understand, or at least agree with, the rationale behind the size of the support forces or the need
to refit and rest combat forces during prolonged engagements. General Sir Alan Brooke, Chief
of the British Imperial General Staff (CIGS), noted that Churchill tended to resist seeing
limitations caused by such things as insufficient force and logistics shortfalls. 86
These perceptions are understandable considering the debate that occurred throughout the
war – how best to balance the force when the demands outstripped limited resources. Indeed,
one can characterize America’s main concern in the Second World War as the mobilization of
industry, combined with allocation of resources - whether it was men, airplanes, or landing craft.
Resources, both in terms of materiel and men, were constrained as multiple claimants demanded
more equipment, units, shipping, or supplies. Russia needed trucks, the British needed aircraft
and tanks, and the US military faced the task of rebuilding its entire force. Given this situation,
it is not surprising that not everyone agreed on the right mix of combat and service forces.
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The Army was not the only service experiencing growing pains within its service forces
during the interwar years; the Navy experienced challenges as well. Despite recognition of the
need for doctrine and shipping that could support a large ground force on a distant shore, the
Navy elected to put its limited funds towards the building of combat shipping and decided to
improvise logistics as the situation required. Because of this decision, the Navy had also
developed an unbalanced force. There was only a limited amount of support shipping available
in 1942. No one had any real idea of what was required to support a large fleet and ground force
deployed halfway across the globe in several theaters. Like the German military, the US Navy
based their logistic plans on a short war and quick victory. 87
Besides neglecting to make any large-scale investments in logistics shipping prior to 1942,
the US Navy also failed to build an assault shipping capacity that could meet the demands of a
large-scale invasion of the European continent. Despite the American desire to invade France in
1943 there simply was an insufficient quantity of assault craft and merchant shipping to land and
sustain the landing force. 88 This meant that the Allies had to look for opportunities and develop
strategy that could attack the Axis forces on the peripherals without risking a direct assault on the
European continent.
During the interwar years, the services had developed a number of war plans, which were
color-coded, based on the potential adversary. Planners envisioned Japan as the most likely
threat to the US after the First World War, so the “Orange” series of plans – war with Japan –
received the most attention. These plans anticipated that the US would use an extensive fleet of
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battleships to retake islands in the western Pacific, with a major Jutland-style naval engagement
determining the ultimate victor. 89
Accordingly, the focus of the Navy during the interwar years was largely on the development
and building of battleships. Aircraft carriers did come into the fleet, but many commanders did
not view these as offensive platforms. In 1937, the fleet commander refused to allow three
carriers to act in an offensive manner during Fleet Problem XVIII, instead relegating these to
defensive missions. 90 Other shipbuilding efforts, such as escort ships and landing craft, were an
even lower priority and received scant funding for development. As late as the spring of 1941,
US landing craft still did not have the capability to lower their front ramps, forcing Marines to
crawl over the bows of what were essentially conventional boats. 91 The Navy set the priorities
and its priorities were on surface combatants.
The Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor showed the world the utility of aircraft carriers, but in
early 1942, the US had only seven carriers shared between the Pacific and Atlantic fleets. The
Navy realized that it not only had to rebuild the Pacific fleet, but it also needed more carriers.
All of this required time, resources, and shipyard space.
At the same time, Army planners faced the challenge of moving a large ground force over
water to a distant shore and then making a landing in the face of a potential enemy. This called
for a fleet that could escort multiple convoys, as well as land several Army divisions. This
mission used different sorts of ships and an entire fleet of landing craft, all of which competed
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for the same time, resources, and shipyard space. Unfortunately, there was not enough materiel
to support all the demands, which led to tensions and rivalries between, and within, the services.
Despite these tensions, the nature of the war and of technology forced the Army and Navy to
depend on one another to an unprecedented degree. The ground forces secured foreign bases and
fought the land battle, while the naval force maintained the sea lines of communication,
protected convoys, provided supporting naval gunfire, and worked to destroy enemy fleets. No
one service could win the war independently, nor could any single service operate solely in its
respective commons. However, this does not mean that the air and ground services shared
mutual visions, priorities, or strategies. Each service devised its own plans while the War
Department and the President worked to set overall priorities and adjudicate disputes.
Landing craft proved to be one of these areas that required national-level management and
allocation. Landing craft were the key to the Allied war strategy because every major campaign
in the war, both in the Atlantic as well as in the Pacific, began with an amphibious landing.
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The challenge confronting Allied planners was that an amphibious landing required landing craft
not just for the initial landings, but for subsequent sustainment operations as well. Assault
divisions had to have supplies, replacement personnel, and additional equipment transported by
landing craft until engineers and port units could seize, clear, and repair a capable port. Only
then could heavy merchant shipping replace the assault landing craft. The timeline for such an
operation could range from days to months, depending on the situation, availability, and
conditions of ports, availability of landing craft, and the level of enemy activity.
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This was not simply a question of deciding to build more landing craft. Building more
landing craft meant building fewer ships. The problem became one of balance – an attempt to
build the right mix of carriers, destroyers, cruisers, merchant shipping, and assault craft. A focus
on any one caused shortages somewhere else. This led to tensions throughout the war as
commanders in every service fought to get the items they deemed necessary for their units.
Considered in total, the administrative situation leading into the summer of 1942 was not
promising. Both the US Army and Navy had neglected to build or train a sizeable logistics
capability during the interwar years. Industrial mobilization had started in the US in 1939 so by
1942 ports were shipping materiel faster than Army service forces could receive it. 93 Great
Britain had been fighting Germany for two years and was expending all of its effort in supporting
her own forces. The Allies had elected to modernize their forces, but equipment was in short
supply and industry was working to meet the increased demand. The US was building up its
military presence within the British Isles, but at the same time, the European Services of Supply
was working to develop an organization while also defining its responsibilities. There was a lot
of activity underway, but it was not as effective or as efficient as it could have otherwise been.
To compound the Allied problem of building up military forces, the Battle of the Atlantic
was ongoing throughout 1942. In that year alone, the US lost 1,902,418 tons of merchant
shipping while the British lost 3,171,942 tons. Put in perspective, US merchant shipping losses
in 1942 alone equaled ten times the amount of American shipping lost in the entire First World
War.
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Russia also added to the demand for Allied shipping and materiel. To keep Russia in the
war, the US shipped tremendous amounts of equipment to Russia through the Persian Gulf.
President Roosevelt promised to ship over a million and a half tons of supplies to Russia by June
1942 - just part of the 4,159,117 tons of Allied Russia-aid cargo that the US shipped between
November 1941 and May 1945. 95 These shipments helped keep Russia in the war, but they also
meant that there was less equipment (such as cargo trucks which had proven themselves as vital
in the First World War), less available merchant shipping, and fewer service units available for
use in British and US combat operations. Unexpected requirements such as these made strategic
sense, but also ultimately resulted in an increased demand for service units. As the war
developed in late 1942, commanders around the globe discovered theaters needed a sizeable
number of service forces to function and that there just were not enough of these type units in the
inventory to satisfy demand. 96

Assessment
The First World War had shown how modern warfare was evolving and how dependent a
foreign theater was on its service forces. To help organize efforts the US divided battle space
into two different areas of operations: one for combat and one for support. In the rear areas,
service units became increasingly specialized as supply, transportation, medical, engineer, and
maintenance technologies and equipment evolved.
Technology continued to transform the military during the interwar years and by 1942, the
battlefield was becoming increasingly complex as technology evolved. In the forward areas, the
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combat commander focused on his forces and on the enemy. In the communications zone the
rear area commander took care of the ports, depots, transportation networks, and civil
governance. Each of the different services and nations had separate logistics chains to support
their forces, but these chains often competed for limited resources, such as real estate, roads,
railways, and other infrastructure within the theater. 97
Western France in the First World War had shown the utility of having a single national
organization in the communications zone responsible for the administrative needs of the army.
Base Sections, Advance Sections, and Intermediate Sections provided the actual support, while
the Services of Supply headquarters planned operations and provided command and control of
the subordinate units. The AEF G4 dictated policy. The doctrine of 1940 carried these tenets
forward; however, the Mediterranean theater in 1942 was significantly different from that of
France two decades earlier.
In 1917, the French had already established a theater of operations by the time American
forces began arriving. Falling in on French support systems, the AEF benefitted from operating
in a secure rear area without the need to make a forced landing against opposition. Even more
importantly, the battlefield of the Western front in the First World War was largely static. Large
breakthroughs with long and fast advances were uncommon. This meant that the theater
Services of Supply could operate from semi-permanent facilities and with a predictable demand
for supplies. Established rail lines provided the backbone of theater transportation. Enemy air
power was a nuisance, but not much of a real threat. Additionally, the AEF did not have to
concern itself with care of the local population or of civil governance.
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As the Allies would later find in 1942, the Mediterranean theater had quite a different set of
conditions. The terrain, infrastructure, enemy situation, politics, and civil demands all combined
to create a unique set of challenges for the US theater commander that had been previously
unseen. Doctrine outlined the organization of the theater, but the devil was in the details. No
logistics experience or doctrine from the First World War existed to address problems such as a
lack of landing craft, how to land large formations across soft beaches, or the need to build large
airfields in a desert. Techniques to build petroleum pipelines in combat areas or splice steel
planks together to form runways and assault beaches did not yet exist. 98
In the Mediterranean theater, the Allies would face a myriad of problems, unforeseen
requirements, and competing demands that they had to meet before advancing to the next
objective. Many of these issues fell directly upon the theater support units to solve. How well
the theater responded to these challenges depended on innovation, flexibility, and learning.
On November 8, 1942, however, the Mediterranean theater was far from being established.
This was the first day of Allied operations in North Africa - operations that continued in the
region for the next two and a half years. Great Britain had been operating in the eastern part of
the continent since 1941, but the combined Allied invasion of Algeria and Morocco represented
a new chapter of the war because this was the first combined Allied step on the path to victory.
For the US forces under Eisenhower, the time had come to put doctrine and will to the test.
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Chapter III: The Invasion of North Africa
I don’t know anything about logistics. You keep me out of trouble.
--Patton’s guidance to his G4, Colonel Mueller, 1943

The landings for Operation Torch, the Allied invasion of Algeria and Morocco, started in the
early hours of D-Day 99, November 8, 1942. Strategically, the operation was a compromise
between the desire to confront Nazi Germany head-on, and the realization that to take on such a
task required additional resources and, more importantly, more time. The Allies did not realize it
at the time, but the invasion of North Africa was only the first of what would become a series of
campaigns across the Mediterranean - campaigns that would eventually stretch from Africa, to
Sicily, to Italy, and to southern France. This was the first step toward an eventual victory against
Germany; a victory that the Allies could not have achieved as quickly as they did without the
experiences gained in the Mediterranean.
From the start of the war, the US military, led by General Marshal, had advocated an early
assault across the British channel in an effort to directly strike into the heart of Germany. The
plan, named “Operation Bolero” and later changed to “Roundup,” called for an attack on the
European continent in the spring of 1943. An alternate plan, named Sledgehammer, called for a
more limited assault in the fall of 1942 should the Eastern Front begin to collapse on the Soviet
Union or should Germany begin to fall. Neither plan received much support from the British
after staff estimates showed that there were insufficient shipping and assault craft necessary to
land and support the armies. British and US production of landing craft lagged behind estimates
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and were incapable of meeting the necessary timelines. As an alternative, President Roosevelt
approved a landing into North Africa as a means to relieve pressure on the Soviet military and to
meet the political objectives of taking action against the Germans, somewhere in the world,
before the end of 1942. 100 Roosevelt agreed with the British Prime Minister to make an assault
into North Africa in order to eject Axis forces from the region and begin to secure the shipping
lanes of the Mediterranean. The Allies would decide subsequent strategic maneuvers following
the landings.
Although the Mediterranean was a tangential approach to confronting the German military,
the US theater would amass a significant number of forces. By the fall of 1944, the North
African Theater of the US Army was supporting 918,000 American forces, 270,000 French
forces, 21,000 men in the Brazilian Expeditionary Brigade, plus 63,000 prisoners of war. 101 This
does not include the myriad requests for food and other supplies that were part of the civil relief
effort across the Mediterranean. To support a force of this magnitude required agile planning,
flexible doctrine, innovation, and perhaps even a little luck.
This chapter covers the time from the initial landings in North Africa until the end of the
initial Allied drive into Tunisia, a period lasting from November through December 1942. These
few months represented the start of a transformation within the US military, a transformation
from a peacetime military to a force that could successfully conduct an amphibious assault
against a determined foe and then continue to support itself. Such a transformation was
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necessary if the US had any hopes of making a cross-channel assault into France later in the war
and then holding onto the beachhead.
The account that follows will show that the US Military of 1942 was ill prepared for such a
task. Only the combination of luck and a feeble defense by the French forces allowed the US
invasion forces to fare as well as they did. However, North Africa was the perfect crucible for
learning. The battlefields of North Africa would allow units of all types to modify themselves to
better deal with the characteristics of modern warfare and the environment. Leaders would learn
that service forces were just as an important consideration as ground or air forces. Just as
importantly, these campaigns gave the Allies time in which to develop and produce of tools of
war, such as aircraft, better tanks, more trucks, and additional amphibious assault craft. Indeed,
assault craft would be the biggest materiel challenge facing Allied leaders throughout the war.
To illustrate how such a transformation occurred, this chapter will first lay out the planning
and assumptions that framed Operation Torch. This will show how many of the attitudes and
beliefs of the First World War regarding service forces remained deeply engrained in US civilian
and military leaders at the beginning of the Second World War. As a part of this, Generals
Eisenhower, Clark, and Patton all make critical decisions that will ultimately cause the Allies to
miss a strategic opportunity and add an approximate six months to the fight for Tunisia, causing
thousands of additional casualties.
Next, the chapter explores the landings in North Africa in an effort to highlight systemic
problems in US amphibious operations. Conducted along three widely spaced beaches, the
landings of Torch will show that the US military would almost have almost certainly failed if
they had attempted such an operation for the first time in a cross-channel assault into northern
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France. The landings in North Africa demonstrate how difficult these operations are and show
just how much the US military has to learn, especially regarding the ability to support a force
once it reaches the shore. The only consolation was that the French were in even worse shape
than the US forces. A comparison in later chapters of subsequent landings in Sicily, Italy, and
France to those of Torch will demonstrate just how far the US military progresses in its ability to
forcibly land on hostile shores.
Finally, the chapter concludes by examining a lost strategic opportunity. With the
unexpected landings, the Allies achieved an element of surprise - one that might have allowed
them to seize Tunisia before the Germans could bring in reinforcements. Unfortunately, three
senior US generals collectively made a series of fateful decisions that reduced the amount of
truck transport and service forces on the invasion convoy in order to maximize the number of
combat forces. There were reasons to do this, but the outcome will provide a bitter lesson for the
US military, especially for its top commander, General Eisenhower. The lack of sufficient
service forces, combined with a lack of transportation, kept the Allied force from reaching Tunis
before German reinforcements. This would add an additional five to six months to the North
African campaign, cause unnecessary casualties, and delay the Allied advance across the
Mediterranean.
Like any military operation, the invasion of North Africa began with a plan. Commanders
and their planners approached the task based on the doctrine of the time and on their own
experiences. Many had experience from the First World War, which shaped their assumptions
and expectations. Unfortunately, there was little time for detailed planning.
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Planning the Invasion
The US military would quickly discover that war in Northern Africa was totally unlike
anything it had ever experienced. Unlike continental Europe, North Africa lacked significant
civilian infrastructure. Roads were unimproved and limited, tending to follow the coastline.
Rail lines were extremely limited and tended to consist of a single line, which also followed the
coastline. The desert environment was harsh on both men and machines.
Perhaps most significant was the great distance between the ports and the armies. The
distance between Casablanca and Tunis was 1,028 miles. 102 In comparison, Rommel’s drive
from Tobruk to El Alamein was about 300 miles and the eventual German retreat from El
Alamein to Tunis would cover 1,400 miles. To operate across such distances the US military
needed to make a mental adjustment to the scale of the battlefield and to the sheer volume of
supplies, equipment, and service forces needed to sustain combat operations across extended
lines of communication – circumstances not experienced in the First World War. In conditions
such as this, the theater logistics effort determined which strategies were viable and could easily
determine the outcome of a battle before the first shot fired.
On July 25, 1942, Franklin Roosevelt decided to go with the North African invasion—
only three months before the anticipated landing date. 103 Logistics planning for Operation Torch
began shortly thereafter, progressing steadily through August. The War Department’s Services
of Supply (SOS) called in the Chiefs of Services and work began on plans to support a total force
of 100,000 to 125,000 men. 104 The planning for
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Torch was hurried. One report that described the planning effort was especially candid, offering
that “Neither the British nor the American General Staffs would care to offer Torch as a model
of planning.” 105
Operation Torch had two major phases: simultaneous landings in French Morocco and
Algeria conducted by three task forces, followed by an overland advance across Algeria, east and
into Tunisia. Commanders hoped to land in North Africa, convince the local French forces to
join the Allied cause, and then join the fight against Italian and German forces operating in
Tunisia.
The Western Task Force was a US force, comprised of the US 3rd and 7th infantry divisions,
an armored combat command, and an armored combat team. The force totaled approximately
35,000 men and was under the command of Major General George S. Patton. The Western Task
Force had the mission of making amphibious landings in western French Morocco, occupy ports
and airfields, and then build up sufficient strength to occupy Spanish Morocco, if needed. 106
The Center Task Force was also a US force, consisting of three regimental combat teams,
one combat command from the 1st Armored Division, and the 1st Ranger Battalion. The task
force held approximately 18,000 men, commanded by Major General Lloyd Fredendall. The
Center Task Force was to land on several beaches around Oran, Algeria in order to seize the port
and airfields and, like the Western Task Force, be ready to occupy Spanish Morocco. 107
The Eastern Task Force was a mix of US and British units, including the 168th Combat Team
of the US 34th Infantry Division; the 39th Combat Team of the US 9th Infantry Division; and the
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elements of the British 78th Division. In total, the Eastern Task Force contained some 45,000
British and 10,000 US soldiers. 108 Due to a history of political animosity between the French
and British, a US officer, Major General Charles Ryder, the 34th Infantry Division commander,
initially commanded the Eastern Task Force during the landings and then command was to pass
at a “suitable time” to the British First Army commander, Lieutenant General Kenneth Anderson
(B), 109 for the assault on Tunisia. 110 The Eastern Task Force contained two US regimental
combat teams, two British brigade groups, as well as I and VI Commando (composite US and
British units.) Upon landing, the Eastern Task Force was to seize Algiers and the airfields at
Blida and Maison Blanche. The British First Army would then move east and seize Tunisia as
soon as reasonably possible, a distance of up to 400 miles. 111
Each task force was responsible for organizing its support plan and support forces. Brigadier
General Arthur Wilson commanded the Western Task Force support forces while Brigadier
General Thomas Larkin commanded the Center Task Force Services of Supply. Planners
expected that Wilson and Larkin would operate independently under control of their respective
task forces and that there could be a future possibility that the two task force support elements
would merge and the resulting theater Services of Supply would fall directly under AFHQ.
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Since the Eastern Task Force had no US supply organization, support for US forces in the east
would continue to come from British supply units. In the months leading to the sailing of the
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convoys, AFHQ logisticians focused on the immediate tasks required to embark the force and
support of the landings, leaving details of a subsequent theater support organization to be
determined as the operation progressed.
US and British officers conducted much of the planning for Torch in London, which made
coordination with the US War Department Services of Supply challenging. There was not a lot
of information on North Africa available to planners so much of the data concerning ports, roads,
and other infrastructure came from past issues of National Geographic magazine. 113 Although
Casablanca was far from Tunisia, it was an important objective because the city was beyond the
reach of German fighters and it was at the end of a single rail line that ran east through the Atlas
mountains to Oran, Algiers, and terminating in Tunisia. This single railway provided a direct
route to the Tunisian objectives that would secure North Africa. The railroad had only a limited
capacity, but it did provide a capability that replaced some truck transport requirements. 114
The lack of a ground tactical plan initially hampered logistics planning efforts because there
was no definitive sailing date for the convoys and no information on composition of the assault
echelons. Some of this information did not arrive for a month or more after planners had
requested. 115 By August 20, 1942, however, planners finally had a troop list and work was
progressing to equip deploying units and to assemble the vast quantity of supplies and
replacement equipment needed to sustain the force once it landed in North Africa.
Even though work had begun to outfit the deploying units, as late as the middle of September
there still was no central plan of operations approved by both the US and Great Britain-less than
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48 days prior to the sail date of the first convoy. 116 Logistics planners made educated guesses on
the types and quantities of needed materiel. In all cases, requisitions for supplies and equipment
had to take production and shipment times into account. This meant that units sometimes
ordered supplies with only a general idea of the overall requirements in order for the material to
be on hand and loaded prior to the projected sail dates. The physics of sustainment could not
wait for the detailed combat plans to be fully developed.
The limited planning time resulted in confusion and hurried plans, which led to late revisions
and changes in forces. This was essentially an exercise in trial and error for planning and
executing a large-scale amphibious attack involving the combined forces of several nations, a
logistician’s nightmare. 117 Physics and time regulated the logistics system, but combat
commanders and their planners were working in another realm with little regard for the logistical
implications of their late decisions and changes in units.
By September, the Allies had agreed to have most of the service units for the Center and
Eastern Task forces deploy from the United States. Service units already in Great Britain needed
to prepare for an eventual direct assault on the European Continent. A large percentage of
equipment for the Center Task Force also had to come from the US even though the War
Department had already shipped a great deal of materiel to Great Britain. The British had
enacted a policy of splitting convoys up to take advantage of available port capacity and, as a
result, accountability of much of the equipment and supplies sent to the UK in 1942 was initially
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lost. 118 Supply officers generally knew what had arrived in the United Kingdom, but had little
visibility as to the specific whereabouts of needed items.
As the sail date for the convoys approached, the impact of preparing logistics plans prior to
tactical plans became more evident. There seemed to be little coordination between the two
groups of planners as the logisticians worked to get supplies to the port, while task force planners
prepared ground concepts that produced an entirely different set of requirements. Support
planners complained that Patton’s staff seemed to be creating plans with little regard for the
physical restraints of port capacity and convoy limitations. 119 On the other hand, Patton’s staff
worked in several different locations and developed its plans in parallel with other planning
efforts. Patton provided little guidance, telling his G4, Colonel Walter Muller, “I don’t know
anything about logistics. You keep me out of trouble.” 120 Given the short time allowed for
planning , the different groups conducting planning, and the lack of involvement by some senior
commanders, it is not surprising that the combat and support plans for Operation Torch were
neither well synchronized nor entirely supportable.
Similarly, loading operations for Torch proved to be chaotic and inefficient. During August
and September, each of the task forces planned heavily for supplies, anticipating the need of a
level of stocks that could support operations for between 60 and 90 days. Accordingly, supply
officers provided requisitions to the depots, which then worked to fill as many of the demands as
possible. The ports quickly became overwhelmed by the arriving shipments and quartermasters
worked to link up the arriving supplies with the right ships. In a sweeping about-face, AFHQ
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issued a directive on October 16, 1942, which reduced the ration load to only 45 days to open
space for additional vehicles and equipment. This required an almost complete unloading of all
rations from the ships to achieve a balance of different food items for the 45 day level of supply,
which then had to all be reloaded.
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As the Allied forces, along with the associated supplies and equipment, assembled at ports
along the US east coast and in Great Britain in the fall of 1942, Generals Eisenhower and Clark
made a decision that would later have a profound impact on the North African landings and on
the greater campaign. Since merchant shipping space was limited and Eisenhower believed that
the threat of a German advance into Spain was possible, the Generals made the decision to leave
half of the cargo trucks behind and to load additional combat units in place of the vehicles. They
did not believe that the assault forces, especially those landing in the west, would have to move
quickly and that the vehicles could arrive on subsequent convoys. 122 This assumption would
prove to have serious consequences in terms of both the sustainment and mobility of the Allied
force—consequences that would become apparent as soon as the assault force came ashore on
the North African coast.
Using hindsight, one can easily deride Eisenhower’s decision to reduce the number of cargo
vehicles, but there were compelling reasons behind the decision. The Allies simply did not know
how strongly the Axis powers would react to the invasion. Some analysts believed that Germany
might move into Spain and take over airfields, thus placing Axis aircraft within range of the
landing beaches. There was also a possibility of attacks from Spanish Morocco, a Spanish
colony located immediately to the north of French Morocco, straddling the landing sites of the
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Western and Center Task Forces. In short, the Allies had little faith in Spanish neutrality and
Eisenhower had to be prepared to defend his western flank. This led to the decision to load more
combat units onto the assault convoy at the expense of the service forces.
Eisenhower approved the final plan for supply for Torch on October 27, 1942; four days after
the initial convoys had departed. The plan called for the task forces to send all requisitions
through AFHQ for approval. Following that, AFHQ would send the requisitions back to the
European Theater of Operations (ETO) in the United Kingdom for fill from existing stocks. Any
requisitions that Europe could not fill made their way to the US War Department Services of
Supply. Eisenhower’s goal was to assemble a 90-day level of supplies within the Torch area of
operations and a 60-day level of reserves in Great Britain. 123 Logisticians hoped to take
advantage of a shorter distance between the UK and North Africa; however, the time from the
initiation of a requisition, until the receipt of supplies, still took weeks if not months.
Ultimately, the US War Department deemed the proposed stockade levels unsupportable so
AFHQ revised the plan on December 4, 1942, in the “Supply Plan for United States Forces in
Torch.” This order directed a 45-day level of stock within North Africa for all supplies except
ammunition; 10 units of fire of ammunition; and a 30-day level of reserve stock for the United
Kingdom. 124 Supplies for the Western Task Force were to come direct from the US. Most
supplies for the Center Task Force would likewise come direct from the US, except for those
supplies that could fit onto allocated convoys coming from the UK. Support for the UScontingent of the Eastern Task Force (one division) was to come from the UK with British forces
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providing common items, such as food and fuel, to the US forces within the task force. 125 This
division of sustainment effort meant that although the majority of supplies would be coming
from the US, the theater would still have to manage several pipelines of materiel that were
feeding into the Mediterranean theater, thus creating additional challenges for theater
logisticians.
Allied planners envisioned resupply for the force occurring in three phases: in the initial
“assault” phase, support units automatically sent supplies to North Africa from parts in England
and the United States. Following initial combat operations, the theater would transition into a
“normal” phase, whereby supply was semi-automatic, meaning that common items, such as food
and fuel, would be shipped from the zone of the interior (the US) based on unit situation reports
while items requiring more control, such as ammunition, required specific requisitions. The final
phase was to begin when the theater was fully established and communications were functioning.
In this phase, the War Department only shipped supplies in response to specific requisitions. 126
Each task force was responsible for its own administrative sustainment up until about D+40.
After that time, AFHQ would establish itself in the theater and designate a combat and
communications zone.
By the third week of October, the planning was complete, the ships were loaded, and the
convoys began leaving the ports-headed for North Africa. Eisenhower was worried about many
things: whether German submarines would find the convoys, to what level the French would
defend the beaches, and whether the Allies would have to defend against an incursion from
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Spanish Morocco. None of these proved to be serious obstacles. What the Commander-in-Chief
should have been worried about was the sustainability of the force once it was ashore and
whether the task forces had the capability needed to take advantage of any opportunity to seize
Tunisia before the Germans had a chance to move in reinforcements. Given the information
available to the Allies at the time, Eisenhower’s concerns were understandable, although the
landings would show that the Allies had not put the right focus on the strategic objective: the
early capture of Tunisia.

Inexperience and Consequences of a Fateful Decision
The Allied landings started in the early morning hours of D-Day, November 8, 1942 across
western French Morocco (Safi, Casablanca, Fedala, Mehdia, and Port Lyautey), as well as at
Oran, Arzew and Algiers, Algeria. Each of the three task forces had a number of assigned
beaches and sea/air ports within their respective areas. As much as Operation Torch was not the
model of US or British planning, the landings and subsequent offloading of ships was similarly
not the model of an amphibious assault. The problems experienced during the landings affected
not just the build-up of combat forces ashore, but also negatively affected the sustainment of
those forces and AFHQ’s ability to move into Tunisia.
There were many reasons behind the problems experienced during the landings. Some are
attributable to incomplete planning, poor assumptions, and the geography of the beaches, while
other problems arose due to the lack of a capable beach organization. Perhaps the main reason
behind the majority of the problems was the lack of training and experience across the forces and
at all levels of command. Of all the different types of military operations conducted during the
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course of the war, those involving amphibious or airborne operations were the most complex and
difficult to control.
Problems started when the convoys arrived off the North African Coastline at the transport
areas. Ships were no longer in the same order they had been in for the voyage across the
Atlantic. Plans called for landing craft from one ship to move the cargo of another ship, but in
the darkness of the night, disoriented Navy coxswains reported to the wrong ship or landed on
the wrong beach. 127
At the Yellow Beach near Safi, the Western Task Force had to abandon the landing of
supplies and equipment after poor beach conditions and a lack of training by Navy coxswains
caused the loss of seven landing craft. 128 The Army and Navy had formed beach parties to
control landing operations on the assault beaches, but on at least three beaches, there was no
evidence of functional beach parties. At Fedala, the Task Group Commander confirmed that he
did not land beach parties with the assault battalions because commanders wanted to use all
available boat space for combat troops. Beach parties landed at Safi early in the fight, but were
slow in executing their duties because they took cover from sniper fire, rather than flushing the
snipers out and getting back to work on the beaches. 129 In all regards, the beach parties failed to
deliver due to a general lack of leadership, planning, and training.
The lack of experience in amphibious landings played itself out at Fedala’s Red Beach, when
enemy fire caused the Army assault force to request a halt in the landings. Landing craft milled
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about the transport area for hours with no clear direction of what to do or where to go. Even
though enemy fire affected just one small area there was no effort by the Navy to continue
landings of troops or supplies on beaches that were not under fire. 130 All of this occurred despite
the fact that sea conditions during the November 8th assault off of Casablanca were as flat as a
pond-a rare condition for the western coast of Morocco.
The lack of a shore clearance capability resulted in supplies and equipment landing at wrong
locations and much of the material on the beach was in disarray. The transports had been loaded
with a cross section of supplies so that any one item might not be lost if a transport was lost, but
the result on the beaches and at the ports was a mixing of supplies with little idea of what items
were where. The shore party had neither the work force nor the vehicles to remove materiel
from the beaches and ports to inshore dumps. The fundamental issue was that no one had
realized just how big a task the clearing of the beaches would be and as a result did not plan for
the right force to take care of it. Many of the items that did make it to the beaches were
unidentifiable, without breaking into the outer containers. Some crates had no markings while
others had inadequate labels, such as “cannon ammunition.” 131 Search parties from the combat
units scouring the beaches in search for specific items, such as high explosive ammunition for a
105mm Howitzer, had a difficult time finding the needed supplies and then quickly transporting
those supplies to the front.
A number of ships were out of position during the landings, which caused assault craft to
land on the wrong beaches or become stranded on reefs. Inexperienced operators damaged many
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of the landing boats at Fedala, even those that landed on perfectly good beaches. Other boats
found themselves stranded on the beaches and remained there because no tugs accompanied the
force. Soon, the landing force stranded at least 225 landing craft beached on just two of the
Western Task Force’s beaches. 132 Of all the landing craft destroyed or damaged at Fedala, not a
single one was hit by enemy fire. 133 Many boat crews abandoned their boats, wrecking vessels
that they otherwise could have saved. 134
Figure 3: Operation Torch, November 8, 1942. 135

French opposition at Fedala and Casablanca was light and generally representative of the
experiences of the three Allied task forces. At Fedala, the initial landings received harassment
fire from the French 100mm guns positioned at the Batterie du Port, drawing heavy counterbattery fire from US Navy destroyers traveling just off the Moroccan coastline. The US fire was
effective, temporarily silencing the French battery.
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The French Navy did attempt to interdict the landings, but had little effect. French destroyers
made two sorties out of the port of Fedala on the morning of November 8, but US cruisers,
destroyers, and aircraft beat back both attacks. By the evening of D-Day, the Task Force had
eliminated all French naval opposition.
The French Air Force did manage to make seven sorties over the Fedala beaches, which
damaged an anti-aircraft gun, caused casualties, and slowed the unloading of supplies and
equipment. 136 The French had not expected a landing along this area because of the usually high
levels of surf along the Atlantic beaches. The few French infantrymen the Task Force
encountered had an average of 15 rounds of ammunition apiece - hardly enough to stop an
invading army. 137 There was no centrally organized defense by the French along the beach.
Despite challenges in unloading the assault force, by the end of D-Day, Fedala was in US hands.
On November 9, D+1, the Task Force set out to capture Casablanca. The 3rd Infantry
Division, Force Brushwood, started the attack toward Casablanca at 7am with a four-battalion
front and initially encountered no opposition. Small French mounted patrols did offer slight
resistance as the force approached the city, but this was of little consequence. At 2pm, however,
General Anderson had to delay the attack until additional food, ammunition, and transport were
in the hands of the front-line units. Even though there was little opposition, Anderson’s units
had run out of the food, water, and fuel needed to proceed toward their objective. The jeeps and
small cargo trucks that accompanied the force were proving inadequate for the task - this was the
first consequence of the decision to reduce the accompanying truck fleet. Supplies were slowly
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making it to the shore, however at rates less than planned and there was insufficient
transportation to move supplies and troops further inland. 138
Some French artillery did engage the Task Force, but patrols quickly silenced the offending
batteries. The French Air Force continued to harass the invasion force, strafing the assault
columns and bombing the offloading beaches. Collectively, the air attacks, shortage of trucks,
and slow offloading of supplies, as well as five to six foot waves all slowed down the rate of the
Task Force advance until it eventually stalled late in the afternoon.
Anderson ordered the attack resumed at midnight, the morning of November 10. By this
time, the force had established an ammunition dump at Fedala and scrounged enough trucks to
resupply the combat units. The US forces encountered enemy patrols on the outskirts of
Casablanca, but experienced only a few casualties. French field gun fire increased the closer
Force Brushwood came to the city.
The French finally offered a determined defense for Casablanca on the morning of November
10, with 3,600 infantry and 90 guns. Two French corvettes supported the defensive fire, until the
US ship Augusta and four destroyers pushed the French back into the harbor. By 1700, US
ground forces were within 400 yards of the city and the French were ordering their units to pull
back. 139 By the late afternoon of November 10, Admiral Darlin issued orders to stop all
resistance. Anderson called off the US attack planned for D+3 and the city surrendered.
Conditions near Mehdia were little better. By the night of November 8, the rising surf had
stranded about half of the landing craft. In addition, the steep topography of the beach meant
that only tracked vehicles could make it inland. The beach at Mehdia had a high escarpment that

138
139

Report of Operations, Western Task Force SOS, 9 and 30.
Howe, 145.

79

made the landing of vehicles very difficult. Added to this, there was no exit from the beach so
engineers had to build a road - a task that carried on into the night of D-Day. Had the 60th
Infantry Regiment needed its heavy weapons to support an attack on Kasba that day, they would
have been stuck on the beach, unable to reach the advancing infantrymen. 140
As at Fedala, the units attacking Mehdia landed on the wrong beaches and supplies were
piling up so fast the work parties had a hard time keeping the piles above the high-water mark.
Beaches lacked organization while stranded sailors wandered about aimlessly. 141 The landing on
the north beach occurred five miles north of where it should have been, delaying operations by
two and a half hours. One report noted, “Conditions on the beaches during the night presented a
scene of indescribable confusion. Surf was rising so fast that about half the craft landing were
unable to retract” 142 The delay at the beaches allowed the French to reinforce the stonewalled
fort at Kasba, tripling the number of defenders.
High surf on November 9 caused the Navy to suspend beach operations. General Truscott,
the 3rd Division Commander, made repeated appeals to the Navy to resume offloading
operations. Landing operations finally resumed at 6:30 am the following morning. On
November 11, the Task Force opened a secondary landing area at the airport, which provided
relief on the beaches but required an additional 10-mile trip for the landing craft. 143
Despite having the calmest sea conditions in the past 68 years and limited enemy activity, the
part of the fleet supporting the Western Task Force damaged or destroyed 242 of the 378 landing
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craft used in the operation; leaving 162 of these scattered across the beaches. 144 A review of
after action reports from the landing blames these losses largely on the lack of training and
experience of the coxswains piloting the craft and the Navy seemed to agree. 145 The coxswains
lacked the training to operate the craft in heavy surf conditions so they often beached themselves
too high on the beaches or hit underwater obstacles. Additionally, the landing craft available for
Torch lacked sturdy construction so they could not handle 24-hour operations or contact with
underwater rock formations. 146 The lack of recovery craft prevented the Navy from dragging
beached craft back into the water. High surf and breaking waves breached these stranded craft,
destroying them in the pounding surf. 147
Losses such as these had both immediate and long-term consequences. The short-term cost
was degradation in the ability to quickly land supplies across the beaches and build initial depots
to support the assault forces. By November 9, the surf had increased to 4 to 6 feet, which slowed
down the landings of supplies. With the loss of over half the landing craft ship’s captains had to
increasingly rely on available piers at the seaports, which were a limited quantity and often
distant from the fighting forces. This increased the demand for already-limited ground
transportation to distribute materiel and slowed down the resupply of forces.
The landings of the Center Task Force had similar problems. Units were split up, landed on
the wrong beaches, and became separated from their equipment. The story of the 48th Surgical
Hospital is illustrative of what happened to many support units. Before the hospital had even
sailed, six officers, eight nurses, and 20 enlisted personnel were detached from the unit. The
144
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remaining hospital’s personnel sailed on one ship, while their equipment was in another ship,
elsewhere in the convoy. The surgeons and other personnel made it ashore near Arzew during
D-Day, but they landed apart, across three miles of coastline. None of the unit’s medical
equipment made it to the beaches.
Doctors and nurses spent the first night on the beach in foxholes, slit trenches, and helping
out at a nearby medical clearing station. The unit eventually collected itself together by noon the
following day. The equipment was still missing so hospital personnel went to work collecting
and borrowing surgical instruments, equipment, and supplies. Dressings, narcotics, and
sterilization equipment were in short supply until D+4, when the unit’s equipment finally
arrived. 148
Medical support was just as limited in the 2nd Armored Division’s area. Casualty collection,
clearing, and dental care were “non-existent.” The lack of capable medical units, combined with
the lack of available transportation made the evacuation of the wounded almost impossible and
very few if the wounded received adequate treatment. 149
By D+6, the most challenging problem facing the Center Task Force was burial of the dead.
The II Corps Quartermaster had initially requested a graves registration platoon of one officer
and 24 enlisted for the invasion force, but the Corps G3 on “the grounds that only combat forces
were important” denied this request. Despite the lack of these specialized service forces, an
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assistant Corps QM and some engineer troops eventually established a temporary cemetery for
the over 400 American soldiers awaiting burial. 150
The lack of trained laborers and an ineffective command organization on the beaches and at
the piers proved to be the largest problems of the assault phase of the operation. However, the
need for an organizational element to take control of the beaches was not a surprise. The War
Department had identified this requirement before Torch in discussions with the British. A new
type unit was formed - the Engineer Amphibian Brigade. This was a multifaceted unit,
comprised of a boat regiment, shore regiment, signal, medical, and supply units. These brigades
were supposed to land equipment and supplies as well as receive these items on the beaches and
move them to inland dumps. 151 Unfortunately, this proved to be a valid concept, but poorly
executed.
The assault force lacked both the detailed planning and trained units necessary to carry out an
effective landing and unloading of equipment and supplies. Captain Whitfield of the Calvert
summed up the problems by noting that there was no cooperation, no organization, insufficient
personnel, and the officers in charge were both incompetent and of too little rank. 152
Landing with the Center Task Force, the Amphibian Brigade concept proved to be harder to
carry out than initially planned. There were no US landing craft available so the Task Force told
all of the Brigade’s units to work onshore, even though many were untrained for this duty. The
landings operated using British command and control systems and British crews operated most
of the landing craft. A lack of training, unfamiliarity of the waters, and darkness produced a
150
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scene of chaos and confusion as boats returned to the wrong ships and landed on the wrong
beaches. 153
The Brigade was to use its trucks to transport supplies to the dumps, off load them, and then
have the supplies sorted, catalogued, and stacked. In reality, the Engineers moved supplies to the
closest dump, regardless of type of item they were carrying, and dumped cargo at the water’s
edge. There was no coordinated control over the landing area and little security for stocks.
There was no discipline in the supply area near the beach and few supplies ended up at the right
location. Only gasoline storage went well because the gasoline supply company had its own
trucks and hauled gas from the landing areas direct to the fuel dumps. 154
Despite the chaos, ship captains did what they could to offload essential supplies. One such
captain resorted to towing life rafts behind the landing boats in order to get supplies of gasoline
ashore. Each life raft held 136 cans of fuel, “otherwise the cans might float off.” 155 Similarly,
Brigadier General William Campbell of the 3rd Infantry Division directed that landing craft
should tow life rafts loaded with ammunition. 156 Shore parties of engineers succeeded in
establishing dumps and aid stations along many of the beaches. Ammunition, rations, water, and
fuel all began to accumulate in small quantities; however, movement of supplies forward of the
beach dumps to the fighting units was almost non-existent. Supplies, such as water, fuel, and
ammunition weighed a lot, distances were too far to carry supplies by hand, and there was a lack
of ground transportation. Supplies made it ashore before the trucks. 157 Planners had counted on
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jeeps and ½-ton trucks to haul supplies, but these small vehicles proved inadequate for the task.
Supplies continued to be unloaded at all beaches with no real direction. 158 By the end of the first
day, 39 percent of the troops had made it ashore, along with 16 percent of the vehicles and just
over one percent of the supplies. 159
The lack of an able support organization limited operations at the ports as well. Initially,
there were too few trained stevedores to unload the number of ships waiting at anchorage.
Additionally, there were no corresponding supply and transportation units available to move the
offloaded supplies from the piers inland to a supply dump. Ammunition, food, and other items
soon clogged the piers because no one was there to take responsibility for it. The Calvert took
five days to unload - twice as long as it otherwise should have taken. To illustrate the lack of
organization and control, soon after the clearing of the port at Fedala a French merchant ship,
the Lumerla, docked and began to unload its civilian cargo, even though two American ships
containing cargo trucks and other essential supplies were kept waiting in the harbor. On
November 11 and 12, no American ships were brought into either Fedala or Casablanca harbors,
even though this was a critical period in which the task force commander was trying to establish
support capabilities ashore to resupply combat units. It was not until after November 15, one
week after the assault, that the first signs of order began to appear at Western Task Force
ports. 160
However, not all of the problems experienced during convoy unloading were the result of
poor planning or a lack of service personnel. Equipment problems and poor luck played a role as
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well. At Safi, the 2nd Armored Division was unloading a medium tank from the Lakehurst on the
afternoon of D-Day. As the crane hoisted the tank out of the hold, a mechanical problem caused
the crane cable to freeze, preventing the cable from going either up or down. The problem took
five hours to rectify. At the same time, the Titania raised a light tank out of its hold and the
cable snapped. The crew spent seven hours trying to find a replacement cable before unloading
could resume. These problems occurred as Brigadier General Hugh Gaffey was urgently
requesting tanks for the front to help stop approaching French forces.
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Through all of this, General Patton was not amused. On D+1, November 9, the Western
Task Force commander wrote that “The beach was a mess and the officers were doing
nothing.” 162 Three days later Patton was at the Casablanca docks and found that “nothing was
going right. Some soldiers gave me coffee. Six French trucks ready to help were standing idle
because no one took hold. Found a LT [lieutenant] and put him to work with the trucks.” 163
Despite this lack of organization, order eventually came to the harbors and ports.
Patton spent hours at the docks and, despite the disorder, made a point of telling the men how
well they had done. As of November 30, there were still piles of gasoline and bombs on the
docks, but these gradually dwindled away. On December 23, Patton noted that the docks were,
finally, “in really fine shape.” 164 The tragedy is that it took the Task Force forty-five days to
straighten out a situation that was avoidable, had a small port unit with some adequate
transportation been included in the initial convoy. This represented a failure of command by task
force leaders. From Eisenhower on down, US officers had failed to plan for the landing of a
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balanced assault force - one that could not only perform its combat mission, but could also
sustain itself from the moment the force landed on the beaches. This was a critical lesson to
learn. Had this same situation occurred facing a determined enemy, the entire invasion force
might well have been pushed back into the sea.
In the Eastern Task Force sector, the British also experienced problems clearing their
beaches. As with the beaches of the Western and Center Task Forces, the Eastern Task Force
quickly found its beaches chaotic with little semblance of order. Supplies were dumped with
little thought or plan. Keys were missing for vehicles. British beaches had only a limited
throughput capability for supplies and equipment, which slowed the buildup of the British First
Army. 165
In general, the overall lack of service units in the task forces precipitated the problems on the
beaches and at the ports. As an example, the Center Task Force included only 260 supply
personnel on the first two convoys, out a total force of more than 60,000. The Corps
Quartermaster asked to include additional supply units, but the Task Force denied his request on
the assumption that local civilian labor would be available in North Africa to offset the needed
units. Upon landing, the task force discovered the local labor to be limited, unskilled, and
requiring constant supervision. Poor assumptions and a lack of understanding concerning the
challenges of supporting a deployed force led to problems that were more than anecdotal.
The long-term impact of the landing craft loss was a reduction in the overall numbers of
assault craft available to support national strategies. Numbers of assault craft in 1942, and
throughout the war, never met the global demand for this unique capability. The US was
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balancing the allocation of both funds and materials, such as steel, among many competing
programs. The loss of any landing craft meant that the Allied global capability to support
amphibious assaults was, in some way, hindered. Indeed, the loss of landing craft affected not
just the Mediterranean and European theaters, but the Pacific theater as well. Amphibious
operations were one of the essential characteristics of Second World War and all the theaters
were demanding increasing numbers of assault craft. The issue was so serious that the loss of
landing craft became a topic of discussion at the Anfa/Casablanca strategy conference of January
1943; a topic that Roosevelt and Churchill would deal with throughout the remainder of the
war. 166
Ultimately, the surprise achieved by the landings prevented any coordinated response by the
French military in Morocco or Algeria. French resistance was spirited in select areas, but had
little real impact on the landings. The Allies got lucky, because a coordinated French sea and air
attack on the beaches might well have prevented the forces of Torch from achieving their desired
objectives.
On November 10, Admiral Darlan, the senior French officer in North Africa, broadcast the
order for all French forces in North Africa to cease hostilities. By 7 a.m. the following day, the
front was quiet and the Allies then shifted their focus onto the capture of Tunisia, as well as
began working out the details of how to integrate the French military into the Allied coalition.
As of November 12, it appeared that the Axis nations were not willing to occupy Spain and there
was little threat from Spanish Morocco. Eisenhower was now free to reorient the forces of Torch
to the east and begin a race with the Germans to see who could seize and hold Tunis first.
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The Allies had a lot to learn before attempting the next amphibious landing. Fortunately, the
weather and enemy generally cooperated—otherwise the landings could have been much worse.
As it was, the three task forces made it ashore and began building up combat power in
preparation for the next phase of the operation. Now they needed to build a viable sustainment
capacity that could quickly support the drive into Tunisia, the true goal of the operation.

More Consequences
Eisenhower noted that the “chief hope of anticipating the Axis in Tunisia lay in our acting
with utmost speed.” 167 The task forces were ashore, but before any large-scale offensive
operation could begin, they needed to build up a support capability that had the ability to sustain
long-term operations in a harsh and undeveloped environment, over hundreds of miles. The
initial combat force secured the initial objectives near the beaches, but it required reconstitution
before the divisions could move beyond the initial lodgment areas. To accomplish this required
a capable sustainment force with the right equipment and supplies.
Even though the Western Task Force had an assigned logistics element, called Services of
Supply Task Force A, Patton and his planners did not integrate the Services of Supply into the DDay landings. The Atlantic Base Section Commander, Major General Wilson, noted, “There
was no consideration given to the problem of supply in the Western Task Force beyond the
landing of troops on the beaches.” 168 The problem was not just with the Services of Supply; the
Task Force G4, Colonel Walter Muller, was on the D+5 convoy, which actually arrived in
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Morocco on D+11. 169 Because of this seemingly intentional effort to relegate the Task Force
logisticians and support elements to later convoys, the Western Task Force’s ports were chaotic,
confused, and unsupervised. Port facilities in the area of Casablanca were available soon after
the landings; however, the lack of trained port personnel prevented the Task Force from taking
full advantage of these facilities. As a result, ship offloading at the ports was slow and largely
unsupervised. Stacks of supplies clogged docks because there were no Services of Supply forces
and equipment available to make sense of the items that had been unloaded and to move these
supplies from the ports and beaches into depots and dumps further inshore. The ports and
beaches had become chokepoints.
By the evening of November 16, there was a continuous pile of miscellaneous supplies on the
piers of Casablanca, averaging ten feet high, 20 feet at the base, and extending approximately
700 yards. One pile included a lethal mix of steel mat, ten-gallon containers of aviation fuel,
Vienna sausages, .45 caliber ammunition, lubricating oil, and a cloverleaf of 105mm incendiary
ammunition. Few people were working to clear the mess and the follow-on convoy was only
going add to the piles. 170
The first convoy to follow the D-Day invasion force was the D+5 convoy. This collection of
nine troop ships and 11 fast cargo ships arrived in Casablanca on 18 November 1942 only to find
confusion and disorder at the city’s docks. Members of the 6th Port, a unit on the D+5 convoy,
which specialized in port operations, found conditions at the Phosphate pier to look
“as though some gigantic overhead scoop full of supplies had suddenly emptied
its contents. Apparently, nothing had been hauled away and nothing had been
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stacked. One box was simply on top of another. On the other dock we could
see boxes, crates, ammunition, and gasoline drums piled up and scattered from
one end to another.” 171

Port operations were new to the Army; units such as 6th Port were less than five months
old. Commanded by COL Hunter Clarkson, the 6th Port landed on 19 Nov 42 and immediately
went to work. The unit was new, but the men in it had a wealth of experience as civilian
stevedores, dockworkers, rail operators, and truck drivers. When they came ashore, the docks
held piles of supplies and equipment while the combat forces were moving inland and calling for
more fuel and supplies. There were not enough trucks, rail cars, or service units to clear the
ports. Adding to the difficulty of the task was the tremendous amount of rain that fell, turning
hillsides into cascades and valley floors into lakes. Everyone in the command was working to
clear the docks to include cooks and clerks. A typical shift was 16 to 18 hours long and meals
consisted of cold C-rations. The rains had knocked down most of the pup tents so many men
chose to sleep in the holds of ships – anywhere that was dry. The port was a scene of trained
stevedores that knew what they needed to do, but had to contend with a larger group of untrained
beginners and local Arab labor. The battle with the French Navy had wrecked all of the port’s
cranes. However, by February 1, conditions had improved and the Allies were employing 8,000
local Frenchmen and Arabs to work as stevedores. 172
Units such as the 6th Port began work to make sense out of the docks and establish a storage
capability away from the piers; however, the shortage of cargo trucks hampered operations. Few
military trucks were available so US forces used any local means of conveyance that was readily
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available, such as horse-drawn wagons and charcoal-burning trucks. 173 One of the ships, the
Lorraine, carried 40 trucks and was the third ship offloaded at Fedala. Unfortunately, due to
waterproofing issues, none of the vehicles were serviceable. 174
The shortage of trucks was a hindrance felt across the force. Planners had allocated 200
trucks for the unloading of supplies at the ports, however less than half of these were in French
Morocco when the D+5 convoy arrived. Additional trucks arrived with the D+5 convoy, but
could not unload until workers cleared the ports. Patton’s combat units in the Western Task
Force had priority use of the trucks that did make it to theater, meaning that the service units had
to make do with whatever was available.
Besides deciding to keep many of the cargo trucks in New York due to limited shipping,
Patton decided to substitute smaller ¼ ton trucks ( jeeps) for the 2 ½ ton cargo trucks that were
authorized and available for the force. On one had the decision makes sense given the shipping
restrictions that the Task Force was wrestling with, however, the decision to deploy with smaller
trucks had operational and logistical implications. Without the 2 ½ ton trucks, affectionately
known as “deuce and a halves,” Patton’s force lacked the ground transportation necessary to
resupply or transport itself. The problem was simply a matter of physics. In terms of carrying
capacity, one deuce and a half was equal to nine jeeps 175 Patton focused on weight and space,
not capability or need, when he made his decision about equipment priorities.
The combined air force element of Torch, the Moroccan Composite Wing, found itself
stranded on the beaches following the landings. As with other units in the Task Force, Patton
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had decided to leave most of the Wing’s automotive equipment back on the piers at the US ports
of embarkation, expecting the Wing to rely on the ground forces for the movement of its
personnel and supplies. However, since the ground force was also short of transportation, there
was little movement of bombs, ammunition, and fuel for the Air Corps once it reached
Morocco. 176
The Wing found itself in a precarious position largely because Wing planners consciously
focused their efforts on ammunition requirements and decided to leave all planning for spare
parts and automotive equipment to the Western Task Force. As such, there was no liaison
between the Wing and the Task Force on the specific transportation needs of the Wing once it
arrived in North Africa. Patton treated the Wing’s truck assets the same as any other units,
apparently not considering the impact this would have on his air support. Either no one argued
for the reinstatement of the vehicles or Patton failed to grasp that in some situations, trucks could
be more important than infantry and armor.
The decision to eliminate a large number of cargo trucks from the initial assault convoys was
not limited to the US military. British planners, likewise, decided to keep a large number of
trucks back in Great Britain due to the shortage of motor transport vessels. This lack of trucks,
in all the task forces, meant that it would take longer to clear supplies off of beaches or ports,
longer to establish a significant distribution capacity, and that large infantry formations were
limited to movement by foot or rail. To illustrate just how much of an impact this decision had
on the force, the Deputy Director of Supplies and Transport for the British First Army estimated
that he could only support forces up to 100 miles east of Bone until additional trucks arrived on

176
Report, Moroccan Composite Wing, dated 25 December 1942, subject: Report of Lessons from Operation Torch. NARA, RG
338 E50215, box 1. 11.

93

the D+32 convoy. This not only proved to be an accurate estimate, but it also played a key role
in the British failure to secure Tunis before the German military had an opportunity to reinforce
the region.
Had additional truck assets been available, the campaign in Tunisia could possibly have
ended five to six months earlier. Eisenhower and his planners knew that the landings would start
a race with Germany to see which side could land reinforcements the fastest. Eisenhower wrote,
“Our chief hope of anticipating the Axis in Tunisia lay in our acting with utmost speed. Indeed,
we were involved in a race, not only against the build-up of enemy forces, but against the
weather as well.” 177
The problem for the Allies in late 1942 was not so much a lack of combat force in North
Africa, but the lack of a means to move that force quickly around the theater. However, limited
rail lines, poor roads, and the lack of ground transport vehicles all contributed to a situation in
which AFHQ (Allied Force Headquarters) could not respond to tactical opportunities. In
December 1942, the Germans lacked the combat and logistical strength to repel a strong Allied
push into Tunis, however the British lacked the means to rapidly deploy and sustain a large force
across the 220 miles from Bone to Tunis. Likewise, Patton’s Western Task Force was largely
unengaged in French Morocco, but the Americans lacked the means to move divisional size
formations to the east. The Allies had an opportunity before them, but they lacked the means to
take advantage of it. Had sufficient transport been available in December, the Allies most
probably could have seized Tunis that month and the Germans would have had their supply
chain interdicted, all of which would have prevented the February 1943 battle at Kasserine Pass.
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All of this is hypothetical, but it does serve to illustrate how decisions on issues as mundane as
trucks contributed to the outcome of the war’s battles and campaigns.
Eisenhower comments that the drive for Tunisia failed for three reasons. First, limitations in
shipping prevented the force from having sufficient strength to deal with the distance and force it
faced. Second, shortages of trucks and the limitation of a single-line railway slowed down the
rate of advance. Third, unseasonable rains stalled air operations. 178 Together, these created a
situation that forced Eisenhower to pause for the winter, but the situation did allow an
opportunity for the service units to build up the theater into an effective base of operations.
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Chapter IV: Establishing the US Theater in the Mediterranean
As mentioned in chapter II, the US theater in the First World War had some serious
problems, which it never overcame. Only the end of the war saved the communications zone of
the American Expeditionary Force from implosion. A quarter-century later, North Africa
provided the opportunity for the US military to learn from its earlier mistakes and this time erect
a theater that included both a viable combat and communications zone. The initial landings
showed that there were still problems to overcome, but the winter pause of 1942-1943 provided
an opportunity to build the structures and systems needed to sustain long-term combat.
The chapter covers the consolidation of the North African landings until the kickoff of the
final drive for Tunisia, roughly December 1942 until April 1943. This is the period in which US
service forces fought to organize themselves and bring order to an already jumbled supply
situation. This is an important subject because this is the first time that US forces built such an
organization on foreign soil - one capable of supporting a force of over a million men engaged in
modern combat over hundreds of miles. This is the true foundation of Allied victory in North
Africa, as well as in the Mediterranean and Europe. Leadership, cooperation, and agility become
common themes for the developing theater. A failure to build a capable communications zone in
North Africa would have ramifications not just for the capture of Tunisia, but for all subsequent
operations in Europe.
The story begins with the US effort to divide the battle space into a combat and
communications zone, which then leads to the development of an intermediate headquarters to
manage the support effort. The chapter also offers insights on the German supply situation,
which helps put the Allied effort into context. The Axis forces failed to protect their lines of
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communication and put less forethought and effort into developing the theater support structures,
creating a situation that ultimately limited their ability to hold terrain and contributed to their loss
of North Africa. Next, the chapter describes the buildup of the US communications zone during
the winter of 1942-43, which helped prepare the Allies for the final push into Tunisia. Finally,
the chapter explores the rearming of the Free French forces - an effort that required a sizeable
amount of equipment and supplies, but provided the Allies with additional divisions and
squadrons that otherwise would not have been available.

Cleaning up the Rear
Following the landings, each task force handled support responsibilities in its own respective
area of operations. Allied Force Headquarters provided overall guidance, but there was no
formal communications zone or single support agency. The base sections took care of their own
task force and anyone passing through the area.
Although weak at first, the base sections steadily increased in strength with the arrival of
additional convoys. Across all three task forces, what they found was confusion and the lack of
any organization. Ports and supply dumps were in disarray. Pilferage by the population had
become a major problem, leading to the requirement for a US soldier to accompany every wagon
or vehicle. Infantry units formed bucket brigades in order to move supplies off the docks.
Vacant fields and broken-down warehouses served as impromptu supply dumps and storage
locations for the thousands of barracks bags separated from their owners on the invasion force.
Military clerks and mechanics served as guides in an effort to direct the endless stream of
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vehicles from the docks to the supply dumps, but even with that effort, many drivers became
lost. 179
To complicate the supply situation further, the Western Task Force had planned to allow
partially unloaded vessels to return to the US if there was insufficient time to empty these vessels
before the convoy had to return and make room for the next convoy. The convoy schedule was
extremely tight and any delay would affect numerous other convoys. Unfortunately, nobody had
thought of inventorying these partially filled ships prior to their return from the
Mediterranean. 180 As a result, no one was entirely sure of the exact quantity of materiel, which
had made its way onto the shores of North Africa. This issue was a problem that the base
sections would have to resolve as the theater began to consolidate and AFHQ formed a
communications zone.
Innovation and adaptability proved to be essential elements in the ability of the theater to
support its forces and operations. Engineers removed the ends from oil drums to serve as
makeshift forms for concrete footings. Due to a shortage of paint, medics placed red iron ore put
against a bed of limestone to create a red cross at hospitals to protect them from enemy attack.
The shortage of lumber resulted in walls for buildings made out of paper, tar, and chicken wire.
181

Units throughout the rear area combined imagination with available resources to compensate

for any shortages in supplies and equipment. This innovation became an integral part of the
force and helped the US forces overcome adversity, not just in North Africa, but also throughout
the Mediterranean theater.
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The underlying problem was the lack of shipping space to the theater, and once supplies were
in the theater, there was a shortage of transportation and infrastructure to move these items to
where units needed them. The war in the Mediterranean was ultimately a war of movement and
throughput: the side that could effectively transport resources into the theater and then quickly
move men, equipment, and supplies to the decisive point had a strategic and operational
advantage.
Resources, such as merchant shipping, were scarce throughout the world so the War
Department and AFHQ needed to find efficiency wherever possible. Issues with limited
shipping space reached the highest levels and even before the convoys had sailed for North
Africa, the Combined Chiefs of Staff directed that “…it is highly desirable to save shipping
space and many steps have to be taken to accomplish this.” 182 The Twin Unit Pack was one such
innovation that addressed the worldwide shipping shortage.
The Twin Unit Pack (TUP) was simply two complete vehicles, disassembled, and packed
together with all the necessary parts for assembly. The TUPS required less space on a ship than
fully assembled vehicles, but they did require an equipped assembly line with trained workers at
the ship’s destination.
The Army’s Ordnance Department had originally planned to ship all trucks to the theater in a
fully assembled configuration, however the Army and General Motors developed a plan to ship
these same trucks disassembled and then assemble them later after arrival in the Mediterranean
theater. Assembled trucks tended to fill up a ship before reaching the ship’s weight limit due to
the large size of the vehicles. As such, ships filled with assembled trucks sailed at less than full
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weight capacity. By loading trucks in a TUP configuration, the loadmasters at the New York
Port of Embarkation (PEMBARK) could better utilize the full cargo capacity of each ship up to
the overall weight limit. In short, the Army could load more vehicles in the same amount of
space, which resulted in a greater transportation capacity within the theater. The only problem
was that the trucks required reassembly and the deserts of North Africa lacked both the
manufacturing capabilities and trained workforce of industrialized nations.
The solution to the assembly problem was the use of specialized units, such as the 302d
Ordnance Regiment. This regiment contained skilled volunteers, which had attended specialized
training at large US industries prior to sailing for the theater. The Army and Munitions Board
granted a triple-A priority rating for the project and the first convoys containing TUP vehicles
arrived in Casablanca and Oran by the end of 1942. 183
Each TUP consisted of four boxes: one contained two truck frames with the motors attached.
The second box contained the cabs and wheels. The third held axle assemblies and the fourth
contained the truck bodies. Overall, shipping one deuce and a half TUP, compared to shipping
two fully assembled vehicles, saved 59 percent cargo space. 184 Manufacturers provided
assembly plant layouts and any specialized equipment necessary for vehicle assembly. Planners
anticipated an assembly rate of 100 vehicles per day for each assembly line. 185
The assembly line at Oran was established where 120 TUPs had been dropped in two muddy
fields since there was no heavy lift equipment available to move the heavy boxes, which weighed
up to 10,000 pounds. Ordnance units used open fields and four-ton wreckers to assemble the
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vehicles, in lieu of the concrete floors and heavy cranes envisioned by the manufacturers. 186 The
demand for the trucks was so great in the Center Task Force area that many units received
vehicles lacking even a road test. 187
The complete assembly line gradually improved over seven weeks. Engineers erected
buildings with overhead hoists, drainage, lighting, water, and compressed air. In one single day,
the line at Oran assembled and delivered 143 of the 2 ½ ton trucks. 188 Installation included
mounting of cabs, lubrication, wheels, wiring, and fabrication of vehicle bodies. This was an
impressive effort, which, although it occurred largely in the background, provided the theater
with a critical item of equipment. Eventually, each assembly line occupied over a million square
feet of space. 189
One of the greatest contributions to the theater was the improvement of the North African rail
network. When the Allis landed in November 1942 the rail system in North Africa presented a
daunting list of challenges. Tracks were typically limited to a single line, limiting two-way
movement. There was no one standard of track-the Chemin de Fer de Maroc, the Railway of
Morocco, was standard gage in the west, but the line changed to narrow-gage in eastern Algeria,
east of Ouled Rahmoun and Tebessa. 190 Additionally, there were few locomotives and rail carsthose that did exist typically had relatively little capacity compared to the demands the military
needed to place on them. The rail system needed a lot of work to maximize its potential.
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Accompanying the invasion force on D-Day was an advance element of the 703rd Railway
Grand Division. Formed along a traditional railroad organization, the Railway Grand Division
replicated a civilian general superintendent’s office and operated three to four railway battalions
along with a shop battalion for heavy maintenance and a base depot company for supply. Each
rail battalion included a headquarters company, which dealt with dispatching, supply, and
signals. Company A handled maintenance of rail lines and facilities along the lines, while
Company B operated the roundhouse and repaired rolling stock and locomotives. Company C
consisted of 50 train crews and a train master. 191 Commander of the Military Railway Service
was Brigadier General Carl R Gray Jr., pre-war vice president of the Chicago, St. Paul,
Minneapolis & Omaha Railroad.
By November 18, 1942, the first personnel of the Rail Division arrived and began making
contact with the French railroad operators to arrange rail movement of all supplies and
equipment arriving on the D+5 convoy. Since the rail lines technically belonged to the French,
the Allies had to negotiate for use of the lines and rail equipment. As luck would have it, George
Falson, a US veteran of the First World War, had been living in Casablanca before the invasion.
George grabbed his discharge papers and met the assault units on the beaches of Fedala when the
assault boats came ashore. George was very familiar with how the French rail system operated
in North Africa so he attached himself to the US Rail Division as “interpreter extraordinaire.”
This local assistance helped US forces acquire engines and other rail support from the French
and eventually helped the US forces assume all switching service. 192
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One of the first tasks of the Rail Division was to coordinate the movement of 54 32-ton
tanks. A few 30-ton and 40-ton railcars, designed to carry steel rail, were located after a wide
search of the area and deemed suitable for movement of the tanks. Each car needed
reinforcement, however lumber and nails were scarce commodities in the North African desert.
The Allies ransacked hardware stores and got merchants out of their beds until they had enough
nails for the task. Ingenuity and resourcefulness helped even more as soldiers cut the beams out
of smaller rail cars and sliced the ends of brake houses off of the cars as well, creating a perfect
opening for the tanks. 193
The War Department shipped rail engines from the states in a partially dismantled
configuration. These arrived in Morocco, where soldiers then transported the disassembled
engines 630 miles east to Sidi Mabrouk, Algeria for reassembly by the 753rd Shop Battalion.
The Shop Battalion finished reassembly of the first two engines in 76 hours and then loaded the
engines on a train for movement to Ouled Rahmoun where the engines went to work on the
narrow-gage tracks. 194
German forces quickly realized the importance of the single rail line running along the coast
and worked to interrupt rail service. German special operation elements landed by parachute
behind the front lines to sabotage the rail lines, while German pilots targeted rail facilities and
supporting infrastructure. The rail battalions had an on-going challenge to keep bridges, fixing
rails and switches, and damaged machinery repaired. Despite the challenges, the rail units
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maintained pace with advancing combat elements and provided the supplies and equipment
needed to win the battle of Tunisia and North Africa.
The arrival of logistics units on the later convoys provided the Allies with an increasing
capability to initiate and sustain prolonged operations. The ports were operating at increased
capacities, depots and dumps were established, and the transportation situation, while still a
concern, was less of a constraint. The Allied forces were steadily building up the capacity to
wage war and the theater was ready to be formally established.

Establishing the Communications Zone
The period of November 1942 to March 1943 represented the change of North Africa
operations into a coherent theater of war. Initially, each task force was responsible for
coordinating its own support, but by spring the time was right to transfer over to a more effective
and efficient system of centralized oversight. Many resources were restricted due to competing
worldwide demands from the different theaters or from shipping limitations. The theater needed
a means to make the most of its available resources. 195 Command of combat units shifted as
well, in order to provide more centralized control over the ground, air, and sea forces. The
establishment of the theater represented an effort to bring order to the combat and
communications zones, a task necessary to support a long series of operations and campaigns.
Without a functioning theater, the US would not be able to support its forces deployed overseas.
This section of the chapter deals with the evolution of the theater and its organic support
structure. The divisions had secured their objectives, now came the task of turning North Africa
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into a base of operations from which to launch the assault on Tunisia, as well other subsequent
campaigns. To accomplish this, the theater needed an organization to coordinate the support
efforts in the rear areas and the base sections needed to establish the installations, prisoner of war
camps, warehouses, and repair facilities to support the force. Throughout all of this, cooperation
of the senior officers and innovation of the individual soldiers played key roles as the US
military began to build a theater in a very austere environment.
The failure to capture Tunis in December 1943 provided a setback for Allied strategy, but it
provided an opportunity for logisticians to build up the rear areas in preparation for a spring
offensive. Eisenhower had paused operations, but the winter of 1942-43 was a time of great
energy devoted to the development of the task force support capabilities. The armies received
new equipment and supply dumps built up reserves. Support forces took advantage of the lull to
refine the systems needed to effectively move and support the force.
The requirements of the theater depended, in part, on the North African geography, climate,
and infrastructure. Roads were much sparser then in either Europe or the US, with primary roads
covered by tar and the secondary roads “often more than earthen tracks.” 196 The hundreds of
primitive bridges, which crossed the wadis, were largely inadequate for heavy military vehicles
or cargos. The railways were few, of differing gage, and capable of handling only a few trains
per day. 197 The railroad was largely unguarded and usually followed the road so that one bomb
could destroy both. Railroads operated on poor-quality Moroccan coal. The tracks were
generally in good shape, but the rolling stocks was in poor condition and limited in capacity. On
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the route from Taza to Oujda, one train ran a day, consisting of two locomotives, two water
tenders, and 20 small rail cars incapable of hauling large equipment. Highway bridges were
typically 1 ½ lanes wide, which limited two-way traffic. 198 In general, the North African terrain
and infrastructure lacked the capacity to support large offensive operations. Nonetheless, these
were the surroundings that all the belligerents had to work with.
In order to relieve the task forces of defense requirements and supply duties in the rear areas,
AFHQ activated two specialized commands, similar to the concept of support exercised during
the First World War. 199 First, the Mediterranean Base Section (MBS) arose on November 10,
1942, with its headquarters at Oran, Algeria. Seven weeks later the Atlantic Base Section
(ABS), with its headquarters located at Casablanca, Morocco, activated on December 30. 200 By
the beginning of 1943 the two base sections were no longer under task force control, but, rather,
directly under the control of AFHQ.
The Atlantic Base Section handled support for forces in the area occupied by the I Armored
Corps (the former Western Task Force). To the east, the Mediterranean Base Section assumed
responsibility for support of all forces in II Corps (the Center Task Force), as well as support of
US forces operating in the area of the British First Army (the Eastern Task Force.) The one
exception was that British forces were responsible for the support of all US forces operating as
part of the British Eastern Assault Force in Tunisia. 201
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Besides having the responsibility for administrative support of combat forces, AFHQ also
assigned the two base sections responsibility for all civil affairs matters. Additionally, requests
from US forces for supplies and equipment went direct to the base sections. 202 The base sections
found themselves with a growing list of customers— they now had to support military forces,
civilians, French forces, and prisoners of war.
There was an interesting difference of views between President Roosevelt and General
Eisenhower on the role and perception of Allied forces. Roosevelt viewed Allied forces in North
Africa as conquerors; ones that could issues orders and expect compulsive compliance. 203
Eisenhower, however, knew that the force was not an occupying one, but instead, was one of an
accepted ally or visitor. Accordingly, “far from governing a conquered country, we were
attempting only to force a gradual widening of the base of government, with the final objective
of turning all internal affairs over to popular control.” 204 In this situation, the Allies had to work
with the local government and populations to establish good will and an atmosphere of
cooperation. This meant that Eisenhower had to consider the welfare of the people to a greater
level than otherwise might have been the case. Support from the people and from their local
government was essential if the Allies were to avoid a situation in which the rear areas might be
threatened, which would require the stationing of significant amounts of combat forces to
provide security. 205 Thus, civil affairs quickly became a critical element of the theater support
strategy.
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The centers of activity for the base sections were the ports, such as the ones at Casablanca,
Oran, and Algiers. The port had to have sufficient berthing spaces to handle the number of ships
arriving with the convoys, as well as enough lifting equipment and transportation networks to
clear materiel off the piers. Ports and depots needed to be close enough to the front to support
Allied strategies, but far enough removed from
southern France and Tunisia to avoid large air raids.
The two base sections had other wide-sweeping responsibilities, to include oversight of all
depots, fund estimates for the task forces, control of transportation not within the task force, all
construction, signal facilities, and civilian labor. 206 Additionally, the base sections had to work
closely with the US Navy for all matters involving the clearing of ports and harbors, operations
of all ports and moles, the loading and unloading
of ships, control of all lines of communications, fueling of ships, and security of all ports and
military installations.
Figure 4: Casablanca Harbor 207

At the time of the initial landings there appears to have been few differences, other than the
name, between “SOS Task Force A” and the “Mediterranean Base Section.” Both organizations
provided administrative support to their respective task forces in a similar manner and both had
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the task of establishing initial support bases. The different names are probably only a
representation of the preference of terms favored by each task force and serve to illustrate the
decentralized nature of planning that occurred between the different task forces.
As the Operation Torch moved from the initial assault phase to the Tunisian offensive phase,
the base sections worked to make some sense out of the piles of supplies, which had accumulated
in the task force areas. As just one example, the Atlantic Base Section faced with a pile of
ammunition at Fedala, which measured 150 feet deep for a mile and a half on either side of the
railroad. Ammunition was “strewn, scattered, jumbled, mixed up - it seemed every type, size, lot
number, and caliber ever produced was piled there in the most amazingly involved condition that
any Ordnance man or officer had ever seen.” 208 This is just one example of the state of the
intermediate supply depots in early 1943; depots that needed to be cleaned, organized, and
inventoried to take full advantage of the materiel that had been received within the
Mediterranean theater.
Without this organizational effort, the base sections would not know what supplies were on
hand, where the needed supplies were at, or how to issue supplies in an effective and efficient
manner. Dumps were often unnumbered. Units had to scour the piers and surrounding areas for
supplies believed to be on-hand. 209 This situation, left unresolved, could have serious
consequences because if a unit needed critical supplies and the base section had no visibility of
what was actually available, the base section then had to send the requisition back to the US for
fulfillment. This meant that a requisition might require months to fill and take up valuable
shipping space, even though the needed items might already be located within the theater and
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available for use. Finally, the net explosive capability of all that ammunition piled up in one
place represented a major safety problem, especially since the chance of air raids was ever
present. Fortunately, it does not appear that the German Luftwaffe ever took advantage of these
lucrative targets, but the risk was there nonetheless.
Situations like this were common. Support units found supplies and equipment haphazardly
strewn about impromptu supply depots, vacant lots, or alongside a rail line. These were an
unintentional and normal result of the growth of the theater; however, better planning could have
limited the extent of the disorganization. Units on the assault wave simply worked to unload
ships as quickly as possible. Workers established the initial supply dumps as a means to
expeditiously clear materiel from the ports, but with little organization or record keeping. Plans
changed - the ammunition dump at Fedala was supposed to receive 35 to 50 percent of all
incoming munitions for the Western Task Force; instead, the dump received nearly 100 percent.
Conditions deteriorated when subsequent convoys arrived and added their supplies to those that
were already on the ground. 210 The shortage of trucks prevented units from quickly moving
supplies off ports and rail spurs. The base sections found themselves with a problem that grew in
magnitude with every additional convoy.
In an effort to rectify the situation, one of the first tasks was the effort to install route markers
along highways and to number all of the dumps. Transportation sections worked to gain control
over the military and civilian transportation resources, although much of the available
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transportation remained in the hands of the combat units. On average, only half of the
transportation within the theater was initially available for use in the rear areas. 211
The designation of North Africa as a separate US theater occurred on February 4, 1943. Up
until that time, General Eisenhower had been operating as the commander of essentially two
theaters: Europe and North Africa. This arrangement made sense while the forces for Torch
were still in England, but by January 1943, it became clear that the two theaters needed to
formally separate. 212 This would allow Eisenhower to focus on Tunisia as well as allow his
replacement in Europe to focus on a future cross-channel assault. Effective at 0001 hours on
February 4, the North Africa Theater of Operations, US Army (NATOUSA) activated with
responsibility for North Africa from the Sudan, east to the Libyan border. As a part of the
theater responsibilities Eisenhower was formally charged with “the strategically, tactical,
territorial, and administrative duties (authors italics) of a theater commander.” 213
Since Eisenhower had responsibilities of being both the senior US commander in the theater
as well as the Allied Commander-in-Chief, the AFHQ staff had similar split responsibilities.
While the AFHQ staff was a combination of both US and British personnel, the US staff in each
AFHQ section also typically served as the US theater staff. In effect, the US personnel at AFHQ
had two roles—one as the US theater staff and the other as part of the combined Allied staff for
all Mediterranean operations. While this division of responsibilities made sense conceptually, it
sometimes resulted in problems, as officers had to remember which headquarters they
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represented for specific meetings or issues, and under which authority they issued plans, policy,
and directives.
Although Eisenhower had the responsibility to provide administrative support to all US
forces as the theater commander, he did not have the time or inclination to do this job himself.
As the Allied Commander-in-Chief, Eisenhower had more pressing duties, such as working to
keep the English-French-American coalition together and dealing with various political officials.
Eisenhower needed another general officer that could focus on the administration of the theater
so on February 6, he chose Brigadier General Everett S. Hughes to be the Deputy Theater
Commander. Army doctrine did not include such a position; however, this same doctrine did not
envision the myriad competing demands required of an allied commander-in-chief.
Everett Hughes became a field artillery officer after graduating from West Point in 1908.
Three years later, he transferred to the Ordnance Corps and, later, deployed to Mexico in 1916 as
part of the Punitive Expedition. Hughes served in the AEF during the First World War and
taught at the General Staff School at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas from 1923 to 1928.
Figure 5: MG Everett Hughes 214

Hughes was a close confidant of George Patton-the two of them were a
year apart at West Point, and both served in Mexico and in France. The diaries
of both Hughes and Patton reveal that the two generals often got together
whenever Patton was visiting AFHQ, with Patton frequently using the
opportunity to remark over several drinks on how he thought Eisenhower or
other senior leaders, such as Montgomery, were doing. 215 This was an
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intriguing relationship between a senior combat commander and a support officer. One benefit
of such a relationship was that Patton had an inside ear and confidant within AFHQ, while
Hughes could learn first-hand of any administrative concerns coming from the front.
Hughes described the duties of the Deputy Theater Commander simply as being “charged
with the responsibility of relieving the Theater Commander of all possible [administrative]
details.” 216 In effect, Hughes became responsible for the support of all US forces, while the
Chief Administrative Officer, Major General Gale (B), had responsibility for all British forces.
Since US doctrine did not include the provision for a Deputy Theater Commander, Hughes
asked that he also become the Commanding General of the communications zone - a familiar
doctrinal concept. This additional designation did not come with any additional responsibilities
or staff, but it did provide an authority needed to deal with the War Department Services of
Supply and it helped to define Hughes’ duties in terms that were more traditional. Eisenhower
agreed and on February 9 signed a memorandum, directing Hughes to
…establish, operate, and command a U.S. Communications Zone for NATO
USA. You will assume all possible U.S. administrative and supply duties now
being performed by AFHQ, in order to relieve AFHQ to the maximum of supply
and administrative matters applying to U.S. forces. You will also be responsible
for the detailed development of supply plans for American forces in future
operations to conform to the broad plans of AFHQ….In addition to the duties
indicated above you are designated as Deputy U.S. Army Theater
Commander. 217
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This became official three days later when AFHQ published a general order on February 12,
1943 directing the establishment of the NATOUSA communications zone. 218 With this order,
Fifth Army became responsible for the general defense of the communications zone and the duty
of the CG Communications Zone/Deputy Theater Commander was to coordinate and
synchronize the activities of the AFHQ staff, Fifth Army, and the base sections. Thus, just one
man- Everett S. Hughes- represented the entire communications zone. 219
Unfortunately, Eisenhower’s order did not specify the specific delineation of responsibilities
among the different logistics staffs and organizations within the theater. Eisenhower achieved
his goal of shifting the administrative burden off of AFHQ, but there arose a difference of
opinion between the Allied Headquarters, the US theater, and the base sections on the roles that
each was to perform and who reported to who. This controversy continued for at least six
months and served as a point of tension among the organizations that depended on efficiency, not
disagreement, to succeed.
February also saw the creation of a third US base section. The British were still supporting
the US forces attached to the Eastern Task Force out of the Port of Algiers. This increasingly
placed a strain on the British sustainment system as more US forces moved into Tunisia so
NATOUSA added the Eastern Base Section (EBS) to the communications zone on February 13,
1943. Transportation difficulties forced leaders to recognize that the 250 miles from Oran to
Algiers was too great a distance to provide logistics support to US units operating in the British
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First Army area. 220 The Allies had insufficient trucks, the rail line was limited, and the road
network consisted of dirt roads that frequently washed out. However, the North African
coastline provided an opportunity to reduce distance from the ports to the combat forces by
offloading ships further to the east for those supplies destined for use by the Eastern Task Force.
The threat of attack by enemy fighters increased the further east the coasters went, but the benefit
of cutting hundreds of miles off the ground route made this a risk worth taking. The main ports
used by the Eastern Base Section included Bougie, Philippeville, and Bone.
The theater staffed the new base section by reducing the size of the other two base sections,
which created some animosity, especially with Brigadier General Wilson of the Atlantic Base
Section. On the other hand, Brigadier General Larkin and the Mediterranean Base Section fully
supported the levy of personnel and provided service personnel to the Eastern Base Section as
required, while Wilson held out for as long as he could and only gave people up when forced. 221
Command of the Eastern Base Section went to Colonel Arthur W. Pence, the Engineer Officer
for the Mediterranean Base Section.
Each of the base section commanders had a vast area of responsibility and a myriad of
different responsibilities, including port operations, care of roads and rail lines, facility
construction and management, lend-lease transactions, and civil affairs, to name but a few. Each
commander was capable, but each also had his own education and experiences to draw from.
Arthur R. Wilson started his Army career as an artilleryman in 1920. After completing the
Command and General Staff course and War College he became an army liaison officer with the
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Works Progress Administration from 1937-1939, followed by an assignment as Chief of the
Support Division of the Federal Works Agency from 1940 to 1942. 222 These positions provided
valuable experience in areas, which most military officers had limited knowledge, such as in
jobs, civilian infrastructure, and function of a civilian bureaucracy. All of this greatly aided
Wilson’s performance of duties throughout the war as one of the Mediterranean theater’s senior
support commanders. The Deputy Theater Commander, Everett Hughes, described Wilson as
being “an able officer…imaginative, but a free-wheeler who [prefers to jump over intermediaries
and deal directly with senior commanders].” 223
Figure 6: BG Arthur Wilson 224

Patton had a less generous opinion of the base section commander, writing
that “Wilson is nuts. [He] is a back-biting fool with an inferiority complex who
will not last long.” 225 Considering that Wilson was commander of the base
section supporting Patton’s forces in French Morocco, this seems to indicate a less-than-healthy
relationship between the two men. Patton was ultimately wrong - Wilson did survive, but he did
not achieve the same level of recognition as Thomas Larkin.
Thomas Larkin received a commission in 1915 from West Point and entered the Army Corps
of Engineers. Larkin had a wealth of experience prior to the Second World War. He was part of
the Army’s 1916 Punitive Expedition in Mexico and he served with the AEF in the First World
War, where he received a silver star for the building of a bridge across the Marne River under
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heavy enemy fire. 226 Larkin had a great deal of civil engineering experience as well. From 1929
to 1933 he was the district engineer for flood control at Vicksburg, Mississippi; from 1933 to
1936 he headed construction of the Fort Peck Dam at Fort Peck, Montana; and he was the officer
in charge of the third locks project at the Panama Canal from 1939-1942. 227
Figure 7: MG Thomas Larkin 228

Similar to Wilson’s experience in civilian institutions, Larkin’s
civil engineering background had a direct connection with the
demands of operating a theater support organization. The ability to
leverage and improve civilian infrastructure was a large part of a base
section’s mission. However, unlike Wilson, Larkin was as a
personable officer who easily worked with others. This combination of civil engineering
experience and personality led to Larkin’s increasing levels of command and promotions that
occurred throughout, and after, the war.
Figure 8: BG Arthur Pence 229

Arthur Pence graduated from West Point in 1918 and, like Larkin,
served as an officer in the Corps of Engineers. Pence did not have as
much experience as Wilson or Larkin, but he did have a tour in the
Philippines from 1926-1928, and was an instructor at the Engineer
School at the start of the war. Pence was a proponent of getting the
mission done in any way possible. By the use of both general policy and verbal guidance, Pence
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gave his men orders to “Get the job done. Use all possible means. Improvise if the standard
means and channels are inadequate. Keep all wheels rolling…It is the results that count…We
must do everything possible ourselves without counting on help from the rear.” 230
This type of guidance capitalized on the innovation and Protestant work ethic inherent in
many of the US forces. It told the men of the Eastern Base Section that the mission was more
important than the bureaucracy typically associated with supply and it also helped to build a
reputation that the EBS would get the materiel needed for operations without question or
delay. 231 What Pence was working toward was an organization that had the means to use
independent thought and to anticipate requirements. In a war of limited resources, these qualities
could determine the success of an operation weeks, or months, before it actually started.
The direct control of the base sections by AFHQ ended on February 15, 1943 with the
establishment of a new headquarters. The Supply of Service for North African Theater of
Operations, United States Army (SOS NATOUSA) was an intermediate level of command
designed to fall between the theater and the base sections. The Services of Supply had the
responsibility to direct and over-watch all sustainment activities for the entire North African
theater. Larkin received a promotion to major general and left the Mediterranean Base Section to
command the new organization. 232
The theater intended for the activation of the Services of Supply to simplify the management
of theater administrative support; however, there was still disagreement of the exact functions
and responsibilities of the Services of Supply. Major General Hughes, the Deputy Theater
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Commander and Commander of the Communications Zone, felt that the three base sections
operated under the oversight of the Services of Supply for supply operations, but that the base
sections actually belonged to, and reported to, the theater. 233 In this view, Services of Supply
served not in a command role, but rather, in a position of management. Hughes felt that the
AFHQ G4 should make policy and then pass it through either himself or MG Larkin for
execution.
Major General Larkin held a slightly different interpretation. In his view, AFHQ intended
that the Services of Supply should “command of all US Army supply and maintenance activities
in the theater.” 234 As such, the base sections should report direct to the Services of Supply and
not to AFHQ. Larkin felt that he had command and control of “the operation of installations and
the employment of personnel and troops in the Communications Zone.” 235 Despite these two
conflicting viewpoints, however, relations between Larkin and Hughes remained cordial
throughout the war and the two officers worked together to resolve issues regarding command
and control. Eventually the Services of Supply stationed a liaison officer at AFHQ in an attempt
to ease coordination; however, tensions between the two headquarters lasted well into 1944. 236
Eventually the theater G4 fell into a role of developing logistics policy, setting priorities,
providing logistical advice Eisenhower, and conducting long-range planning. The G4 also
coordinated common supply support for the air forces and adjusted levels of support between the
ground and air forces for items with limited supply.
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While the G4 dealt with policy, the Services of Supply was responsible for the detailed
planning of immediate support operations, the management of supplies, and for the execution of
all sustainment actions. In essence, the G4 focused on how sustainment actions should generally
occur and the Services of Supply dealt with getting these accomplished.
Overall, Services of Supply was responsible for providing all of the administrative support
for US forces in the Mediterranean theater. This included providing supplies, transportation,
medical care, signal support, civil engineering, and maintenance support. However, to do this
they had to operate ports, build and run installations, build prisoner of war camps, provide
supplies to prisoners of war, build telegraph and telephone systems, operate the rail system
across North Africa, and maintain the road, bridges, and rail lines.
As an example, each of the base sections established general, field, and evacuation hospitals
to support all Allied forces and prisoners of war within their respective regions. Quartermaster
salvage units established salvage depots to collect and classify damaged or abandoned
equipment. The unit then sent reparable equipment to a suitable repair shop, while serviceable
equipment went to a supply dump or depot. The Mediterranean Base Section processed over 357
tons of salvaged equipment in the month of March 1943 alone. 238
The base sections established a myriad of capabilities to take care of the deployed force and
avoid returning equipment back to the US for repair. Civilian shoe repair shops augmented
military repair units, repairing some 400 pairs of shoes per day for one base section. Each base
section contained dumps, warehouses, bakeries, sales stores, offices, ports, civilian and military
hospitals, fuel storage facilities, maintenance shops, lumber yards, map depots, wineries,
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equipment assembly plants, motor pools, graveyards, rifle ranges, personnel replacement depots,
and rest camps.
Figure 9: Ration Dump at Oran

By May 1943, the US theater would store over 25 million pounds of meat, almost two
million pounds of fish, and twenty million pounds of dehydrated milk. 239 In the Mediterranean
Base Section, these facilities occupied 47 different locations spread across an area the size of
Georgia. 240 Coordinating everything was the Services of Supply - a headquarters initially
authorized only 97 officers and 200 men, a minuscule number of personnel to be responsible for
sustaining a theater that was already approximately 154,200 square miles and contained
hundreds of thousands of men. 241 This was an immense operation to set up and operate in such
an extreme environment.
Labor was a serious problem across the theater and the base sections had to use a
combination of US military labor, casual native labor, more formal native labor companies and
Italian POW service units to meet the required workload. Native labor units consisted of Arabs
over the age of 35 inducted by the local French authorities. In the Eastern Base Section, for
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example, there were only enough US service forces to do about 33 percent of the total labor
requirement.
Figure 10: Local Labor 242

Due to a general lack of personnel, the base sections hired a large quantity
of local French labor to augment US headquarters units. Support units needed
typists, translators, laborers, and real estate appraisers. Arabs largely
provided the bulk of the common, unskilled labor. By June, the Atlantic Base
Section had employed 14,815 local workers and the Mediterranean Base
Section had 12,498. 243 No figures are available for the Eastern Base Section. As an incentive,
local labor received US ration cards for goods that were hard to find on the local economy, such
as tea, coffee, sugar, and cloth. Many of the Arab laborers even preferred rationed supplies to
the three-franc daily wage because they could later sell the rationed goods on the black market at
a substantial profit. 244
The single rail line along the North African coast presented challenges of coordination
between the Allies and the local French authorities. Compounding the problem was the initial
lack of a central NATOUSA transportation section. On one occasion, the Eastern Base Section
required a resupply of French francs to conduct purchases from local suppliers and venders. The
Services of Supply arranged a shipment of one million francs with the Atlantic and
Mediterranean Base Sections, under the plan to disguise the money in a piece of laundry
equipment and to provide only a small guard. At some point in the journey, both the lone guard
and the laundry machine were lost. An Army laundry and bath unit later contacted the Atlantic
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Base Section and stated that, upon opening a replacement laundry machine, they found a box full
of French currency and asked for guidance on what to do with the newfound wealth. Eventually
the base section recovered all of the money, except for a thousand francs. However, a better
means of coordinating movements among the different support organizations could have easily
prevented this entire incident from occurring. 245 Situations such as this helped to point out
deficiencies in the theater support organization and NATOUSA took notice. By the end of 1943,
the Services of Supply had a central movement’s office and this became the standard for all
follow-on operations within the Mediterranean theater.

Building up the Theater
Having an authorization document was just the first step toward the functional establishment
of a Services of Supply. Although the new headquarters was authorized personnel, it still took
time to assemble and train the staff. By the end of February 1943, only 47 officers were
available for duty, although the Services of Supply had been required to begin immediate
oversight of the theater’s sustainment operations upon its activation. 246 By the end of March
1943, the situation was dire enough to force Larkin to travel to AFHQ and argue for more
personnel. Services of Supply NATOUSA was at only a skeletal fill for personnel and few of
those that had been assigned were trained or experienced in supply matters. The ports were still
inadequate, roads were poor, and rail and signal lines were limited. Larkin knew AFHQ was
considering the employment of five divisions in Tunisia, but Services of Supply NATOUSA did
not have the capability to provide all that was required of it.
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The message Larkin left at AFHQ was that the Services of Supply needed adequate
resourcing or the future operations and the lives of thousands of soldiers would be at risk. This
put both AFHQ and the US War Department on notice: key positions within the Services of
Supply needed filling by qualified personnel or there could be theater-wide and even strategic,
repercussions. 247 AFHQ understood the need and by April 23, 1943, a cable was at the War
Department requesting approval for a Services of Supply headquarters of 594 personnel - double
the size of the original authorization.248 The fill of personnel still lagged behind authorizations,
however, and by June 5, 1943, the Services of Supply was still at only at half-fill of its
authorized personnel. 249
Larkin did what he could to make the personnel situation known to his higher headquarters
and there was support for the requested increases, but the realities of having too few trained
service personnel in the Army forced the Services of Supply to be innovative, flexible, and to
make due as best it could. The Services of Supply had tried to stand up a casual detachment of
200 officers and 600 enlisted men, but Hughes canceled the move because AFHQ had not
approved the proposal. 250 Larkin and his Services of Supply were simply another demand
against a growing worldwide demand for service forces as the different theaters continued to
expand their level of operations. Until the fill of service units, improved North African base
section commanders were simply unable to do everything they needed to do. 251
One area of contention between Generals Gray and Larkin was the command chain for the
rail forces. While the Rail Division supported Services of Supply NATOUSA in carrying out
247
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sustainment operations for the North African theater, the Division did not report directly to the
Services of Supply. Instead, the commanding general of the rail division was “responsible to the
Deputy Theater Commander for the well being, discipline, and training of the United States’ railway troops.” 252 Larkin could ask Gray for support, but Gray ultimately worked for Hughes.
Although this arrangement ultimately worked, the command arrangement was not as clean and
efficient as it might have otherwise been. However, considering the personalities of the generals,
it probably was the optimal arrangement.
US ground units were not the only forces reliant on the Services of Supply for support; the
North African air and naval components required support as well. To bring efficiency to the
theater, Services of Supply was responsible for providing all common support to US forces
regardless of service. Base sections provided items such as petroleum, food, construction
supplies, and vehicles. Special items, such as aircraft repair parts, special ammunition, or naval
equipment, were the responsibility of the respective component. This was a two-way street: the
Services of Supply had to provide the needed supplies, but the services were required to provide
timely and accurate requisitions and forecasts. 253
Supply forecasting by all the services was part art, part science, and part luck. Allied Force
Headquarters identified major operations six to twelve months in advance, allowing planners an
opportunity to develop broad resupply plans and requirements. However, planners and
commanders often modified operations plans up to the date of execution, resulting in changes in
logistical requirements. The War Department required the receipt of requisitions at least 45 days
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prior to a convoy’s sail date. This meant that the theater needed to have requisitions from its
components at least 60 days prior to the convoy sail date. 254 If one added in the transit time of a
convoy (two to four weeks, depending on the route and type of ships), then requisitions needed
to be at NATOUSA three months before the supplies were actually needed.
Requirements for these other services could be heavy. For example, the III Air Service Area
Command, on a daily basis, required 250 tons of fuel and 50 tons of bombs and ammunition at
Tunis-Bizerte, with an additional 450 tons of fuel and 250 tons of bombs and ammunition at Cap
Bon. Additionally, the Enfideville-Kairouan area needed 350 tons of fuel and 250 tons of bombs
and ammunition. 255 This totaled 1,050 tons of fuel and 550 tons of munitions every day for this
one air service area alone.
Sustainment for the Air Corps and the airfields quickly became a major endeavor for the
Services of Supply. The rains, which began in December 1942, quickly turned airfields into mud
fields. Broken stone laid on top of dirt had initially served as a serviceable runway during
November, but after the rains arrived, the stone simply sunk into the mud. Steel matting was the
only appropriate material that could resurrect the runways and taxiways; however, a single
runway required 2,000 tons of matting. This equaled two day’s worth of the entire rail capacity
for the forward area. 256 This need for matting occurred at the same time AFHQ was working to
resupply the front line forces, which was an even higher priority. The inability to move materiel
forward to improve the airfields played a large role in Eisenhower’s decision to abandon his
hopes of an early seizure of Tunisia.
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As the theater grew, the war became a war of attrition, which meant that it became a war of
resources. The Allies realized this and spent great effort in developing North Africa into a base
of operations. A look at the German situation shows that the enemy chose to approach the issue
of theater support from a different angle - one that profoundly limited the Axis forces’ ability to
fight.

Logistics on the Other Side of the Hill
The German supply situation was dire even before the Torch landings. The Afrika Korps
commander, Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, complained to his superiors that in the first eight
months of 1942, German desert forces had only received 40 percent of the 120,000 tons of
requested supplies. 257 Continuous operations over the open desert ruined German vehicles and
there were not enough engineer units or resources to build more roads.
In the fall of 1942, the Axis army in North Africa was in the middle of a long retreat, heading
west, back from El Alamein, with the British Eighth Army in pursuit. Less than a third of
German tanks were serviceable and British Aircraft were effectively targeting the fuel tankers
destined for Rommel’s North African ports. 258 The situation only became direr as the operation
went on.
Rommel and the Axis force of North Africa faced four problems. First, Hitler considered
North Africa a secondary front so it received fewer resources from the German high command.
Second, Malta served as an effective base of operations for the British air and sea services in the
Mediterranean, allowing them to target the supply convoys steaming out of Italy or southern
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Europe. Third, the Germans did not have a single organization within North Africa to handle the
organization of the supply effort or centrally manage limited resources. The services each took
care of their own needs. This meant that the army might divert a shipment of fuel to the front
lines, when it could achieve a greater good with the Luftwaffe. Conversely, the Luftwaffe might
divert fuel to its airfields, when the Army really needed it at the front. Lastly, the Germans did
not have the truck capacity needed to sustain an Army over extended distances for a long period.
By January 1944, Rommel notes that the shortage of supply trucks and long distances meant
that he could only receive 50 tons of supplies per day, compared to the 400 tons that he needed.
“The result was to be seen in deficiencies of every possible kind.” 259 Perhaps part of the problem
was also the lack of importance the Germans seem to have given to logistics staff officers. In the
US theater, Eisenhower had a major general in charge of the communication zone, a major
general heading the Services of Supply, and a brigadier general serving as the US theater G4. In
contrast, Rommel’s supply officer was Major Otto. 260
Field Marshal Kesselring, the Axis commander-in-chief and Rommel’s immediate superior,
believed that the protection and organization of the overseas line of communication was of
decisive importance and that the Italian Navy with its weak air forces had failed to secure line of
communications. In fact, Kesselring labeled the failure to protect the sea-lanes between Italy and
its colonies, along with the deterioration of the German Supply Service in Tunisia, as two Axis
crucial mistakes of the North African campaign. 261
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The concerted Allied attack on the Axis lines of communication achieved the desired effect.
Kesselring notes that the interdiction of the sea lines by Allied air, marine, and submarine forces
kept supplies from arriving in North Africa. A similar attack on German ground traffic within
North Africa made the supply situation “intolerable.” 262 The Germans had enough problems
supplying Rommel when he was only facing the British Eighth Army; the addition of another
Allied force to the west made North Africa unwinnable for the Axis.
In December of 1942, however, both sides had limited supplies and transportation. In the
race for Tunisia, the side that could more effectively and efficiently produce and distribute the
means to fight had the clear advantage. The Services of Supply might not win the war by itself,
but if it failed in its mission, the Services of Supply could easily cause the failure of the entire
Allied Mediterranean campaign. However, besides supporting US and some British forces, the
Services of Supply also had the task of reequipping and supplying the large number of Free
French forces within North Africa. Totaling over 300,000 men, the Free French represented a
large pool of combat forces that could not support themselves.

Rearming the French
One development that provided a strategic boon to Eisenhower, but with a logistic
implication, was the agreement to rearm and outfit the Free French forces of North Africa.
Under the terms of the agreements coordinated between the different commanders on the ground,
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French commanders retained command of their forces, but agreed, “to operate in a spirit of
consultation and cooperation with Allied forces.” 263
The US used the proposal of rearming French forces as a means to help convince French
officers to join up with the Allied cause. By 1941, the Free French had established a national
committee in London under the presidency of General de Gaulle. The British provided the initial
equipment to some 30,000 Free French forces outside of Vichy control, using items supplies
from the US through the Lend-Lease Act. 264
The capitulation of the French in North Africa dramatically added to the numbers of Free
French forces. Through the agreement signed by Admiral Darlan and General Clark on
November 22, the French agreed to join the Allied cause. By the end of November 1942, the
Free French Africa Army numbered over 300,000 men. The French needed large amounts of
training, equipment, and supplies. 265 Despite these problems, they represented a large pool of
manpower - one that Eisenhower could not ignore.
The worst aspect of the French forces was the overall lack of equipment. The French had
insufficient equipment to deal with the armor on German tanks, which affected unit efficiency
and morale. 266 Agreements reached at the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, stipulated
that Eisenhower was the “final approving authority for French requisitions and that any rearmed
French forces were to be given missions under the Allied Commander-in Chief’s direction.” 267
This provided Eisenhower with a tremendous advantage. The Allieds based the French-Allied
relationship on cooperation, but if the French wished to enact a different strategy than the one the
263

“History of Allied Force Headquarters, volume 2, part 1. December 1942-December 1943,” 105.
Marcel Vigneras, Rearming the French (Washington: Center of Military History, 1989), 9.
265
Ibid., 17-18.
266
“Report by General Dwight D. Eisenhower on Operations in the Mediterranean Area 1942-1944,” 31
267
“History of Allied Force Headquarters, volume 2, part 1. December 1942-December 1943,” 107-108.
264

130

Allies proposed, all Eisenhower had to do was to threaten to cut off supplies for French forces.
This situation played itself out in December 1943, when the French Committee of National
Defense declined to send a rearmed unit, the 9th Colonial Infantry, to the Italian front. After
Eisenhower issued a telegram threatening to cut off the rearmament program, the Committee of
National Defense reconsidered its position and agreed to send the 9th Colonial to Italy as AFHQ
had requested. 268
The rearming of the French was not just limited to ground forces. Speaking before Roosevelt
and Churchill at the Anfa Conference in January 1943, the senior French commander, General
Giraud, asked to rearm the French Air Force as well - including 50 fighter squadrons, 30 light
bomber squadrons, and other transport squadrons. This totaled over 1,000 aircraft. 269
The impact of supporting French rearmament was that the Allies gained a sizeable fighting
force, one that was knowledgeable with local customs and terrain. However, the rearmed French
forces also had an impact on the mission of the theater sustainment units. The base sections
received the mission to reequip the French forces using US equipment. The amount of
equipment required for this effort was impressive. During April to May 1943, the Atlantic Base
Section equipped a French Armored Regiment, one tank destroyer battalion, an armored
reconnaissance battalion, and eight anti-aircraft battalions with all the necessary equipment to
function as a fighting force, to include 1067 vehicles, 586 trailers, 237 half-tracks, 214 tanks, 39
tank destroyers, and 111 anti-aircraft guns. 270 Additionally, the base sections had to provide
instructors to train French forces on the new equipment.
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The French provided a sizeable addition to the Allied military strength in North Africa,
stating that they could contribute up to eight infantry and two armored divisions within a month
after the Allied landings. 271 As French North Africa came under Allied control, the number of
French forces increased the Allied militaries by 197,000 and by November 22, 1942, the French
had over 300,000 men under arms. This included an infantry division in Tunisia; three infantry
divisions plus a light mechanized brigade in Algeria; and two infantry divisions, a light
mechanized brigade, and 5,000 goumer forces in French Morocco. 272 In early 1943, the French
forces represented available labor, but needed an infusion of supplies and equipment to make
them effective in combat. The French had lost half of their aircraft, tanks, and other heavy
equipment. 273 Many units had outdated equipment. Men needed everything from underwear to
uniforms to rifles. After the force was reequipped, it also had to be sustained with ammunition,
fuel, food, repair parts, and other like items. Additionally, the French forces needed an overhaul
of their entire sustainment system.
The Free French forces represented both an added capability for the Allies, as well as an
added demand for scarce resources. The French would prove to play an important role in the
Mediterranean theater through their force contributions, but the benefit was not without cost. To
use the Free French, the US had to provide most of the equipment and supplies needed to sustain
these forces in combat. By the war’s end, the US had provided 10,731 machine guns, 1,406
tanks, 27,176 trucks, and 1,417 aircraft for French use. 274

This was a tremendous amount of

equipment, especially considering the worldwide demand for such items. The Pacific theater and
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Soviet Union were likewise clamoring for items and any item provided to the French was one
less available for some other requirement. In addition, once equipped, the base sections kept the
French units supplied with everything from food, to fuel, to ammunition, and repair parts.
Regardless of the cost, equipping the French provided at least an additional eight divisions to the
Allies - divisions they otherwise would not have had. To Eisenhower, the decision to rearm the
French was a simple one.
American ordnance units assumed responsibility for the rearmament of the French. Plans
called for French forces to assemble the lend-lease vehicles arriving from the states, but the
French lacked the equipment, personnel, and experience necessary to accomplish the task. 275
Schools had to be set up to train the French on the unfamiliar equipment. The French had good
attitudes regarding fighting, but failed to take care of equipment. The increased wear and tear of
US equipment issued to the French placed an additional burden on American maintenance units.
Manuals and stock records all required translation into French, and then requisitions translated
back into English. 276
Reequipping and then supporting a force like this presented a unique challenge for the base
sections and the Services of Supply. Not only did the French represent an additional demand on
the supply system, but they also introduced a new culture and different set of expectations. This
represented the essence of operating as part of a coalition; capitalizing on each nation’s strengths
and capabilities while working to overcome any shortfalls. Eisenhower and his subordinates
realized that this was not easy, but it was important.
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By April 1943, the North African theater was essentially set. AFHQ was the Allied theater
headquarters, while NATOUSA served as the US theater headquarters. The Services of Supply
managed work in the communications zone. The three base sections were maturing with a
growing capacity, while the service units within the base sections found themselves bringing
order out of chaos via available military and civilian resources and infrastructure. Eisenhower
was now ready to finish the fight in North Africa and the communications zone was set to
support the operation.
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Chapter V: The Fight for Tunisia, 1943
The first essential condition for an army to be able to stand the strain of battle is
an adequate stock of weapons, petrol, and ammunition. In fact, the battle is
fought and decided by the Quartermasters before the shooting begins. The
bravest men can do nothing without guns, the guns nothing without plenty of
ammunition, and neither guns nor ammunition are of much use in mobile
warfare unless there are vehicles with sufficient petrol to haul them around.
--Field Marshal Erwin Rommel, The Rommel Papers 277

With the missed opportunity to grab Tunisia in December 1942, Eisenhower faced the need
to prepare for a war of attrition. Earlier chapters show how the US theater developed during the
pause that occurred during the winter of 1942-43, a pause that allowed AFHQ to create a formal
communications zone. The base sections began organizing the rear while engineers worked
feverishly to build installations and airfields. As a result, the North African communications
zone of 1943 was much more capable and agile than its European predecessor from 1918. North
Africa now possessed improved transportation infrastructure, better management of
transportation resources, more mission-ready trucks, and numerous supply dumps. Allied
aircraft routinely attacked Axis shipping in the western Mediterranean. The Allies were ready to
finish the fight in Tunisia and begin the next step across the Atlantic.
In early 1943, however, the Axis forces of North Africa were not yet ready to hand the Allies
an easy victory. Eisenhower put his forces on the defensive, but Rommel still had a chance to
strike deep into Allied territory and cause real harm to the forces of Torch before turning his
attention to the east and dealing with Montgomery’s Eighth Army. The battle for Tunisia was
not a fait accompli.
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This chapter analyzes the buildup of support of the final struggle for Tunisia, a period lasting
from January to May 1943. During this time, the Allies established a theater capable of
supporting a long-term war of attrition - a theater that would enable the first collective victory
against a major Axis force. This victory is important because it was the first step towards
clearing Germany out the Mediterranean and opening the way into southern Europe. Victory in
Tunisia represented a maturing of the US theater support structure and helped pave the way for
the invasion of Sicily, which occurred less than two months after Tunisia fell.
Considered in total, the invasion of North Africa, the establishment of the theater and the
victory in Tunisia all provide exactly what the US forces of 1942 needed - a chance to practice
and rehearse amphibious landings, as well as to provide for the continuous support of forces once
they are ashore. One must learn to walk before trying to run and North Africa provided such an
opportunity. To have done otherwise would have invited disaster and a caused a probable
lengthening of the war effort.

Strategic Setting
The failure to capture Tunisia in 1942 forced a reexamination of Allied strategy. At the Anfa
conference of January 1943, Allied leaders had agreed to an invasion of Sicily in the summer of
1943. This meant that the Allies had to finish the fight in Tunisia during the spring of 1943 in
order to meet the deadlines associated with preparing for this follow-on invasion. Unfortunately,
winter rains needed to end before AFHQ could launch a full-scale offensive and the rainy season
traditionally lasted until the end of March. 278
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The rains, terrain, and enemy situation outlined the parameters of the Allied plan. Rommel’s
force had retreated up into Tunisia. The British Eighth Army extended west, out of Tripoli.
Eisenhower’s forces would have to hold the western flank until conditions improved to support
an attack in the spring of 1943.
By January, Rommel commanded approximately 100,000 Axis forces, comprised of 74,000
Germans and 26,000 Italians. The Italians were all dismounted infantry and needed German
transport to keep up with the rate German mechanized units. German units were only at levels of
about half of their authorized strength and only one-third of their equipment was operational. 279
Hitler had originally intended for North Africa to be a secondary theater where Rommel
would head a small force intended to hold back British advances. By the summer of 1942,
however, successful advances across North Africa convinced Hitler to place a new priority on
North Africa operations. The German High Command allocated additional resources for
Rommel’s forces, but the Italians remains responsible for shipping resources to Axis units
operating in Africa. Ultimately, a combination of decisive Allied air attacks on Axis shipping in
the Mediterranean and the lack of a capable supply and transportation network within North
Africa led to a situation in which Rommel’s forces routinely received only a fraction of the total
supplies required.
Fighting in January occurred generally along the eastern dorsal passes of Tunisia. Allied
units possessed better logistics, but were relatively inexperienced. German units had the
experience, but lacked the units, cooperation, supplies, and equipment needed to achieve a
breakthrough.
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In January, Eisenhower had repositioned II Corps to the east in an attempt to push through
the German lines and reach the port town of Sfax, splitting Rommel’s force in half. The Eastern
Base Section pushed its supply depots forward by using the rail line from Constantine to Bone
and then to Souk Ahras, at a rate of 250 tons per day. Supply points extended as far east as
Kasserine. However, a German attack against Faid Pass on January 30 convinced Eisenhower to
call off the Allied attack and to put II Corps on a defensive setting instead. 280
In February, Rommel tried once again to break through the western Allied lines. Fearing that
the Americans might again try to split the Axis forces, Rommel gained approval to attack the US
formation in the west and then swing his forces to the east to deal with Montgomery. The plan
called for General von Armin’s Panzer Army to strike west from northern Tunisia, while
Rommel’s Afrika Korps converged from the south, forming a pincer attack in the direction of
Kasserine.
The attack commenced on February 14. Three days later, the 21st and 10th Panzer Divisions
had seized their initial objectives. The Fifth Panzer Army characterized its supply situation as
acceptable. Rommel was ready to push on through Kasserine Pass in an attempt to sieve the port
of Bone, a move that would outflank Eisenhower’s forces. The attack began on February 19.
The Axis attack made rapid advances against inexperienced and ill positioned US and British
units. Service units destroyed ammunition, gasoline, and other supplies near Sbeitla in fear of
the German advance. The US garrison evacuated the town of Gafsa. The drive in Tebessa
convinced II Corps to evacuate its large supply dumps. Units set fire to everything they could
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not move. 281 The II Corps railhead at Ferianna held approximately 55,000 gallons of fuel - fuel
that the service units could not evacuate, but would be a prize for the German Panzers. Allied
units in the area filled their vehicles and then the Quartermasters fired tracer rounds into the
remaining drums and fuel cans, igniting the dump. Tebessa became the fall back position for II
Corps support units and the main support base for the battle. 282
Whether Rommel realized it or not, Tebessa represented the one objective that could provide
his divisions with the resources needed to sustain their drive to Bone. With the US pullback
from forward positions on February 16, Tebessa now held over a half million gallon of gasoline
and a million rations. 283 Rommel’s forces lacked these same supplies. If Rommel overran
Tebessa, he could seize the supplies needed to keep his armies on the offense.
Rommel asked to pursue the advance, but little support from von Arnim and poor road
conditions slowed the attack. The Germans controlled Kasserine Pass by the night of February
19, but delays allowed II Corps and the British to reinforce its positions. By February 22, Allied
units had reinforced themselves to the point where Rommel felt there was little chance of further
success. The Germans only had a few days worth of food and ammunition remaining and there
was little reserve fuel. 284 On February 23, Rommel pulled his units back to the east, giving back
Kasserine. 285
The battle was costly for Eisenhower. Besides the casualties, II Corps also lost 183 tanks,
194 half-tracks, 208 pieces of artillery, and 512 trucks. Units needed replacement equipment
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before the Allies could consider a large attack. In addition, some items, such as the Sherman
tank, needed immediate updating to deal with superior German equipment. 286
Following the battle, Hitler tried to fix the German command and control problems by
placing all German ground units under Rommel’s command, with the title Army Group Afrika.
However, Rommel’s time in Africa was limited. Following Kasserine, the German commander
had increasing difficulty with his heart, nerves, and rheumatism. On February 26, Rommel
wrote his wife complaining of his health problems and mentioned that the conditions did not
exist in North Africa for victory. “Everything depends on supplies,” Rommel wrote. 287
Ultimately, neither the German supply situation nor Rommel’s health would improve. On March
10, Hitler recalled Rommel to Germany for health reasons, passing command of Army Group
Afrika to General von Arnim.
Both sides used the following month to consolidate their positions, rest the troops, and
prepare for the next fight. The Allies needed to reequip themselves and re-establish the supply
dumps evacuated during the German advance. Salvage crews from the Eastern Base Section
gathered up debris from the battlefields and trucked it off to depots for sorting and repair.
Engineers worked to reestablish damaged rail lines and roads. By March 6, 1943, the Base
Section had restocked the theater and Patton was now in command of II Corps. The Allies were
preparing for the final drive through Tunisia.
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Positioning the Force
As II Corps moved back east, the boundary of the Eastern Base Section moved east was well.
This followed established doctrine—as the combat zone shifted forward, the leading boundary of
the communications zone also moved up. This ensured that the combat forces could maintain a
focus on the enemy without having to dedicate additional resources to maintain a lengthening
supply line. However, someone had to deal with the lengthening lines of communication so this
fell upon the service units in the communication zone. By April 8, 1943, the Eastern Base
Section had moved its boundary as far east as Tebessa. 288 Advanced depots became general
depots. Engineers worked to improve road and rail lines to support the increasing usage of the
limited infrastructure. The base sections used all available seaports along the northern coastline
to support the flow of materiel into the theater.
The final phase of the North African campaign started in April 1943. The combined pressure
from the British Eighth Army on the east and from the British First Army and US II Crops in the
west forced von Arnim to collapse the German defense in southern Tunisia and concentrate his
forces into an arc in northeast Tunisia. This allowed Axis forces an opportunity to concentrate
their units and shorten their lines of communication.
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General Alexander, Eisenhower’s commander for ground operations, devised a plan to stage
II Corps along the northern part of the front. Montgomery’s Eighth Army was to attack from the
south. The main effort would come from the British First Army, positioned south of II Corps.
Figure 11: The Final Push for Tunisia 289

In response to the developing situation, the Allies reorganized their lines in Tunisia during
the middle of April 1943. The British shifted forces from the Eighth Army on the coastal plain
to the zone of British IX Corps east of Le Kef. The US II Corps moved 140 miles to the north to
occupy an area in northern Tunisia east of Bédja. 290 This move, which occurred in only four
days, from 14-18 April, forced a complete shifting of the eastern US supply line. There were
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competing demands on the limited road and rail networks in the region as the British were
hesitant to allocate more than 250 tons per day out of the available rail capacity. A deal between
the Services of Supply and the British allocated an additional 250 tons per day between Souk
Ahras and Bédja, in exchange for British use of an equal tonnage on the American narrow-gage
track between Ouled Rahmoun and Tebessa. 291 Arrangements like this supported the needs of
both armies and allowed the Eastern Base Section to shift its line of communication to the front
while also building a stock of supplies for the upcoming fight.
To support operations in Tunisia, the Atlantic and Mediterranean base sections acted as
intermediate-level bases, providing bulk supplies to the Eastern Base Section, which directly
supplied the combat zone. The Mediterranean Base Section established an advance ordnance
deport at Constantine, capable of supplying all US forces east of Algiers with 15 days of supply.
This push of supplies allowed the Eastern Base Section to focus its efforts forward toward II
Corps, with the main supply route running from Constantine to Tebessa.
To meet the increased demand, the Eastern Base Section established supply depots at
Tebessa, Ouled Rahmoun, Bone, Mateur, Tabarka, and Philippeville - with the one at
Philippeville supporting over 40,000 troops. Due to labor shortages, all depots operated with
reduced staffs.
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For the attack across Tunisia, the Eastern Base Section established a stockage goal of 21 days
of supplies and enough ammunition for six units of fire. 293 Trucks from the Eastern Base
Section delivered supplies to II Corps supply dumps, which were typically 15-30 miles behind
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the forward areas of the combat zone. German air attacks had subsided by this time so food,
fuel, and ammunition distribution generally occurred during daylight and the dumps required no
camouflage, only dispersion for security.

294

Once supplies were at the dumps, II Corps truck

units pushed supplies forward to the front-line units.
The British First Army had operated in Tunisia since the landings of Torch so they were
never far from their ports and a developed support system. The British Eighth Army, however,
faced an ever-growing line of communication. Pursuing Rommel since the battle of El Alamein
in November 1942, the Eighth Army had to deal with a line of communications that extended
itself day after day. The capture of ports along the African coastline, such as Tobruk, helped
shorten the overall distance supplies traveled by road, but extended British sea shipping
distances. Additionally, as the Army moved forward the British support bases moved as well.
The British First Army enjoyed a fixed and robust support base unavailable to the Eighth Army.
The arrival of Montgomery’s forces into central Tunisia in March 1943 allowed the Allies to
reorganize their lines of communication and begin supporting Montgomery from the west.
In April 1943, the Eastern Base Section opened a supply line between Ouled Rahmoun and
Tebessa, providing a new line of communications to the Montgomery’s Eighth Army, which up
until then had been receiving its supplies from as far away in the east as Tobruk and Egypt. The
rapid movement into Tunisia and the contraction of the front had caused major supply challenges
for the 18th Army Group so the diversion of US supplies provided needed relief. 295 The new line
of supply was just 100 miles long. As the British pressed north along the Tunisian coastline the

294

“Report of Colonel James Edmunds on Supply in NATO.” Located in “Report of Observers, Mediterranean Theater of
Operations, US Army Ground Forces Observer Board, vol II.” US Army Ground Forces Observer Board, 1942-1945. June 26,
1943. MHI. 1-2.
295
“Report by General Dwight D. Eisenhower on Operations in the Mediterranean Area 1942-1944,” 41.

144

supply line reversed itself as the Allies liberated the Tunisian ports of Gabes and Sfax from the
Germans. The Allies were able to offload ships at these ports and truck supplies overland back
to the base section depots, thus providing shorter routes from the ports to the forces and adding
more port capacity to the Services of Supply. 296
Upon recapturing of the airfield at Gafsa, II Corps turned the facility into a forward supply
dump for Montgomery’s use as well. This allowed the Allies to stockpile resources in
anticipation of Eighth Army’s northward advance. 297 The plan worked and by April 15, the
British Eighth Army had moved north, through the Mareth position, and stood before the Axis
defensive Enfidaville Line. 298
The Eastern Base Section worked to position supplies as far forward on the battlefield as
possible so that combat units would not have to come far into the rear for resupply, especially for
fuel, ammunition, and rations. The movement of petroleum presented unique challenges.
Gasoline and other bulk fuels traveled to North Africa in large tankers, but these fuels required
special trucks or containers for further distribution.
The distribution of fuel within North Africa occurred through a combination of pipelines,
rail, and trucks. Pipeline and rail provided the most efficient means of movement, but at some
point, quartermaster units had to transfer the fuel into smaller containers, put them onto trucks,
and then transport these containers to the front lines.
The 2004th Engineer Pipeline constructed a pipeline from Philippeville to Ouled Rahmoun,
along with a bulk storage tank farm, on April 6, 1943. This pipeline had the capacity of moving
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500 tons of fuel per day, the equivalent of 200 2 ½ ton cargo trucks. The pipeline proved to be
so successful that a second pipeline was started a week later from Bone’ to Souk el Arba.
Together, these two pipelines moved 1,200 tons of fuel per day, relieving 480 cargo trucks for
other materiel. 299 During the month of April alone, the Eastern Base Section alone provided
over 7,800,000 gallons of fuel to the US II Corps and Air Corps. 300
Sabotage was a constant problem because these pipelines were exposed and largely
unprotected. Mounted Arabs with incendiary bullets often hit the pipeline, causing a spout of
flaming fuel to leap upward. Roving guards failed to stop the sabotage. One day, a reserve
officer, who had worked in civilian construction and knew the cultures of the French and Arabs,
suggested that the Eastern Base Section should contract out security of the pipeline to the French
and levy fines if the pipeline were damaged. The French, in turn, would contract the Arab
Caliphs, with the same provision of a fine for any damage. Pence supported the idea so the base
section made the proposal to the French. The French government agreed to the contract as long
as they could execute it as they saw fit. Almost overnight the shooting and vandalism stopped,
US guards were able to return to their normal jobs, and the fuel moved forward. 301
The lack of ground transportation resources caused a missed opportunity for the Allies at the
beginning of Operation Torch and, by March 1943, despite the efforts to increase the number of
trucks in North Africa, transportation shortages remained. Base section planners had estimated
that the rail line from Philippeville to Ouled Rahmoun could handle 1,500 tons per day, but this
soon fell quickly behind due to the limited network. Following the German breakthrough at
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Kasserine Pass, the Allies had to work quickly to move ammunition and other essential supplies
forward to support a counter-offensive against Axis forces. To meet the increased demand the
Services of Supply formed new truck companies and leveraged resources from across the
communications zone. A single truck regiment, the 46th Quartermaster, handled the control and
administration of over 6,000 troops. The Services of Supply formed a Movement Control Group
to provide for operational control of all trucks. Engineer, Armored, Infantry, and Artillery units
provided the drivers. 302
Challenges accompanied the formation of these new truck units. Soldiers were untrained on
convoy operations and their officers were untrained on leading truck units. There was an overall
shortage of tools needed for vehicle maintenance, and even if the tools were available, there was
a shortage of repair parts. One unit arrived in the area with no tools other than the few small kits
that accompanied each vehicle. 303 Despite these setbacks, however, the transportation capacity
steadily increased. A spirit of cooperation and desire to accomplish the mission overcame many
obstacles.
German commanders, including Rommel, had argued that North Africa was a losing
proposition and that the High Command should evacuate Axis forces while there was time.
Hitler refused to listen to these proposals, taking the same no-compromise position that he held
for the Eastern Front against the Soviets. Hitler wanted to hold Tunisia at all costs.
The Allied attack began in the British Eighth Army sector the night of 19-20 April 1943.
The British initially broke through the Italian defensive line, but General Bayerlein quickly
repositioned forces to plug the hole, stalling the British attack for four days. The following
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night, 20-21 April, the Germans made their own attack against the British First Army and
penetrated about five miles before stalling against the main defensive positions. 304
The British First Army launched its attack on April 22, which quickly developed into a major
battle, breaking through the German Afrika Korps’s northwest flank. Divisions fought each
other, incurring heavy losses and consuming large amounts of fuel and ammunition. By April
26, German supplies were running low. Limited amounts of fuel constrained the movement of
German tanks and trucks. Axis units were short of the munitions needed to repel a strong Allied
attack. By April 30, the lack of fuel immobilized the Axis force, but it kept on fighting and
somehow held off Allied attacks in the critical sector of Djebel Bou Aoukaz. 305
II Corps started its attack to the east on April 23, in an attempt to move through the
mountainous Djebel region and head towards Mateur and Bizerte. The terrain in the 9th Infantry
Division’s area was especially rough, with few roads and limited mobility. The Services of
Supply and Eastern Base Section had built a sizeable line of communication forward from the
ports, but the end of the chain for many combat battalions involved moving supplies by mule for
several miles. 306
The Corps made steady advances. A daily train from Beja carried essential supplies forward
from the supply dumps. At times II Corps resorted to the use of combat vehicles, such as tanks,
to move artillery ammunition forward. 307
There were still occasional problems in the US supply effort. On one occasion, the daily
supply train for II Corps carried rations for 50,000 men. These consisted of 16 rail cars of peanut
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butter, plus a rail car of crackers, grapefruit juice, and flour. The II Corps G4 sent trucks back to
the Eastern Base Section to draw rations better suited for combat and to explain that 17 cars of
food did not necessarily mean a full issue of everything needed to feed a Corps. 308
The base sections all established hospitals within the communication zone to treat the
wounded, sick, and injured. A critical link in the medical care structure was the system of
evacuation from the front. Medics at the front provided initial care to stabilize the wounded, but
the quicker a wounded soldier arrived at a hospital, the better the chances of recovery. The
Tunisian campaign used three methods of transportation for casualty evacuation: ambulance,
train, and aircraft. Ground ambulances evacuated the bulk of casualties. A daily hospital train
also carried the wounded from Tebessa to Ouled Rahmoun. Aircraft moved only about 95
patients per day. 309
This use of aircraft for casualty evacuation represented an important step in the care of
wounded soldiers. Doctors quickly realized that the more seriously injured could be quickly
moved to more capable treatment facilities in the rear, while avoiding the time and physical
jarring associated with movement by ambulance. Compared to the other evacuation means,
aircraft moved relatively few casualties, but they did serve to validate the concept. This trend of
using aircraft for casualty evacuation would increase exponentially as the campaign in the
Mediterranean expanded and it would be an important part of the later Normandy operations.
The Allied advance continued into early May, pushing the front north and east. Kesselring
begged for supplies, but the German High Command and Italians ignored the requests. On May
3, the city of Mateur fell to II Corps. Von Arnim tried to reinforce Bizerte, but the 10th Panzer
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and 21st Panzer Divisions could not move because they were out of fuel. Axis planes and ferries
landed 1,130 tons of ammunition and 180 tons of fuel on May 4, but it was too little and too
late. 310 II Corps captured Bizerte on May 8 and the British First Army rolled into Tunis on May
9, splitting the Axis force. Von Arnim’s southern flank collapsed on May 12, which led to the
final surrender on May 13. The Allies had finally gained victory in Tunisia and North Africa.
The experiences of the combined US and British force in the Eastern Task Force convinced
commanders that the support of Torch’s units worked best when each nation took care of its own
forces whenever possible. This made eminent sense because the two forces used different types
of equipment, which had different standards and used different repair parts or fired different
calibers of munitions. Uniforms were different, as were dietary expectations. Neither army was
particularly fond of the other’s rations. Despite the loss of efficiency in such a parallel system, it
was effective. The British 1st Line of Communication handled administrative efforts for British
forces located in eastern Algeria and Tunisia. The US Services of Supply took care of US
forces.
Tunisia’s limited infrastructure forced some cooperation between the two support systems,
especially regarding coastal transport. The British volunteered use of their heavy landing craft to
help move supplies and equipment to the Port of La Calle, a small fishing port in northern
Algeria close to the Tunisian border. The port had a relatively shallow draft and no equipment to
offload ships. The British heavy landing craft represented the perfect means to utilize the port—
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these vessels had only an 11-foot draft. These landing craft, along with two portable cranes,
enabled the transformation of a fishing village into a military logistics base. 311
The buildup of reserves in preparation for the final push into Tunisia also saw the use of
balencelles, small Cornish fishing craft. The British Navy used the vessels to haul US materiel
all along the North African coastline. The British provided 14 of these vessels, which sailed
daily in groups of four to six from the Port of Bone. Like landing craft, the balencelles had a
shallow draft and were capable of hauling between 25 to 50 tons of cargo apiece. These ships
proved to be perfect for moving cargo into the shallow-water ports of La Calle, Algeria, and
Tabarka, Tunisia. 312
An increase in the number of available ports helped solve one problem; however, there was
still the challenge of moving supplies inland to the fighting forces. Due to the wide dispersal of
US forces in Tunisia, supply problems plagued II Corps from the start. German and US forces
had destroyed the railway bridges between Fedala to Gafsa and Kasserine to Sbeitla as the battle
line moved back and forth. Everything in the front area, from infantry to supplies, had to move
by truck. 313
As the rate of operations increased in the spring of 1943, so did the workload of the graves
registration units. These units had the unenviable task of establishing temporary or permanent
military cemeteries, identifying the dead, preparing reports of death, and collecting and shipping
the deceased’s personal belongings. The North African climate, the nature of the fighting, and
the tendency of the local populace to despoil graves made the work of the graves registration
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units even harder. Across the battlefield graves were scattered, bodies disinterred, and personal
effects (that would help in identification) were missing. 314
As the Tunisian campaign ended in May 1943, these units worked to consolidate the remains
of killed US servicemen into nine large cemeteries with a personal effects depot located in
Constantine. To help coordinate the effort, each base section identified a Graves Registration
Service Officer and identified potential cemeteries. The Atlantic Base Section had responsibility
for one cemetery, the Mediterranean Base Section had two, and the remainder fell under the
Eastern Base Section due to its proximity to the Tunisian battlefields. Prisoners of war took care
of beautification efforts and civilian caretakers cared for the grounds.

315

Along with the Tunisian offensive in May 1943, the Allies became responsible for housing
and care of a large number of German and Italian prisoners of war (POWs). The base sections
had to transport, guard, feed, and care for these prisoners. By the time Tunisia fell, 275,000
Germans and Italians crowded the prisoner of war camps. 316 To support the burgeoning prisoner
population, base section units used captured German rations and field kitchens helped offset
demands on Allied rations. Empty wine vats became storage for potable water. 317 Fortunately,
morale among the prisoners was good and they needed guides more than they needed guards. 318
The POWs represented another demand on the supply system for resources, but they were
also a possible source of labor. The US Army had an on-going shortage of service forces within
the force and local Arab labor in North Africa was largely untrained, undependable, and required
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close supervision. To take advantage of the situation, Services of Supply NATOUSA instituted a
program aimed at Italian POWs, which offered compensation in exchange for their labor and
support of the Allied war effort. Of the eventual 65,720 Italian POWs that remained within the
Mediterranean theater throughout the war, 62,089 served in organized POW service units. 319
This was the beginning of a program, which, by the summer of 1944, allowed Services of Supply
NATOUSA to augment or replace approximately 175,000 military support positions with Italian
POWs and civilians. 320
By May 13, the Tunisian campaign had ended. The campaign seemingly took a long time to
complete, but, in actuality, it was only seven months between the initial landings and the Axis
surrender in Africa. In this short period, the Allied had landed a sizeable force on the African
continent, established a theater of war, expanded their capabilities, and learned to adapt to the
difficult environment. US forces alone had grown from 128,567 in November 1942 to 395,461
by April 1943—a threefold increase. 321
What allowed all of this to occur was the establishment of a functioning communications
zone; this was the foundation upon which of the Allied victory rested. The base section
commanders had a personal interest in caring for the forces they supported. Services of Supply
NATOUSA had oversight of the entire support structure and could move resources quickly as the
circumstances demanded. Situations, such as the need to increase ground transportation, proved
that the Services of Supply/base section doctrine was indeed flexible and could adapt as needed
to meet the demand of the front line units. However, a lot also depended on the quality and
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timing of the decisions made by key leaders, such as Eisenhower, Hughes, Larkin and Pence.
Commanders in both the combat and communications zones had to understand the needs and
limitations of the other in order for the theater to function. Eisenhower’s decision to delay
offensive operations in the winter of 1942 to allow the support structure to build was just one
example of a decision that was unpopular, necessary, and operationally correct. Ultimately,
victory was assured- not just because of the maneuvering of the Allied force, but also because of
the capabilities provided by the sustainment system.
The surrender of the Axis forces in Tunisia signaled an opportunity to reset the Allied forces,
plan for the next operation, and discuss the lessons of the past six months. There were many
lessons; whether or not the Allied would learn from their mistakes was an entirely different issue.

Lessons Learned from North Africa
Perhaps the most important aspect of Operation Torch and the entire North African campaign
was the experience gained by all the participants, from private up to Commander-in Chief. The
troops learned how to fight, the services learned how to support the front lines, and senior
commanders learned how to run a theater. Just as importantly, the Allies learned how to work
with one another, although there were still officers on all sides that thought ill of the other
partners.
Eisenhower and other senior commanders learned that they needed to rethink the
composition of the initial assault force for future amphibious operations. The force for Torch
had too many combat forces without enough mobility. The force was of the right mix to seize
and hold a harbor, but what the Allies actually needed was a mobile striking force that could
have quickly moved in to seize the campaign’s ultimate objective—Tunisia. Eisenhower later
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wrote, “Additional vehicles would have permitted us to strengthen materially our initial attack
into Tunisia.” 322 As such, the failure to gain Tunis by December was not a mistake; it was “an
impossibility.” 323
Had Tunisia fallen when the Allies had hoped, the Allied attack on mainland Italy could have
occurred in the summer of 1943, instead of the fall. This might have allowed the Allies to push
up far into northern Italy before the onset of winter of 1944, which could have been very
advantageous for the Allies. More difficult is the analysis of what an earlier end to the Tunisian
campaign would have meant politically for the Axis powers. Particularly, would Mussolini still
have been in power during an earlier Allied invasion of Italy? If so, what would this mean in
terms of Italian resistance to the invasion and German reinforcement? Any assessment would be
pure speculation because there are simply too many human variables to consider.
Patton took a slightly different approach to the lessons of Torch, believing that the majority
of the early problems were due to the lack of time and the need for security in the planning
process. The Western Task Force commander noted that successful amphibious operations
depended on surprise, speed, and simplicity. Additionally, Patton felt that although almost every
technical branch felt that it needed more vehicles on the assault, “fighting men must take
precedence over everything else.” 324
At first glance, this seems to ignore the argument for a more balanced assault force; a force,
which could perform a multitude of missions upon landing with the flexibility needed to respond
to strategic opportunities, such as the case that Tunisia presented in December 1942. Indeed,
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even many of the subordinate units within the Western Task Force argued that, in hindsight, they
should have had more service forces and more vehicles in the initial convoy. 325 However, at the
time of the landings Patton focused on the threats posed by the French and the Spanish forces
stationed in the region. The level of French resistance to the Allied assault was unknown at the
time on the landings and the Allies did not know whether the Spanish would choose to intervene
in the conflict. Arguably, Patton planned for the worst-case scenario. Such thoughts may keep a
commander from losing a campaign, but they also may make it harder to win one.
However, upon landing, the worst-case scenario did not happen. The French capitulated
quickly and the Spanish elected to remain behind their borders. Patton’s decision to load as
many combat forces as possible in the initial convoy meant that the force was ashore, but it had
to wait for follow-on convoys before it could build any real capacity to maneuver or sustain
itself. The Allies had played it safe and focused on the beach. A larger gamble of trading off
combat forces in exchange for a more mobile and supportable force probably would have paid
off, but the lack of time between the decision to go and the convoy sail time limited any real
discussion, possibly even consideration, of this option.
The 3rd Infantry Division summed up the impact of deploying with insufficient
transportation. The Division was simply unable to support operations more than 20 miles
beyond the landing beaches. This distance would have been even shorter if a Quartermaster
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battalion had not established a supply dump at Fedala, 10 miles from the beach, with
commandeered civilian trucks and wagons. 326
Despite Patton’s insistence that the fighting forces must take precedence over all else, the
AFHQ staff clearly gained an appreciation for the benefits of having force that could make a
landing on organized beaches, deal with any initial opposition, and then make its way inland to
pursue other missions or opportunities. Torch was the last amphibious assault of the war to
ignore the role of service forces; from this point onward all subsequent landings in the European
and Mediterranean theaters included a better beach organization, transport for forces and
sustainment, and the inclusion of G4/ Services of Supply personnel in the initial assault.
Regarding sustainment operations, one of the main insights of Operation Torch and the entire
North African Campaign was that it was impracticable for the supplies of the British and US
Armies to be entirely standardized. Although the goal was desirable, there were simply too
many differences in equipment, standards, and systems for this to effectively work. 327 At times,
US units tried to use British fuel cans, however the British cans did not have integrated funnels.
Not only did this waste an average of 15 percent of the fuel in the can, but also it took a lot
longer to conduct refueling. 328
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Even in things as simple as food and clothing, the two Allies found that there were different
expectations. One US unit, operating under British control, went seven weeks before receiving a
much-needed resupply of uniforms. 329
However, while the Allies mostly separated the ground forces on a national basis to make
everything as simplistic as possible, they discovered that the two air forces operated best as an
integrated force. This allowed commanders to take advantage of the different characteristics of
the various aircraft. 330 Centralized control of the air forces would later be a contributor to the
success of air operations in the theater’s subsequent campaigns.
Other lessons showed the inexperience of the force. The 1st Infantry Division noted that to
sustain amphibious landings the landing craft and port facilities must operate on a 24-hour basis.
During the landings, landing craft were often idle due to crews taking breaks, landing crews
reporting to the wrong location, and to the under utilization of port facilities. 331 In short, the
navel and ground task forces needed organizations that could make the most of limited resources.
There was widespread realization that amphibious landings required a single officer with
sufficient rank to direct the landing craft. Additionally, the craft operators needed to training on
the operation of the craft, as well as in the mechanics of landing operations.
There were many lessons on the beach operations themselves. Beach parties needed
recovery boats to rescue craft stranded on beaches and reefs, drivers needed training in driving
through the surf and deep sand, and shore parties needed sufficient personnel to operate 24 hours
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a day. Above all, there needed to be unified control of the landings throughout all phases of the
assault. 332
Despite this, the doctrine of beach and shore parties was sound. Problems developed when
units decided to deviate from the doctrine. Amphibious assaults needed a three- battalion shore
party for operations over beaches and the right equipment to repair and clear ports. In all cases,
congestion resulted when commanders reduced the number of trucks specified for an
operation. 333
Regarding training, the Allies learned that it was not enough to train the coxswains on how to
land troops on the right beach and to train the combat forces on how to load/unload the landing
craft, but, perhaps even more importantly, a task force needed to train and rehearse the resupply
plan from the battalion level down to platoon. 334 The Torch landings showed just how hard it
could be to offload bulky supplies into landing craft and then get these onto the shore in some
kind of order. Lowering ropes were too short, vehicles did not fit, and offloading operations
took an exponentially long time to accomplish if the seas were high. US forces had talked
through the offloading plan during rehearsals along the eastern US coast began departing for
Africa, but they never actually rehearsed these operations because of the trouble of unloading,
and then re-loading the ships. Torch showed that these types of rehearsals were difficult, but
needed. It was one thing for an Infantryman to climb down a cargo net into a landing craft, it
was quite another to get a spare tank engine or crate of ammunition into the same boat.
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Many of the insights from Torch would not seem to be especially earth shattering, but they
did make a real difference in later operations. A number of US rations were shipped to North
Africa were packed in plain cardboard boxes. These boxes proved unsuitable for transport
across sea or for storage in outdoor supply dumps or depots. 335 As a result, future shipments
were in waterproof containers suitable for the elements.
Divisions noted that rather than shipping repair parts to the beaches separately, where they
could easily get lost, motor vehicles should carry their own supply of parts. Additionally, rather
than have maintenance personnel segregated in Ordnance units within the Services of Supply,
some maintenance units should be an integrated part of an amphibious division. 336
The commanders from Torch realized that to fight a campaign far away from the US, in an
unimproved theater, meant that the forces sent ashore needed to be able to deal with the enemy,
but they also needed to be able to deal with the environment and to provide for their own
sustainment. The theater took time to establish and ports took time to open and begin operating.
In the meantime, the task force needed to ensure it was mobile, that equipment stayed in good
condition, and that supplies were not only on hand, but could be distributed to those that needed
them. This represented the point at which the US military began to transition into a world power
capable of projecting, and sustaining, forces, to almost any point in the world.
To accomplish the transition, the War Department and theater leaders had to rethink basic
assumptions about the makeup of an amphibious force and of how to establish a theater
sustainment capability in future operations. Torch proved that the success in offloading assault
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convoys within the theater is heavily dependent on the quality of planning and loading done
while uploading unit equipment and supplies. Services of Supply and staff logisticians need to
accompany the assault force and someone needed to be in charge of the beaches with a capability
to direct assault craft, organize offloading, and direct beach clearance.
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A significant

development was a recognition that the theater sustainment forces needed to arrive as soon as
possible, not in bulk, but rather, as part of a gradual increase in capacity. This would provide an
element of flexibility to the theater commander and to the assault force, without shifting the
balance of force to much away from the combat element.
As much as supply shortfalls hindered the initial invasion force for Torch, commanders also
learned that it was possible to have too many supplies accompany the lead echelon. Logisticians
had packed as many supplies as possible aboard the assault convoy, attempting to fill all
available space. Planners had not fully considered the challenges the first convoy would have, to
include the need to conduct resupply over beaches, having to contend with damaged or destroyed
port facilities, and the number of service forces and associated equipment needed to establish
supply dumps away from the unloading areas. In short, the supply plan needed to match the
supply requirements for the landing, plus any overland movement. 338 Anything beyond that, for
the initial convoy, was merely surplus. Anything less was a shortage.
Along with the lessons came innovation. Recognizing that there was a limited amount of
landing craft, one division recommended the development of a floating supply container that one
could simply tow to the beach and did not require special handling or landing craft. Men could
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toss these containers over the side of the ship, string them together, and then tow them to shore;
similar to how several ships had used their life rafts. 339 Innovative as this recommendation was,
however, the idea never appears to have caught on at the War Department.
Perhaps the one recommendation to arise from Operation Torch that had the most personal
impact on the individual soldier, one that affected troops across all the theaters and still is in
evidence today, is item number 29 out of the 50 recommendations submitted by Brigadier
General Wilson. This recommendation was simply that toilet paper should have a flat
configuration that could fit into the pocket of a uniform for easy carrying and convenience. Such
a configuration was efficient to ship, uncomplicated to issue, and handy when needed. As
Wilson noted, “the hole in the center of a roll…serves no useful purpose.” 340 As amusing as this
sounds, it was recommendations such as this, and thousands others, that kept the War
Department and all the Services working toward a force that was more efficient, effective, and
deadly.
The logisticians of the Mediterranean theater were often pessimistic in their estimates, but
who could blame them? The lines of communication from the US and Great Britain were long
and subject to interdiction by German U-boats. Once materiel landed on the African continent, it
required transportation across restricted roads and railways. Forecasts required six-month lead
times for those items that needed to come from the States. The weather and the enemy were
always a concern.
However, at times this pessimism could also limit the boundaries of what the Services of
Supply judged to be possible. Logisticians in North Africa believed the rail line heading east
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from Casablanca could not support more than one US division, plus, perhaps, an additional
regiment, into Tunisia. Eisenhower considered their advice and then decided to position not one,
but rather, four divisions in the forward area and directed his logistics officers to sort out the
means of supporting the force. 341 One can debate whether this was a disregard of professional
advice or a calculated risk, but in any case it worked. Had Eisenhower headed the advice of his
logisticians he would not have reinforced Tunisia as he did, possibly preventing the Allies from
having the forces needed to deal with the Axis forces.
Commanders on all sides learned that desert warfare often involved rapid advances or
retreats over long distances; meaning that success or failure in these types of operations is
closely linked to an army’s mobility sustainability. Both the US and British found that forces
had to be balanced between combat strength and service forces, and that equipment, especially
vehicles, had to be capable of operating in the desert environment. In the campaigns before
Alamein, fully 30 percent of British transport was non-desert worthy. 342
Regarding the management of supplies, the War Department learned how to properly
package supplies, the ports in the US learned how to best load the ships, and the base sections
learned how to manage the receipt and storage of supplies. By the time of the tenth convoy, less
than two percent of the total cargo was lost to pilferage, loss, or damage.
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This was a

significant achievement compared to the initial landings in November 1942, and greatly aided all
future operations throughout the rest of the war.
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AFHQ made a concerted effort to learn as much as possible from its experiences in North
Africa. Many knew that this had been, for all intensive purposes, a relatively easy fight. The
challenges would only increase, as the battles grew closer to the European continent.

Conclusion
Operation Torch and the battle for Tunisia represented a transformation for the
Allied War effort. The US was now fully committed in the war and from this point forward it
was a team fight against the Axis forces, characterized by an ever-increasing presence and
capability.
Whenever challenges arose that might have affected the mission at hand, the US service
forces displayed a level of innovation and resourcefulness that led to unique solutions. Trains
departing Safi averaged 16 ½ cars on December 1, 1942; within a month these same trains
averaged up to 40 cars and were pulled by large engines brought over from the US. 344 Ports
were operating at rates beyond those seen during peacetime. Throughout the theater, Engineers
worked to expand and improve the local infrastructure.
The Allied drive into Tunisia was the first campaign to test the ability of a Services of Supply
and its base sections to support a major, mobile, offensive. Unlike the First World War, the
campaign involved considerable distances between the ports and the front line troops, an
inadequate road and rail network, few available local resources, and a threat of enemy air
attack. 345 The ability of the Allies to support such an operation was the result of several factors:
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a flexible doctrine, agile and innovative forces that quickly adapted to changing conditions,
sufficient materiel provided by the US, and good decisions by senior officers.
The Tunisian campaign was one of movement in which the Allies learned valuable lessons lessons that paid dividends later during the drive into northern and southern France. Sustaining
the attack relied on the overall throughput of resources, from the port to the point of delivery at
the using unit. This seems to be an intuitive point, but it is a lesson that Rommel never managed
to grasp- one that eventually led to his failures across North Africa.
The base section doctrine worked, but only if support units could establish supply points
forward and keep pace with advancing units. The theater had to maximize use of both rail and
truck resources and be able to adjust these to meet changing priorities. Tunisia proved that the
theater needed a viable and capable communications zone to support operations against a
determined defense.
To some degree, the success of the base sections and of the Services of Supply in supporting
the theater depended on the attitudes and decisions of the senior combat commanders.
Eisenhower had an appreciation for the administrative demands of the theater, but had to relegate
these to Major General Hughes because of the other demands on the Commander-in Chief’s
time. Eisenhower, however, did make himself available to get involved with administrative
issues when they affected multiple nations or were so significant that they impacted theater
strategy.
Patton preferred to leave the details of administration to his G4, Colonel Mueller. Patton
assumed that the administration would work itself out and became involved with sustainment
problems only when they threatened to undermine the tactical plan or when there was nothing
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else to do (i.e. Patton’s frequent visits to the Moroccan ports during December 1942.) Bradley,
in contrast, contacted the Eastern Base Section prior to initiating any campaign in Tunisia to
determine what problems might fall out of the tactical plan, and to discuss the means to avoid
these problems. Patton felt that the combat forces made up the team and others were in support.
Bradley felt differently, treating the supporting service units as an integral part of the team. 346
These contrasting viewpoints made a difference in determining in the morale and level of effort
received from the supporting service forces.
Not everyone was fully satisfied with the theater organization that had developed in the
deserts of North Africa. Some officers in the technical services saw Services of Supply
NATOUSA and the base sections as jealous empire builders that disregarded shortages and
overages of supplies, refusing to provide support troops without a specific order from higher
headquarters. 347 To these officers the base section concept meant that the communications zone
was a divided effort and without the efficiencies that could otherwise be provided. Perhaps these
were valid arguments, but ultimately the base sections proved themselves sufficiently agile and
capable in supporting the needs of the theater. This ultimately was to be a greater benefit to the
combat commanders-they knew the one person responsible for all administrative support and it
was easier working problems out with one organization versus going to all of the different
technical services.
Fortunately, the Allies learned the lessons of amphibious operations and establishing a
theater against a second-rate adversary and with sufficient time to build the foundation necessary
to take on the more capable Axis force on the European mainland. There was a new appreciation
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and understanding of the need for a balanced force. There was no easy solution for determining
what such a force comprised, but at least commanders and planners better understood the
problem. For each subsequent operation in the war, commanders and staffs still had to determine
the proper balance of forces. Too many combat forces limited sustainment on the far end; too
little combat risked mission failure. In all decisions, it was a matter of calculated risk.
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For Torch, the best military outcome (French capitulation) would have required a highly
mobile force, one that could capture additional ports and move towards Tunisia. On the other
hand, a strong French resistance would have required a less mobile force-one with more combat
forces and fewer support units. In the case of Torch, Eisenhower planned for a compromise,
which resulted in insufficient transportation when the time came to move east quickly to seize
the Tunisian ports. Eisenhower had made a gamble, one that barely missed. 349
In assessing the fight for North Africa, Field Marshal Kesselring believed that the main
failures of Axis forces were the failure to protect the sea lines of communication; an inadequate
supply system in Tunisia; and the lack of support from the German Luftwaffe - a telling
admission from a Luftwaffe field marshal. The main Allied problem, Kesselring mentioned, was
the “hesitant advance toward Tunisia.” 350 The field marshal’s assessment confirms that the
Allies missed a key opportunity, largely due to a lack of available ground transportation.
Whether the Allies would make the same mistakes again, or not, would occur in less than two
months. North Africa was just the beginning of a series of campaigns that would eventually
stretch across the Mediterranean. Units were preparing for Operation Husky, the invasion of
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Sicily, and before that, the Allies had to deal with the garrison on the island of Pantelleria.
Fortunately, the communications zone was postured to support operations against each.
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Chapter VI: Pantelleria and Sicily, Supporting the Island Campaigns

North Africa began the transformation of the US military. No longer new to modern
mechanized war, the US Army and Navy learned valuable lessons from all aspects of the
campaign, from invasion planning to consolidation of a theater once an enemy capitulates. The
American Army learned what was required to support an amphibious invasion force, establish a
theater, and support mechanized and airborne operations. The battles of North Africa allowed,
perhaps even forced, the American military to transition its systems, processes, training, and
equipment to fit the demands of twentieth-century modern warfare. AFHQ had won the
campaign in Tunisia; now it was time to prepare for the next fight.
The Allies had agreed on Sicily as the next target during the January 1943 Anfa conferences
held in Casablanca. This was a logical objective because it allowed Allied leaders to use forces
and airfields that were mostly already in theater. General Marshall had argued for a 1943 crosschannel assault in France, but the Atlantic still contained German U-boats and England did not
have the requisite numbers of divisions and supplies stockpiled for such an endeavor.
Grudgingly, the US agreed to continue the campaign in the Mediterranean.
Patton had found some glory on the deserts of Tunisia with II Corps, but Eisenhower
removed him from corps command on April 15, 1943, to take over Seventh Army and the
planning for Operation Husky. Here was a chance for an even greater victory - command of an
army and the opportunity to command all US forces participating in the invasion. Events will
show the Seventh Army commander to be a talented tactical commander, but with little regard
for the administrative effort needed to support his army.
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This chapter addresses the capture of the Mediterranean islands of Pantelleria and Sicily, a
period lasting from May 18 until August 17, 1943. Within these three short months, the Allies
would launch a major amphibious assault, secure the islands, and learn vital lessons about
supporting combat forces from the beach. This was the opportunity to try out new organizations
and equipment, designed in response to problems identified during the landings in North Africa.
Sicily was another opportunity to rehearse amphibious warfare and prepare the force for the
invasions of the European mainland. Just as important, the capture of Pantelleria and Sicily
continued the process of pushing the Axis forces out of the Mediterranean and would topple
Hitler’s main political ally, Benito Mussolini, from power.
The fall of Sicily begins with the capture of Pantelleria, a German outpost off the coast of
Tunisia. From there, the chapter addresses the planning of the operations, as well as the
preparation and loading of the invasion forces. The invasion of Sicily shows how new
equipment and more robust beach organizations make for better landings, but some problems
remained. The movement of US forces across the island illustrates that an army commander
cannot simply focus his staff on tactical concerns; the army also has a role in managing the
logistical support of the force, a role Seventh Army largely disregards. Additionally, Sicily also
demonstrates the importance and need for planning to provide essential support for the civilian
population decimated by the ravages of war. The chapter concludes with an assessment of the
Sicilian campaign and a look to the future: the fight in the mountainous terrain of Sicily is a
precursor to what would come in the battle for Italy.
Sicily, then, is a good news-bad news story. The Allies will show that they are learning the
hard lessons first discovered on the beaches of Morocco and Algeria. However, there are still
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important shortfalls that arise as the operation progresses. In either case, Sicily provided
additional experience in amphibious warfare, which served to improve the entire Allied force.

Strategic Setting
The year 1943 proved to be a critical period of the war as momentum shifted to the efforts of
the Allied nations. In February, Field Marshal von Paulus and the German Sixth Army
surrendered at Stalingrad, providing Hitler with a massive loss of men and a corresponding
public affairs disaster. After Stalingrad, Russian forces would continue to conduct a series of
counterattacks to the west, with Stalin all the while looking, no – demanding, for help from his
allies.
February also saw US victory at the battle of Guadalcanal, a major Allied win in the Pacific.
Admiral Ernest King, the commander of the overall US fleet and the Chief of Naval Operations,
made strong arguments for an increase in the allocation of units and resources for the Pacific.
Among the items needed were ground and air service units, as well as landing craft – the same
resources needed across the Mediterranean and in England.
The battle for the Pacific was frustrating for commanders such as Admiral King and General
MacArthur. Not only were they trying to win the war against Japan, they had to win the war for
resources back in Washington as well. Money was not the issue as the commands could get all
the funding they needed. The real issue was the allocation of units, equipment, and supplies.
These took time to build and produce and there was a finite amount available at any one time.
With a Europe-first policy, the Pacific theater had to fight for everything it needed. 351
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Contributing to that fight were the efforts of General Douglas MacArthur. MacArthur
chaffed at seeing opportunities to attack the Japanese, but lacked the strength necessary to
execute his plans. “Until victory was won in Europe, operations in the Pacific would be directed
toward containing the Japanese with the limited resources available.” 352 Unhappily, MacArthur
noted that Washington had left him out of the conferences that decided on a Europe-first
policy. 353
General MacArthur held the belief that the Pacific theater should be the priority effort
because Japan, not Germany, represented the most direct threat to American interests and
MacArthur could attack Japanese vulnerabilities. However, MacArthur’s views held little
weight against the need to keep the Soviet Union and Great Britain in the war. MacArthur was
not even in charge of the Pacific; this fell to Admiral Nimitz and the Navy. The Army was a
supporting effort, responsible for commanding only a portion of the Pacific theater. Throughout
1943 and 1944, officers junior to MacArthur, such as Eisenhower, Clark, and Patton received the
priority for resourcing. Speaking with General Marshall in late 1943, MacArthur called attention
to “the paucity of men and materiel I [MacArthur] was receiving compared with all other
theaters of war.” 354 Marshall agreed there was an imbalance, but could do little to rectify it. The
Pacific would have to work with the resources Washington allocated.
Naval progress, though, was not just limited to the Pacific. In March, improved Allied antisubmarine tactics forced Admiral Karl Dönitz to withdraw a majority of German U-Boats from
the Atlantic because of heavy losses. This helped to ease the pressure on the shipping lanes,
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increasing the delivery of supplies and material to Great Britain and the Mediterranean.
However, the battle against the U-boats was far from over.
The agreements that came from the Casablanca Conference of January 1943, envisioned the
war unfolding along several major efforts. 355 First, Eisenhower’s forces would occupy Sicily in
order to open the western Mediterranean to Allied shipping. Second, England would be the base
for a large Allied strategic bombing offensive against Germany, as well as serve as a staging
base for a ground force capable of re-entering the European continent. Third, the Allies would
continue operations in the Pacific, with an eye toward increasing the tempo against Japan once
Germany was defeated. Churchill and Roosevelt approved of this plan, while also maintaining
that air reinforcements needed to go to China and supply convoys needed to continue for
Stalin. 356
Roosevelt remained committed to a cross-channel invasion of France; although by the time
of the Casablanca Conference, it was clear that this could not occur in 1943. The US had pulled
too many units and supplies out of Great Britain for use in Torch. The President reassured the
Prime Minister that the US would rebuild its base of operations in Great Britain for use either as
a striking force for Sledgehammer or as the nucleus of a larger invasion force for Roundup. 357
However, with the diversion of units and supplies to the Mediterranean, Operation
Sledgehammer/Roundup - the invasion of France - could not occur before the spring of 1944. 358
Instead, the Allies continued the march east, across the Mediterranean, setting up bases of
operations as they went.
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By the end of the Anfa Conference, the Americans agreed with the British proposal to
continue operations in the Mediterranean. The next target was Sicily; an objective that would
use the large Allied formations already in North Africa and would produce greater economies in
Allied shipping across the Mediterranean once the island was in Allied hands. Finally, at attack
on Sicily provided an opportunity to knock Italy out of the war. 359 At the same time, the US
would build a large military force in Great Britain, capable of either attacking the Brest
Peninsula in 1944, or augmenting the fight in the Mediterranean. 360 A combination of the buildup of forces in England and increased operations in theaters around the world guaranteed that
resource constraints for the Allies would continue into the near future.
Although the fighting in Tunisia continued in January, Allied leaders understood the need to
determine the follow-on strategy so planners and logisticians could begin the work of preparing
for the next operation. On the final day of the conference, Roosevelt and Churchill agreed that,
to make continued use of the force in North Africa, the best option was to pursue the capture of
Sicily in order to clear Mediterranean-shipping routes and open a path directly toward the Italian
peninsula.
However, between Africa and Sicily were the islands of Pantelleria and Lampedusa.
Pantelleria presented the greatest threat, serving as a garrisoned strong point that the Allies
needed to address before moving on to Sicily. Thus was born the basis for Operation Corkscrew
- the attack on Pantelleria. This operation, although relatively modest, had to succeed before
AFHQ could move on to the primary objective: Sicily.
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Pantelleria: Operation Corkscrew
Pantelleria is a small island, located east of Tunis, almost halfway between the Tunisian
shore and Sicily. The island is approximately eight miles long and five miles wide and made
from a relatively soft volcanic rock. Perhaps of most significance is the fact that the island sits
140 miles north of Malta, allowing for control over the shipping lanes to and from Malta.
Control of Pantelleria would provide greater security not only for the Husky operation and
sustainment convoys, but also for British shipping across the entire western Mediterranean. The
coastline of Pantelleria was extremely rough, largely consisting of cliffs and jagged stone.
Despite the fact that this was an island, there were no beaches suitable for landing operations.
As a result, the Allied landing force was limited to one small port as a means to assail the island.
Planners estimated that the Italians had stationed approximately 10,000 defenders on the
island, deeply entrenched in caves, tunnels, and cellars. No one was quite certain whether the
Italians would fight or simply surrender after a token resistance. To deal with such a threat,
Eisenhower approved a strategy of using the North African Allied Air Force to pummel the
island by air as a means to degrade the enemy’s capacity and will to fight. Supporting the effort
was the British 1st Division, commanded by Major General W.E. Clutterbuck. 361
The air offensive began on May 18 with 100 sorties per day, evenly split between medium
bombers and fighters. This continued for the next 20 days. By June 6, the combined Allied air
forces had flown over 1,700 sorties and dropped 1,300 tons of bombs. This was only a prelude
of what was to come. The period of heaviest bombing occurred from 6-10 June. On just June
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10, alone, Allied planes dropped 1,571 tons of bombs. 362 While the planes dropped bombs, the
combined Allied navies also maintained a complete blockade of the island and added to the
general destruction through a series of naval bombardments.
Figure 12: Bombs for the Air Force 363

The ground force assaulted the island at noon on June 11, just as the defenders were raising a
flag of surrender. However, what drove the Italians to surrender was not the threat of a ground
invasion; rather, it was the lack of water. The intense aerial and naval bombardment had
thoroughly destroyed all of the islands roads and other infrastructure. The success of the
bombing campaign was not the production of enemy casualties or destroyed morale; instead, the
bombing interdicted the enemy’s ability to resupply its forces. Italian forces were unable to
supply themselves and the defenders could not venture outside. The Allied air offensive
achieved its desired goal: air power had cut the enemy lines of communications, starving out the
defenders. The island fell with relatively few casualties.
Operation Corkscrew is regarded largely as a footnote in the overall Husky campaign
because the island fell with relatively little force or Allied casualties. However, there are two
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items which should be mentioned: First, the reason the North African Allied Air Force was able
to sortie so many flights to Pantelleria was due to the number and capacity of airfields spread
across Tunisia and Northern Africa. The extensive work of the theater Services of Supply (SOS)
and Twelfth Air Force service units in building and supplying the airfields provided a capability
to extend air power across the western Mediterranean; work that is largely unnoticed because
these efforts to expand Tunisian airfields occurred in the strategic background with little fanfare.
North African airfields were essential to Eisenhower’s strategy. Not only did air power
provide an effective bombing campaign, but on the day of the ground invasion of Pantelleria
(June 11), American P-40 fighters from the 57th Fighter Group drove off a formation of 55
German Messerschmitt Bf-109 fighters and Focke-Wulf Fw-190 bombers. 364 There was no
damage to Allied shipping and the invasion occurred as planned.
The second item worth considering is the sheer magnitude of the support effort needed to
maintain such a bombing campaign. Besides bombs and other munitions, planes also needed
vast quantities of fuel and repair parts. Between May 8 and June 11, the North African Air Force
flew 5,258 sorties against Pantelleria, 365 each sortie representing a number of demands on the
supply system for items such as fuel, munitions, and repair parts. Maintenance operations were a
critical element in the effort to keep aircraft flying in the harsh North African environment. The
pilots received the accolades, but the air campaign was a success largely because of the
combined team effort of planners, air crews, and ground support personnel.
The airfields supporting Corkscrew and Husky were mostly in the Tunis/Sousse/Mateur area
of Tunisia. This placed a great demand on regional truck and rail transportation since the daily
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requirement for transportation was increasing, but there was no corresponding increase in the
number of available trucks, locomotives, or rail cars. To assist, the British made available the
total capacity of the Bizerte-Tunis standard gage railway as well as the Tunis-Kairouan narrow
gage railway. This gave the theater an added 1,100 tons per day capacity for the movement of
fuel and bombs - the highest priorities for rail movements. 366
Pantelleria did provide additional experience and some valuable lessons for Allied planners
and leaders. The Germans had demolished all ports and buildings in the main town. Roads
throughout the island were impassable. However, despite the bombardment, few coastal guns
were out of action. This meant that if a ground invasion had been required, the Allies would
have needed a large engineering capacity to repair roads and bridges before any mechanized or
motorized forces could move about the island. Additionally, the destruction of the island’s
telephone system meant that the existing lines were useless until the Allies could make extensive
repairs. 367
One lesson from Corkscrew was that any invasion force, following a sizeable bombardment
campaign, needed to consider the effects of friendly bombing on local infrastructure and plan to
compensate for the damage. Damaged ports, roads, and telephone lines all needed the right
support forces, materiel and, perhaps even more importantly, time, for repairs. Destroyed
bridges required construction materials and engineers. The lack of a local telephone system
meant an increased demand for military communications units. As the Allies experienced in
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North Africa, a commander that focused on loading primarily combat forces on the assault
convoys, in lieu of a more balanced force, could easily put the mission at risk.
Following the fall of Pantelleria, a second obstacle stood in the way of the assault on Sicily Lampedusa, a small island also in the Sicilian Strait. Not as reinforced as Pantelleria, the Allies
likewise secured this island through an intense bombing campaign, followed by naval
bombardment and a small landing. As in Corkscrew, the Lampedusa air bombardment,
combined with a growing Italian disillusionment of the war, persuaded the defenders to surrender
on June 12, 1943.
The straits between Sicily and North Africa were now clear. AFHQ had less than 30 days
before the next operation - Operation Husky, the conquest of Sicily. Time was short and the
Allies still had much to do before Husky’s convoys could sail.

The Planning of Husky
On February 2, Eisenhower issued a preliminary directive for his senior commanders to
begin planning for the seizure of Sicily. Outline plans were due to the Commander-in-Chief by
March 15 368, meaning that planners had less than six weeks to develop the basis for a campaign
plan involving several divisions and the largest amphibious operation yet attempted. The
commander-in-chief believed that there were two main tasks: The first task was to get sufficient
troops and supplies ashore as quickly as possible. The second was to secure ports for the further
build-up of these forces. 369
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Sicily is a large island of some 15,000 square miles. Much of the island’s topography
consisted of rocky ridgelines, hills, and a limited supply of fresh water. Movement was
generally limited to existing road and rail networks, making cross-terrain movements and
resupply efforts difficult, if not impossible. Existing highways were in generally good shape,
especially compared to the roads of North Africa. Standard-gage rail lines circumvented the
island and auxiliary narrow-gage lines connected interior towns. Rapid, large-scale military
movements were possible, but they required sufficient rail and/or motorized vehicles.
Sicily had four large ports: Messina, Catania, Syracuse, and Palermo. Messina was on the
northeastern corner of the island and was the main Axis port. This port also had extensive air
defenses and fell under the umbrella of Axis air coverage from mainland Italy. Catania was in
the center of the island’s east coast, but also contained sizeable defenses. Any attempt to seize
these locations would be extremely tough, if not suicidal.
This left planners with the options of Syracuse and Palermo. Syracuse, located on the
southeastern corner of Sicily, did not contain as many Axis units and was within range of Allied
fighters and medium bombers originating out of Tunisia. Palermo was on the northwestern
coastline, but was out of Allied fighter range. The Allies found the ports of Syracuse and
Palermo the most attractive and both met the needs of the respective armies in terms of ship
berthing and other infrastructure.
Planning for Husky began on February 10 by a nucleus of planners, mostly from Allied force
Headquarters (AFHQ) The staff assumed the designation Task Force 141 (named after the
number of the room used in the Hotel St. George.) The planning group was a sub-section of
AFHQ G3, but later would evolve to be the nucleus of the 15th Army Group staff.
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The two principal Allied formations were Force 343 (Western Task Force/ US Seventh
Army) and Force 545 (Eastern Task Force/ British Eighth Army) Planning for the operation was
complicated - forces for the assault would launch from both ends of the Mediterranean as well as
from the United States. Commanders and their planners found themselves spread across the
theater and there was still an on-going battle in Tunisia, which tied up a number of units destined
for Sicily.
Despite the efforts to learn from past mistakes, the planning for Husky had just as many
problems as the planning for Torch. This was most likely due to the continuing fight in Tunisia,
combined with the inability to consolidate all of the different planning staffs into one general
location. Hundreds of miles separated the staffs of the different organizations. For example,
Force 141 (the future 15th Army Group) and the Navy positioned their headquarters at Algiers.
Force 343, originally I Armored Corps and later Seventh Army, was at Rabat, French Morocco.
3rd Infantry Division was at Bizerte. 370 Distances were great and travel was difficult - two
factors which limited coordination and cooperation. Additionally, the North African air forces
found it difficult to dedicate much effort to the planning process because of on-going combat
operations against German and Italian forces.
Senior commanders finally collectively focused on the plans for Husky at a commander’s
conference on March 18. The draft plan, dated March 3, called for split landings, with the
British seizing the port of Syracuse and the Americans seizing the port of Palermo five days
later. This plan would have split Allied forces, but would have also provided each task force
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with a sizeable port facility, which could speed the buildup of the beachheads and facilitate the
drive inland, toward Messina - the campaign’s objective.
This course of action assumed that the poor and limited beaches of Sicily could not support a
large invasion force and that the two armies each needed a major port. As such, the driving
factor for this initial plan was logistically oriented. 371
Force 141 conducted the overall level of planning, but left the details of the ground assault
plan up to the respective task force commanders. On April 7, the two army commanders, Patton
and Montgomery, had received a memorandum asking for their outline plans no later than the
first of May. 372 Patton and his staff, at that time in French Morocco assigned to I Armored
Corps, were ready to begin planning; however, Montgomery and the Eighth Army staff were still
engaged in Tunisia and did not have the time or inclination to dedicate the necessary time needed
to shape the early planning of Husky. 373
British officers, including the head of the naval element of the Eastern Task Force, Admiral
Ramsey, and Eighth Army commander, General Montgomery, objected to the draft plan,
believing that the two task forces needed land in closer proximity to each other or risk isolation
and destruction by Axis coastal units and divisions already on the island. General Alexander, the
deputy commander-in-chief and commander of 15 Army Group called for conferences on April
27 and 29 to work through the differences. 374
The conferences produced a revised plan on May 19, with a final outline plan dated May 21.
The new plan dropped the seizure of Palermo and moved the American landings down to the
371
Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe , 163-164. Also see Interview with Field Marshal Alexander , by George Howe, undated,
compiled by Dr Sidney Matthews. Sidney Matthews Papers, MHI. Box 2. 10.
372
Directives, HQ Force 141, dated April 7, 1943. NARA, RG 492, box 124.
373
Patton was relieved from command of II Corps on April 15th to allow him to focus on Operation Husky
374
Stambler, 57. Also see Albert Garland and Howard Smyth, 60-63

182

shores of southern Sicily, immediately west of the British landing sites. The new plan sacrificed
logistical supportability for the sake of a stronger beachhead. 375 There was an element of risk in
each option so Eisenhower and his commanders had to make the final decision. For each task
force the initial mission was essentially the same: they were to seize and secure beaches, ports,
and airfields within their sectors to enable the required build-up. Following that, each task force
would drive north to secure the island.
Torch had shown that conducting sustainment operations over the shore was much more
difficult than projected and that established port facilities were essential to conducting a rapid
build-up of forces ashore. The decision to move the American invasion site from Palermo to
beaches west of the Eastern Task Force meant that the port of Palermo was no longer available
and that sustainment planners had to look for other means to build up materiel to support the
drive inland. This required a major modification for the Seventh Army’s sustainment plans - all
within seven weeks of the landings.
The loss of Palermo was significant since many experts estimated that the port could support
up to ten divisions.376 Now, Seventh Army had to sustain itself from across the beaches. Licata
and Gela were both in the American sector and each had a small port, but the capabilities were
limited and came nowhere near that of Palermo. Licata had an estimated daily capability of 600
tons per day, compared to Syracuse, estimated at 1,000 tons per day and Palermo with an
estimated 2,500 tons. 377 Scoglitti had only a small fishing port. Gela could handle a mere 200
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tons per day. The loss of a large port put the ability of the theater to resupply US forces into
question.
The creation of a single logistical headquarters for both the British and US forces was never a
serious consideration. Due to the differences in systems noted during the Tunisian campaign, the
distances between headquarters elements on North Africa and the embarked forces, and the
separation of bases within Sicily, General Alexander decided to maintain the existing
administrative support relationships. 378 The US theater organization would support US forces,
the British would take care of their own.
AFHQ G4 and the Services of Supply began working on revised maintenance plans for the
operation on May 23. The new support plans called for the three divisions within Seventh Army
to land with seven days of supplies combat loaded into assault craft. An additional 14 days
worth of materiel would arrive in two follow-on convoys. The Cent Force (45th Infantry
Division) was to land on the beaches near Scoglitti. The Dime Force (1st Infantry Division)
would land on the beaches surrounding Gela. Lastly, the Joss Force (3rd Infantry Division with a
combat command from 2nd Armored Division) was to land on the beaches around Licata. Kool
Force (the remainder of 2nd Armored Division) was a floating reserve, with 21 days worth of
supplies for its own use. 379
This supply plan significantly increased the quantity of supplies needed to accompany the
assault forces. Original plans had called for four to five of days of supplies for the assault forces;
now each carried seven. This meant that units had to modify requisitions, as well as the
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respective load plans and landing plans. In a scene reminiscent to Torch, logisticians found
themselves modifying support plans at the last minute to accommodate the changing tactical
plans of the combat forces.
Due to the lack of a tactical plan prior to debarkation, logisticians based their support plans
on generic type units in generic missions, on generic beaches. This required some reloading
prior to combat and many vehicles were not combat loaded. Only after the assault ships had
sailed did Force 343 discover that its assault beaches had 1,000 yards of sand dunes behind the
beaches, a terrain factor that complicated mobility and required engineer support to improve the
beach exits. Had the task force known this before embarkation, the Seventh Army G4 would
have planned for additional road and beach construction materials. 380 The late identification of
specific beaches limited pre-assault reconnaissance because commanders did not want to flag
their intensions.
As in Torch, planning was neither fully coordinated between the combat and support
commanders, nor between the services. Ultimately, the absence of tactical plans by the Seventh
Army commander meant that logisticians had to develop a support plan that could support any
tactical plan and that joint planning was next to impossible.
The lack of a tactical plan affected more than just the theater. As one senior British
administrative planner noted:
I was under great pressure to furnish certain essential information regarding
administrative requirements to the War Office without delay, and this meant that
I had on more than one occasion, to produce the administrative plan for various
phase before the operational plan had been prepared… When our plans were
eventually seen by the Commanders-in-Chief concerned they were, as was
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course natural, modified radically. This meant that a great deal of work had to
be done over again; but much more serious it upset forecasts that had already
been sent to London and Washington in regard to the weapons and equipment
that we had to have to make the operation a success. 381 [author’s italics]

Any changes to the administrative support for Husky could easily impact support to the other
theaters of war as well, all of which were competing for limited resources.
Despite the changes, units finally solidified their plans. The Eastern Base Section was to
serve as the reinforcing base section, with the main supply depots being at Ferryville and Mateur,
Tunisia. The base section headquarters operated out of Mateur. The theater Services of Supply
would load seven days of follow-on supplies into coaster vessels, planned to arrive in Sicily on
D+14. For long-term support of the operation, follow-on convoys carried supplies from the US
at 15-day intervals. The Services of Supply also maintained an additional 15 days of supplies in
Tunisia as a reserve that could be moved on short notice. 382 Any items needed by Seventh
Army that were not on the US convoys, or needed before the next convoy, were sourced and
shipped from North Africa by the theater. 383 Service forces would accompany the assault force
to land on the beaches and small ports in the US sector, but if these sites proved inadequate, US
planners had made provisions with the British force to share use of the port of Syracuse,
beginning approximately D+14.
If needed, an element known as the American Liaison Group, 2,500 service troops and two of
the largest assault craft, Landing Ship-Tank (LST), would land at Syracuse on approximately
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D+14 to begin establishing a US support element at the port. 384 If the Allies executed this
contingency, the US port party would combine with the British logistics element, known as
Fortbase. Luckily, the beaches proved more capable than first thought and the shift of US
beaches to the port of Syracuse was not required. 385
During the assault phase of the operation, any requests for US resupply outside of the
preplanned convoys were to flow from the units up to Seventh Army. The Seventh Army Rear
Headquarters, located at Bizerte, reviewed the requisitions and filled them from army stocks if
possible. The army passed any unfilled requisitions to the Eastern Base Section. From here, the
base section worked to fill all possible requirements from stocks already in the theater. If the
combined Fortbase was established, US requisitions were to flow from Seventh Army to
Fortbase and, from there, to the Eastern Base Section. 386 Critical items, such as repair parts for
mechanized equipment, would fly to Sicily by plane, while other, less critical items, were to
move by sea.
By May 1943, planning was in full progress, but there was an additional challenge facing the
planners: units had never seen many of the different assault craft projected for use in Husky so
they did not have an appreciation of the capabilities and requirements of these new items. As an
example, there was no data available for craft, such as the LCT(R) (Landing Craft Tank (Rocket)
or the LCG (Landing Craft-Gun). No one had ever seen how many personnel could fit within a
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LST. 387 These pieces of information mattered a great deal because they had a direct impact on
the planning of the loading and landing of the task forces. The exact size of assault craft ramps
dictated which types of equipment could fit onto a particular vessel. Personnel capacities
dictated whether units could be transported in whole, or piece-meal. Beaching depths
determined whether infantrymen could wade ashore, or needed inflatable boats.
Unfortunately, in the rush to deliver new equipment from the shipyards and factories, there
was insufficient time to prepare the manuals and instruction sheets that normally accompanied a
piece of equipment. Units had to figure out the details as they went. Details on new equipment
slowly became available as the Navy worked to disseminate technical information, but situations
such as this showed that the introduction of new equipment into an operation, without an
opportunity for training, introduced new problems as well.
Back in North Africa, each base section commander was responsible for the support of Force
343 units staging in their respective areas, but once the units arrived in Sicily the responsibility
for support beyond Seventh Army’s capability transitioned to the commander of the Eastern
Base Section. 388 To help facilitate coordination, Patton agreed to have a Force 343 liaison
officer stationed with the Eastern Base Section - one that could speak with Patton’s authority for
many questions dealing with personnel, equipment, or supplies for the US forces in Husky.
General Larkin also stationed a Services of Supply liaison officer with the Eastern Base Section
as well to help coordinate any requirements that may be beyond the capability of the base
section.
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Whereas the Services of Supply and AFHQ G4 had a fair idea of the types and quantities of
supplies needed by the ground forces for Husky, the Air Force never provided a specific list of
needs. In general, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the lack of Air Force participation
in the overall planning effort. There was no coordinated planning effort between the services
and the support plan provided by the Air Force was “the most masterful piece of uninformative
prevarication, totally unrelated to the Naval and Military Joint Plan, which would possibly have
been published.” 389 The air plan called for daily landings of massive quantities of supplies and
equipment - none of which included the weight, size, or projected use. The Air Force apparently
expected this level of support, even though its resupply plan called for convoys of every four
days, despite the fact that the theater was planning convoys for one every 14 days. AFHQ and
the Services of Supply conducted support planning in the cork forests and olive groves
surrounding the Force 343 headquarters, but the Air Force declined to provide a
representative. 390
In 1943, US aviation units were still part of the US Army, but operated under a separate
chain of command within the Mediterranean theater. Formed on December 5, 1942, under Major
General Carl Spaatz, the Northwest African Air Command served as the joint headquarters for
all US and British air forces. 391 This meant that the air forces largely determined their own
missions and the Army had less influence on Air force operations outside of the continental US.
Eisenhower served as the overall theater commander and could have ordered US Air Force to
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participate more fully in the planning of Husky, but there is no indication that the issue ever
arose to his level for resolution.
Ultimately, the lack of a ground tactical plan from Seventh Army provided the biggest
planning challenge for logistics planners. The absence of these plans meant that any logistics
plans needed to be flexible enough to accommodate any combat plan. This same lack of a
ground tactical plan also inhibited planning coordination among the joint services. 392
Despite the lessons of Torch, Husky hardly served as a role model for joint service planning.
Perhaps this was understandable, given that operations were still going on in Tunisia, but it was
not inevitable. The planning effort did improve in terms of anticipating the need for a more
balanced ground force, one that included the necessary combat and combat support elements.
However, work remained on integrating the Air Force into the planning effort. Regardless, as
summer drew near, the time for planning ended and it was time to load the invasion force.

Mounting the Force
Brigadier General Pence received word in late April that the Eastern Base Section would
have a large role in equipping and supplying Force 343 units for the invasion and for loading
them on the assault craft, a process known as “mounting.” 393 At the same time, the base section
was deeply involved in supporting the Allied drive across Tunisia. Short on personnel, the
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Eastern Base Section pulled two officers and one enlisted man from the staff to form a special
planning group for the mounting of Husky. 394
To complicate matters, the Allies did not capture the area of Tunisia needed for the mounting
operation until May 10, 1943 - less than two months before the convoy’s departure date.
Planners were unable to conduct reconnaissance trips or survey potential support sites so much
of the work so maps served as the main sources of information. The Eastern Base Section was
responsible for the US mounting effort. The base section was to equip all troops participating in
Husky from North Africa, provide 30 days of supplies for these forces, transport units to the
ports of embarkation, and then load them on assault vessels. 395
The forces for Husky found themselves spread across French Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia.
The Services of Supply had to gather these units at specified ports and transport them to the ports
of embarkation following any training. Service units identified, and packaged supplies for the
assault and any follow-on support. Some cargo was preloaded on vessels, while other was stored
in Tunisia, awaiting later shipment. This was a massive undertaking in terms of both complexity
and magnitude and had to occur simultaneously with the normal administrative support still
required in North Africa, to include support of US ground and air troops, civilian populations
French forces, and prisoners of war.
To support the force in Sicily the Eastern Base Section developed a basic plan that was
extremely flexible in order to respond to changes and unforeseen requirements. The general
depot was at Mateur, Tunisia due to its close proximately to air and ground bases, seaports, and
the rail and road network. Truck units and rail moved supplies and equipment to either Bizerte
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or Tunis for sea transport. Although the British controlled Tunisia, AFHQ arranged for the
Eastern Base Section to move its advance headquarters and a series of supply depots to Mateur.
The Husky mounting operation was a new challenge for AFHQ and the North African
theater. The War Department or European Theater had prepared and mounted forces for the
earlier Torch invasion. This was the first time the North African theater would mount a sizeable
assault using its own forces and there was virtually no information available on exactly how to
conduct such an operation. 396 Considering this, it is surprising that the mounting operation
occurred as well as it did.
Two divisions that were already in North Africa - 1st and 3rd Infantry Divisions - had little
time for in-depth load planning based on the final version of the Husky plan. Logistics officers
representing the various units and staffs gathered on the afternoon of May 20 to discuss the
upcoming movement. Units had only 48 hours to develop their supply requirements. To meet
the necessary timelines, supply requisitions for the assault force were due on the afternoon of
Saturday, May 22, 1943. Requirements for the follow-on convoys were due two days later. 397
There was not much time for detailed planning so supply planners used the experiences of the
North African campaign to make their best judgments.
Personnel from the 1st Infantry Division were to load transports at Algiers. The personnel for
3rd Infantry Division loaded craft at Bizerte. Tunis served as the main embarkation port for all
Force 343 equipment. 398
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Major General Terry Allen, commander of the 1st Infantry Division, was worried that his
units would not have sufficient time to fix their equipment before loading up for Sicily. Five
months of hard fighting in North Africa had left the Division’s vehicles and weapons systems in
a general state of disrepair. Allen had grave doubts whether the ordnance units in Tunisia had
the capacity to refurbish the division’s equipment before the required load dates. 399
The Mediterranean Base Section responded, putting together a plan to overhaul the
equipment of the 1st Infantry Division within 10 days of receipt. The only deficiencies not
repaired were those problems requiring repair parts that were not physically in North Africa.
The plan worked and the Division was able to meet its load dates with equipment that was in
much better shape than had been expected. 400 By the first week of June, the two divisions were
now ready to move to the assembly areas and begin loading the assault craft.
To conduct the actual mounting operation, the Eastern Base Section formed the 1st
Embarkation Group (Provisional.) No such group had existed previously so this was very much
a trial-and-error type of operation. The lack of experience in conducting this type of operation,
combined with the changing plans, produced a difficult situation for the new unit. To provide
additional labor for the mounting, personnel from the 34th (Red Bull) Infantry Division helped to
establish and run the camps and vehicle parks. 401
The advanced party from the embarkation group arrived in the area on May 31. The
assembly areas opened shortly thereafter, from June 10-13. Services of Supply and 34th Infantry
Division personnel worked quickly to post signs, establish communications, stockpile food,
399
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arrange for water and sanitation facilities, establish medical facilities, provide security, and
coordinate movement plans. The maximum troop capacity of the assembly areas totaled
25,000. 402
The major landing craft included Landing Craft-Infantry (LCI), Landing Ship-Tank (LST),
and Landing Craft-Tank (LCT). The LCIs were sea-going craft that could carry between 180200 soldiers at a time and land them directly onto a beach. The LSTs were the workhorse of the
armada - seagoing vessels designed to carry large amounts of men, equipment, and supplies.
Each LST could carry approximately 20 medium tanks and about 200 men. These vessels did
not need a pier or port to discharge their cargo. The LST’s smaller cousin was the LCT. Each of
the flat-bottomed LCTs carried nine Sherman tanks, or 300 tons of cargo. These vessels had
only half the speed of the larger LSTs and did not do well in lengthy open-sea crossings.
Figure 13: Landing Ship- Tank (LST) 403

Small landing craft that could carry soldiers, but avoid obstacles, formed much of the first
wave of an amphibious assault. Landing Craft-Vehicles Personnel (LCVP), also known as
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“Higgins Boats,” were plywood craft that had flat bottoms and could carry up to 36 troops or a
small vehicle such as a jeep, but were not made for long open water voyages. Similar to the
LCVP, the Landing Craft-Assault (LCA) was a small plywood craft designed to carry 31 soldiers
from the larger troop transport ships to the assault beaches. Together, these small craft landed
many of the infantry units onto enemy beaches.
The embarkation group could simultaneously stage and load 52 LCIs, 30 LSTs, 32 LCTs
(vehicles and equipment), and 12 personnel-only LCTs. Each task force moved into a staging
area the day prior to moving into its assembly area. From there, vessel-sized groupings of
equipment, known as serials, moved into the loading areas on the scheduled loading day. The
first vehicle serials loaded on June 18, personnel serials started loading on June 23. The Cent
Force, 45th Infantry Division, had earlier loaded its transports in the United States and sailed for
North Africa, where it was to meet with the other divisions.
The final assault force to complete loading was the Joss Force - 3rd Infantry Division.
Loading for this force encountered problems in late June when the Division’s supplies arrived
out of order at the assembly areas. The problem originated at the theater depots when service
units failed to follow instructions and loaded the wrong supplies in trucks heading for the docks.
To deal with the problem, the 1st Embarkation Group established dockside dumps, which
allowed units to offload, sort, and then load supplies on the correct vessels. This slowed loading,
but not enough to hamper the timeline. The group completed the loading of supplies on July
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5. 404 Joss Force personnel were the last units to load, with units filling LCIs on July 5 and the
LSTs on July 6. 405
The mounting operation showed that the theater needed to allow at least 60 days between the
completion of planning and the earliest sail date. This included nine days to complete load plans,
30 days to waterproof supplies and equipment, seven days to shift cargo to match the shipspecific transport quartermaster plans, and 14 days to load a division. 406
Waterproofing was still a developing skill. Each vehicle, radio, or other sensitive item of
equipment landing with the assault force needed the right protection to keep seawater from
getting into vital components, such as engines and batteries, during the voyage to the assault
area, as well as during the transition from the assault craft to the beach itself. Improper
waterproofing often produced unserviceable equipment at the far shore. The US forces
experienced problems with this during Torch; now the Embarkation Group worked to provide a
better level of protection for the forces of Husky.
With the 3rd Infantry Division loaded, the Allied assault force was on its way to the shores of
southern Sicily and the 1st Embarkation Group prepared to deal with the returning assault craft.
Returning craft began arriving in Tunisia in earnest on July 12, carrying casualties and prisoners
of war. From here, the Embarkation Group either reloaded the assault craft for the voyage back
to Sicily or released the craft.
By August 5, the mounting of Husky was complete. With little experience or time for
preparation, the Eastern Base Section had loaded 77,520 personnel, 17,165 vehicles, and over
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12,000 tons of supplies onto the Force 343 assault craft. 407 The subsequent landings on the
beaches of Licata, Gela, and Scoglitti would determine whether this was sufficient.
The loading of the ground forces was not the only preparation required for Husky; the North
African Air Force was also busy with the expansion of bomber bases in Tunisia. Some airfields
required expansion, while other new fields had to be constructed. These bases were essential to
the buildup of additional bomber forces in eastern Tunisia and for the Husky bombing plan. 408
AFHQ also had a challenge in providing all of the petroleum products required for the
operation. Seven fleet tankers were on hand to provide an estimated 212,000 tons of fuel oil and
60,000 tons of diesel fuel to the invasion force, the estimated needs for D to D+21. The main
reserve of fuel was at Casablanca. 409
North Africa had shown that modern war was reliant on the control of transportation
resources. Merchant shipping was limited, there were competing demands for assault craft, and,
once on shore, the mobility of a combat force largely depended on truck transportation.
To better coordinate and synchronize these limited assets, the Services of Supply and
Seventh Army modified their organizations. Seventh Army added a large transportation section
to the G4 in order to plan and direct supply activities of all army service forces. AFHQ formed
the 1st Embarkation Brigade (Provisional) to plan and execute the mounting of Seventh Army
from North Africa. Additionally, Seventh Army formed a “near shore control group,” a rear
echelon of Seventh Army, to ensure that the follow-on convoys from North Africa met the
changing demands of the army. Finally, the 1st Engineer Special Brigade would organize the
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beaches and serve essentially as an advance base section on the far shore of Sicily. These new
organizations and their missions were the direct outcome of hard lessons learned during the
Torch landings. The upcoming landings would determine whether these measures were
sufficient to overcome the problems experienced seven months earlier.

Invasion and Initial Support
The assault of Sicily was the largest amphibious assault conducted up to that time. The
entire force consisted of six US and five British divisions. The naval armada contained over
3,200 vessels, of which 1,700 conducted the movement of the US force and its cargo. 410 The
aim of Operation Husky was to seize the island of Sicily in order to help secure the western
Mediterranean. AFHQ envisioned three phases: The first phase was the seizing of the
beachheads, to include airfields near the beaches, to serve as a base for following operations.
The second phase was the seizure and opening of the ports. Seventh Army would secure the
western part of the island, while the British Eighth Army drove north to seize Syracuse, Augusta,
and Catania. In the third phase, the Allies would complete the occupation of the island by using
the British force to drive north along the eastern coast, while the Seventh Army moved east,
along the northern coast road. The campaign was to be complete once Messina fell. With the
loss of Sicily, the Allies hoped to knock Italy out of the war.
The invasion started during the night on July 9, 1943 with US and British airborne drops
planned for objectives behind the beaches. In the British sector, the Pointe Grande Bridge was
the key to seizing Syracuse. Montgomery decided to use glider elements of the British 1st
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Airborne Division for this objective. Unfortunately, the landing zone contained stonewalls and
large cliffs - obstacles that made the area wholly unsuited for the landing of the large, fragile
craft. 411
Figure 14: The Invasion of Sicily, July 10, 1943. 412

The 2,075 glider men set out from six airfields in Tunisia in 137 Waco and ten Horsa gliders
and headed east for Malta. Passing over the navigation aid of Malta, they assumed the final
course for Sicily. However, a combination of poor night navigation by the tow pilots, improper
distance estimation by the glider pilots, enemy flak, and 30-35 mile an hour winds off Sicily’s
coastline all served to break up the formations. Sixty-nine of Operation Ladbroke’s 147 gliders
crashed into the Mediterranean. Fifty-nine landed over a 25-mile area. The rest returned to
411
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Tunisia or crashed due to friendly fire. Only twelve made it to the assigned landing zones. As a
result, only eight officers and 65 men of the British Airborne “Red Devils” captured the Pointe
Grande Bridge, holding it less than 12 hours before being overrun. 413
The American’s airborne operation experienced less loss of life, but similarly failed to land
many forces on their objectives. High winds and low moonlight meant that pilots had a hard
time seeing out their windshields. Pilots lost their sense of direction and missed checkpoints
because of haze, fires, and dust. Aircraft flew all over the southeastern part of the island
discharging their human cargoes. The 3,400 US paratroopers landed all over the southeast
corner of Sicily, ranging from the Eighth Division’s sector, west across Gela, and inland from the
45ht Division’s beaches. Only one battalion, the 2nd Battalion of the 505th Parachute Infantry
Regiment, landed relatively intact, but it landed 25 miles from the expected drop zone. 414
Despite the missed landings, US paratroopers made the most of the situation by disrupting
the enemy’s areas. They cut communications lines, destroyed supplies, ambushed patrols, and
caused confusion among the Axis commanders as to the locations of the main landings. 415
Living off the supplies they carried or found, the paratroopers operated in small bands, doing
whatever they could until they joined up with the divisions arriving over the sea.
The beach assault began during the early morning hours of the following day, July 10.
Compared to Torch, the Husky beach landings were a considerable improvement, although
coordination between the Navy and Army was still a problem. Even though the Allies had to
contend with a force spread across over 100 miles of beaches as well as strong winds and high
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seas, the assault occurred largely according to plan. Still, ships and landing craft sometimes
landed at the wrong ports and beaches or without warning. Critical to the operation of the
American beaches was a new type of unit: the Engineer Special Brigade.
The 1st Engineer Special Brigade was to remedy many of the problems experienced in the
beaches of North Africa. Redesignated from the original 1st Engineer Amphibian Brigade, the
new brigade consisted of four shore groups (one for each US division) plus one smaller shore
group designated for the floating reserve.
The brigade had the mission of supporting all four divisions plus supplying all Seventh Army
units for a period of up to 30 days following the assault. Not only was the brigade to perform the
engineer functions of opening up the beaches, but it was also to act as the de facto base section in
Sicily until the Services of Supply could flow sufficient troops in to assume the logistics mission.
Each shore group consisted of an engineer regiment plus other support units, such as a
medical battalion, quartermaster battalion, naval beach battalion, as well as ordnance and signal
companies. The Services of Supply added other capabilities, depending on the infrastructure in
the assigned area, such as rail lines. The 36th Engineer Shore Group was the largest group in the
brigade, totaling 4,744 officers and men. 416
The impetus behind the creation of beach organizations was similar to that of the theater base
sections and Services of Supply - to take the burden of administrative issues off the ground
tactical commander. This would leave the commander and his staff free to focus on the fight
before them and to plan the next move. The Seventh Army G4 would still be responsible for
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logistic planning and policy, but until the Services of Supply could establish a local base section,
the 1st Engineer Shore Brigade had the responsibility to conduct the required sustainment
operations. 417
Each beach group had the responsibility to organize its respective beaches. This included the
tasks of unloading ships, marking aids and obstacles to navigation, constructing beach exits,
providing security, setting up beach dumps to receive supplies from the landing craft, unloading
boats, and moving supplies inland. The groups also had
to operate vehicle maintenance areas to clear the beaches, run de-waterproofing areas to prepare
vehicles and equipment for combat, and operate a casualty aid and evacuation station. Each
shore group could operate up to six beaches and one divisional supply dump. A typical division
required between four and six beaches, depending on the number of attached units. 418
Generally, the Navy had responsibility of the beach to the high water mark. From there, the
Army and Navy shared responsibility for the near beach (the strip of land close to the high water
mark that formed an area for beaching of vessels, ship to shore communications, anchorage, and
initial unloading.) The Army had sole responsibility for the far beach (the area inland of the
shore that could take advantage of cover, clearance, and concentration of units.) 419
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Figure 15: Typical Landing Beach for One Combat Team 420

Although the landings were very different from those of Torch, there were still surprises and
challenges to overcome. Beaches south of Gela contained obstacles, which threatened to impede
sustainment of the force. Many of the beaches in the American sector included cliffs that
limited, or prevented, vehicles from exiting the beach. The beaches themselves were about 30
yards in width, with sand dunes running in the back for 700 to 1,000 yards. The sand dunes were
often made of soft sand or rocks, which were large enough to stop vehicles. At several beaches,
such as Red Beach in the 3rd Infantry Division sector, a sand bar ran offshore, parallel to the
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entire beach, limiting the approach of the larger assault ships. 421 Beach exits to the island’s
interior were often limited or non-existent. 422
Tanks and the new amphibious vehicles known as DUKWs 423 (“ducks”) were the only
vehicles that had no difficulties in transitioning from the water to the beach. Although the new
landing craft, such as LCTs and LSTs, had a flat bottom and could beach themselves in relatively
shallow water, the combination of high ramps and soft sand caused many wheeled vehicles,
especially those carrying heavy loads or trailers, to stall in the water or become stuck on the soft
sand of the beaches. In several cases, beaches became cluttered and prevented the landing of
larger vessels, as LCVPs (Landing Craft, Vehicle, Personnel, also known as Higgins boats)
breached and became stranded.
Figure 16: DUKWs at Scoglitti

As in Torch, there was still an absence of strong leadership on some of the beaches. The
Navy shore parties and the engineer shore groups were not well connected and their actions were
often uncoordinated. Traffic jams occurred in both the 3rd and 45th division sectors due to the
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limited number of beach exits and limited road networks. Vehicle recovery in the surf and on the
beach was slow and diverted other support vehicles, such as the DUKWs, from their assigned
tasks. 424
Beach units offloaded much of the equipment and supplies by using an LST as a causeway
onto the beach. Arriving LSTs anchored from ½ to one mile off the beach. They would then
transfer their cargo into the smaller LCTs, which could tie up at the offshore end of the beached
LST. Roller conveyers on the beached causeway LST then enabled a quick loading of the LCTs.
The low beach gradients prevented the large LSTs from actually landing on many of Sicily’s
beaches. Knowing that this would be a problem, the Navy devised a means to transfer vehicles
from the LSTs onto the smaller LCTs, which could land on the beaches. While in North Africa,
the Navy cut access holes in the sides of the LSTs of the same size as an LCT ramp. Once off
Sicily, the LSTs anchored about 1,000 yards from the beach. Two LCTs then came alongside
the LST. Workers lashed one LCT to the side opening of the LST, at a right angle, to serve as a
loading platform. The second LCT then tied off to the first LCT. Drivers quickly drove vehicles
off the LST, across the first LCT, finally ending up on the second LCT. As soon as this second
craft was full, it untied and headed for the beach, with the empty space filled by a waiting empty
LCT. Working in this fashion, it took two and a half to three hours to offload a full LST. 425
Ingenuity and cutting torches compensated for the lack of ports and fixed facilities.
Another method of unloading the large LSTs, which worked particularly well, was to anchor
the LSTs in deep water and then transfer supplies and equipment into DUKWs, which then drove
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directly to the dumps. This limited the handling of supplies and did not expose the assault craft
to enemy fire from the beaches.
The experiences of the 45th Infantry Division illustrate the task and challenges of the shore
groups. The 45th arrived off Sicily on July 9 carrying 12,500 tons of supplies in its transports.
All this required offloading and subsequent transportation inshore. Of the total, 15 percent was
palletized which required little labor to move.
For the remainder of the supplies (10,625 tons), the division needed an estimated 1,870
laborers and 110 of the 2 ½ ton cargo trucks to empty the convoy in its allotted timeframe. The
shore group contained 1,500 men and 40 DUKWs, resulting in a shortage of 350 men and 90
trucks on the beaches. 426 Fortunately, good weather and a lack of enemy activity compensated
for these resource shortfalls.
Supplies were generally deposited on the beaches and then moved to inshore dumps, but in
some cases essential supplies were taken off of LSTs, placed into DUKWs, and driven right to
the front lines (during darkness), bypassing the dumps entirely. 427 This represented a vast
improvement in support of the combat forces compared to the beaches of French Morocco and
Algeria.
Since Sicily was a relatively arid island, engineers worked to develop a means of transporting
potable water to the island to support the forces landing ashore. Using a planning figure of one
gallon per day per man, 20 LSTs were fitted with large tanks, with each ship capable of hauling
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10,000 gallons of water. After arriving at the landing beaches, these LSTs would then transfer
their cargo into canvas tanks, established ashore by the 1st Engineer Special Brigade. 428
Water was a critical commodity in the war and of the operation. A shortage of ammunition
could stall an offensive, but a shortage of drinking water could bring Allied military operations
to a rapid and total halt. Fuel kept vehicles moving, but in the infantry units, water that kept the
combat forces moving while ammunition kept them fighting. Water sources in Sicily were
limited and the daily temperatures in July averaged over 90 degrees with little rain. Tanker
LSTs, with the accompanying storage points ashore, would help ensure the Seventh Army could
keep on the move.
One situation that could have easily impeded operations was the storage of food on the initial
convoy. The assault wave carried 24 hours of rations in the easily unloadable LCTs, deciding to
store the remainder of the food on the rear of the LSTs. Poor weather conditions on July 8
threatened to impact vessel offloading, but calmed just prior to the landings. If the weather had
not calmed when it did, sea conditions could easily have slowed the offloading of the LSTs,
which had the potential quickly led to a food shortage across the task force. Fortunately, the
weather cooperated and planners learned that in future landings, the LCTs needed to carry more
of a balance of supplies to allow for poor weather and critical supplies, such as food, belonged in
the front of the LSTs to allow for easier access. 429 Lessons, such as this, contributed to the
success of later assaults in the Mediterranean, as well as in the Normandy campaign. Some of
these lessons seem intuitive, but many only showed themselves in actual combat. Having the
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opportunity to practice these landings throughout 1943 and 1944 provided the knowledge
necessary to succeed later on the beaches of France in the face of a determined German defense.
The DUKWs were the recognized heroes of the Sicily landings, for both US and British
units. Used for the first time in actual combat, these vehicles proved themselves more capable
than anyone had imagined. Due to the soft sand of the beaches, DUKWs ended up hauling the
vast majority of supplies and equipment from the beaches to the inland dumps, 2 ½ tons at a
time. They were hard to maneuver and slow, but they were unequalled in recovery operations
and cross-beach mobility. Drivers could regulate the air pressure of the tires from inside the cab,
allowing the vehicle to transition quickly between the beaches and the roads. 430

Figure 17: Transferring Supplies to a DUKW 431

Although the DUKWs excelled at transporting soldiers or cargo over short distances (up to a
mile), numbers of broken trucks quickly accumulated. Units, unfamiliar with the limitations of
the equipment, diverted DUKWs from their assigned amphibious missions or used them to haul
cargo over extended distances on-shore. Manufacturers had not designed the trucks to cover
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long distances over roads or to travel across rough terrain. The diversion of these vehicles in the
division areas quickly disrupted landing craft offload plans and congested narrow roads along the
beaches. 432
Because of the tremendous usefulness of these vehicles, maintenance issues began to appear.
The beaches were tough on tires and tubes. Propeller gear easily broke. Since these vehicles
were relatively new to the Army inventory, spare parts were still in short supply. Keeping these
vehicles in full operation was an on-going challenge for the beach groups.
The original concept behind the amphibious vehicle was to use it as a reconnaissance vehicle
for traversing rivers and lakes. At a demonstration on June 24, 1942, the commanding general of
the Army Service Forces saw that these would be on invaluable service to logistics units and
ordered the production of several hundred vehicles. 433 A year later, the DUKWS became a
central feature of the Husky support organization and enabled sustainment of Seventh Army
from over the beaches.
Despite the inclusion of a greater number of vehicles with the invasion force, there were still
not enough trucks to move all supplies and equipment forward. Fortunately, neither Allied air
attack, nor intentional destruction by Axis forces, had damaged the Sicilian rail system to any
great extent. By D+1, Shore Engineers and rail personnel had begun putting the rail system into
use, pushing supplies forward. 434
By the end of D+3, Seventh Army had successfully landed 66,235 men, 17,766 tons of bulk
cargo, and 7,416 vehicles on Sicilian beaches and the small ports of Licata and Empedale. The
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main beach supply dumps were located at Gela and Licata. In the 45th Division sector, beach
units moved the original Green, Red, and Yellow beaches approximately three miles to the
southeast, near Scoglitti, to take advantage of better beach conditions and improved road
network. 435
Within ten days, the invasion was well under way. Most of the assault convoy had offloaded and the docks at Licata were in use. Engineers were working to improve the road
networks. Food and water were on-going concern at the front lines due to limited transportation,
but there was plenty of ammunition.
The situation continued to improve as time progressed. Beaches that were not conducive to
offloading, such as Joss Force’s Red Beach, closed in favor of new sites. In a show of flexibility,
the force adjusted to meet the conditions on the ground. By the end of July, Seventh Army had
landed 111,824 men, 104,734 tons of cargo, and 21,512 vehicles. 436
In retrospect, Husky’s beach operations were not perfect, but they had greatly improved
compared to the North African landings eight months prior. New equipment had solved many
problems experienced during the earlier invasion and commanders and their planners had done a
better job in balancing the assault force. However, both the Army and Navy still had a lot to
learn. Both services needed firm leadership early on during the assault on all the beaches, not
just on some of them.
Despite the problems on the beaches, the landings were generally a success and met the
demands of the combat forces. True, not everything had gone as planned, but the unexpected is a
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part of any operation of this magnitude. Problems arose, but new organizations, such as the
engineer special brigade and its groups, worked to resolve any problems. Many problem areas
seen in the first hours of Torch, such as care of the dead or an inability to resupply combat
forces, failed to reappear.

Figure 18: The Beach at Scoglitti 437

In the grand scheme, the Allies were flooding ashore with all of the material needed to
pursue a mobile, offensive campaign. This tremendous stream of supplies and equipment
landing on Sicilian shores was not lost on the enemy. On July 11, an Italian homing pigeon
landed on a US minesweeper. The message read, in part, “Cargo ships by the hundreds are
discharging uninterrupted war materiel. No friendly air…Send more pigeons.” 438 Seventh Army
had successfully arrived on the beaches of Sicily and was ready to drive inland, heading toward
the north.
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To the east, Montgomery and the British Eighth Army had faired a bit better on the landings.
While some the US beaches experienced bottlenecks, mostly from a lack of beach personnel, the
British were in a better position. Weather did not influence the beaches in the British sector as
much as in the US sector and Syracuse proved to be a very capable port. 439 The British did have
some difficulties in offloading trucks as quickly as Montgomery wished, but overall, the British
support forces kept a steady stream of materiel moving forward.
The presence of Syracuse in the British Eighth Army area aided Montgomery’s sustainment
operations. With a daily discharge capacity of 1,000 tons per day, the Eighth Army could send
most of its materiel into Syracuse, and use outlying beaches for any needed residual capacity.
Additionally, the port of Augusta, 15 miles north of Syracuse, would quickly add to British port
capacities. This study did not look into specific problems with British beach operations, but
none of the major unit combat reports indicates any major problems with the landing of the
Eastern Task Force’s 66,000 personnel, 10,000 vehicles, or 60,000 tons of supplies sent in on the
initial assault. Eisenhower reported that by July 17, “Eighth Army’s supply lines through the
ports of Augusta and Syracuse were already in good working order.” 440
British beaches operated generally with the same type of support units as those found on US
beaches. Shore parties handled the reception and organization of the beaches, although the
British did have some issues with standardizing the make-up of the different beach groups,
which included United Kingdom, North African, Middle East, and Indian variants. 441
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The supporting British logistics headquarters Tripbase, originally stationed out of Tripoli, but
later renamed Fortbase (a part of the 15th Army Group) upon the transfer to Syracuse. The
British Number 1 District provided logistics support for British forces on Sicily, while the North
Africa District Headquarters maintained responsibility for support of the AFHQ British theater
rear area in North Africa. 442 The plan for two distinct systems of support was working.

The Other Side of the Hill
After Tunisia fell in May 1943, Hitler had focused his effort on the Eastern Front. Stalingrad
and the German Sixth Army had fallen in February 1943 and the Germans needed to stop the
Soviet advance or risk losing the entire Eastern Front. The bulge of the lines at Kursk provided
such an opportunity. Named “Operation Citadel,” the German High Command planned on the
destruction of the Soviet offensive capability; after that, they could return their attention to the
west.
However, Allied movements in the Mediterranean, along with wavering support from within
Italy for Mussolini, bothered Hitler. For two months, from the end of April until the end of June,
Hitler repeatedly postponed Citadel. Finally, on June 29, Hitler returned to the Eastern Front and
ordered Operation Citadel to begin on July 5. Four days later the Allied attacked Sicily, forcing
Hitler to divide his attention between the two theaters. 443
Compared to North Africa, the Axis forces found the island of Sicily much easier to support.
Sicily lay within range of Axis fighters staged both on Sicily, as well as on the Italian mainland.
Ferries carried supplies over the Strait of Messina, a narrow expanse of water separating the
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eastern edge of Sicily from the Italian peninsula that was a mere 1.9 miles wide. The main
enemy port was Messina, which was not only very capable, but also heavily defended. Antiaircraft batteries lined both sides of the Strait of Messina and fighter aircraft were on the island
and the Italian mainland. German supplies moved by train from Germany, down the Italian
peninsula, and then by barge to Sicily. The communications lines were vulnerable to Allied
strategic bombers, but were out of range of fighter aircraft based in North Africa.
The proximity of Sicily to Italy meant that the Italian High Command, Commando Supremo,
had no problem shipping supplies to Axis forces operating on the island. Indeed, German
commanders complained more about the lack of Axis air support than they did about their
supplies. Field Marshal Kesselring wrote that the fall of Sicily was due to the utter failure of the
Italian coastal defensive units and reserve divisions. Additionally, the German divisions arrived
too late and without sufficient strength to effectively deal with the Allied invasion. 444
The center of gravity for sustainment of the Axis force on Sicily was the ferry service
shuttling across the Strait of Messina. Organized by Admiral Meendsen-Bohlken, the service
used civilian ferryboats, naval assault craft, and Siebel ferryboats to move units, equipment, and
supplies. Captain (Baron) Gustav von Liebenstein served as the Sea Transport Leader for the
Strait. 445
Recognizing the importance of the Strait, the Germans began work in 1943 to improve its
capacity. The number of principal routes increased from three to 12. Similar to what the Allies
would later use at Anzio, pools of loaded German trucks rolled onto the ferries near Reggio,
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cross the strait, and then rolled direct to a Sicilian supply depot. By July 1944, the system could
move 610 vehicles, 750 tons of supplies, and 3,600 men in a single day. 446 This line of
communication not only served to supply the divisions on Sicily, it was also the escape route
back to Italy.
Faced with the Allied divisions landing ashore, the commander of the Italian Sixth Army on
Sicily, General Alfredo Guzzoni, complained to Hitler’s personal representative, Konstantin von
Neurath, that Italian troops were not fully equipped and lacked the mobility needed to move
about the island. Allied aircraft attacked the Sicilian railways on a daily basis, but the Italian
government was not repairing the damaged equipment quickly enough. The German High
Command’s assessment was that the Italians did not have the will to fight. 447
On the other hand, German units on Sicily did have the necessary will, mobility, and
equipment to meet the invading armies. Whether they were strong enough was the question.
The Hermann Göring Panzer Division and 15th Panzergrenadier Division responded to the initial
invasion. Hitler quickly realized that Sicily needed reinforcements, so by the end of July, the 1st
Parachute and 29th Panzergrenadier Divisions were on Sicily as well. General Hans-Valentin
Hube, a veteran of the Eastern Front and one of Hitler’s most capable corps commanders,
commanded all German forces on the island.
As expected, the Italians put up little resistance to the Allied invasion, so the brunt of the
fighting rested with the German divisions. The loss of airfields and aircraft represented the
greatest problem for the defenders. As of July 18, there were only 25 German aircraft on Sicily
capable of flying - advancing Seventh and Eighth armies had destroyed over 1,100 Axis
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planes. 448 Air sorties for the Germans increasingly had to be flown from the Italian mainland,
reducing loiter time over the island. The one advantage of this was that the Germans could ship
less fuel and fewer bombs to Sicily, thus easing the demand on transportation. This simplified
resupply efforts and allowed German service units to focus on the needs of the ground force.
Logistically, support of the Axis forces eased as the front lines moved back to the north and
east. This shortened the enemy line of communications and the size of the front lines, thus
reducing the demand for fuel and vehicles. Requirements dropped as Axis units evacuated from
the island. Ammunition and high explosives remained critical items throughout the operation.
Although the Allied strategic bombers were targeting rail infrastructure on Italy and Sicily,
sufficient supplies were getting through to sustain Hube’s XIV Panzer Corps. Despite this, Hube
simply lacked sufficient forces to stop the progress that Patton and Montgomery were making.
As of the middle of July, the entire Axis garrison on Sicily numbered from 250,000-365,000;
the exact numbers are unclear. The heart of this force was four German Divisions, which totaled
approximately 62,000 men. 449 Facing the defenders were two Allied armies. The US Seventh
Army held approximately 217,000 men and Montgomery’s British Eighth Army had 250,000
men, for a total Allied force of 467,000. 450
Both sides suffered. The Germans had approximately 12,000 killed or captured. A similar
number sustained wounds, but made their way back to Italy. The Allies killed 2,000 Italians,
wounded 5,000, and captured another 137,000. Of those taken prisoner, the Allies sent 75,000 to
North Africa as prisoners of war and paroled the rest in Sicily. On the Allied side, the
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Americans had 8,791 men killed, wounded, or captured, while the British had 11,843 killed,
wounded, or captured. 451
Faced with two Allied armies and their considerable resources, the German effort turned
from an effort to push the Allies off the island, to an evacuation operation - with the goal being
to safely transport as much men and equipment as possible back to Italy. By August 10, the Axis
fight in Sicily would turn into a delaying action to allow time to evacuate as many German and
Italian forces as possible across the two-mile Strait of Messina.
The Axis evacuation of Sicily was one of the great logistical feats of the war. Facing a
determined Allied attack from both Eighth and Seventh Armies, the commander of all German
forces on Sicily, General der Panzertruppen Hans Valentin Hube, ordered the evacuation of
Sicily on August 4, 1943. The priorities were men first, equipment and supplies second. Despite
a half-hearted Allied attempt to interdict the Strait, the evacuations occurred as the Germans had
planned. By August 16, the Italians had evacuated between 70,000 and 75,000 men, 500
vehicles, and 12 mules. The Germans evacuated 39,951 soldiers, 14,772 casualties, 9,789
vehicles, 51 tanks, 163 guns, and 18,665 tons of supplies and equipment. Only one German
soldier died in the process. 452 The evacuation was a masterwork of coordination, skill, and
transportation management.

Support of Seventh Army and the Drive towards Palermo
On July 12, the Italian Sixth Army realized that counterattacks against the Allied beachheads
were ineffective and the time had come to switch to the counteroffensive. General Guzzoni
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adopted a strategy to delay the Allied advance and begin withdrawing forces to the northeast
corner of the island. Patton, who was looking for an opportunity, became aware of the change in
enemy intentions and quickly directed an aggressive move inland.
The II Corps commander, Major General Bradley, moved two divisions towards the towns of
Agrigento and Porto Empedocle on July 13. 453 These towns were important strategically and
Porto Empedocle contained a port that could contribute to the support of Seventh Army.
Meanwhile, General Alexander was adjusting the US/British border to the west in an attempt to
give Montgomery’s Eighth Army an avenue of approach that could skirt past strong German
defenses. This shift forced Patton and Bradley to adjust the US advance from the north to the
west since there were only a few roads leading north and Montgomery now controlled all of
them.
Despite the change in directions, Patton still saw Palermo as the next big objective. Meeting
with Alexander on July 17, the Seventh Army commander successfully argued that the best
means to protect Eighth Army was by aggressive action along the western portion of the island,
thereby splitting the island in two. 454 Alexander agreed to the plan and Seventh Army was free
to resume an unrelenting drive to the northwest.
The southern towns of Agrigento and Porto Empedocle fell to Seventh Army on July 16.
Control of these towns gave Seventh Army access to Highway 118, which led toward Palermo,
and a rail line that ran from Porto Empedocle north to Termini Imerse. These routes would
become critical to sustaining the divisions as they moved north, away from the assault beaches.
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Seventh Army’s Provisional Corps, under command of Major General Geoffrey Keyes,
controlled the western part of the island, while Bradley’s II Corps controlled the center.
The Provisional Corps had the mission of seizing Palermo, while II Corps moved north to cut
the island in half. On July 19, the 82d Airborne Division moved into western Sicily and began
mopping up any enemy units that had not already moved east. East of the 82nd, the 3rd Infantry
Division moved north, along Highway 118, towards Palermo. The 2nd Armored Division
followed as the Army reserve. Resistance was light and both divisions covered 20-25 miles.
The combination of Allied air support and direct fire from the ground units was usually enough
to convince Italian defenders to surrender without a fight. Patton’s orders were to continue
advancing toward Palermo unless ordered to stop. Hilly terrain did little to slow the advance.
The US advance on July 19 was 25 miles. The day after, 20 miles. By the night of July 22, the
3rd Infantry and 2nd Armored Divisions were on the outskirts of Palermo, but the Italian
defenders gave up without a fight. 455
The fast capture of Palermo was partly due to enemy decision to shift focus to the northeast
corner of the Sicily. Other factors included the bombing of Rome being by Allied aircraft (thus
redirecting the attention of the Italian High Command,) as well as the sizeable stocks of fuel that
were built up on Seventh Army beaches. The drive was only about 100 miles in length, but three
divisions on the move required large amounts of trucks and gasoline. The pursuit did not require
much ammunition, but everything depended on mobility. The figure below shows the main
routes used during the operation.
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Figure 19: Motor Freight Support for Husky 456

While II Crops was advancing northwest, the support situation was maturing as well. By
July 17, the divisions began relinquishing control of their respective beaches and turning them
over to the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, whose responsibility it was to gather all sustainment
activities under its command. 457 Within a week of landing, the brigade was now responsible for
running the reception operations, as well as serving as the intermediate support element for the
entire Seventh Army. The brigade assumed command over all shore groups and any service
forces not assigned to the divisions or II Corps and began acting in the capacity of a base section
for all US forces on the island. 458
By July 23, Palermo was secure and engineers began to repair the damage that retreating
Germans had inflicted on the port. The damage at Palermo was extensive, but not prohibitive.
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The Germans had sunk 44 vessels and barges into the main shipping channels and along the
docks. Working parties had to clear these obstructions before the port could be usable.
The port of Palermo was large enough to hold 36 LSTs and 14 Liberty ships- a substantial
improvement to the limited capability of the southern Sicilian beaches. 459 Thanks to the focused
efforts of the engineers, the port was at 30 percent capacity within a week of its fall. The first
coasters arrived on July 28 carrying food, fuel, and ammunition. 460 From Palermo,
transportation units trucked supplies eastward to the advancing army. The capacity at Palermo
continued to improve as the campaign progressed, providing a valuable means of supplying
Seventh Army’s drive east, towards Messina, across the northern coast road. Patton had
captured Palermo and now had access to a port along the northern Sicilian coastline, but this was
only an intermediate objective. The real prize was Messina.

The Race for Messina
On July 25, the Allied ground force commander for Sicily, General Alexander, formally
assigned Seventh Army the mission of helping Eighth Army seize the city of Messina. Up to this
point, this had been an Eighth Army objective, but one that Montgomery’s forces had difficulty
achieving because of a strong German defense and the problems associated with going around
the imposing Mount Etna. The capture of Palermo allowed Alexander to split Sicily into two
sections along the east-west Highway 120. Seventh Army had the top portion, Eighth Army, the
south. Both armies were to work their way toward Messina. For Patton this was a race - not just
to get there, but also to do so before Montgomery.
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The opportunity to grab Messina before the British provided a powerful motivation for the
Seventh Army commander. Patton placed a renewed urgency in moving east along the northern
coastline as quickly as possible. This stressed not only the battalions, regiments and divisions,
but the supporting service elements as well. German engineers were adept at demolishing
bridges and roads as they slowly retreated east; delaying the advance until Seventh Army
engineers were able to repair the damage or constructed new routes. Whether Patton’s push for
Massena represented personal ambition or merely the work of a demanding tactical commander
is a topic open for debate. Despite the increased casualties and risk, however, Seventh Army
constantly advanced.
Bradley ordered II Corps to advance toward Massena along two axes of advance. Highway
113 skirted the northern coastline and provided a direct link with Palermo. Highway 120 ran
about 20 miles to the south, linking Nicosia, Troina, and Randazzo. Between the two highways
was a system of mountains and streams, which effectively separated the American forces and
prevented one unit from reinforcing or resupplying the other. The terrain favored the enemy and
amplified any supply problems. 461 This effectively slowed down the Seventh army movement
eastward.
The mountainous terrain of Sicily took its toll on both men and machines. An infantryman
could wear out a new pair of shoes in as little as a few days. Vehicle maintenance became a
concern as the US divisions rapidly moved across the island. II Corps found itself with a
growing maintenance problem as the terrain took its toll on vehicles while a single Ordnance
maintenance company struggled to keep up with the growing number of disabled vehicles.
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Despite the need, an additional Ordnance company did not arrive in the Corps area until near the
end of the campaign. 462
For the supporting service units, the terrain not only tended to limit movement to the roads
and rail nets, it could also add to the time required to complete a convoy. Hills, defiles, valleys,
and ridges all served to slow down the rate of march. On one occasion, a II Corps convoy
needed 26 hours to cover a 60-mile distance - an average of less than two and a half miles per
hour. 463
As divisions moved further to the east, away from the beaches and Palermo, the line of
communications lengthened as well. Supplies from Palermo moved east via rail, trucks, and
watercraft to Termini, San Stefano, Brolo, and Barcellona-Calderà (see map of Sicily at
Appendix A). Seventh Army had difficulty in pushing sufficient supplies forward to meet all the
demand so, in some cases, divisions had to send trucks back to the Army supply dumps to draw
supplies, a distance of up to 120 miles. 464 Following doctrine of the period, the army and
divisions had assigned support forces, while the corps did not. This saved the corps from
expending energy and time on administrative matters, but it also meant that divisions had to skip
an echelon if they needed to go back for support.
The work of the engineers along the northern coast road was invaluable. Retreating Germans
routinely mined and blew demolitions along the road, halting all travel. Quick repair or
improvisation by the engineers allowed the supplies to continue to flow east. For those situations
where repairs were not yet complete, the army opened new beaches along the coast and shipped
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essential supplies direct to the advancing forces via landing craft. 465 This allowed Seventh Army
to keep constant pressure on the enemy.
The steady resupply of ammunition to the forward US battalions and regiments proved to be
a deciding factor in many engagements. The advance slowed when US units faced barrages from
German artillery and supporting mortar fire. Working to seize Pizzo Spina, the 180th Infantry
stopped the German artillery attack with a 100-round, 30-minute counter attack of high explosive
and white phosphorous rounds. In total, the 171st Field Artillery Battalion fired 1,100 rounds in
support of the 180th Infantry on July 25th, while a sister artillery battalion, the 189th, fired an
additional 500. 466 Such intensive attacks consumed large amounts of munitions, but they held
the enemy at bay and ultimately decreased the number of friendly casualties. Logistics weighted
the odds of a positive outcome in any level battle.
Because of the limited road and rail networks stretching across the island, the engineer
special brigade initially supplied the entire II Corps from just one army-level supply dump at
Licata until the capture of Palermo. After that, as II Corps turned east toward Messina, service
units established other supply points along the north coast road. These locations included
Caltanissetta, Petralia, Nicosia, and on the Coast Road itself. 467
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Figure 20: The Allied Advance Across Sicily 468

By D+20, sufficient army-level service forces were ashore to begin relieving the 1st Engineer
Special Brigade from its base support mission. The brigade had performed admirably in
executing its traditional engineering mission, as well as that of coordinating support. Seventh
Army began taking responsibility for the advance supply points and dumps, with the service
personnel transferring from engineer control to army control. 469
The Seventh Army attack towards Messina encountered increasing resistance from the
shortening Axis defensive lines. On July 30, the German 29th Panzer Grenadier Division
initiated an attack on US lines from just north of the town of Motta. The Germans had the initial
surprise, but the US 45th Infantry Division quickly dig in and began calling for support from the
Division’s artillery units. Following a 15 minute concentrated attack from the Division’s three
artillery battalions, the German attack slowed and then stopped by 1 p.m. that same day. Motta
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fell without a fight the following day. 470 Once again, strong divisions with sufficient resources
to overwhelm the enemy proved essential to victory.
On July 30, the 1st Infantry Division had reached the town of Troina, along Highway 120.
Terrain here was difficult: hills surrounding the town held defensive positions. Mines littered the
streams. 471 Troina was important to the Germans because this was the northern anchor of the
German Etna defensive line.
Major General Terry Allen and his 1st Infantry Division expected to take Troina without
much of a fight. Starting the attack on July 31, the 39th Infantry Regiment made some initial
gains, but the 15th Panzer Grenadier Division, amidst heavy enemy artillery fire, repulsed the
Regiment. Allen ordered the 39th and 26th Regiments to attack once again on August 1, but the
US advance gained less than a half mile. The supporting US artillery did not arrive in time to
support the attack because of poor roads and heavy traffic. 472
Colonel George Taylor’s 16th Infantry Regiment made another attack on the following day,
August 3, but with only limited success. A counter attack in the mid-afternoon threatened the
advance, but US artillery support prevented the Germans from overrunning the lead US
battalions. The main US attack occurred on August 4. Determined to take the town, Allen
pounded Troina with eight artillery battalions. The Air Force contributed as well, using 72 A-36
fighters to bomb the German defensive lines. The 60th Regiment from the 9th Infantry Division
arrived as well – providing fresh troops to augment the now-tired regiments of the 1st Infantry
Division. By the end of the day, Allied air attacks had destroyed most of the German supply
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dumps. The US force was threatening to cut off the only escape route leading to Massena. On
August 5, General Hube approved the withdrawal of German units out of Troina. 473
The fight for Troina represented a situation in which it did not matter that the US forces had a
preponderance of logistics capacity. The combination of terrain, skill, and determination had
kept Allen’s men at bay for nearly a week - much longer than the Americans had expected.
Perhaps the outcome might have changed had Allen chosen to employ his forces differently, but
the sheer amount of available equipment and supplies alone could not overcome the German
advantage. Logistics enabled the fight, but they did not predetermine the outcome.
To augment the limited number of US service forces, the theater organized a number of nonUS service units within North Africa for service in Sicily. These included native labor units
(North African civilians working as part of an organized unit within the Services of Supply) and
French military guard companies, which helped provide such services as transportation, bakery,
laundry, refrigeration, and shoe and typewriter repair to Seventh Army. Generally, a French
civilian managed each native company with a US military officer overseeing two or more
companies. 474
Unsurprisingly, differences in languages and culture presented challenges in the employment
of these native service units. On one occasion, US officers asked a French supervisor to have his
unit sort out different types of rations and to stack similar items together. The supervisor, who
could not read English, did the best he could. Afterward, US officers found that there had indeed
been a sorting and stacking, although not as they had expected. Everything in one pile contained
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labels that read “California Fruit Packers.” Everything came from the same producer, but the
contents were all different. 475 Such was the nature of working with native service units.
North Africa had taught the Allies the importance of maintaining a friendly civilian
population within the areas of operations. On one hand, a friendly population presented less of a
threat to the vulnerable supply lines, thus requiring less security and avoiding a drain of labor
from the forward areas. However, on the other hand, achieving a population friendly to the
Allied cause did not come without some level of effort. Infrastructure needed rebuilding, food
and clean water were in demand, and essential local and regional government functions often
needed to be reestablished.
Years of occupation by Italian and German defenders had depleted Sicily of food, fuel, and
other basic commodities. Criminal elements sought to take advantage of the situation. All of
this drove the effort for a military government plan.
From the beginning of the planning effort, Force 141 recognized the need for an Allied
Military Government of the Occupied Territory (AMGOT) of Sicily. General Alexander,
commander of Force 141/15th Army Group, was to be the military governor of Sicily. Provincial
administrations provided most of the interaction with the local populace and there was an
overarching military government headquarters, which included finance, law, civilian supply,
trade, health, police, and custody of enemy property divisions. The British and American task
forces each deployed with a subordinate military government headquarters as well to provide
civilian affairs support as soon as the forces landed ashore. 476
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Sicily is technically part of Europe; however, in terms of culture, climate, and society the
island is really a mix of Southern Italian and North African influences. Italian military officers
tended to view their island cousins more as animals, than human beings. 477 Given such
conditions, the Sicilian populace welcomed the invading armies, but also saw the occupation as a
means to improve their existence. The military government system proved to be an effective
means of dealing with the various needs of the population, without diverting attention away from
the front lines.
Patton was not impressed with life in Sicily. “Of all the countries I have ever been in, this is
the most utterly damned. Dust, filth, bugs, and natives,” adding, “The people of this country are
the most destitute and God-forgotten people I have ever seen.” 478 Life in Sicily was hard; it
became even harsher under the oppression of the Axis defenders. The Sicilians needed food,
fuel, and the necessities of life. If the Allies could help provide these, then the population would
fully support the occupiers. The rear areas would not only be secure, but the local populace
could also serve as a willing source of labor. Civil affairs and the Allied military government
were a secondary effort to the overall operation, but they served a crucial role - one that let
commanders look forward and not be worried about their rear support areas.
Native labor came in many shapes and it was not always in human form. The theater
headquarters had discovered the benefits of pack animals in the mountainous areas of North
Africa and they carried this lesson over to Sicily. As Seventh Army moved across the difficult
terrain of the northern coast, the need for such a capability became even more evident. Damaged
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or non-existent roads meant that service units had to transport supplies either by hand, or by
mule.
Teams of acquisition officers purchased mules at various locations and by various means.
Some came from Sicily; others from North African markets and forwarded to Sicily by sea.
To help the infantry units resupply themselves, Seventh Army submitted an emergency
requisition for packsaddles. The Eastern Base Section worked to scrounge up sufficient saddles
to meet the demand, eventually collecting 122 captured Italian saddles and 288 US Phillips
saddles. These were gathered and shipped to Sicily on August 10, on 12 C-37 cargo aircraft. 479
Eventually, over 4,000 horses, mules, and donkeys were in use across Sicily. 480 The 3rd Infantry
Division alone used 650. 481 These animals helped haul supplies, such as food, ammunition, and
water to the dismounted combat units fighting in the rough terrain and returned to the rear lines
carrying the dead and injured.
The use of pack animals presented special challenges to the service forces. The animals
needed veterinary support and fodder. Special training was required to load and manage the
pack trains. Fortunately, the experienced gained in Tunisia helped prepare Seventh army for
these unique challenges and the largest problem was simply acquiring enough animals and
equipment to support the demand.
Besides trucks and pack animals, the use of existing rail lines also provided a valuable means
of moving men and materiel across the island. Rail support began early after the landings. In
sharp contrast to the Torch landings, rail personnel from the 727th Railway Operating Battalion
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landed with the assault force and immediately went to work locating the rail yards, and
organizing local Sicilian workers. Within four hours of landing, the battalion was conducting a
test run of the rail system around Licata. By D+1, supplies were being carried by rail to the 3rd
Infantry Division, carrying 40 tons on the first day. Within three days, the daily tonnage had
increased to 800 tons. 482
The mining and sabotage of the rail system that had been a problem in North Africa repeated
itself in Sicily. Using techniques carried over from Tunisia, the 727th pushed an empty flat rail
car ahead of the locomotive to find any hidden explosives on the rail lines. Rail workers had to
clear spurs by hand. As the combat forces drove north and then east, the rail battalion followed
in close pursuit. 483
Initial rail service started out of Licata with 30 rail cars per day. Within a week, US rail
service included 16 locomotives and over 100 rail cars, now operating from Caltanissetta. 484
Eventually, Sicily was able to provide over 300 locomotives and 3,500 rail cars. 485 The rail
battalion established service up the center of the island and then spread it across the northern
coast as the army turned east.
By September, the fighting had ceased and US forces had withdrawn to the eastern and
center parts of the island. As soon as soon as rail lines and other infrastructure were no longer
needed for military use, the Island Base Section turned these facilities over to the military
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government for continued maintenance, in conjunction with local Sicilian authorities. The 727th
continued to coordinate all US rail support until it departed Sicily on October 27. 486
Certain individuals made such a difference that they were singled out for award or
promotion. Such was the case of Master Sergeant Kenneth Phillips of the 727th Railway
Operating Battalion. Master Sergeant Phillips had been serving as the Yardmaster of the rail
yard at Licata, which was also one of the central supply bases. As the line of communications
lengthened, Phillips showed a remarkable agility in organizing the civilian rail workers to
establish rail service well-forward into the combat areas. This was essential to maintain pace
with the fast-moving combat forces. The agility and skills demonstrated by Master Sergeant
Phillips proved vital to success of operations and earned Phillips a Legion of Merit from the
theater commander, General Eisenhower. Not only did an enlisted soldier win this award, but an
enlisted service force enlisted soldier. The actions of a single soldier, no matter where in the
theater, could indeed influence the lives of thousands of men.

The Fall from Grace
No discussion of Operation Husky or of George S Patton III is complete without at least
some acknowledgment of the two incidents in which Patton physically and verbally abused
soldiers during visits to military hospitals. The incidents revealed a character flaw in the Seventh
Army commander. This flaw threatened to overshadow everything Patton had accomplished in
Sicily and affected Patton’s relationship with Eisenhower for the remainder of war.
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The first incident occurred on August 3 in the receiving tent of the 15th Evacuation Hospital,
situated near Nicosia. After speaking with soldiers wounded in battle, Patton came upon a 27year-old soldier named Private Charles Kuhl. When asked why he was crying, Kuhl replied
words to the effect that his nerves could not take it any longer. 487 Patton lost his temper, slapped
the soldier across the face with his gloves, and “broke out in a torrent of abuse against the
soldier.” 488 Two days later the hospital diagnosed Private Kuhl with chronic dysentery and
malaria - two physical illnesses that surely contributed to the man’s loss of nerve. 489
The second incident occurred a week later, August 10, at the 93rd Evacuation Hospital.
Patton started making his rounds, speaking to wounded soldiers. Patton came upon Private Paul
Bennett, an artilleryman, shivering on a cot. Patton asked Bennett what his problem was and
Bennett likewise answered that he had a problem with his nerves. “Hell, you are just a
goddamed coward, you yellow son of a bitch,” Patton yelled, pulling his pistol from the holster
and waved it at the soldier. Patton slapped Bennett twice, the second time knocking the private’s
helmet to the ground. 490 A later investigation showed that Private Bennett had wanted to stay
with his unit, but the battery surgeon ordered him to the Evacuation Hospital for evaluation. 491
Word of Patton’s misdeeds spread throughout the medical community and eventually
reached Eisenhower. A group of newspaper reporters collaborated the reports. Eisenhower
noted that in Patton’s defense, had these events occurred on the battlefield no one would have
cared. However, the rear areas were no place for such outbursts. The same qualities that made
Patton a successful battlefield commander also made Patton a liability off the battlefield.
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Determined to keep his best combat commander, Eisenhower first wrote a stinging letter of
reprimand, notifying the Seventh Army commander that any further such incident were grounds
for Patton’s immediate relief. Additionally, Eisenhower ordered Patton to personally apologize
to the two soldiers, as well as issue a public apology to representative groups of officers and
enlistment from all of the Seventh Army’s divisions. 492 Eisenhower discussed the response with
reporters and asked that they refrain from writing about the entire situation.
Patton was wrong for abusing the two soldiers, but in his defense, the Army still did not
understand a great deal about battlefield stress. The massive artillery bombardments of the First
World War produced a condition known as “shell shock,” but the medical corps of 1943 still did
not have a full understanding of battlefield stress, or its treatment. Whether such stress was an
illness, wound, or simple cowardness depended on the circumstances. Patton, himself, was
probably under some level of stress that contributed to his outburst. Regardless, commanders of
the time did not have a good understanding of the condition or of its treatment.
Treatment of battlefield stress did continue to improve as the war went on. During the fight
up the Italian Peninsula, the Services of Supply would create rest camps in Naples that could
help in the treatment of such illnesses. These lessons would also carry over to Normandy, where
the European Services of Supply would construct an effective treatment regimen for soldiers
experiencing battlefield stress. Patton’s situation was tragic, but it did help raise awareness of
the problem.
The final point worth mentioning is that Patton’s relationship with Eisenhower was forever
changed. Now on notice, Patton could not afford to make any more mistakes. Before the
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slapping incidents, Patton had the ability to argue with Eisenhower about anything he did not
agree with. Afterward, however, Patton no longer enjoyed this same level of freedom.
Patton was an effective tactical commander. However, his Anglophobic tendencies, distaste
for logistical details, and hot temper made Patton ill suited for higher levels of command.
Eisenhower notified General Marshall that “In no event will I ever advance Patton beyond Army
Command.” 493 This set Patton’s future for the rest of the war.

Evolution of the Island Base Section
Recognizing that Sicily would likely become a base of operations in the western
Mediterranean, AFHQ decided to form a base section on the island to provide intermediate
support. Accordingly, the theater activated the 6625th Base Area Group (Provisional) on July 17,
1943. As part of the initial assault, the 6625th attached 39 officers and 98 enlisted personnel to
the 1st Engineer Special Brigade to serve as part of the Brigade during the landings and to act as
the base section advance element. 494 This advance element landed in Sicily between D+2 and
D+9 and began work as part of the Engineer Special Brigade’s staff.
As soon as Patton’s army had secured Palermo, the remainder of the 6625th left Tunisia and
headed for Sicily, completing the move to Palermo by August 6. The base group established its
headquarters in Palermo, commanded by Colonel Robert Sears. Although Seventh Army had
established the 6625th at Palermo, there was no order or written instruction detailing the group’s
exact responsibilities. In fact, the 6625th had two separate headquarters in Sicily - one at
Palermo and one with the advance element at Licata. Each headquarters argued that it was more
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important than the other and issued separate orders, producing confusion that lasted for several
weeks. 495 To rectify the situation, Seventh Army issued a general order that directed the 6625th
to assume the administrative support duties performed by the engineer brigade and to abolish the
headquarters at Licata. 496 Palermo was to become the new logistics hub for the army.
The 6625th was operating as a coherent support unit by August 18, although consolidation
with the element at Licata would take longer. With the formal arrival of the base unit in Sicily,
Seventh Army turned over all supply functions to the 6625th and the Services of Supply, a
responsibility Patton was glad to relinquish. Seventh Army could now focus on combat
operations, while the 6625th handled the administrative matters. Equally glad was the 1st
Engineer Special Brigade. The establishment of the 6625th relieved the engineers from the
supply and transportation mission effective August 25, allowing the engineer brigade to focus on
engineer-specific tasks and missions.497
The confusion over the two headquarters stemmed from the original plans that called for two
base section groups in Sicily - one at Palermo and one at Licata. However, the situation had
changed since those plans were developed. With Seventh Army operating along the northern
Sicilian coastline, it no longer made sense to have a base of supply located on the southern
coast. 498 In a display of organizational agility, Seventh Army modified the plan to create one
central port at Palermo, although the change itself created internal confusion within the 6625th.
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On September 1, the 6625th provisional Base Area Group became a formal base section,
named the Island Base Section, under the theater Services of Supply. 499 As Husky progressed,
Seventh Army began to turn areas over to the base section. Initially, the Island Base Section had
responsibility for the western part of the island, while Seventh Army maintained control of the
east.
Eventually, Seventh Army transferred responsibility for the entire US sector of the island
over to the Island Base Section. By November 1943, the Island Base Section controlled a swath
along the northern Sicilian coast extending east from Palermo to Termini, as well as the depots at
Agrigento, Porto Empedocle, and Licata. The British Number 1 District controlled the rest of the
island. 500
Although the Island Base Section was created relatively late in the operation, the creation of
such an organization made tactical sense and followed established doctrine. Seventh Army was
ready to shed itself of administrative oversight for the force and, by the middle of August, there
were adequate service troops on the island to accept the mission. Perhaps even more important,
with the activation of the Island Base Section, Seventh Army was now free to focus on any
follow-on missions. The combat phase of Husky had ended on August 17; Patton and his staff
were looking ahead. The Services of Supply and its Island Base Section took on the un-glorified
task of reequipping the divisions, mounting forces for the upcoming Italian invasion, standing up
Italian service units, and closing out support facilities on Sicily. The 3rd and 45th Infantry
Divisions had to prepare for the assault on Italy. The 1st and 9th Infantry Divisions, plus the 2nd
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Armored Divisions were destined for the United Kingdom to prepare for the upcoming crosschannel assault. Sicily had become part of the communications zone.

Assessment of the Engineer Special Brigade Concept
Although the concept behind the Engineer Special Brigade and its beach groups seemed
sound, Husky illustrated the challenges of implementing this new idea. The engineers and their
attached units represented a unique capability, one that several divisions found difficult to leave
on the beaches and shore areas. Reports intentionally leave out the specific identities of the
culprits, apparently to protect the guilty (and because division commanders were general
officers.) However, of the three divisions that landed at Sicily on D-Day, two used the Engineer
shore groups inappropriately.
One division chose to strip the service forces out of its beach group and establish a separate
division supply service further inland. This ad hoc organization was not effective - it did not fit
into the overall logistics plan and its removal severely hampered the operations of the beach
group and its shore regiment. A second division indiscriminately used the shore group troops
and vehicles to move supplies as far forward as the front lines, thus impeding beach operations.
Personnel of every rank were on the beaches commandeering vehicles and drivers. Divisional
staff officers diverted and kidnapped entire convoys. Officers and men scrounged the beaches
looking for specific supplies and equipment. 501 The 1st Engineer Special Brigade had helped fix
the assault beaches, but until the divisions learned to leave the shore groups alone to do their
jobs, the beaches would continue to have problems.
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The Navy had its complaints about the shore groups as well, claiming that from the time of
the initial landing until D+3 that beach conditions were chaotic. The beach parties were
overwhelmed by the number of boats arriving so quickly and many vehicles ended up disabled
on unmarked mine fields. Beach parties failed to organize supply dumps while supplies piled up
on shores. At night, the Navy could not find shore party personnel. Overall, the Navy
characterized the landings to be as disorganized as during the Torch operation the previous
November, especially on the Cent and Dime beaches. 502 Clearly, work remained in organizing
future landings.
Patton, following the conclusion of Husky, shows little change in his attitudes concerning
logistics and administrative support. In October, Patton noted in his report that:
“In any landing operation confusion is bound to occur…landing craft do not
land where they are supposed to and stores get ashore regardless of progress.
The main thing is to get the man and stores ashore. If they are there, they can be
used. If we waste valuable time trying to get them ashore in some preconceived
order they will not be available.” 503

At least part of the problem, in Patton’s view, was the type of officers commanding the
various beach parties. Patton recognized that these parties could be of immense value in
bringing order to the landing beaches, however, the beach parties “very seldom produce the
results they should. This is due to the lack of force of character in the men of the Army and
Navy commanding them.” 504 Either through strong will, sufficient rank, or a combination of
both, the services needed to get leaders on the beach that could provide direction and make
things happen.
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Patton had his faults, but he was a good judge of character, particularly in issues involving
questions of leadership. The Seventh Army commander was exactly right - the services were not
staffing the beach parties with the best and brightest officers available, so the beaches were not
as organized and beneficial as they otherwise might be. The beaches needed strong and forceful
officers to bring order out of the chaos that was inevitable when trying to land hundreds of
thousands of men and their associated equipment onto foreign soil in the face of the enemy. The
beach commanders needed to control what was coming onto the beaches, direct where it landed,
and then ensure it made its way to the right location past the beach. At Sicily, Seventh Army
expected the Engineer Special Brigades to control the beaches and support of the divisions. This
massive task demanded exceptional leadership and management skills. Unfortunately, most of
the officers with those traits found themselves assigned to units other than the beach parties.
Glory was still at the front, not running a beach in the rear.
The Seventh Army commander was worried about only one thing - getting everything ashore
as quickly as possible and then working it out from there. This concept works well for smaller
amphibious landings, but for large landings involving a myriad of different units and types of
equipment it is also a recipe for confusion and inefficiency. Fortunately, Patton seemed content
to leave his logisticians alone unless there was a problem that influenced the operations of the
army. The fact is not that Patton did not care about logistics, but rather, that he preferred to
focus on tactics and left the administrative details for others to deal with.
Patton did lack an understanding and/or appreciation of the importance and benefits that a
coordinated and well-planned supply system could provide to a military commander. This was
more than just having supplies delivered to a beach, an effective and efficient supply plan meant
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that ultimately fewer service forces would be required and that support to the combat forces
would occur faster and with a greater degree of fidelity. If a homeowner were to look for a
particular item in a crowded basement with items divided into organized boxes, it is much easier
and faster to find what you are looking for. If everything is lying there in a jumbled pile, it either
takes longer, or requires more people, to find that same item. To illustrate - Patton would worry
only whether sufficient gunpowder was available for the artillery. Artillerymen, on the other
hand, knew that mixing different lots of powder together could result in variances in the point of
impact by as much as 50 yards. 505 For Sicily, the 1st Engineer Special Brigade had the mission
of organizing the US supply system on Sicily. Unfortunately, the brigade did not have the
training, experience, or personnel to perform this role. In addition, the diversion of personnel
and resources from the brigade and its shore groups, by the divisions, only served to exasperate
the situation.
General Alexander, commander of the 15th Army Group and overall in charge of the Sicilian
ground operation, confirmed this assessment of Patton, noting that Patton was one of the few
commanders in the Mediterranean who had a complete disregard for the limitations of logistics.
Patton was a “commander who would make a tactical plan irrespective of administrative
possibilities and then had a tendency to say supply would follow tactics rather than tactics would
follow supply.” 506 This raises a question of how well Patton appreciated the physical limitations
of his supporting service forces, compared to the desired capabilities that Patton envisioned.
Perhaps this also explains why Seventh Army was in no apparent hurry to assume control over
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the beaches and support structures, preferring instead to let the engineers and II Corps work
through any sustainment problems.
Throughout July and early August, Seventh Army found itself in a state of continual
logistical evolution. The reception of material was transitioning from the beaches of southern
Sicily to the port of Palermo. Responsibilities had shifted from the divisions to the 1st Engineer
Special Brigade and the army. However, Sicily was not the only area undergoing change - the
service forces in North Africa were transforming as well to meet the demands of the current fight
and to prepare for the next one.

Changes in North Africa
While AFHQ focused on the progress of operations for Husky, the theater Services of Supply
found itself with a complex situation. The base sections had to support Sicily for any item not
loaded on the pre-planned convoys from the states. The base sections also had to continue
normal support for the hundreds of thousands of men still in North Africa, as well as prepare for
the mounting of Operation Avalanche, the invasion of Italy. Given the lead times required to
submit requisitions to the US, planners had to work months in advance of anticipated needs.
The mounting of the Husky force had put the North African base sections out of balance.
The Mediterranean Base Section and Eastern Base Sections had issued large quantities of
supplies and equipment to the divisions heading off to Sicily. By the end of June, these two base
sections had to deal with shortages, while the Atlantic Base Section had excess stocks.
Additionally, the overall reduction in the number of troops in North Africa required the Services
of Supply and AFHQ to reassess the quantities of supplies needed within North Africa and to

242

determine what might be available for support of Husky. 507 The communications zone needed to
adjust to the new environment.
To accommodate the changing situation, the Services of Supply contemplated consolidating
the majority of the theater’s intermediate supply activities within the Mediterranean Base
Section. Transportation officers diverted cargo that was originally destined for the other base
sections to the Mediterranean Base Section. The Atlantic and Eastern Base Sections would
slowly draw down their stocks while theater shipping distributed the remainder to other
locations. Logisticians estimated that it would take five months to redistribute all excess stocks
from the Atlantic Base Section. 508
The theater support structure in North Africa, especially in Tunisia, continued to develop
throughout the summer of 1943. The Eastern Base Section worked to establish 26 hospitals to
accommodate any casualties flowing from Sicily or the upcoming operation in Italy. Engineers
worked on the highways, ports, and other infrastructure to support the needs of the expanding
communications zone. Pipeline construction and the building of petroleum tank farms in the
Bizerte-Ferryville area improved the ability to move and store fuel. This fuel was an essential
element in supporting the air campaign over Sicily.
On August 20, 1943, command of the Eastern Base Section transferred from Brigadier
General Pence to Colonel A. B. Conard. Conard was no stranger to the base section; he had been
with the Eastern Base Section since its inception, specifically as Chief of Staff, G4, and Depot
Commander.
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In addition to supporting the ongoing operation in Sicily, Conard charged the officers of the
base section to look outside their own area of responsibilities, to report potential problems, and,
most of all, to look ahead for requirements. 509 In Conard’s view - the duty of the base section
was not to just respond to requisitions - it was to anticipate needs. This was a more nuanced
view of the role of a support organization - one that had developed over time. Had the Allies
opted for a cross-channel invasion in 1942, this level of thinking would not have been prevalent
across the service forces. This more mature view of the combat unit/support unit relationship
was one of the differences between the Services of Supply of 1918 and the Services of Supply of
1943.
The complexity of supporting a military theater increased as the number of different items of
equipment used by units increased. By 1943, there were over 350,000 different items in use
across the theater, with over 2,100 new items received in the month of June alone. 510 These
items all needed close management to insure that the right items ended up in the right units.
Additionally, new equipment required new repair parts and repair skills, thus increasing the
complexity of tasks for quartermaster and ordnance units. The War Department was working to
ship new items to the theater as fast as possible, but the theater had to understand how to
distribute, use, and maintain all this new equipment.
Despite the effort to ship trucks to the Mediterranean, there continued to be a shortage of
transportation in the communications zone throughout 1943. To deal with the constraints, the
Services of Supply became proficient at temporarily consolidating truck units under the G4
transportation section for centralized management of the fleet. In one such operation, the Eastern
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Base Section used 11 officers and 440 enlisted men to move ammunition over a 13-day period,
operating 24 hours a day. 511 Experiences in this type occurred frequently in the lead up to Husky
and helped shape later surges of transportation across the Mediterranean and European theaters.
Later vehicle surges, such as the Red Ball Express, were rooted in the lessons and experiences of
North Africa and Sicily. What made these types of actions possible was the existence of a
centralized administrative headquarters that could assemble and manage the limited resources
available to the theater commander. The North African theater was showing that it could, in fact,
learn and adapt. However, not all of the Allied victories were on the battlefields. The fight for
Sicily also produced one notable political casualty- Hitler’s principal ally, Benito Mussolini.

The Fall of il Duce
The fall of North Africa and the Allied invasion of Sicily did nothing to enhance Mussolini’
reputation for the people of Italy, King Emmanuel, or the politicians in Rome. To make matters
worse, on July 19, 1943, more than 500 Allied bombers struck Rome on the same day Mussolini
met Hitler at Feltre. The attack heavily damaged a working-class neighborhood and inflicted
heavy damage on San Lorenzo, one of Rome’s seven basilicas. Following this attack, 150,000
Romans reportedly left the city. The people of Italy now placed their fate more in the hands of
the church, than with the government. 512
Additional attacks the next week on the Italian mainland at Bologna and Foggia further
demined Italian support for the war and for Fascism. Two days after the fall of Palermo, the
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Fascist Grand Council of Italy called Mussolini to stand before it. This was the first time the
Council had met in three and a half years - a bad omen for the Mussolini. 513
After twelve hours of debate, the Council held a vote, which produced a vote of 19 to seven
in favor of no confidence for il Duce. General Vittorio, the head of Commando Supremo, Field
Marshal Badoglio, a Mussolini opponent, and King Victor Emmanuel III all combined forces to
rid Italy of its Fascist government. 514 Mussolini protested the vote, but the King ordered him to
submit a resignation in accordance with the Council’s wishes.
The removal of Mussolini from power spelled the end of Fascist rule in Italy. However, what
did this really mean? Mussolini was gone, but Italy remained in the war, at least for the moment.
For operations in Sicily, there was little change. Fearing that the Italians might try to negotiate a
separate peace, Hitler initially considered an order pull all German forces out of Sicily. Advisers
argued against the move and instead, the orders for Sicily stood, while the Germans began to
institute a series of contingency plans developed in case of an Italian collapse.
The Axis forces in Sicily remained on the defensive, hoping to stall the Allied advance.
Seventh and Eighth Armies remained fixated on Messina. The fight for Sicily went on,
seemingly oblivious to the political changes that were underway.
Mussolini’s removal from power, however, did generate a great deal of discussion and
speculation among Allied leaders. The Americans argued that a stronger strategic bombing
campaign of the Italian mainland might be sufficient to push Italy out of the war without an
actual invasion. On the other hand, the British felt that only an actual invasion would convince
the Italians to surrender. The Combined Chiefs held a meeting on July 26, during which they
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agreed to authorize Eisenhower to launch an invasion of Italy, Operation Avalanche, at the
soonest possible date. 515 If the threat of an invasion did not convince Italy to surrender, then
perhaps the actual landings would.
Back in Germany, the sudden removal of Mussolini surprised Hitler. At the Feltre
Conference, the Italians had agreed to commit four additional divisions in the south of Italy. The
first reports, arriving in Berlin the night of July 25, seemingly indicated that the Fascists were
merely conducting some internal adjustments to the internal Italian political system. By the
following day, however the situation was clear - Italy had revolted and Mussolini was gone. 516
The Germans expected field Marshal Badoglio to either remove Italy from the war, or at the
very least, to allow Allied forces to land in northern Italy. Hitler quickly recalled Rommel and
gave him command of Army Group B, with the mission to defend northern Italy. Meanwhile,
the 305th and 44th Infantry Divisions moved toward the Italian border and secured the Brenner
and Mount Cenis passes. 517 Germany prepared to take over their reluctant partner. Throughout
the rest of July, the Germans worked to stage divisions in anticipation of an Italian double-cross,
while the Allied leaders tried to find a diplomatic means of convincing Italy to surrender. Italy
found itself caught in the middle. If the Italians surrendered, German occupation was inevitable.
If Italy did not surrender, the Allied would invade and cause considerable damage to the
population and countryside. At the end of July 1943, two German divisions were already in
northern Germany and there were 200,000 more Germans assembled near Innsbruck. The Italian
government felt itself to be a prisoner of the Germans and suggested that the Allies land in the
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Balkans and the northern Italy as soon as possible. 518 The fight for Sicily ended two weeks later,
but the fight for Italy was just beginning. The Allies would have more opportunities to put the
lessons of recent campaigns to the test.

Lessons Learned
In summary, the preparation and mounting of Husky was much more proficient than that of
Torch. Instead of mixing supplies and priorities on vessels and trucks, vehicles generally were
loaded with supplies for one service, with one priority, for one craft.
However, control of the landing beaches still needed attention. Both Husky and Torch
showed that the senior operational headquarters needed to land and establish itself as soon as
possible and to take responsibility for the beaches. 519 Seventh Army did not do this on Sicily,
and the result was confusion across many of the beaches and a mismanagement of resources.
Along a similar vein, planners learned that a single brigade could not effectively handle both
long-term responsibilities to operate landing beaches, while simultaneously executing the
logistical support of an army. The 1st Engineer Special Brigade performed admirably, however
the magnitude and complexity of the task simply overwhelmed the organization. The colonel in
command did not have sufficient rank to ward off diversions of the brigade’s attached units by
the divisions. The scope of the task was beyond that of the brigade staff. The terrain of Sicily,
compounded by the size of the supported force (over 150,000 men) overwhelmed the brigade’s
capacity. 520
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Husky also showed an engineer headquarters was not suitable to execute a technical logistics
function over a prolonged period. The brigade simply lacked the detailed technical knowledge
inherent in supply, ordnance, transportation, and medical operations. As an example, for
ammunition resupply the brigade tended to ship forward those stocks that were configured the
easiest to ship, despite actual unit needs. Control over chemical gas shells was also less than
adequate, with some chemical artillery rounds being accidently shipped as far forward as
Nicosia. Eventually, ordnance specialists collected up all chemical munitions on the island and
returned them to North Africa or the Licata ammunition dump under the control of chemical
warfare troops for safekeeping. 521
The 1st Engineer Special Brigade was sufficient to perform the initial tasks, but Seventh
Army should have assumed control of the logistics mission at an earlier date or worked with the
Services of Supply to stand up a base section sooner. By the time, Seventh Army assumed
control over sustainment operations, on D+20, only two weeks of fighting remained. The 1st
Engineer Special Brigade had borne most of the task of supporting the fight across Sicily.
Perhaps the lack of a professional logistics headquarters explained why supply dumps tended
to remain near the beaches and ports and not follow the army’s progress up the island. This
lengthened the distance between the divisions and the support base, which was one of the major
complaints of the campaign. Service units could not merely establish dumps at the beaches,
these facilities needed to stay near the rear boundary of the combat zone in order to meet the
needs and expectations of the fighting forces. This was a lesson that would be hard to
implement, especially if an army was involved in a fast-paced pursuit. Sicily was the perfect
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place to learn this because the consequences were marginal. The same would not be true in later
on the battlefields of France and Germany.
The level of cooperation and coordination among the different services still needed
improvement as well. Control of the beaches was still an issue between the Army and Navy and
coordination was limited at times. Additionally, the Air Force needed to do a better job of
working with the other services for the material it needed delivered to Sicily, material that
competed for space on the landing craft. By the time of Husky, the US theater could build an
airfield within two weeks time. This required large amounts of steel matting, wood, and tin - all
of which had to move by sea and ground shipping. 522 Additionally, the Navy and Air Force
provided requisitions late in the planning process, preventing the Services of Supply form
completely filling them. All three services needed to work together and identify their needs as
early as possible in order to set priorities and accommodate everyone’s needs.
This is not to say that there were not examples of good inter-service coordination. At the
Joss breaches, a British observer commented that it was “exhilarating beyond measure to find the
two services [Army and Navy] fused into a single force with a complete singleness of
purpose.” 523 This was not true across all the beaches, but at least it was a good beginning.
Certainly, many areas had improved over Torch. Waterproofing of vehicles was much better,
although there were still some shortages of waterproofing materials. The new landing craft and
specialized amphibious equipment meant faster and safer landings for both combat and service
forces. Improved beach organizations were a step in the right direction.
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The most dangerous part of an amphibious operation is the period from noon on D-Day, until
night on D+1. This is when the supply requirements of the combat forces place a great demand
on the shore parties and there has only been limited time to build up any level of reserve
stocks. 524 Adjustments in organizations and in the creation of a more balanced assault force
provided the means to overcome this period of vulnerability.
One factor that influenced the success of Husky was the lack of a tide within the
Mediterranean. The absence of a rising or falling tide provided much greater flexibility for
amphibious operations and the subsequent support efforts over the beaches. This would not to be
the case in the English Channel, where tides varied by 20 feet or more and storms were a
constant threat. 525
Perhaps the most significant lesson of Husky for the senior Allied leadership and AFHQ
was that the theater could supply a major assault force, for a lengthy period, over the shore,
without a major port. This went against the lessons of Torch, which implied that any corps or
army-level landing required a sizeable port. Sicily showed that this was not necessarily the case.
The Cent beaches of the 45th Infantry Division handled up to 1,900 tons of goods per day. The
beaches at Gela handled about 2,500 tons per day. On July 16, the US moved the largest singleday totals over the Sicilian southern shores - a total of 6,638 tons. 526 With the right equipment,
weather, and enemy situation a force did not need a major port. After Husky, leaders, at all
levels, viewed ports as desirable, but not necessarily required. 527 Whether this would hold true
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in all future landings was a question still unanswered. Undoubtedly, however, this experience
did shape leader’s decisions about future operations in Normandy.
An additional lesson of Husky was that the lack of a detailed ground maneuver plan did not
necessarily bode problems for logistical support planning. The limited amount of theater
sustainment planning allowed by the time and circumstances proved remarkably adequate for the
support of the Allied forces. Neither the British nor US forces faced any serious shortage of
material. Due in part to knowledgeable planning, in conjunction with inspired guesswork,
supplies shipped from Great Britain or the US, weeks in advance of the operation, proved to be
very close to the actual type of goods and in the approximate quantities needed. 528 In the end
assessment, the sustainment plan worked. Whether this would become a justification to drive
support planning, without an underlying tactical plan, was something that theater planners would
have to wait to see.
One surprise was the quantity of communications wire needed to keep pace with advancing
units and the speed with which signal units needed to install it. This proved to be more complex
than just laying the wire behind advancing units as enemy (and sometimes friendly) fire, as well
as vehicle traffic, cut wires already laid, requiring repair or replacement. The expanding support
areas also needed wire for connectivity. As the beachhead grew, so grew the demand for
communications supplies and materials. 529
The theater still needed to do a better job in training for, and exercising, amphibious
operations. There had been just one dress rehearsal for Husky: the only supplies accompanying
the assault force on this rehearsal were one K ration and two canteens of water on each soldier.
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The units did not attempt to handle or land any ammunition, fuel, or construction materials. 530
This not only failed to stress logistics systems, it missed an opportunity to show where supply
problems might occur during the actual landing. As in Torch, commanders felt that the exercise
of the support plan was too hard so service units were not trained and any deficiencies had to
wait until the landings to be discovered.
The drive up through the center of Sicily showed that vehicle maintenance was a necessary
requirement, but one that was exceedingly difficult to accomplish while on the offensive. The
Seventh Army demanded speed and audacity in its advances; whether this was within the
physical capabilities of the supporting vehicles was an entirely different matter. The 2nd
Armored Division arrived in Palermo with approximately 75 percent of its trucks ruined from the
poor roads and rocky terrain. 531
For future armored operations, Husky also showed that there needed to be an army-level rail
or truck head within 30 miles of the rear of an armored division if the division expected to
sustain itself from organic vehicles. The drive to Palermo had put 2nd Armored Division to the
test, driving vehicles 24 hours a day. The distance from the division, to the beach dumps,
lengthened by the day, eventually reaching over 140 miles. Luckily, enemy resistance was light
and ammunition needs were minimal. The lesson was that in mechanized offensive operations,
the supporting service units needed to establish supply dumps near the division rear boundaries
and to keep moving these with the division, or else the drive forward became impaired. 532
Perhaps just as important, the Allies had to prioritize the movement over the roads between
530
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combat and service units. This did not always occur during Husky and, as a result, the delay of
administrative vehicles slowed the advance forward. Tanks required fuel and service unit trucks
delivered the fuel. Thus, the need for a balanced force extended far beyond the beach.
Sicily reinforced the lesson that the best means to sustain a combined force was through two
separate logistics channels. Indeed, examples of cross-nation support during the Husky
operation are scarce, possibly due to the short duration of the campaign, but also due, in part, to
the physical separation between the two armies. AFHQ controlled the allocation of shipping and
other limited resources between the two nation’s forces, but once the allocations and priorities
were set, each nation handled its own sustainment. This worked so well that it became standard
procedure for upcoming major operations.
Although Services of Supply personnel accompanied the 1st Engineer Special Brigade, it
appears that there were no base section representatives on the Seventh Army staff itself until July
30, 20 days after the landing. In hindsight, Seventh Army recognized that this was a problem
and recommended that future operations include Services of Supply representatives within the
G4 in order to facilitate the transition of ports and support responsibilities from the army to the
base section. 533 Transitions were much easier if a core cadre of base section personnel
accompanied the landing force headquarters’ G4 section from as early a date as possible.
The rehabilitation of the port of Palermo was the first time that the US had to undertake the
challenge of repairing a damaged port while simultaneously supporting combat operations.
Palermo also showed the great lengths that retreating German forces would take in order to deny
seaports to the Allies. This was a trend that continued into Italy and Southern France, but the
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lessons gained in Palermo provided the practical experience necessary to deal with this
intentional sabotage of infrastructure.
At the strategic level, Sicily demonstrated that the Allies could conduct a major operation,
even while balancing the demands of other theaters for scarce resources, such as merchant
shipping and assault craft. While AFHQ was launching the invasion of Sicily, Russia was
continuing to demand more convoys of supplies and equipment for the Eastern Front. China
needed air reinforcements. Great Britain and the US were stockpiling men and materiel in
Britain as part of a possible cross-channel invasion.
The Pacific theater demanded resources as well. During the summer of 1943, General
MacArthur, Admiral Nimitz, and Admiral King were working to build up the Pacific forces for
the move against Japan, as well as conducting Operation Cartwheel, the campaign aimed at
neutralizing the Japanese base at Rabaul. Throughout the summer, MacArthur’s forces advanced
along the northeast coast of New Guinea, while Nimitz maneuvered through the Solomon Islands
towards Bougainville. While Operation Cartwheel continued, planners in the Pacific looked
ahead at future assaults in the Gilbert, Marshall, Mariana, Palau Islands. The Pacific was a
supporting theater, but its commanders demanded increasing amounts of divisions, supplies, and
assault craft to deal with the situation before them.
Competing with the Pacific were the operations in the Mediterranean, Europe, and Southeast
Asian theaters of war. At one point, the Allies were working to plan and resource operations in
Sicily, Italy, France, and Burma - all which occurred within a year. Husky proved that the Allies
could not only plan more than one operation at a time, they could also support multiple
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operations. This provided a level of confidence and experience that would be invaluable as the
war progressed.
Interestingly, the Report of Operations from Seventh Army on Operation Husky provides a
detailed analysis of the campaign, but fails to highlight many of the deficiencies that remained in
doctrine or in practice. The official report describes many minor issues and recommendations
for future operations. However, Patton’s staff states that, in relation to Husky, the “Lessons of
the “Torch” operation were well learned; its mistakes were rectified, and the result was an
operation as well planned and as smoothly executed as the unfortunate fortunes of war
permit.[author’s italics].” 534 Perhaps the Seventh Army staff and its commander believed this,
but many others across the theater had a different opinion. The assault on Sicily had shown that
the Allies had learned a lot, but work remained.

Conclusion
Husky ended sooner than planners had predicted. The Italians largely failed to fight and the
Germans did not have the air power or reserve divisions necessary to stop the Allied invasion.
With the cessation of hostilities on August 17, there was a lot of Allied war material on the
island and even more projected to arrive. Some critics complained that this was a misuse of
resources, such as the fact that the theater shipped too much small arms ammunition to the island
and that units threw away many of the spare parts that accompanied the assault force. 535
However, perhaps a more candid assessment is that it is surprising that the sustainment of
Husky occurred as well as it did. The planning for Husky occurred with many of the same
534
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constraints and challenges as the planning for Torch: limited time, changing plans, lack of a
tactical plan, and long lead times for requisitions. Despite all these issues, the landings were a
success and the ensuing ground campaign achieved the operational goal - the capture of Sicily.
There were some supply shortages, but these occurred at the lower levels and did not affect the
general course of the fight. Overall, the US forces had the equipment and supplies needed for
the mission.
This was not simply a question of which side had the preponderance of supplies. Supplies
might well be within a theater, but the pivotal issue was the ability to recognize where they were
needed and then to have the means, systems, and organizations to distribute these resources.
Logistically, the force that landed on the shores of Sicily was very different from that of
Torch. The assault force included a sizeable percentage of service troops. New equipment
addressed the challenges of supporting a large army over the shore. AFHQ and the War
Department made organizational changes, such as the activation of the 1st Engineer Special
Brigade, in direct response to the disorganization of North African beaches and the overall lack
of support for the invasion force. The sustainment structure supporting Husky was much more
mature, capable, and skilled than that of eight months prior. Yes, there were problems
remaining. As an example, supplies made it to the beaches of Sicily in ample quantity within
seven hours of landings, but these initial dumps and piles were far from organized 536 However,
the US military did make progress in terms of how the theater planned and organized its
sustainment and this would carry on as the war continued.
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One of the ideas coming out of Husky was that the initial LSTs should carry DUKWs
preloaded with critical supplies (water, ammunition, and fuel) in order to speed up the delivery
of initial support. 537 Planners would expand on this simple idea as a primary means of
supporting US forces later on the beaches of Anzio.
Equally important was the equipment issued for support of the force. DUKWs were
invaluable on the beaches and, inshore, the 2 ½-ton cargo truck was equally indispensible.
Major General Lucas wrote to Eisenhower following the Sicily campaign and stated that “The 2
½ ton truck is the outstanding cargo vehicle in the Army and without it this rapid campaign
would have bogged down long before its completion because of lack of supplies. I have seen
nothing belonging to our enemies or our Allies that can compare to it.” 538 The Deuce and a Half
was a critical enabler of the army’s ability to support offensive operations.
Planners and commanders at all levels made better decisions concerning support of the force,
proof that there had been much learning from the lessons of Torch. Indeed, many of the
commanders and staffs were the same. Patton’s Seventh Army staff was essentially the I
Armored Corps staff that had come ashore in French Morocco less than a year earlier. The
AFHQ staff was largely the same. Experience bred more informed decision-making.
Comparing the makeup of the Torch and Husky assault forces shows just how much learning
had occurred. Instead of loading as many combat forces into the transports as possible, the force
that landed in Sicily included a large number of service units. This provided the capability to
Patton and his commanders to build up strength once on shore and to take advantage of any
operational opportunities, such as the quick seizure of Palermo. Whether the seizure of Palermo
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was the best tactical move is debatable, however no one should question the flexibility that a
sizeable support structure provided in terms of mobility and capabilities. Patton may still have
had little appreciation for the detail needed to produce a comprehensive support plan, but he did
understand the benefits of having sufficient materiel on the beach to support the army’s
maneuver plan.
The time to prepare for the next operation and to further refine doctrine and organizations
was short. In less than a month, AFHQ was to have forces landing on the Italian mainland.
Indeed, while the Eastern Base Section had been working to support operations in Sicily, its 1st
Embarkation Group was simultaneously working to mount the troops of VI Corps, British 46th
Division, and Fifth Army for Operation Avalanche.539 The Services of Supply was proving that
it could support one major operation, while preparing to launch the next.
The successful mounting of Husky from North Africa also proved that major operations did
not necessarily need to be embarked from the US or Great Britain. This placed a greater demand
on the local theater, but the savings in term of transportation were significant. The British
estimated that by mounting their forces out of the Middle East they required 65 fewer assault
vessels. 540 The mounting went so well that several commanders commented to Major General
Larkin that the mounting from within theater had placed their combat units in “far better shape
for the coming operation than had they been from either US or UK for Operation Torch.” 541
This would set the stage for the theater to mount and launch all subsequent operations in the
Mediterranean for the next two years.
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By the end of August, combat had ended in Sicily and the island was becoming part of the
communications zone. The Eastern Base Section was transferring its headquarters in Tunisia
from Mateur to Bizerte to better support the upcoming invasion of Italy. Additionally, the
theater was conducting long-range planning for an internal redistribution of service forces within
the theater to better support the upcoming operations. The fall of Sicily gave Allies control over
the western Mediterranean and conditions were set for a drive further east, into Italy itself.
AFHQ and the Allied theater organizations were finally ready to make the move onto the
European mainland and face a sizeable number of German divisions head-on.
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Chapter VII: Operation Avalanche and the Invasion of Italy, September 1943 to
June 1944
How is it that the plans of two great empires like Britain and the United
States should be so much hamstrung and limited by a hundred or two of
these particular vessels will never be understood by history.
-- Winston Churchill referring to the shortage of LSTs in
a letter to General Marshall, April 16, 1944

In the late summer of 1943, Allied leaders in the Mediterranean were confident. They
now had control over North Africa and Sicily and Italy was on the verge of surrender.
However, Eisenhower and his commanders knew that a difficult fight possibly laid ahead the fight for Italy. Even though the Italians might join the Allied cause, there were enough
German divisions in the region to contest an Allied advance. What the Allies did not
know was that Hitler was determined to hold Italy as long as possible since the possibility
of Allied air bases in northern Italy would have the range to hit targets inside Germany.
In September, each of the belligerents in the region would make a decision that
dictated the course of the war in the Mediterranean and in Europe. The Allies decided to
proceed with amphibious landings in southern Italy. Italy announced its decision to
surrender. Finally, Germany decided to conduct a wholesale invasion of Italy and defend
the peninsula from an Allied advance.
This chapter addresses the fight for southern Italy, a period lasting from the Allied
landings in September 1943, until the fall of Rome on June 5, 1944. This was the first
time that the Allied would meet a concerted German defense on the European mainland.
The consequences could be significant for either side - an Allied victory in Italy meant a
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base of operations in southern Europe. A German victory meant defeat of the Allied
Mediterranean strategy.
The invasion of Italy contributed to the Allied cause in several ways. First, it forced
the Italian government to acknowledge its surrender publically. Second, the campaign
provided invaluable experience in rebuilding a nation’s infrastructure, such as ports,
transportation lines, and public utilities. Third, the Allies also gained experience in
conducting and supporting operations in mountainous conditions, as well as in the winter.
Additionally, operations in Italy uncovered the need for the Allies to plan for, and
conduct, extensive civil affairs support of the local population, especially in urban areas.
Last, and most importantly, Italy provided the Allies an opportunity to establish a base of
operations on the European mainland; a base that would eventually enable the invasion
into southern France and help end the war. Sicily provided a glimpse of what the fight for
Europe might entail with the fight in Italy providing even more lessons that would help
shape and harden the force. Ultimately, the 1944 invasion of France and drive east across
Germany would have been more difficult and time consuming had the Allies not first
attacked into Italy.
This chapter starts with the landings at Salerno - landings that show just how much the
Allies had learned regarding mounting, landing, and supporting a capable invasion force.
From there, the work explores the development of Naples and its port, which enables the
campaign for Italy. The establishment of the Island Base Section provided the means to
support the infantry’s battles in the mountains and shows how there is an inherent link
between logistics and combat. Additionally, the invasion of Anzio shows that a
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commander may miss a tactical opportunity if he spends too long developing a base of
operations. The long-term sustainment of the invasion force at Anzio illistrates the agility
of the service forces, which helped to erase the tensions between combat and service units.
Finally, the development of Italy as an Allied base allowed the US theater in the
Mediterranean to draw down its bases in North Africa and shift operations to Italy,
positioning the theater to enable the next and decisive phase of the war: an attack into
France and Germany.

Strategic Setting
The Allied planning effort for the invasion of Italy had been in progress since the end
of July 1943. Eisenhower focused on an attack around the Naples area; however, in late
August and early September, the exact position of the Italian government was still unclear.
King Emmanuel wanted to remove Italy from the war, but feared German reprisal. The
staging of Rommel’s Army Group B, almost 200,000 German forces, on the northern
border did nothing to calm the King’s concerns and the Allies were still in Sicily and
North Africa.
General Bedell Smith and British Brigadier Kenneth Strong had been working
undercover to negotiate the surrender of the Italian government. The Italians, fearful of a
German invasion, wanted the Allies to land in force north of Rome. The arguments of
Smith and Strong eventually worked and on September 3, 1943, General Castellano flew
to Sicily to sign the terms of unconditional surrender. That same day, British forces
landed near Taranto, on Italy’s heel, to little opposition.
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The tactical situation prevented a direct Allied movement on Rome. German forces
had possession of Rome’s airfields, preventing an Allied airborne operation. The
Mediterranean coastline near Rome was beyond the range of Allied bombers, but within
range of Axis aircraft. The Italian government had held off a public announcement of the
armistice terms, fearing a German invasion. 542 Given these factors, Eisenhower decided
to go ahead with the Salerno landings since they had the best chance of success.
By September 6, Vice Admiral Kent Hewett’s Western Naval Task Force, containing
the Salerno invasion force, was steaming east, toward Italy’s western shore, uncertain of
what they might find. The Italian government had privately surrendered three days earlier,
but publically remained at war. Allied commanders hoped for a peaceful landing; they
wanted Italian support, not resistance at the landing sites. The convoy came around the
west coast of Sicily and picked up the British 46th Division, already loaded into landing
craft. The force continued its way east, toward the Gulf of Salerno, in calm seas.
At 6:30 pm on September 8, the ships tuned their radios to an Algiers’s radio station
and turned on the ship’s loudspeaker systems as General Eisenhower announced Italy’s
surrender to the world. This forced Marshal Badoglio to confirm publically the armistice
terms an hour later in Rome. The world now knew of Italy’s capitulation and the Germans
were quick to react, sending Rommel’s Army Group B across the Alps to reinforce the
north of Italy. The Allies were landing in Italy’s south, the Germans were reinforcing the
north. This set the stage for the battle of Italy.
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Over the past ten months, the Allies had successfully conducted two major amphibious
assaults, established a viable theater of war, and built up sufficient men and materiel to
make an assault on the mainland of Europe and confront Hitler’s armies head-on. There
had been setbacks along the way and they had not won every battle, but the trend line was
clear: the combined Allied forces could land along a coastline at a point of their choosing
and then provide the staying power necessary to expand the beachhead. Once that
occurred, the struggle became a race to see which side could surge the greatest amounts of
men and resources. The Allied support base in North Africa provided the stockpiles,
bases, and capabilities necessary to conduct such a reinforcing action.
The main strategic goal, particularly for the Americans, was to conduct a crosschannel attack into France as soon as possible. This would help provide relief to the
Russians along the Eastern Front and bring about the quickest end to the war. At the May
1943 Trident conference in Washington D.C., the Allies re-affirmed the plan to launch the
invasion of France from the United Kingdom sometime in the early summer of 1944. 543
However, for the operation to succeed, the Allies needed to knock Italy out of the war and
to draw as many German divisions away from France as possible. As Churchill argued, an
attack into Italy could provide such a diversion.
With the fall of Sicily and the clearing of the Sicilian Strait, the Allies now had a clear
line of communication leading into Italy. The mountainous terrain and limited roads and
rail networks of Italy would serve to limit Allied advances north, but they would also
hinder any quick movements of large Axis formations as well. The ability to conduct
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amphibious attacks along the Italian coastline, bypassing enemy strongholds, represented
a sizeable advantage in the war of movements. What made the campaign possible was the
combination of sufficient assault craft, combat forces, merchant shipping, resource
stockpiles, and a support organization that could get materials to the right locations at the
right time.

Planning Avalanche and the Mounting of Fifth Army
Planning for Avalanche originated as a plan to attack Sardinia. As Patton and Seventh
Army were preparing for an attack on Sicily, Eisenhower ordered Lieutenant General
Mark Clark, commander of the US Fifth Army, to start planning for an assault on
Sardinia, with the possibility of shifting the attacks focus on Italy. 544
This was the first operational mission for Fifth Army. Formed in Morocco on January
5, 1943, the command represented an important growth in the US theater. Eisenhower
now had two army level commands, both headed by trusted subordinates. Some might
view the assignment of the invasion of Italy to Fifth Army as a slight against Patton,
especially since Patton had slapped and verbally abused the two soldiers previously
described at hospitals in Sicily. However, the assignment of Fifth Army to Italy was not a
slight against Patton. In the summer of 1943, Seventh Army was busy with planning and
conducting Operation Husky, while Fifth Army focused on Operation Avalanche. These
were sequential campaigns, but the planning and preparation for each overlapped each
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other. One headquarters could not do both. Fifth Army was planning for the invasion of
Italy before Patton’s slapping incidents even took place.
Fifth Army planned for a variety of possible operations. Options included Operations
Brimstone- the attack on Sardinia; Musket- the attack on Taranto; Gangway- an attack on
Naples; Barracuda- an attack south of Naples; and Avalanche- the attack on Salerno. The
planning efforts acquainted the planning staffs with the different areas of southern Italy,
but the diverse plans also diluted the planning effort from the one final option Avalanche. Eisenhower did not settle on the final landing location until July 27.
After much discussion between the Allied partners, the Salerno-Naples-Foggia area
was chosen as the initial objective as part of Operation Avalanche. Salerno was just inside
the range of friendly fighter aircraft (staging out of Sicily) and the port of Naples had
sufficient capability to support a large army. Foggia was perfect for the basing of aircraft.
Eisenhower’s plan was to establish a foothold on the Italian peninsula and then work
north towards Rome and, from there, continue north into the Po River valley. 545 This
would draw German divisions away from the Western Front and help convince the Italian
government to surrender.
The plan called for three different attacks. The British Eighth Army would mount
from Sicily, cross the Strait of Messina, and seize Reggio di Calabria on the toe of Italy.
Additionally, a British airborne division would seize the port of Taranto on Italy’s heel.
Finally, Fifth Army, under the command of Lieutenant General Clark, would sail from
North African ports and land in the Gulf of Salerno along Italy’s western coast.
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Commanders judged a landing directly at Naples as being overly risky due to the level of
German defenses.
Figure 21: The Invasion of Italy 546

The terrain surrounding the Gulf of Salerno presented challenges for the invading
forces: there was only a small coastal plain, bordered by the sea on the west and by
moderately high mountains from a distance of two to ten miles inland. Two narrow
gorges would serve as chokepoints on the way to Naples. The mountains and rivers along
the coast favored the defense and limited avenues of advance. Only two major roads led
north towards Rome. However, the beaches around Salerno were excellent for an
amphibious assault, permitting landing craft to come close to the shore for discharge of
men and material. 547
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The terrain leading north along the Italian coastline was similar in nature. Hilly and
mountainous terrain in front of the northern Apennines provided excellent positions for
German defenders. Ridge formations paralleled the coastal plain. Steep slopes and
outcroppings limited mobility. This land favored infantry, rather than large tank
formations.
On July 27, 1943, AFHQ issued Fifth Army a directive to begin the planning for the
attack on Naples. The draft plan was due to AFHQ by August 7, with an expected
invasion date of September 7. 548 Clark’s plan called for the landing of two army corps’,
totaling 125,000 men. After landing at Salerno, the force would move north to capture the
port and airfields surrounding Naples. Clark expected VI Corps to capture the port by
D+12, but made allowances to operate the beaches for up to 30 days if necessary. Within
25 days, Fifth Army would grow to 225,085 men and would land 45,262 vehicles and
153,930 tons of cargo. 549
The corresponding support plan described three distinct phases for supporting
Operation Avalanche: the first was equipping and preparing units for the assault. The
second phase was support of the forces once they were ashore at Salerno. The final phase
was support of the force through the base ports, such as Naples. 550
Fifth Army was to contain two corps. VI Corps initially held the 34th Infantry
Division, with elements of the 3rd, 45th, and 34th Infantry Divisions, as well as the 82nd
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Airborne as follow-up forces. The addition of British X Corps, with its 46th and 56th
Divisions, made Fifth Army a combined Allied force.
For Operation Baytown, the invasion across the Strait of Messina, the British Eighth
Army had the British 13th Corps, with two divisions: the 1st Canadian and the 5th British
Infantry. The 1st British Parachute Division formed the assault force for Operation
Slapstick, the assault on Taranto. Facing the Allies were approximately 130,000 Germans
spread across the Italian Peninsula in eight divisions. 551
Earlier operations had shown that logisticians tended to requisition more spare parts
than were necessary, that individual soldiers tended to carry too much with them (much of
which was later discarded on the beaches), and that there was too much in the
accompanying barracks bags. The transportation requirement for barracks bags alone for
a single combat team equaled 25 rail cars - an entire train. Additionally, there had been
insufficient service forces in the early stages of the operations. 552 Avalanche presented an
opportunity to put these lessons to use by initially bringing less material ashore.
Plans called for a D-Day assault force, plus convoys on D+2 and D+7 to land the
initial force and its supplies. A convoy on D+19 would bring an additional seven days of
supplies and a D+24 convoy would bring 14 days worth of supplies. 553
Only 23 days separated the cessation of combat on Sicily and the start of Avalanche.
Because many assault craft had been engaged in the continued support of forces in Sicily,
repair and refitting of these landing craft became the top priority. The limited time
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between operations prevented any full-size dress rehearsal between the army and the naval
task force. However, the divisions that participated in Avalanche had been able to
conduct division-sized landing exercises. Many of the units within Fifth Army lacked any
experience in amphibious landings so Fifth Army established an invasion-training center
near Arzew, Algeria in the spring of 1943. This center trained regimental combat teams
and combat commands on the intricacies of amphibious operations, to include beach
operations. The capstone event was a practice landing operation of the 36th Infantry
Division from August 26-27. 554 The landings provided confidence to the participants;
however, just as in the preparations of Husky, there was no practice of any large-scale
supply offloading.

Mounting the Force
Busy and crowded. These terms best described the ports of North Africa and Sicily
throughout the month of August. The Eastern Base Section was working to support ongoing combat operations in Sicily, while also preparing to mount Fifth Army for the attack
on Italy. The mounting of the army in North Africa occurred mainly at the ports of Oran,
Bizerte, and Tripoli. In Sicily, Fifth Army forces sailed out of the ports of Palermo,
Termini, and Castellamare along the northern coast. The majority of VI Corps mounted
from Oran, while most of the British X Corps mounted from Bizerte.
Many of the units involved in the mounting of Husky, particularly the US base
sections, were also involved in the mounting of Avalanche. The 8th Embarkation Group of
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the Eastern Base Section, particularly, brought a wealth of experience. The recent practice
from Husky helped make this second effort smoother as there was general agreement on
the division of roles and responsibilities. 555
Despite the fact that this was the third such type of assault, there were still major
disconnects between the Army and Navy. The Services of Supply issued a loading plan
that had not been coordinated with the Navy. The Mediterranean Base Section assumed
control of directing the loading of ships at Oran, but not all of the base section’s personnel
had the expertise or knowledge necessary to load such vessels. Loading priorities
changed, necessitating the loading, unloading, and reloading of some ships. Apparently,
not all the lessons of the past made their way to those responsible for the mounting
operation. 556
Some of the boxes loaded on the assault craft sported incorrect labels, through either
negligence or intent. A box marked “special equipment” broke open, spilling out piles of
shoes. Others, marked “medical supplies,” actually contained coffee, sugar, and milk. In
another incident, a box of incendiary bombs was stowed in an officer’s stateroom,
requiring later removal. 557
Vessels were intentionally loaded beyond capacity - an accepted risk in view of the
short voyage length. Transport vessels carried from 90-128 vehicles and ships carried
300-800 tons of cargo. 558 However, AFHQ did not publish the final allocation of shipping
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until just before D-Day, resulting in a continuous revision loading plans. By September 5,
despite the challenges, the convoy was loaded and ready to sail.

Support of the Landings at Salerno
The armada for Operation Avalanche included 642 ships and vessels, as well as 925
ship-borne landing craft. 559 Convoys from Tripoli, Bizerte, Oran, Termini, and
Castellamare joined each other 12 miles off Salerno the evening of September 8.
Conditions were favorable for the next day’s landings.
News of Italy’s surrender had reached the invasion force earlier that day, but no one
was quite sure of what it meant. The troops largely expected that the surrender would
make for a much easier landing. Combat commanders worried about German intentions.
Logisticians wondered whether this meant that they would have to support a high-speed
advance up the Italian coast. They all would have wait until landing to see how events
would play out.
The favorable beach gradients in the northern landing areas allowed the assault craft,
including LSTs, to beach themselves directly on shore, eliminating the need for pontoons
or causeways. This greatly decreased offloading times. Ships approached the beaches
with their ballast tanks dry, and once they were aground, pumped in 350 tons of seawater
to hold them on the beach. 560 The vessels on the southern beaches were not as fortunate,
requiring pontoons to facilitate unloading.
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Despite the positive experience of Husky in moving palletized supplies, the Army did
not have the time or resources to expand the effort for Avalanche, so as a result, most
supplies were not palletized, thus requiring additional handling to unload and stack on the
beaches. The Navy’s combat-loader vessels were slow to unload due to number of
reasons, to include poor loading in North Africa, congestion on the Salerno beaches,
enemy fire, and an absence of the two and a half ton DUKW amphibious vehicles on the
beaches. 561
DUKWs had been included in the assault force but, unlike Sicily, Fifth Army chose to
use these vehicles mainly inland, serving as trucks inshore of the beach dumps.
Additionally, the Army dedicated 123 DUKWs to the hauling of 105mm howitzers and
ammunition for VI Corps. The Navy viewed this as a disastrous diversion of resources:
use of these amphibious vehicles in other capacities slowed vessel offloading and exposed
the DUKWs to loss through damage, attack, or maintenance problems. The absence of the
DUKWs from the beaches was so great that the naval task force commander, Vice
Admiral Kent Hewitt, went so far as to recommend that for future assaults the DUKWs
and their drivers should be under direct naval control until the unloading phase of the
assault is complete. 562 This was the only way to ensure that the ground forces could divert
the amphibious vehicles for other uses.
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Figure 22: Salerno 563

Why did Fifth Army not duplicate the successes of Husky and focus the DUKWs on
unloading assault craft? Possibly, General Clark and his staff had been focusing on the
task before them and there was neither sufficient time nor effort to share the lessons of
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Seventh Army with its sister unit before the launching of the invasion. This seems
unlikely, given the fact that the same shore regiment that had supported the beaches of
Husky was operating in Salerno. The shore regiment knew how successful the DUKWs
had been in helping to offload vessels and clear beaches.
Another explanation, one that is more probable, is that VI Corps felt that the DUKWs
would be more valuable in the role of inland transportation and artillery support, rather
than in offloading vessels. These were still relatively new vehicles to the Army inventory
and commanders were still working out how best to utilize the unique capabilities of the
DUKW.
Another possibility for the different approach is that General Clark and the Fifth Army
staff wanted to keep an arm’s distance from Patton and the Seventh army staff. The final
planning for Avalanche occurred simultaneously with Patton’s slapping incident so Clark
may have been reluctant to spend too much time at Seventh Army. Patton was becoming
an outcast and Clark surely did not want his reputation tarnished by association.
Regardless, the DUKWs proved that they could perform either mission well. The
tensions between the services stemmed from the fact that, like assault craft, there simply
were not enough within the theater to meet the demand.
Avalanche used a combination of US and British shore parties to operate the beaches.
The British 56th and 46th Divisions used British Beach Groups, while the 36th Infantry
Division was supported by the 531st Engineer Shore Regiment along with a beach party
from the 4th U.S. Navy Beach Battalion.
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Fifth Army tried a new approach in the battle to organize the beaches. Instead of
establishing an engineer special brigade directly under the task force commander, as
Seventh army had done in Sicily, Fifth Army chose to use a sub-element of the Engineer
Special Brigade, the 531st Shore Regiment, for the beaches. This was a prudent move
since Avalanche contained only a third of the overall length of beach compared to that of
Husky. In addition, the 6th Port, which had been responsible for the ports of Casablanca
and Bizerte, had an early arrival date in Italy to establish control of the ports.
Responsibilities for the support initially rested with VI Corps, later to transition to the
Fifth Army.
Unlike some of the combat units, the 531st Shore Regiment contained a number of
veterans from the landings of Africa and Sicily. The 90 officers and 1,980 enlisted men
came under the command of Colonel Roland Brown. Brown and his men had been part of
the regiment responsible for organizing the beaches around Gela for the 1st Infantry
Division during Operation Husky. Here they were, less than two months later, performing
the same task for VI Corps, south of Salerno.
Two battalions of the 531st landed in the Gulf of Salerno, with one battalion held in
reserve. Allied smoke screens proved to be so effective that landing craft could not see
the beaches, causing man and materiel to land on the wrong beaches and the beach
timetable soon became unattainable. Shore units made the best of the situation before
them. One road platoon landed a mile and a half from their assigned beach, but used the
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opportunity to build a beach exit road to get to the main highway. 564 The landings were
not going perfectly according to plan, but the plan merely served as a general guideline
anyway once the elements of weather, time, and the enemy factored into the equation.
By noon on D-Day, the 531st had finished beach exits from the landing beaches to
facilitate the arrival of forces and supplies. They could not establish shore dumps that day
due to a lack of cargo trucks, but these vehicles arrived on D+1 and quartermaster units
established supply dumps in the vicinity of Paestum, approximately 1.3 miles inland. 565
By D+3, dumps had been established west of Highway 18, an important road which
transversed the entire US line from north to south. A day later, the clearance of all
supplies from the beach to the dumps was complete. 566
Only one German Division, the 16th Panzer Division, faced Fifth Army at Salerno on
September 9, but the German Tenth Army Commander, General Vietinghoff, quickly
ordered the 26th Panzer and 29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions to reinforce the Salerno area
from the south. Additionally, he ordered the 15th Panzer Grenadier and 16th Panzer
Divisions to move to Salerno from the north. These two divisions totaled about 27,000
men, but only had about 37 tanks between them because they were in the process of
refitting after evacuation from Sicily. 567
The five German divisions immediately started toward Salerno, but supply problems
hampered their movement. Tenth Army did not have an organic quartermaster section for
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Kesselring’s headquarters; Oberbefehlshaber Süd (OB- Süd) had to handle all resupply of
the Army. The results were less than satisfactory for the German divisions. There was no
coordinated logistics plan and the supply dumps did not necessarily match unit locations.
There was little fuel available from local Italian stocks. One panicked German officer
demolished the petroleum storage facilities and a coastal tanker at Sapri, on the Gulf of
Policastro, when he incorrectly perceived that he was under attack. This loss of fuel,
combined with the lack of a well-coordinated logistics plan, slowed down the movement
of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division, delaying its arrival at Salerno. Instead of arriving
en mass, the division’s arrival strung out over three days, preventing German commanders
from fully committing the division while Fifth Army was still weak. 568 Had sufficient fuel
been available, the 29th certainly would have arrived by the evening of September 9th and
quite possibly could have made the difference in pushing the British X Corps off the
beaches and dividing Fifth Army.
Back in the VI Corps area, the 531st proved that they were capable of doing more than
running a beach or establishing a supply dump. As German snipers harassed the beaches
at Paestum, Company D of the 531st and a company of infantry maneuvered to eliminate
the snipers, destroy machine gun nests, and to drive-off German tanks that had hidden
themselves in the city. 569
This raised a question that had no definitive answer: if a beach was coming under fire,
should the shore parties continue to work and risk being hit, or should they focus on

568
569

Ibid., 98.
Dunham, 36.

279

eliminating the threat before going back to work on the beach? 570 No matter which option
the commander chose, someone was going to be dissatisfied. Each shore party
commander had to weigh the options and make his best judgment.
However, despite the threat of German snipers, not everyone appreciated the danger
and the need to limit their exposure. A captain in charge of one of the VI Corps supply
dumps observed his men working out in the open, in white tee shirts, during daylight,
oblivious to the signal this could send to German pilots. The captain produced a novel
solution by sending the offenders to a front line unit where they could gain a better
appreciation of the risks of exposing oneself unnecessarily to enemy fire. 571 Under such
conditions soldiers learned quickly about the importance of camouflage.
Despite the seeming progress, the Navy became increasingly concerned over the
congestion of the beaches. Congested beaches slowed the unloading of the convoy, which
could delay the scheduled return of the vessels. On D+ 1, Admiral Hewitt had seen
enough and asked the Army to dedicate 1,000 men to help clear the beaches. The Shore
Regiment found as many men as possible, but the Navy still estimated that by the end of
the assault phase the Navy had unloaded 90 percent of the supplies onto the beaches. 572
This was acceptable to the Army, but the Navy was clearly dissatisfied.
Due to heavy enemy activity, VI Corps closed its Yellow and Blue beaches south of
Salerno on D-Day and diverted all vessels to the Red and Green beaches. This produced
congestion on the beaches as supplies and equipment built up - providing a rich target for
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German fighter aircraft. Supplies continued arrive up to the point that crates of gasoline,
ammunition, food, and water were sitting in several feet of water along the shore. The
Corps then closed the Red and Green beaches closed on D+1 until beach units could sort
the mess out, which forced landing craft to wait offshore. To alleviate the backlog, VI
opened a new beach, Red 2 ( to the left of Red Beach), thus allowing landing operations to
continue. 573
The same problems seen at Sicily’s beaches soon appeared at Salerno. From the
perspective of the Navy, the Army had no apparent plan for beach operations. Supplies
piled up on the beaches. Barracks bags and personal gear - hardly viewed as essential landed “in huge quantities” as early as D+7. There was a shortage of personnel and trucks
necessary to establish inshore dumps and clear beaches. Beach operations virtually ceased
at night and did not resume until the following morning. 574 The proximity of Avalanche
to Husky meant that there simply had been insufficient time to fix all the problems seen in
the previous campaign.
The arrival of tanks on the Avalanche beaches occurred much quicker and smoothly
compared to that of Torch. The first 30 tanks were ashore on the southern beaches by
4:45 am on the day of the assault. Supplies also arrived according to the landing plan,
with over 2,000 tons deposited on the beaches of Salerno by the end of D-Day. There
were still problems concerning the sorting of items and clearing of the beaches, but at least
the supplies were there.
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By D+1, the 36th Infantry Division was occupying the high ridgelines to the north and
south of their objective. German resistance was weakening so, by D+2, VI Corps had
moved inland 5-6 miles from the beaches in all directions. The assault was progressing
well.
The Fifth Army Quartermaster, Colonel Joseph Sullivan, arrived on the VI Corps Red
Beach on D+2. Sullivan gives a slightly different account of the beaches than that of the
Navy, describing them as “a marvelous sight. The dumps had been laid out, a wire road
had been built and everything was proceeding in an orderly fashion.” 575 What explains the
difference between the accounts of the Navy and Army? Possibly the difference is one of
perspective: the Navy wanted to see the beaches cleared as soon as possible so the ships
could return to safer waters and adhere to schedules . The Army merely wanted to see
organization and progress. How one saw the situation depended on where they were
standing and what they were hoping to achieve. Each service had a slightly different goal,
which colored their assessments.
The situation was similar on British X Corps beaches. Better beach gradients made
offloading of vessels easier, but there was a shortage of shore party personnel and
vehicles. Operations slowed as vehicles jammed the beach exits and traffic jams
developed along the limited road networks. 576 Despite this, the British X Corps occupied
Salerno by the morning of D+2, although the traffic congestion remained. Colonel
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Sullivan summarized the situation by stating, “Apparently, traffic control is not
understood by British personnel as we know it.” 577
Fifth Army was ashore, but the landing had shown that the Allies still needed work on
development of a strong beach organization that could deal with an influx of hundreds of
thousands of men and thousands of tons of supplies into a relatively small area in a short
amount of time. Physics dictated the realm of the possible, but organization and planning
went a long way toward maximizing what was possible.
Although the enemy defense was initially disorganized, German artillery presented the
greatest early challenge to the beaches. Shore parties had to contend with artillery attacks
that closed several beaches and hampered operations on many others. The British X
Corps, landing along the northern beaches, faced the luxury of better beach gradients, but
with heavier enemy artillery fire. 578 Enemy air attacks were also a constant threat.
The most serious threat to the Allied beachhead came during September 12-14, as a
strong German counterattack sought to split the US and British forces along the corps’
boundary on the Sele River. This was a vastly different situation from that of Torch or
Husky; Fifth Army was facing a strong and capable opponent - one that was determined
and could quickly reinforce itself. Even though the Germans were having trouble in
responding to the landings, they were able to amass enough combat power to split Fifth
Army in two. By September 12, the Germans were reinforcing at a rate equal to, or
greater than, that of the Allies.
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The main attack came midday on September 13. General der Panzertruppen Traugott
Herr, commander of the LXXVI Panzer Corps, launched the 29th Panzer Grenadier and
16th Panzer Divisions along the Sele and Calore Rivers, hoping to take advantage of the
boundary between the two Allied Corps. Meanwhile, Vietinghoff ordered the German
XIV Panzer Corps to attack south of Eboli, in an attempt to hasten the Allied withdrawal
from the beaches. 579 The German division made good gains, rolling over American
defensive positions. Clark was unsure whether VI Corps could hold the beachhead and
asked the Fifth Army staff to make plans for a possible re-embarkment from the US beach
- a scenario that would have been disastrous, both for the operation and for the forces
involved.
AFHQ and Fifth Army responded by focusing all available resources against the
German attack. Fighters and strategic bombers all converged on the German attackers.
Naval gunfire was especially effective the nearer the enemy approached to the coastline.
The third, and equally important leg of the defense, was the decisive response by Fifth
Army units in dealing with the threat.
All available men joined the defensive line. The engineer shore regiment abandoned
its beach operations and took a position on the VI Corps right flank. Mechanics and truck
drivers became infantrymen, which strengthened the defensive line, but limited the ability
of the army to distribute forces since this contributed to a lack of transportation. 580 The
small advance element of the base section, which had landed on D+2, even found itself on
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the line under the command of a non-commissioned officer. This was one disadvantage of
landing early in an operation – the area was not yet secure.
The crisis prompted AFHQ and the Services of Supply to reinforce Salerno as fast as
possible. The Combined Chiefs gave Eisenhower approval to use 18 LSTs that were
transiting through the Mediterranean on their way to India. General Alexander directed
that the rest of the 3rd Infantry Division replace service troops scheduled for landing
Salerno. General Clark considered sending the 82nd Airborne Division into Salerno, but
there were insufficient landing craft and aircraft to move the entire division in the time
required.
September 14 brought a new resolve to the Fifth Army beachhead. Allied air cover
provided 187 B-25s, 166 B-26’s, and 170 B-17’s over the beaches of Salerno. 581 Elements
of the British 7th Division began arriving in the British X Corps sector. The last of the US
45th Infantry Division arrived, providing Fifth Army with an operational reserve. Admiral
Cunningham had ordered two cruisers and battleships from Malta and offered up another
two battleships if needed. That evening, the 82d’s 505th Parachute Infantry Regiment
landed just south of Paestum and landed on their assigned drop zones. The Allies
succeeded in making a massive reinforcement on, above, and off Salerno’s beaches.
Meanwhile, the assault force already on the beaches fought to hold its ground.
No single service could have pushed the German counterattack back, but the combined
Allied air, ground, and sea force proved to be the decisive factor. The theater strategy of
building bases in Tunisia combined with the decision to launch a balanced ground force
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which could sustain itself shortly after landing on the beach, proved to be deciding factors
in the early stages of the campaign. The fight for Salerno showed the importance of
having a base of operations near the landing areas - this was the only quick means to
reinforce an assault force in trouble.
On September 15, General Vietinghoff and the German Tenth Army began to realize
that they had lost the opportunity to push Fifth Army off Salerno’s beaches. Allied air
power made the daytime movement of forces and supplies dangerous. An attack by the
Hermann Goering, 3d, and 15th Panzer Grenadier Divisions made little headway against
the reinforced British 46th Division. Late that day, the German Tenth Army commander
wired Kesselring for permission to break off the attack. 582 The German Tenth Army
would now assume a defensive strategy up along the Italian peninsula.
General Clark was finally able to begin expanding the beachhead. The port of Salerno
opened on D+4. The condition of the port was fair and there was sufficient space to berth
three coaster vessels and three LSTs within the port and beach another 12 LSTs alongside
the harbor. However, the port still fell under range of German artillery so large-scale port
operations could not begin until after D+15. From this point, the port of Salerno became
the central point of offloading for ships supporting the advancing army. 583
The complaints of the Navy concerning the beaches point to a general shortage of
service forces and support equipment on the assault force. However, it is remarkable that
as many service units landed as they did. Commanders for Avalanche faced the same
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shortage of shipping and assault craft that had faced the previous amphibious assaults.
The Combined Chiefs of Staff still centrally managed vessels, such as Liberty Ships,
LSTs, and LCTs. Limited amounts of these craft were available to Eisenhower so
commanders had to determine the best ratio of combat and support forces for the assault
convoy.
In Sicily, the Allies faced a demoralized Italian force, which contained a few German
Divisions. For the attack of Italy itself, there were still questions about whether Italian
forces would fight to defend the mainland, and there was an entire German army
defending the area with the ability to receive reinforcements directly from central Europe.
Allied commanders needed to be able to deal with the threat - this meant that that there
had to be sufficient combat forces in the initial assault or the Germans could push Fifth
Army off the beaches. The invasion was a zero-sum game: more combat forces on the
landing craft meant less service forces. The fact that many service troops landed on the
beaches in the first convoys serves as a testament to the appreciation that combat
commanders had developed regarding the role and contributions of service units. There
were still shortages of support personnel and equipment, but this was necessary to land the
combat strength required to deal with the opposing force.
The total amount of men and materiel landed over Salerno was quite impressive.
Despite the challenges of the heaviest enemy resistance seen in the Mediterranean to date,
inefficient beach parties, and occasional severe weather, Fifth Army landed 202,066 men,
45,262 vehicles, and 153,930 tons of supplies from September 9 to October 8. Similar to
Sicily, Salerno proved that a major port was not a prerequisite for landing and maintaining
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an army. 584 However, the advantages of a large deep-water port were clear and the army
moved north to secure its main objective - Naples.

Naples and the Establishment of the Support Base
An advance echelon of base section personnel had landed at Salerno on D+2 and
worked with the Fifth Army staff in an adversary capacity. VI Corps had been responsible
for support of the invasion force since D-Day, but the army headquarters had steadily
grown in size and by September 15, D+12, VI Corps was ready to relinquish the
responsibility of sustainment to its higher headquarters. The line of communications was
lengthening and General Clark agreed that the time had come for Fifth Army to take
responsibility for the rear area. On September 15, the Fifth Army G4 Transportation
Section became responsible for all beach operations and supply distribution. 585
One lesson that Fifth Army did note from Operation Husky was that Services of
Supply personnel needed to arrive early in the landing and establish a formal base section
as quickly as possible. Once Fifth Army assumed control of the beaches it had overall
responsibility for the planning and oversight of administrative requirements, but the army
needed a capable headquarters that could conduct the daily management and execution of
logistics.
Brigadier General Arthur Pence, former commander of the Eastern Base Section,
arrived in Italy on November 11 as the commander of the 6665th Base Group
(Provisional), later to become the Fifth Army/Peninsula Base Section. Pence arrived in
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Naples on October 2, along with the 6th Port headquarters, to begin the establishment of
the main support base for US forces in Italy - the first base section established on the
European mainland. 586
The citizens of Naples welcomed the arrival of the service forces. These units
represented not only relief from German oppression, but also a chance to rebuild lives,
families, and the city itself. As in Sicily, life under occupation had been harsh.
Conditions within the city of Naples were deplorable. The Germans had destroyed the
city’s communications and transportation systems. Retreating German units hid large
time bombs throughout the city, burned the city’s stockpiles of coal, and tore up the port
railways. Food was scarce and there was a lack of clean water. Retreating Germans had
drained the city’s main water supply, there was only enough to last for eight days, and
German forces still controlled the main reservoir. 587 The people of Naples had been
without bread for nearly ten days. Much of the city’s transportation system was in
shambles. When Pence and the service forces entered Naples, German artillery,
positioned on the hills just north of the city, was still shelling the city. 588
By October 5, base section personnel began occupying the Finanza Building in the
center of Naples. Officers of the headquarters billeted in the Parco Hotel, while the
enlisted men stayed in the west wing of the Naples Post office. The men heard rumors
from the local civilians that the Germans had hid explosives in the city, but did not
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immediately act on the rumors due to the amount of work associated with occupying the
new city. 589
An explosion at 2:10 p.m. on October 7 interrupted the peaceful occupation of the city.
A large German mine with a time-delay fuse destroyed the southwest corner of the post
office. Parts of the building flew as far as 100 yards as the first two floors of the building
crumbled. The base section and 2nd Base Post Office had 12 men killed and another 19
injured or missing. 590 Civilians, including children, were also among the dead and
injured. The base section relocated its troops to a former apartment building and the
Allies began a search of the city to find any remaining bombs. Meanwhile, the priority
was to get the port into operation as quickly as possible.
The story of the rehabilitation and exploitation of the port of Naples is worthy of a
volume of its own. This was a scene of notable dedication, skill, and ingenuity on the part
of the Allied service forces to turn a destroyed port into one of the most important support
facilities of the theater in a matter of days and weeks.
Both the Germans and the Allies recognized that a major factor constraining the
buildup and sustainment of any amphibious force was port capacity. The Allies worked to
increase capacity as quickly as possible, while the Germans did everything in their power
to damage and destroy port facilities and supporting infrastructure. Every major port
seized in the Mediterranean, from Bizerte to Marseille, saw some degree of devastation.
This was a means to slow the Allied advance and allow time for the enemy to move in
reinforcements.
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The Allies expected that only a moderate amount of repair work would be required at
Naples, but they entered the port on October 1 to a scene of utter destruction. 591 The
strategic bombing campaign of the Mediterranean had included industrial transportation
facilities within Italy, especially ports and rail yards. The ports of Naples and Genoa were
“thoroughly worked over,” by the bombers, which hurt the Germans, but also would later
hinder Allied use of these same facilities. 592
In addition to the damage caused by the Allied bombing campaign, the Germans had
taken the techniques used at Palermo and expanded them to bring a new level of damage
to the port of Naples. For three weeks, German sappers had been hard at work destroying
all usable equipment and sinking every available vessel in an attempt to render the port
useless to the Allied force. Of 72 berths at Naples, only three were initially operable. 593
Not only did the Germans sink vessels of all types alongside the piers and quays, but
they sunk them in such a way as to make later clearance as difficult as possible.
Bulkheads were blown apart to preclude rising by compressed air. Vessels lay on top of
each other and then German engineers added other debris such as mines and compressed
gas bottles to the sunken mass. 594 Explosives placed under gentry cranes damaged not
only the cranes, but quay walls as well. 595 However, as inventive as the retreating
German forces were, the naval port party, under the command of British Rear Admiral J.
A. V. Morse, was equally as proficient at devising innovative measures of working
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through the clutter. Salvage teams quickly entered the port and began clearing the
channel. Engineers left larger sunken vessels in place and built piers over them. Within
two days, there were enough open berths to hold five Liberty ships and eight coasters; 17
days later British and US engineers opened an additional 10 berths. 596 Naples was on its
way to being the hub of logistic activity for the Italian campaign.
Unlike Torch, which had relegated service units to later convoys, the units needed to
operate ports in Italy landed much earlier in Avalanche. An advance echelon of 6th Port
arrived on D+2 in Salerno, along with the 389th Port Battalion. The remainder of the port
headquarters arrived October 1. 597
Once in Naples, 6th Port went to work organizing the port. Constant rain hampered the
discharge operations at Naples just as it had at Casablanca. Men camped out in damaged
buildings near the docks. Naples, however, was three times larger than the port of
Casablanca and greater in capacity than the port of New York. The first day of operations
saw 5,380 long tons unloaded at Naples; within six months, the total exceeded 2,375,000
tons - twice the peacetime discharge rate of the port of Naples and four times what the
War Department had estimated. 598
Port engineers quickly refurbished docks, quays, and gantry cranes. Within 30 days of
its seizure, the port of Naples had a sufficient throughput capability to support both Fifth
and Eighth armies, a remarkable achievement. 599 Even though the port of Naples was
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proving to be even more capable than originally expected, Fifth Army worked to add
additional ports to the growing support area. By the end of October there were three
smaller ports working in support of the effort at Naples: Bagnoli, Pozzuoli, and Nisida.
The Allies needed these additional ports to receive and stage the vast numbers of
replacements and units that were landing on the Italian mainland, thus allowing Naples to
focus on the reception of supplies and materiel. 600
Figure 23: Pier Extended Over Sunken Ship at Naples 601

The original plan envisioned that all ports along western Italy were to be jointly shared
between the US and British forces, but the British would have overall jurisdiction and
command. This worked well immediately after the capture of Naples, but the relationship
had to change as more and more US port forces began arriving in the area and the volume
of supplies arriving at the port were overwhelmingly for US troops. The British
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commanded the port of Naples until November 1, after which 6th Port had sole
command. 602
The actions of a single individual could create repercussions up and down the logistic
chain. One such individual was Staff Sergeant Nick Orobello of Brooklyn, New York.
Sergeant Orobello was determined to improve crane operations at Naples. An Italian
speaker, Orobello headed into Naples and hired hundreds of local laborers, promising to
feed them as well. The group loaded 8,396 long tons of coal into rail cars in 70 hours and
cut the average time required to unload a coal ship from two to three weeks to three to
four days. 603 The faster off-load times meant that more supplies were flowing out of the
port and shipping was becoming more efficient. Word quickly spread throughout the city
on the benefits of working at the port.
The port soon proved to be a major employer for the local civilian populace as the
civilian labor pool grew from 700 to over 12,000 personnel. Besides providing these
civilians with a reliable source of income, 6th Port also provided workers with something
that money could not always buy in Naples - meals. The laborers spread word about the
available food and port units soon found themselves feeding up to 20,000 civilian refugees
a day, in addition to the normal workforce. 604 The supply dumps, likewise, had to face the
reality that they needed to feed the civilian workforce because that was the only way to
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keep the men at work and healthy. 605 The ports and dumps soon found themselves centers
of activity and a key means of providing civil relief to the ravaged city.
By the end of October, food had become an issue for Fifth Army. The Services of
Supply was confused, because the theater had shipped sufficient rations to feed the
military force, but shortages were developing. In fact, the theater had shipped over eight
million rations, but these were not in the supply dumps. Investigation revealed that the
problem was an uncontrolled growth in the myriad of demands for food. Not only was the
base section providing rations to the Allied units in Fifth Army, but they were also feeding
Italian units performing guard and labor duties for Fifth army, elements of the French
Expeditionary Corps, as well as meeting Allied Military Government (civil affairs)
requirements. This represented a dramatic increase over the projected level of support and
did not even include the tonnage required for animal fodder. 606 By December 1943, the
Peninsular Base Section was providing food for 200,000 Americans, 8,634 French nonMoslems, 10,100 Moslems, and 9,176 prisoners of war. There was a seemingly insatiable
appetite for American rations, which the Services of Supply had to address. 607
Figure 24: Italian Civilians Seeking Assistance 608

To deal with the situation the base section
worked to identify all of the various demands for
rations. Additionally, supply units enacted measures
to procure as much as possible from local Italian
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sources and to reduce loss by pilferage. A healthy black market was springing up in Italy,
especially Naples, and the theater needed to put an end to such activities. Civil relief
supplies quickly became a major part of the support effort. By the end of the war over 4.8
million tons food, coal, and medical supplies were shipped to Italy solely for use by the
Italian people. 609 The situation was partly the Allies’ fault anyway – bombing attacks on
the railways had slowed the distribution of food throughout Italy. 610
As if this were not enough, base section engineers were also busy rehabilitating the
rest of the city’s infrastructure. Within 15 days, roads were sufficiently clear to allow
traffic on all main roadways within Naples. Engineers worked to repair the sewers and
sanitation system by the middle of December, at a cost of 27,444 man-hours by US forces
and 136,298 man-hours by local Italian employees. Base Section engineers also repaired
or rebuilt high-tension towers, enabling the resumption of electrical distribution.
Ingenuity was once again in evidence as both the Allied service forces and local
Italians worked to bring Naples back to life. While workers strove to bring two pump
stations back on-line, the Italian Navy anchored three submarines in the harbor.
Lieutenant Colonel Gilbert Cooley of the Peninsular Base Section’s electrical division
devised a plan whereby the submarines could indirectly tie their generators into the city’s
electrical grid. This was accomplished by running the direct current electricity from the
submarines backwards thorough the Naples tramway sub-station, using the tramway’s
alternating current motor as a secondary generator. This produced an alternating current
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that traveled to the pump stations for further distribution across the city. Actions like
these not only brought the city back to life, they also forged relationships with the Italian
military and generated goodwill among the Italian people
Ingenuity allowed the service forces to overcome many unforeseen challenges, but GI
creativity also caused an occasional problem for the growing base section. In one case,
the Provost Marshal received a complaint that soldiers had been taking pistols away from
the local Carabinieri. The Carabinieri, naturally, asked for replacements. One soldier had
taken 18 pistols and issued a receipt for each one, signed “Joe Bloke, S/Sgt, 1093rd Mess
Kit Repair Battalion.” 611 As expected, there was no Joe Bloke and the Army had no such
unit as a mess kit repair battalion. The Provost Marshal worked to find the culprit, while
the base section replaced the pistols.
Electricity slowly came back to parts of the city; although citizens first had to evacuate
the areas for fear that the return of electrical current might set off additional German
mines. The threat posed by electrically detonated charges and mines left behind by the
Germans presented a danger that the base section ignore. Despite the challenges, the
Services of Supply forces repaired, tested, and brought the city’s electrical system back
on-line by November 1.
Fuel proved to be essential to restarting the industry in Naples, which put people back
to work, improved the local economy, and served as a source of materials for the Allied
forces. Immediately after the invasion, all fuel came from Allied stocks. By December
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1943, the Allies were providing an average of 500,000 gallons of gasoline and 200,000
gallons of diesel fuel per month to support Italian industry. 612
The widening area of Allied responsibility also increased demand on the limited
amounts of coal. By October, the Allies were working hard to support the needs of their
rail and naval fleets for coal, as well as to meet the civilian demands from North Africa,
Sicily, Sardinia, Corsica, and southern Italy. The British War Office offered to meet the
civilian demand if Eisenhower could accept a reduction in the military account for half of
the total quantity and a lower-grade of coal. 613 AFHQ had to balance the various needs
and decide which of the dependent groups had the most pressing needs. As with other
resources, coal required prioritization and allocation. Winter was quickly approaching and
the demand would only continue to grow.
The base section steadily grew in numbers, so on October 25, the section was renamed
the Peninsular Base Section, becoming officially activated on November 1. 614 Fifth Army
had been responsible for administration of the army for a month, but with the activation of
the Peninsular Base Section this responsibility was now in the hands of the Services of
Supply. General Clark and the Fifth Army staff still had to provide policy and priorities,
but the daily execution of the logistics missions now fell to the theater service
headquarters along with its base sections.
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German Logistics
September of 1943 found the German High Command in a quandary. Sicily had
fallen, although this was not a complete loss since the vast majority of German and Italian
units managed to escape with their equipment to the Italian mainland. The war along the
Eastern Front was not going well – the Germans had just been soundly defeated at the
Battle of Kursk, the largest tank battle in history, and the Russian formations were driving
west, toward the Dnieper River. Finally, Italy had deposed Mussolini on July 25 and
Hitler had lost his closest ally. Hitler needed victories or he would quickly lose public
support for the war.
After the fall of Sicily, the German High Command knew the Allies would invade the
European mainland, but they did not know exactly where. Sardinia, Corsica, Naples,
Rome, Salerno, and Greece were all viable possibilities. As such, German commanders
could not focus their units, or their logistics, in any one place. Rather, they had to make
educated guesses and remain flexible. This meant that when the Allies landed at Salerno,
they found an enemy only partly prepared. In fact, Hitler did not think that British forces
would land in southern Italy due to the danger of malaria. 615 Instead, Hitler expected that
the Allies would try to land in Sardinia and the Balkans.
As much as the Allies were experiencing a worldwide demand for limited resources,
so too, were German units. The Germans were in an even more precarious state due to the
lack of natural resources within Germany, combined with the long-term strategic bombing
campaign that had been continuing throughout the war.
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The Allied bombing campaign was limiting the overall amount of equipment produced
by the German state, as well as slowing down the rate of resupply down the Italian
peninsula. However, the type of fighting inherent in mountain operations was not as
demanding in terms of resources compared to other terrain. In North Africa, Rommel had
to worry about having sufficient fuel to feed his panzer divisions and trucks to move the
Italian infantry across long lines of communication in a very austere environment. The
fight in Italy was quite different, involving large artillery bombardments, little movement,
shorter lines of communication, and an enhanced infrastructure. The Allies believed the
bombing runs were taking a toll on the German support structure, but German units at the
front seemed unaffected and fought tenaciously. Allied commanders were going to have
to rely on maneuver and overwhelming force to break through the German lines.
Both sides had to get used to the peculiarities of working in the mountainous terrain.
Field Marshal Kesselring noted that the German divisions only gradually adapted to this
new type of warfare. A general shortage of high-altitude clothing and specialized
mountain equipment led to many tactical failures. 616 The larger problem for the Germans
was the lack of air power. During the Italian campaign, the Germans had approximately
300 aircraft available throughout the peninsula, compared to four to five thousand for the
Allies. 617 With this great disparity, the Allies could overfly German units and
communications lines at-will. Conversely, the Germans could do little to interrupt the
Allied lines of communications.
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As in Sicily, heavy amounts of Allied artillery fire proved very effective for repelling
German attacks. In fact, this became the expected outcome for any German counter
attack, even when Fifth Army was complaining that it was running short of munitions.
However, Kesselring, the German Commander-in-Chief for the Southwest region still
rated his supply service in Italy as “not too bad.” 618 When assessing the battles in Italy the
Field Marshal wrote that the major shortcoming of the Germans at Salerno was a poor
disposition of German forces and inadequate air support. However, supply challenges
began appearing by the time the front moved up to central Italy, particularly in terms of
fuel, ammunition, and combat vehicles. 619
Allied interdiction of the German lines of communication presented the biggest
challenge for the enemy. Allied air raids were so effective that the Germans had to ration
gasoline throughout the campaign. German supply units had to use all available means of
transportation to move supplies - trucks, trains, planes, and ships. The loss of a road or
rail line meant adjusting to other modes of transportation. This produced a very agile
support system that could react to Allied actions. 620 Italy was a secondary theater for the
Germans, but it did receive a priority for supplies whenever a large battle occurred. In
short, the Germans received the supplies needed to slow down the Allied advance, but
they did not have sufficient strength to break through the Allied lines. Allied air attacks
did succeed in constricting the flow of German supplies, but they could not completely
block all of the different communications lines leading into the country.
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The Allies could not starve out the enemy; rather, they had to fight the Germans in the
mountains of Italy.

The Mountain Campaign
German defenders strove to slow the Allied advance by any means possible.
Retreating units used every opportunity to remove or destroy critical components to
communications and transportation facilities, which succeeded in slowing movement as
well as diverting manpower and materials away from the front. Additionally, German
defenders took every advantage of the precipitous terrain to impede Allied progress.
Whether one could characterize German troops as being the best in the world is
debatable. Certainly, some US commanders felt that way when their attacks broke down
and Fifth Army measured progress in terms of yards gained, rather than miles. Perhaps
the underlying explanation behind German effectiveness was the enemy’s use of the
mountainous terrain in Italy that naturally suited the defender. The mountains of southern
and central Italy were simply unsuited for mechanized warfare and high-speed pursuits.
Rather than focus on the quality of the individual soldier, Field Marshal Kesselring
envied the logistic capabilities of the Allied force, especially the Americans. Not only did
US forces enjoy an abundance of supply that allowed them to conduct large amphibious
operations at any place of their choosing, but also the American equipment enjoyed a level
of standardization that was missing in the German Army. Additionally, the Allied forces
were motorized and able to rotate combat forces out of the front lines on a routine basis,
something else the German Army could not do because of a lack of units and a failure to
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modernize the entire German Army. These factors, the Field Marshal argued, were the
main discriminators between the two sides. 621
As Fifth Army moved away from the beachhead, units increasingly had to operate in
the mountains that paralleled the coastline. Motor vehicles could only go so far on the
difficult slopes where roads dwindled into paths. The typical chain of supply for a unit
operating under such conditions was to transport cargo by truck to a truckhead. From
there, supply specialists transferred materials to jeeps and drove them forward to company
areas. In the company areas, the support platoons configured the supplies to fit on pack
animals and moved them forward on mule trails. In extremely difficult terrain, units
transferred supplies to a man-carried pack board for the final movement to the front
lines. 622 This was an effective, although not terribly efficient, means of supplying the
front line units, requiring time, labor, and multiple handling of supplies.
The 3rd Infantry Division, having arrived from Sicily, was the only unit with its own
pack train. Lieutenant General Clark became increasingly impressed with the capability
provided by the mules and asked for recommendations on how to expand the capability to
other units. The subsequent study from the staff recommended that the army procure an
additional 1,300 mules. 623
To meet the demand for service animals, the Peninsular Base Section established a US
remount station in October at Persano, the site of the former Italian Remount Squadron.
There were still about 200 head of usable stocks at the site and the Fifth Army
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Quartermaster quickly established the 1st Remount Station Headquarters to meet the
demand for pack animals. 624 Local mules were preferred because mules shipped from the
US tended to eat a different type of fodder. Just as US troops hated to subsist off their
British cousins, the American mules detested Italian feed. 625
Figure 25: US Army Pack Train in Italy 626

The Services of Supply bought animals according to a fixed range of prices in order to
provide some level of standardization. The first rates in 1943 ranged from $80 to $150.
By April 1944, prices had risen to a top limit of $250 for mules and $300 for horses. 627
Each mule of Italian origin could carry about 100 pounds and traveled 20-150 miles per
trip.
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US service forces initially operated the remount station, but the base section worked to
transition as many jobs as possible to Italian military units. This freed US forces for other
more pressing duties and employed an Italian unit that had experience in working with
animals. An Italian-speaking US officer was found and assigned to the base section
operations section to serve as a liaison between the command and the Italian workers at
the remount station.
Transitioning from a US operated facility to an Italian operation was not a matter of
simply handing over the keys to the front stable door. The Italians were generally ill
clothed, poorly fed, and had low morale. The unit had to be refit with new uniforms,
boots, tents, and trucks. Support units had to arrange to feed and otherwise care for the
men and the mounts. 628
To help manage the animals, Fifth Army created a quartermaster pack troop within
each division beginning on November 1, 1943. Each troop contained 2 officers, 80
enlisted men, and 303 animals. 629 As in Sicily, these pack units proved essential to
resupplying remote posts and small units, especially during winter and periods of rain.
The use of animals in the US Army was not a new concept, but Italy required pack
animals on a scale not encountered in the First World War. A typical 1917 US Infantry
division contained 1,854 draft horses, 2,082 riding horses, 2,565 draft mules, 82 riding
mules, but only 53 pack mules. 630 Most of the division’s animals were for pulling wagons
or riding, not for packing supplies to forward locations. As such, the older members of
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divisions in the Second World War did have some familiarity of working with animals,
but there was little expertise on supporting battalions and companies by pack train. Only
trial and error could produce this skill.
Supply of the pack units became a major task in and of itself. Just as trucks needed
fuel and spare parts to run, the mules needed fodder, horseshoes, and saddles. The daily
forage requirement could be as high as 14 pounds of grain, 16 pounds of hay, and 1/8th
pound of salt per day for a large horse. The total forage requirement for the 15th Army
Group equaled 1,125 tons of barley or oats and 1,500 tons of hay per month. The Italian
army required an additional 300 tons of barley or oats and 600 tons of hay. The French
Army took care of its own needs. 631
As the campaign continued, so grew the requirements for additional pack animals. In
November 1943, Fifth Army estimated that it needed 9,981 animals. 632 By May 1944, the
total Allied pack animal requirement for Italy had grown to 18,236 mules and 3,023
horses - 21,259 animals. This included 23 British, 15 French, and six Italian remount
units. 633 Additionally, the 10th Mountain Division, scheduled to arrive in November 1944,
would bring another 6,000 animals. Forage would be a continuing issue for 15th Army
Group for the rest of the war.
The battle for San Pietro Infine represented the challenge of fighting in the mountains
of Italy during the winter and of the close tie between operations and logistics. Positioned
along the southern side of Monte Sammucro, San Pietro was a medium sized village of
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about 1,400 that found itself unwillingly part of the German defensive Bernhardt Line,
part of the greater Winter Line that Fifth Army needed to break through to get to Rome.
By November 1943, Kesselring had succeeded in positioning 23 German divisions in
Italy: 11 in the south and 12 in the north, totaling about 185,000 soldiers. 634 The Allied
had 14 divisions in Italy, although the numbers are deceiving. By this stage of the war,
many German units were less than half strength, while the Allies were proportionally
higher. The Allies had close to 500,000 men in Italy, although half of these represented
corps and army level troops, as well as the Services of Supply.
San Pietro was the key to the Migano Gap, which, in turn, opened the way to the Liri
Valley - the path to Rome. Highway 6, one of the two routes leading to Rome, went
directly past San Pietro. Fifth Army had to take the town to move forward. Troops of the
29th Panzer Grenadier Divisions defended the area in well-prepared positions.
The terrain was so rough that Allied planes were unable to airdrop supplies to the
attacking forces, the supplies just rolled down the sides of the mountains. Likewise, there
were no suitable roads to move supplies to the front lines, forcing units to evacuate the
wounded by hand - a trip that took up to six hours. The troops at the front carried little in
terms of rations or ammunition; they needed both hands to pull themselves up the
hillside. 635
The British 56th Infantry Division tried to take the town in early November, but the
weather and terrain quickly exhausted the troops. The US 3rd Ranger Battalion had a

634
635

Rick Atkinson, Day of Battle (New York: Holt, 2007), 281.
Blumenson, Salerno to Cassino, 229.

307

similar experience in late November, failing to secure the town. The VI Corps
commander, Major General Keys, ordered the US 36th Infantry Division to take the town.
The attack began on the night of December 7, 1943. Artillery shells landed throughout
the town, shattering the quiet as two battalions from the 143rd Infantry Regiment tried to
make progress against heavy enemy fire. Despite the effort, there was no change in the
lines by nightfall. The problem was the German gunners located on Monte Lungo, a
highpoint that overlooked Highway 6 and San Pietro. The 1st Italian Motorized Group
tried to capture the hill the following day, but found themselves quickly driven off and US
artillery had to fend off a German counterattack. 636 The Italians lost over half of their
1,600-man force in the attack.
For the next four days, the 143rd Infantry had a hard time just remaining where they
were. German counter attacks threatened to push the Americans back. Each night pack
trains struggled to carry supplies forward and bring out the dead and wounded.
To reach the extreme remote locations, such as the front lines at San Pietro, both mules
and men had to carry supplies. Mules carried loads up to the end of a trail. From there,
supply platoons transferred the supplies to men outfitted with backboards. These porters
then carried the supplies up steep inclines, using ropes tied to trees as a means of leverage,
on what could be a seven-hour round trip. 637
Figure 26: Packboards 638
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The demand for pack boards quickly exceeded
available supplies. Fifth Army had ordered 300 pack
boards on November 17 and added another requisition for
1,500 additional boards a week later. By the middle of
January, Fifth Army had ordered 7,000 pack boards to
help resupply remote outposts and small units.639
With a pack board, each man could carry 50-100
pounds of supplies. One company typically needed 20 men to carry a day’s worth of
supplies – ten carried rations, five carried water, and five carried ammunition. Support
platoons packaged supplies into 25-pound containers so they could easily be transferred
between mules and men. 640
The threat from snipers or artillery discouraged fires along the front line so it could be
hard to make a cup of coffee – a staple in combat. To deal with this, cooks strapped three
155mm brass shell casings to a pack board and filled these with boiling water. After the
four-hour trek to the front lines, the water arrived still hot enough to make coffee or soup
– a welcome relief, especially during the winter months. 641
The columnist Ernie Pyle arrived in the area during the start of the battle for San Pietro
and observed the pack mules in action. He watched as soldiers unloaded the dead from
the mules near a cowshed and then placed them on the ground.
Dead men had been coming down the mountain all evening, lashed onto
the backs of mules. They came lying belly-down across the wooden
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pack saddles, their heads hanging down on the left side of the mule, their
stiffened legs sticking awkwardly from the other side bobbing up and
down as the mule walked. 642

Pyle had little to say as he observed the offloading of the dead, but the scene did inspire
him to write one of his most famous columns of the war, “The Death of Captain
Waskow.” 643
The fight for San Pietro continued until December 16, when the 142nd and 143rd
Infantry Regiments succeeded finally in pushing the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division off
Monte Lungo and out of San Pietro. The battle had caused 1,200 casualties for the 36th
Infantry Division, but produced no clear breakthrough. The Germans had merely retired
to another defensive line further to the north. Both sides replaced their tired divisions in
late December, as the 34th Infantry Division replaced the 36th and the German 44th
Division replaced the battered 29th Panzer Grenadier Division. 644 The fight in the
mountains continued.
By December 12, Fifth Army contained 2,257 mules and the number was steadily
increasing. Much of the forage was available from local Italian sources, but 8,000 tons
still needed to be imported. To help manage the collection effort, AFHQ formed a
centralized board, the Joint Purchasing Forage Board, to collect and buy all available
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Mediterranean forage. 645 Hay and grain had become as important to the fight as fuel or
ammunition.
The Army created additional remount sites as the campaign progressed. One remount
depot formed at Bagnoli on December 12, and another at Santa Maria, to receive 141
mules shipped from Sardinia. The weekly average for procurement of animals was 20 in
December; by January 1943, this average had increased to 200. To deal with the problems
of caring for the animals the Army established a hospital for wounded pack animals at
Persano on January 24. 646
Training of men assigned to the remount units was a continuing problem. Only half of
the men assigned to these units had ever worked with animals. Italian pack mule units
were often short animals and/or men.
Dark colored animals were preferred because they were harder for the enemy to spot at
night. However, as mules became scarce, light colored animals increasingly found their
ways into the ranks of the remount units. Troops sprayed the coats of these lighter
animals with a five percent solution of potassium permanganate, an oxidizing agent,
which darkened the coats for up to two months at a time. 647
Those units that did not require pack boards and mules for resupply still had their own
challenges to overcome. Southern Italy only had a limited road and rail network prior to
the war, and the German Tenth Army had taken advantage of the opportunity to steal or
destroy as much as possible.
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The lack of a usable rail network meant that the service units had to rely more on truck
transport to send the materials of war to the front. As the distance between Naples and the
front increased, so too did the demand for cargo trucks. Demolition of the railways had
been more successful than expected and, as in North Africa, the flow of supplies in the
early stages of the campaign depended on time and trucks.
By October 21, the harbor of Naples was crowded with 52 ships, which had backed up
awaiting discharge. The problem was not getting material off the ships, but in clearing it
through the port and into the dumps. The crowding of ships represented not just a delay in
offloading needed supplies, but also presented an inviting target for German aircraft.
On one occasion, German pilots managed to bomb a large pile of coal at one end of
the port, igniting the mass into a large fire. At the opposite end of the port lay Mount
Vesuvius, an active volcano. German pilots took advantage of the two highly visible
landmarks by lining their aircraft up between the volcano and the burning coal to target
ships anchored in the port. The only means to eliminate this target reference was for the
base section to either move or cover the burning coal with a layer of dirt. After three days
of work, the section managed to move part of the pile into the water and to pump a footthick layer of mud over the remainder. This removed one reference point and after that
the port experienced significantly fewer losses. 648 The volcano was left untouched.
General destruction of the rail lines, tunnels, and bridges slowed the establishment of
rail service in Italy. German ingenuity had produced a giant steel hook, which engineers
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pulled behind a locomotive to plow up the wooden crossties. Demolitions cut the rails. 649
The Germans destroyed everything they could not take with them. An advance element of
the 713th Railway Operating Battalion landed in Salerno shortly after the assault, but it
took until the end of October to establish a rail link between Salerno and Naples with nine
operational locomotives. 650
Rail service gradually increased as engineers and rail personnel repaired or rebuilt
tracks, bridges, and switches. The first task was to restore service around Naples. The rail
lines surrounding Naples suffered total destruction. Twenty-five major bridges were
blown and the Germans had damaged every rail, switch, and frog. Mines littered the rail
lines and facilities.
The first locomotives put into service were cargo trucks outfitted with boxcar wheels.
Arriving in the area on D+2, rail troops located a serviceable rail line and several Italian
boxcars, but no locomotive. Taking two 2 ½ ton trucks, they removed the traditional
wheels and installed flanged railway wheels to provide the power to pull the railcars,
providing another example of American ingenuity. These truck/rail engines served as a
temporary measure until the rail units could deploy heavy machinery from Sicily or North
Africa onto the Italian mainland. 651
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Figure 27: Truck Reconfigured as Rail Engine 652

Figure 28: Damaged Ties
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Much of the problem stemmed from the fact that there were no stocks of general rail
items available in Italy to repair the damaged rail lines. Workers had to use sidings to
glean usable rails and switches. Rail workers had to clear demolished overhead bridges
before repair of the tracks could begin. The Germans were not solely responsible for the
damage – Allied air raids had damaged the rail yards as much the demolition work of the
enemy. 654
Engine operators, such as Sergeant Fred A. Tomer, were without a job until the rail
lines were back in operation so these men lent a hand wherever possible. Tomer decided
to help out in the clearing of the rails by forming a track gang. The sergeant grabbed a
private who had some track gang experience, PVT Alexander Parker. Together, they
formed a 21-man team that, in a single day, managed to reclaim eight rail cars and a
section of track to place the cars on. The following day Tomer and his crew put an
additional 12 cars into operation. Then, on the next day, the track gang repaired a German
crane and built 75 yards of track. Sergeant Tomer was just trying to help and keep himself
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busy; however, these were exactly the kinds of endeavors that allowed the service units to
bring the rear areas into operation as quickly as possible. Efforts, like these, steadily
increased the capacity of the Italian rail service. Allied rail troops eventually rehabilitated
6,233 miles of rail lines and 612 bridges across the country. 655 In this war of attrition conducted with aircraft and mechanized forces - the rail lines were the backbone of the
ground transportation network and allowed the support units to use the limited numbers of
cargo trucks in the forward areas where the railways could not venture. 656
By January 1944, the Railway Grand Division had reestablished service from Naples
north to Vairano and east to Foggia. Their British counterparts had connected Taranto to
Vasto. 657 A rail line now connected the major elements of the 15th Army Group.
In an effort to bring efficiency to the rail system, AFHQ placed all US and British rail
units under the control of Brigadier General Gray and the Military Railway Service.
Working together with General di Raimondo of the Italian military railway, General Gray
set the priorities and policies that governed rail reconstruction and organization throughout
Italy. 658 Cooperation was widespread and rail service expanded throughout the war.
To manage the limited Italian roads, rail lines, ports, and other infrastructure, the
Allies formed the Italian Resources Commission. The senior British member of the
commission was Major General Sir Brian Robertson and the senior US member was
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Brigadier General Pence. The commission met regularly to set priorities and make
allocations between the forces.
Items adjudicated by the board included not only the expected matters of rail
allocation, but also such matters as shipping allocations for the British to bring in seed
potatoes, the opening of Italian breweries, and the purchase of pack mules in Sardinia and
Spain. Shipments of goods typically originated in North Africa before heading to Italy.
Unfortunately, the result of one decision could have unforeseen consequences on another.
On one such occasion, the action to open the breweries required a large purchase of
hops. The Services of Supply purchased the hops and, coincidently, shipped them to Italy
aboard the same vessel containing a large number of mules. When the ship docked in
Italy, the hundred-dollar-a-ton hops were gone and the mules were bloated from the
bounty of forage. 659 Future shipments carried mules and hops in separate ships. Despite
these entertaining incidents, the Italian Resources Commission process worked well and
continued meeting throughout the war.
Life in the base section was not just about supply and transportation; it also included
other critical functions, such as engineering and medical support. Engineers in Italy
encountered a scope of demands they had not previously seen. Local civilians wanted the
infrastructure repaired and basic services restored. Combat units wanted mines cleared, as
well as roads and bridges fixed. The base section needed bases built. There was no
shortage of tasks.
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Supporting the effort were a number of lumber mills and rock quarries. By the end of
the war, Peninsular Base Section engineers were using 60 civilian mills to provide the
lumber needed for all these projects, capable of producing 500,000 board feet of lumber
per month. This was required for the construction of camps and bridges, but also for the
holds of Liberty ships. Each Liberty ship needed one million board feet of lumber to
separate and store cargo in its holds.660
Unlike North Africa, Italy held a number of local resources that the Allies were able to
purchase. Various items such as food, lumber, road construction materials, iron, and
electrical wire were all available, which resulted in a savings of over 400,000 tons of
shipping space over the course of a year. This supported the Italian economy and meant
that units did not have to wait as long to have requisitions filled.661
The Island Base Section established one of the largest medical centers of the war near
Naples. This included a state-of-the-art laboratory at Bagnoli, which conducted advanced
studies on hepatitis and native diseases. Italy also represented the first wide-spread use of
whole bold transfusions, penicillin, sulfa drugs, and evacuation of the wounded on
aircraft. 662 The Mostra fairgrounds contained three general hospitals, two station hospitals,
and a medical supply depot. A large swimming pool facilitated physical therapy while a
200-seat theater showed movies and live entertainment for the development of patient
morale. 663 By January 1, 1944, there were 14,992 hospital beds within Italy spread among
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30 hospitals. 664 The Allies had learned that patient survival rates increased the closer that
medical treatment facilities were to the front lines. Having a medical complex on the
Italian peninsula saved lives and lessened evacuation requirements.
To stay abreast of the situation in Italy and to manage the administrative needs of the
combined force, AFHQ established an advance administrative headquarters in Naples on
November 1, known as FLAMBO. This was not an acronym, but rather, simply a code
word for the forward headquarters. The main purpose of this headquarters was to
coordinate administration and support between the Fifth and British Eighth Armies in
order to facilitate future operations against Germany. 665
FLAMBO had the role to serve as a combined administrative staff, as well as provide
general administration of British forces. For the actual execution of administrative
missions, the Peninsular Base Section handled support for all US units, while the British
Number 2 District, stationed at Bari, provided for the local administration of British
forces.
Fifth Army was not alone in working to meet the needs of civilians; the British
experienced similar demands on their administrative systems as well. Local Italians
within the British sector of Italy needed comparable support to what the US service units
were providing in the west, but, by December 1943, an additional requirement had
appeared. Over 71,000 civilians on the Dalmatian Islands (offshore of Croatia) were
without food and starvation was imminent. 666
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The advanced headquarters worked to address the immediate need, but correctly
argued that long-term support for these people should not justify large transfers of supplies
from the on-going effort in Italy. There was already a serious lack of civilian food and
housing and the British could not accommodate the transfer of these additional refugees
onto Italian soil. Rather, FLAMBO asked British Middle East Command to coordinate a
long-term plan to ship food direct to the islands from the eastern Mediterranean.
Up to November, the British Eighth Army had been receiving supplies from the port in
Taranto. However, as the army advanced, the line of communications lengthened, thus
increasing the transportation requirement on the service forces. Since trucks were an issue
for the British as well, FLAMBO sought to reduce the line of communication by changing
the port of supply from Taranto to Naples once the railway to Foggia was completed. 667
Support of the armies was transitioning to Italy’s west coast, while support for the air
forces remained in the east. FLAMBO continued to coordinate general administration for
British forces until February 1944, when it was absorbed into General Alexander’s
headquarters of the Allied Armies of Italy (AAI.)

Other Claimants
In November 1943, the French Expeditionary Corps arrived in Italy, representing
another demand on the US sustainment system. The 13,000 French forces included the 2nd
Moroccan Division, 4th Group of Moroccan Tabors, two mule companies, French service

667

“History of the Peninsular Base Section, North African Theater of Operations.” Volume II. 26.

319

units, and 5,000 live sheep. 668 The divisions of the French corps had been reequipped
with US equipment in North Africa and the French would fight under Fifth Army, adding
to the complexity of supporting the army. Planners had envisioned that the French would
operate their own support base and staff it with French service forces. La Base 901
formed under the command of Colonel Le Masle, to serve as the main French support
base. 669 The Peninsular Base Section would provide supplies to Base 901, which in turn,
supplied the French corps. This was a relatively simple system on paper, but differences
in culture, expectations, and a shortage of French service forces, provided challenges that
would carry over to the invasion of southern France.
Providing support to the French was more complicated than it would first seem. North
African units were mostly Muslim, so they could not have any pork products in their
rations. A request for rations from a Muslim unit really meant rations with no pork, thus
requiring additional handling and packaging at the ration dumps. French soldiers also
tended to eat more than US troops so ration issues did not last as long as intended. Units
would be issued three days of rations and then eat them all in one day. 670 Eventually, a
system worked out where the French received 50 percent of their food needs from the US
base section and the rest (wine, brandy, fish, and flour) came from French sources. 671
Compounding the situation was a difference in language that, at times, clouded
communications between Base 901 and the Peninsular Base Section. The French did not
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always understand the US systems and the Services of Supply did not always understand
the French requirements. US procedures required the French to account fully for all
equipment, which seemed a waste of time to the French. Thus, there was a difference in
cultures both allies had to consider.
The War Department had tried to institute a list of limitations on what Fifth Army
could, and could not provide to the French. Fifth Army largely disregarded these
restraints and responded to any legitimate need. French units were typically
underequipped and needed help outfitting their soldiers. 672 As an example, the War
Department had not included overshoes on the list of approved equipment for issue, but
French units were operating in the mountains in up to a foot of snow. General Clark
approved an issue of overshoes to the French units, which then went on and accomplished
their objectives. 673 The War Department was worried about Lend-Lease accounting and
the worldwide allocation of resources; the theater was worried about units accomplishing
their assigned missions.
By December, the theater had adopted a policy whereby the local base section could
provide all necessary support to French forces, with the exception of major items of
equipment. Major items, such as vehicles and weapons, required approval of the theater
commander for issue. 674 The US Services of Supply became responsible for providing
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any supplies that the French could not provide for themselves. 675 Operational necessity
had trumped War Department directives.
Since the Free French forces had no industrial base to turn to, the burden of rearming
French units represented a steady drain on stocks of Allied war materiel. In May 1944,
alone, the French requested an additional 82,000 individual arms, 360 tanks, 6,000
machine guns, and 5,500 vehicles – in addition to those items already issued earlier in
North Africa. 676 This was the cost of incorporating a force that could not provide for itself
into a coalition. The burden would only continue to grow as fall gave way to winter and
the Allies had to maintain their operations in a cold, harsh, landscape.

Winter
The Allies had hoped that the Germans would withdraw to the Pisa-Rimini line north
of Rome. By the fall of 1943, however, signs of German intention showed that Hitler
planned, instead, to delay the Allied advance up the peninsula as much as possible. The
Germans hoped to slow the rate of advance in order to allow time for their engineers to
construct a formal network of successive prepared defensive lines. 677 Winter was going to
be a slow and grueling fight up the Italian peninsula. Predictions came true as the fight
bogged down due to poor weather, mountainous terrain, and a lack of landing craft needed
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to outflank the German defenses. 678 As in Tunisia, circumstances, not the plan, dictated
the pace of the campaign.
As soon as it became evident that the drive to Rome would take longer than expected,
Fifth Army began looking ahead to identify requirements for winter clothing. Winter in
North Africa had been cold and wet; winter in the mountains of Italy would be freezing,
cold, and wet. Given the time needed to procure specialized equipment and clothing and
ship it from the states, Fifth Army and the Services of Supply did not have much time to
spare.
The initial requisition for winter clothing encountered the typical challenges of the
military’s supply system. The War Department cancelled a requisition for 100,000 sets of
winter uniforms because factories no longer manufactured that particular type of clothing.
Instead of substituting a different uniform of similar qualities, the War Department
directed Fifth Army to submit another requisition. 679 The exchange of cotton uniforms for
wool, and vice versa, occurred every six months, a process that required early planning
and presented a large task for the supporting quartermaster units.
Eventually, Fifth Army submitted the right requisitions and items such as winter
uniforms, insulated tents, and heaters all flowed into Italy. The tent heaters were
especially valued and required close management to ensure no unit received more than its
share.
Winter also brought another challenge - illness. Two entirely different types of
diseases affected two different populations during the first few months of 1944: typhus hit
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the civilian population in Naples and venereal disease ran widespread throughout Fifth
Army. Both were a drain on the medical system and each held the potential to influence
the war effort.
As the local inhabitants returned to Naples, enterprising Italians saw opportunity with
the large numbers of Allied soldiers that were working or recovering in the Naples area.
Licensed and unlicensed bordellos sprung up along an amusement belt of sorts, spreading
gonorrhea and syphilis to unsuspecting troops. By the first week of January, venereal
disease patients, mostly from Fifth Army, filled 13-15 percent of the hospital beds in the
Peninsular Base Section area. By the end of the month, 2,800 beds had been set aside
solely for the treatment of venereal disease. 680 This was becoming a problem Fifth Army
could not ignore.
To deal with the situation the military police formed a vice patrol, commanders were
held accountable for the numbers of cases in their units, and prophylactic stations which
contained condoms and washing materials were positioned in neighborhoods prone to
prostitution. Services of Supply medical units tested jailed prostitutes for venereal
disease. If a woman tested positive, she received treatment before her release. 681 Such
measures collectively worked and the incidence rate of these diseases gradually
diminished to tolerable rates, at least among white soldiers.
The incidence rate between white soldiers and other soldiers of color displayed a
striking difference. In the spring of 1944, colored soldiers had an incidence rate for
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venereal disease that was four times the level of white soldiers. In March, the rate was
98.51 per 1,000 per annum for white troops, but 351.25 for colored troops. 682 One can
most probably attribute this difference in rates to a combination of factors, including
differences in culture, education, and different operating zones. A majority of colored
units tended to serve in the rear areas, where populations of civilians were greater.
Typhus presented a great challenge, both in terms of the possible affected population
and in prevention. If Naples experienced a major typhus outbreak it could quickly overrun
the military’s ability to treat everyone affected, as well as limit the Allies’ use of the port
and could even possibly spread to the troop units as well. The Allies had seen the effects
of typhus in past wars and no one wanted to see it return.
A report by the Fifth Army Surgeon provides some idea of the conditions, which
allowed diseases, such as typhus, to spread. Sanitation of the Italian populace was
generally poor and there were inadequate supplies of food or dairy products. Italians
fertilized vegetable gardens with human excrement and dairy cows frequently had
tuberculosis or undulant fever. Drinking water frequently came direct from local streams.
Typhus spread through body lice, which were common in the winter months when
many people stopped washing their clothes. 683 The only good news was that the winter
tended to kill off the mosquitoes, which spread malaria during the summer months.
In early 1944, Naples was in a pre-epidemic state. 684 Sanitation was still a concern,
clean water was limited, and typhus fever was beginning to spread among the population.
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New cases developed at a rate of 20-25 a day through the month of February. 685 In a
quick response, the War Department deployed the US Typhus Commission under the
leadership of Brigadier General Leon Fox, an Army doctor and health officer, to Naples to
deal with the threat.
The commission worked with Italian authorities to treat the conditions causing the
disease and to limit its spread. Within a month, the threat had passed and no US soldier
ever caught the disease. Commanders had a personal interest in keeping down the rate of
disease – at any one time, soldiers with diseases or injuries occupied two-thirds of all
hospital beds in the communications zone. The remaining one-third were battle
casualties. 686
There was more to taking care of soldiers than limiting the spread of disease; troop
morale and cleanliness were also important considerations. Included in the base sections
were specialized quartermaster units which provided laundry and shower support. These
services were traditionally part of the communications zone, but that was proving to be
unsatisfactory. Divisions had to wait until they rotated out of the front lines to delouse,
shower, and get clean clothes. Showers and clean uniforms affected more than just
morale; they also contributed to the health and welfare of a unit. Experiments in pushing
this type of support forward provided a large boost to morale and proved to be one of the
most popular initiatives. 687
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In November 1943, Major General Truscott, commander of the 3rd Infantry Division,
provided a list of complaints to Fifth Army. Included in these was the fact that after a
year’s service in North Africa, Sicily, and Italy, the division had never had an opportunity
to have a bath or shower aside from those out of “tin cans, helmets, and other makeshift
installations.” In less than two weeks, the 61st Quartermaster Laundry Company was
moving to set up laundry and shower facilities within the 3rd Infantry Division sector.
Mud was everywhere, slowing down the setup of the equipment, but the company
commander promised that his unit would be operational by November 20. 688
Additionally, the Services of Supply ordered the 302nd Sterilization Company, located at
Piedimonte, to set up a bath facility and laundry exchange for the 34th Infantry Division. 689
The possibility that the 3rd Infantry Division had been in theater for a year before
receiving a proper shower is somewhat surprising. The Division landed with the Western
Task Force in Morocco and had fought in Tunisia, as well as Sicily, but there were periods
of rest in between the campaigns. When the Division was not on the front lines, the
communications zone should have provided shower and laundry services as part of the rest
and refit period, however from Truscott’s note this appears not to have happened. Part of
the answer possibly lies in the time needed to train, equip, and deploy the shower and
laundry units; these were among the lowest priority units in the Army’s inventory.
Additionally, these types of support units traditionally operated in the rear areas, far from
the front. The Italian campaign was the first instance in which Quartermasters
experimented with positioning clothing exchange and bath units well forward in the
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combat area. 690 Regardless, Fifth Army responded to Truscott’s note and made care of the
infantry divisions a priority for this type of support.
Upon arriving at one of these shower units, soldiers entered a large warming tent and
removed their uniforms. Dirty clothing went into one bag, personal items into another.
After showering, troops received clean clothing, while their old uniforms went to a
laundry facility for cleaning, sorting, and later re-issue. They retrieved their personal
items and emerged looking, and feeling quite better; the effects of a warm shower and
clean clothing improved the mind as much the body. This experiment of exchanging old
uniforms for new while a soldier showered proved wildly popular among the troops and
was much faster than waiting for the laundering of individual uniforms. The service
forces were adjusting to the needs of the combat commanders, although a complaint from
a general officer tended to speed up the process.
The rain that slowed the 61st Quartermaster affected other units as well. Throughout
November, rivers flooded, roads became impassable, and supplies rotted if they were not
suitably packaged. Replacements were untrained in how to keep themselves dry and
young sergeants and lieutenants were untrained in the prevention of trench foot, the
scourge of the First World War.
Medical reports from Fifth Army first began reporting cases of trench foot in midNovember 1943. Before November ended, medics hospitalized 305 soldiers with the
condition, and reported another 1,323 cases reported in December. In the first 90 days of
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1944, Fifth Army had 4,000 additional trench foot cases, divided equally between the
Cassino front and the Anzio beachhead. 691
The British Army had an effective means of preventing trench foot. Every unit
conducted a daily foot drill in which a sergeant oversaw the men remove their shoes and
socks, massage their feet, and then put on a dry pair of socks. This stimulated circulation
and kept feet dry. 692 Additionally, the British boots and socks were heavier than that of
the Americans so British soldiers were less susceptible to the disorder.
Fifth Army adopted the strategy and ordered an additional issue of socks for everyone
in Italy. This was a medical problem, but one that the quartermaster had to solve. Socks
became a priority item for issue and, as with venereal disease, Fifth Army held
commanders accountable for the rate of trench foot within their units. The measures
worked and the incidence rate of trench foot in Fifth Army during 1944-45 was only onethird that of the previous season. 693
Up to this point in the war, the Allies had mainly used cargo aircraft or delivering men
and supplies from one airfield to another. There had been some minor attempts to conduct
airdrop of supplies in North Africa and Sicily, but these were rare and involved small
units. The mountains of Italy provided the need and opportunity to develop the use of
parachutes for airdrop of supplies as a means to sustain a fighting force on a larger scale
than had been previously experienced.
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Realizing that this was a specialized task, the Peninsular Base Section established an
Air Resupply Depot at the Capodichino Airfield outside of Naples. 694 This depot held the
supplies, specialized equipment, and trained personnel needed to prepare items for aerial
delivery. Delivering supplies by air meant more than tossing the material out of an
aircraft; each load needed the right parachute, sling assemblies, and padding to protect it
from damage. This was a developing science.
Supplies were wrapped using wire and salvaged blankets. These bundles were then
either loaded into C-47 cargo planes or placed into the belly tanks from A-36 bombers. 695
Typical airdrop missions involved the delivery of rations, water, medical supplies,
petroleum products, and ammunition to US and British forces separated from their supply
lines.
For the first time, the use of airdrops influenced major battles. US forces involved in
the fight for Casino during the third week of January 1943, received supplies by air for a
five-day period during the fall of 1943. Supplies dropped in view of the enemy using 160
air sorties. In a testament of the skill of the air crews and the lessons that had been learned
in packaging supplies for airdrop, 80 percent of the supplies dropped were received and in
usable condition. 696

Due to the difficult terrain, Cassino would continue to hold out until

May 18, but the concept of airdrop for large units proved itself a viable option.
A major complaint about using aircraft for supply drops had been that it took too long
between the time a unit submitted a request and the actual delivery of supplies. Units did
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not have the luxury to wait for a few days while the request worked its way through the
system. Italy proved that the support troops could shorten this timeline. On May 16,
1944, a combat force found itself 30 kilometers from its support base in a mountainous
area with no roads and few trails. The unit radioed in a request for aerial resupply at 10:45
p.m. and the mission flew next day between 2-4:30 p.m. – just 16 hours after the initial
request. By means of comparison, delivery of this same material would have required 500
mules and two days. 697 Missions, such as these, proved to be of immense value to the
ground forces and the Air Corps gained another competency, which carried forward into
the fight for northwest Europe. Throughout the rest of the war, the use of aircraft for
support missions continued to increase as commanders and logisticians discovered the
range of potential capabilities.
One area that received little fanfare was the care of the dead. By the summer of 1943,
units had become more accustomed to dealing with the fallen and the Quartermaster Corps
had refined the systems for establishing temporary cemeteries and dealing with personal
effects. Unlike Torch, where the dead were piled together on the beach awaiting a
decision on what to do with them, graves registration specialists accompanied the
Avalanche landing force and quickly established a corps cemetery on a spot of about four
acres at Paestum, near the Gulf of Salerno. By D+4, two rows of graves were already
complete.
A personal effects depot, ran by a staff sergeant, removed the personal effects of each
of the dead. Graves Registration specialists filled out duplicate forms; one copy
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accompanied the effects and one copy remained at the depot. 698 The depot cleaned all
Army equipment returned it to a supply depot for later reissue.
German prisoners of war had the task of digging the graves and the 36th Infantry
Division chaplain, Chaplain McCullough, was interring the dead. They buried the remains
without caskets. Blankets or mattress covers draped some of the bodies; some simply lay
in their uniforms. Graves Registration soldiers used burlap straps to lower the dead into
the graves.
The workload for graves registration units varied, depending on the activities of the
front. The record in Italy was set on May 30, 1944, when the US cemetery at Nettuno
interred 245 bodies in a single day. 699
Within the first three months of the campaign, Fifth Army had established 20
cemeteries on the Italian mainland. 700 Most were small, remaining open for only a few
days and holding as few as 20 bodies. The trail of cemeteries was a witness to the flow of
battle and the intensity of the fight.
Proper care of the dead had little direct impact on the battle, but it did have a large
impact on both the morale of the soldiers within the theater and for public support of the
war. Troops knew that if they fell in battle, the Army would find their bodies and handle
them with respect. Families of the fallen quickly received word of what had happened and
later received the personal effects. After the war these families would also have the choice
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of leaving their relatives in an overseas cemetery, or having them disinterred and returned
to the US for subsequent burial.
Graves Registration units in Italy had a steady stream of business from the time of the
Salerno landings. Business would increase even more at the end of January as the Allies
tried to bypass German lines with an amphibious assault at Anzio.

Anzio
By the middle of October, Allied hopes for a quick advance to Rome were fading.
German forces provided a spirited defense along the Gustav line, running from northnortheast Cassino to Ortona. Fifth Army hoped to use an amphibious assault along the
western Italian coast as a means to bypass German defenses and force an enemy
withdrawal. Code-named “Operation Shingle,” the attack on Anzio hoped to land a force
in the German rear that could drive east, toward the Alban Hills. Commanders felt this
would put enough pressure on the German defenders to allow Fifth Army to break free of
the line of defenses, link up with VI Corps at the Anzio beachhead, and then march on to
Rome.
Vital to the operation was the use of 68 of the 90 operational LSTs that remained in
the Mediterranean. The Combined Chiefs of Staff had directed that AFHQ transfer these
vessels to Europe in preparation for a cross-channel assault, but the possibility of securing
Rome provided a powerful argument to allow the vessels to remain in the Mediterranean
in support of the operation. The Commanders in Chief granted Eisenhower temporary
loan of the LSTs for use in the Mediterranean, but only for a limited period.
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The competition for LSTs was fierce and everyone had a good reason to demand more.
The Services of Supply was using these craft to ferry supplies from North Africa to Italy.
Fifth Army wanted more LSTs in order to conduct amphibious assaults around German
defenses. The War Department had promised the European theater headquarters in
England two-thirds of all available LSTs by the middle of December 1943 to conduct
landing training. Additionally, the Pacific theater continued to demand additional assault
craft as they prepared to begin the campaign to clear the Marshall Islands, scheduled for
late January. 701 Landing craft were the key to make, and sustain, amphibious landings landings that were the hallmark of the war.
The final decision for Anzio languished for several weeks as senior leaders tried to
determine the best strategy for a stalled Italian campaign. Compounding the indecision
was the movement of key personnel. On January 8, 1944, Eisenhower relinquished
command of AFHQ to General Sir Henry “Jumbo” Wilson, commander of the British
Middle-East Theater. Along with the change, Lieutenant General Devers arrived to serve
as the Deputy AFHQ commander and commanding general of the North African Theater
of the US Army (NATOUSA.) General Montgomery was also to leave the Mediterranean
for Europe to take command of the 21st Army Group. Generals Alexander and Clark
remained in their current positions.
The combined change of supreme command in the Mediterranean, along with the extra
attention from Churchill (who was recovering in North Africa from a case of pneumonia,)
led to renewed interest in the Anzio operation. On December 23, the Prime Minister
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became determined to seize Rome as quickly as possible, before anyone could strip units
and resources away from Italy for a possible south France operation. Logisticians
questioned the feasibility of the Anzio plan because LSTs were only on loan for a short
period and could not provide long-term support of the landing force. 702 The 15th Army
Group and AFHQ noted these concerns, but then commenced operations because of a
belief that the two forces could link up within 8-15 days.
The assault force of 47,000 men and 5,200 vehicles sailed from Naples and
surrounding ports on January 20 for the short voyage north along the coast. The total
number of ships and craft totaled 376. 703 Maneuvering around enemy minefields, the
armada arrived off Anzio at 0005 hours the following morning.
The ground forces consisted of VI Corps, under the command of Major General Lucas,
the 3rd Infantry Division; a Ranger force; and the British 1st Infantry Division. The initial
landing force scheduled to land on D-Day held 27,000 US forces, 9,000 British, and 3,000
vehicles. 704 Their objective was to cut the German line of communications and threaten
the forces opposing Fifth Army.
The landing area was just 30 miles south of Rome. The Anzio harbor was restricted –
it contained one jetty and was limited to vessels with less than a ten-foot draft. Only
landing craft could navigate the shallow waters; Liberty ships had to anchor off the coast.
The beaches and limited port facilities were not ideal for prolonged support of a landing
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operation, but commanders expected that there would be a quick link-up with Fifth Army
forces soon after the landings.
The Allied nations divided support responsibilities for the force. The Peninsular Base
Section handled support for all US units, while the British Number 2 District provided
support for the British units. Once supplies reached the beach, they were the
responsibility of the 540th Engineer Shore Regiment, which had a total beach party
strength of approximately 4,200 men. 705
The attack began at 1:50 am on January 22 as two British landing craft launched a
barrage of 1,500 5-inch rockets on the beaches. There was no response; the landings were
a complete surprise to the Germans. Allied aircraft flew over 1,200 sorties that day as
well, but there were few targets. The 3rd Infantry Division landed south of Anzio while
three battalions of Rangers occupied the town of Nettuno. The British landed on the
beaches to the north.
The landings occurred more or less as planned, although the British 1st Infantry
Division had to make some adjustments. The presence of an offshore sandbar and poor
beach gradients on the western beaches made landings difficult. Due to the poor beach
conditions, the British closed their beaches and all further to the Anzio harbor. Despite
these changes, 90 percent of the men and equipment of the assault convoy arrived ashore
by the end of D-Day and most of the landing craft were returning to Naples. 706 Casualties
were light; VI Corps sustained only 13 killed, 97 wounded, and 44 missing. 707
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At the end of the D-Day, VI Corps had a favorable position. The Allied force made it
ashore with minimal casualties, the 3rd Infantry and British 1st Divisions reached their
assigned objectives, and the Germans were completely surprised. Eisenhower had given
Lucas a deliberately vague order, to attack in the vicinity of Anzio, secure a beachhead,
and “advance on Colli Laziali [Alban Hills].”708
The Corps Commander, Major General John Lucas, faced two options: push his forces
as far forward as possible and hope that the bold move convinced the German Tenth Army
to withdraw north, or consolidate the beachhead and buildup supplies to meet a possible
German counterattack. Lucas chose the latter. He stopped the two divisions short of the
Alban Hills and began to build Anzio into a base of operations, awaiting the arrival of the
45th Infantry Division.
By January 29, VI Corps was ready to resume the offensive. However, the Germans
had used the time to move the German Fourteenth Army Headquarters down from
northern Italy to assume command of the beachhead. Both forces hurried to reinforce the
area to gain an advantage over the other. The VI Corps attack on January 29
accomplished little. By then, there were an almost equal number of combat forces facing
one another; VI Corps had 100,000 men on the beach, of which 25,000 were service
forces. The Germans had 90,000 men, of which approximately 30,000 were involved in
the support effort. 709
Lucas’ decision to stop the VI Corps advance on D-Day short of the Alban Hills, along
with waiting to build up a base of operations before attacking, would become one of the
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most controversial topics of the war. Risk went along with either option: to advance or to
not advance. Lucas later stood by his decision, explaining that going too far from the
beach would have put his divisions in a position that was not sustainable in a German
counterattack. Critics would claim that Lucas acted tentatively and missed an opportunity
to move on Rome.
Lucas faced a particularly tough decision. On one hand, the VI Corps experience at
Salerno had shown how tenuous a beachhead could be when an invading force stuck its
neck out. General Clark and Fifth Army had come close to abandoning part of the beach
because they could adequately man the beachhead perimeter. On the other hand,
venturing out to the Alban Hills extended the perimeter and possible put divisions on the
road to Rome without sufficient logistics support to sustain the drive. Lucas took the
cautious approach, which possibly lengthened the Italian campaign.
Figure 29: Anzio 710
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Anzio degenerated into a four-month fight for land. Counter attack followed attack.
VI Corps struggled to flow enough supplies into the beachhead to sustain the force. The
Germans complained that they lacked the air cover needed to get close to the beach as
naval gunfire stopped German assaults as soon as the enemy came into range.
While VI Corps focused its attention on dealing with elements of the 13 German
divisions that were responding to the invasion, supply operations progressed relatively
smoothly at the harbor. Supply unloading moved faster than planned and there were few,
if any, supply or maintenance problems. Liberty ships were anchoring outside the harbor
and transloading their cargo into landing craft, which could enter the harbor. Within a
week, port units had fully offloaded seven Liberty ships and 201 LSTs. The amount of
men and material moving over the beach was sufficient to support a large offensive,
should the VI Corps commander decide to do so. 711
Logisticians were not convinced that the two forces could link up in the advertised 8 to
15 days, so, as a safety measure, they allocated 35 days for shipment of supplies by sea.
One convoy was to sail every three days to compensate for periods of poor weather that
might affect off-loading operations at the beachhead.
An idea that had surfaced during the planning of the operation was to preload trucks at
Naples and then drive these trucks onto assault craft for the trip to Anzio. Once at Anzio,
the trucks could quickly drive off the vessels, which would shorten offloading times and
limit risk to the assault craft. Generals Clark and Lucas liked the idea, however Churchill
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was opposed to the idea, thinking it was an inefficient use of trucks. 712 Despite the Prime
Minister’s objections, the Services of Supply made provisions to institute this ground-sea
ferry service for sustainment of the Anzio beachhead.
The combination of LSTs and 2 ½-ton cargo trucks rapidly became the centerpiece of
sustainment for Anzio. Following the amphibious assault, follow-on convoys consisted of
14 LSTs and 500 combat-loaded cargo trucks, meaning that the trucks were all preloaded
with a pre-determined breakout of essential supplies. 713 Each truck contained 60 percent
ammunition, 20 percent fuel, and 20 percent rations. The Peninsular Base Section loaded
the vehicles at Bagnoli and staged them in serials at the port of Naples. The loaded
vehicles then drove onto the LSTs, facing outward for quick offloading, for the trip to
Anzio. Drivers remained with their vehicles.
Once at Anzio, the vehicles simply drove off the landing craft at the beach and
proceeded directly to the respective supply dumps. Each truck carried an average of 5
tons of supplies - twice its stated cargo capacity. Trucks that had arrived the day before
had been loaded with salvage material, men on pass, or prisoners of war and placed in a
waiting line near the Anzio harbor. As soon as the loaded trucks exited the LST, the
returning trucks pulled into the port and on to the vessel. To support this effort, theater
logisticians made 2,000 trucks available in Italy to serve as a ground/sea ferry service to
deliver supplies to the Anzio beachhead. 714 For the Allies, this was a new means of
resupplying a combat unit - a means that maximized the capabilities of the equipment,
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while minimizing the risk of enemy fire. Due to the immense truck requirement, this
procedure could not support an army, but it could support a corps. This support of VI
Corps continued until the Allied breakout occurred at the end of May 1944.
One of the challenges facing the service forces at Anzio was the daily barrage of
German artillery. The hills to the north and east provided German gunners with the
visibility and range to target almost every dump or storage location. Ammunition dumps
were particularly susceptible, with a single hit often setting off secondary explosions.
Approximately 40,000 tons of munitions had to be stored under such conditions. 715
The executive officer for the Fifth Army G4, Lieutenant Colonel Charles D’Orsa,
deployed to Anzio as part of the Fifth Army advance element. D’Orsa provided a daily
cable back to Naples, which helped convey the conditions of the beachhead. The
conditions D’Orsa described often resembled life at the front lines, rather than in a support
area. On February 29, more than a month after landing at Anzio, German artillery still
ranged the beach and harbor:
The harbor and beaches were pretty hot today. It almost appeared as if
they [German artillery] had observed fire. Shells were landing all over
the Anzio docks and Yellow Beach area with air bursts over the area.
They also registered on X-ray Beach with shells landing and also air
bursts. Shells hit two LSTs today; one landed this morning about 10
o’clock on the loaded upper deck of one at the hard; destroyed two
trucks, started a fire, caused about a dozen casualties…Captain Haverty,
of the Medical Section, who was supervising the loading, was killed.” 716
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Unlike North Africa, Sicily, or Italy, there was no rear area for Anzio. Every inch of
ground was within range of the enemy. This forced the service units to adapt how they
performed their duties to protect themselves as well as their supplies.
The constrained beachhead meant that Ordnance units could not disperse the
munitions as a means to limit risk. There was only so much available terrain.
Logisticians had planned to expand the rear support area once a breakout occurred, but as
time went by that breakout became less of a probability. The beachhead was not
expanding, but supplies and equipment kept arriving on the beaches.
To deal with the situation, service forces, such as ordnance companies and
detachments, became proficient at fire fighting and using techniques - such as trench
storage - to limit the exposure of supplies to enemy fire. Units formed trenches by using a
bulldozer to push sand in the direction of the enemy. This provided a berm in front of the
trench and restricted any loss to a single stack of crates. Unfortunately, the water table at
Anzio was near the surface and flooding of the trenches was an on-going problem.
Another solution was the use of L-shaped bunkers. Eight bulldozers could build sufficient
bunkers in a day to hold 3,000 tons of munitions.717 This proved a very good design and
no fire ever spread from one bunker to another.
If a bunker did catch fire, crews raced to deal with the problem before it could spread.
Bulldozers piled dirt on top of trenches in an effort to smother the fire. If a fire had just
started, hand equipment was often sufficient to quench the fire with water before any
explosions occurred. In worst-case situations, commanders pulled their personnel back
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from the trenches and allowed them to return only after the fire had extinguished itself.
On any given day, the beaches of Anzio lost an average over 31 tons of munitions to
fires. 718 This was an on-going problem, but the innovation, skill, and bravery by the beach
units prevented this from spreading into a larger problem, which could ultimately
influence the battle.
For the first time in the war, there was no animosity between the front line troops and
the supporting service units. The shallow beachhead meant that everyone was sharing the
same dangers, hardships, and frustrations. Soldiers called the evacuation hospital at
Anzio, “Hell’s half-acre.” 719 The running joke was that German gunners were using the
red cross on the tents as a target. The hospital was so dangerous that some of the injured
would have preferred to stay in the forward areas, rather than move to the beaches. 720
However, evacuation to Naples meant that the wounded had to spend at least some amount
of time on the beach awaiting transport. Danger and hardship were succeeding in forging
bonds of respect between the combat and service forces.
Figure 30: 105mm Shell Casings at Anzio 721

Artillery was the king of battle at Anzio.
105mm howitzers, in particular, were crucial tools
in keeping German divisions from overrunning the
beachhead. Lieutenant Colonel John McFetters
commanded the 91st Artillery Battalion. This unit
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fired 8,700 rounds in one day at Anzio, a record for the time. Colonel McFetters died a
short time later at Anzio and the battalion fired the traditional 21-gun salute volley during
the funeral on the beachhead - using howitzers aimed at the enemy- a fitting and lethal
tribute.
Allied air and naval attacks on the German lines proved especially effective. Any
German attack that neared the beach met concentrated gunfire from the Allied combat
ships constantly cruising offshore. An attack by the German 715th Division came close to
breaking though the British lines, but failed due to the intense artillery fire and the naval
guns of three Allied cruisers. 722 On February 29, during one of the last German attacks at
Anzio, 247 Allied fighter-bombers and 24 light bombers stalled the German advance.
Field Marshal Kesselring later wrote that the Germans could have succeeded in pushing
VI Corps off Anzio’s beaches if not for Allied air and naval fire support. Without these,
Kesselring argued, the Germans could have shut off the Allied supply line. 723 Allied
firepower not only stopped German attacks, it also protected the lines of communication,
which allowed VI Corps to survive.
Support operations continued until adverse weather conditions shut down vessel
unloading off the beach – high waves and winds simply made it impossible to transfer
cargo from ships to the landing craft. The Navy estimated that, due to weather and high
seas, only two days out of seven would support unloading operations. In reality, good
weather allowed vessel unloading an average of four days out of seven. Despite this,
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some shortages did occur. In one instance, the munitions dumps at Anzio were down to
six rounds of 105mm ammunition. However, they did contain over 100,000 rounds of
tank ammunition (planned for a breakout that had not yet occurred.) The tank rounds had
about the same range as the howitzer rounds so soldiers placed logs under the front of
tanks along the entire perimeter, which increased the elevation of the tank main guns and
increased their overall range to 14,000 yards. By doing so, 250 Sherman tanks performed
the role of an entire division’s worth of artillery and held the line until the weather
subsided and ship offloading resumed. 724 Yankee ingenuity had come through once again.
By May 1944, VI Corps was ready to break out of the beachhead and Fifth Army was
ready for the final push through the German Winter Line. Strategic bombing raids had
taken their toll on German supply lines and supporting infrastructure from Rome up to the
Brenner Pass. German combat strength was ebbing along the front lines, while the Allies
had managed to maintain a steady rate of resupply and replacements. In preparation for
the breakout, over 1,000 artillery rounds were stacked near each gun emplacement. An
overwhelming barrage of fire would crack the line that had held the Allies for over four
months.
A variety of factors led to the prolonged stalemate. As noted earlier, the VI Corps
commander, Major General Lucas, failed to take full advantage of the surprise gained by
the assault and intentionally did not push his divisions as far forward at Anzio as some felt
that he should. This is debatable since Lucas questioned whether he could sustain or
reinforce those forces if they advanced too far from the beach.
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Additionally, other factors ought to enter into any discussion of this topic. First, part
of the problem was also the reduced manpower of the British divisions – both at Anzio
and along the Fifth Army front. Due to the length of the war, the number of British
casualties, and a relatively small population, British formations were at less than full
strength and there were not sufficient replacements available to meet all the demand.
These units may have lacked the power to punch a hole through the stiff German
opposition. 725 Had replacements been available from Great Britain, this might have been
different, but the British Empire was simply running out of young men by this point in the
war.
Figure 31: Recovering the Dead at Anzio

The second factor to consider is that, in
January 1944, the 36th Infantry Division had a
shortage of equipment and limitations on its
expenditure of artillery ammunition. This limited
the division’s ability to cross the Rapido River as
planned. 726 Fifth Army needed this crossing to help open up the Liri valley, which, in
turn, would open the way for Fifth Army to join forces with VI Corps at Anzio.
The third factor was the weather. Torrential rains and a heavy snowmelt during
January had flooded rivers. German engineers had diverted the Rapido River, creating a
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marsh, which bogged down tanks and other vehicles. Movement was slow in both the
forward and rear areas.
In the end assessment, a lack of aggressiveness from the beachhead combined with
poor mobility and a lack of combat power in several divisions, all contributed to the
winter standoff. The lack of resources was not the sole factor, but it did play a role.

Changes within Services of Supply and the Peninsular Base Section
While the divisions stalled at the front, there was a considerable amount of change
occurring in the theater support structure. The rear areas in Italy were growing and
developing additional capacity every day. New units formed to meet the increased
demands. Some changes occurred due to new commanders; others were due to
developments in the tactical situation. The only constant in the communications zone was
change, which was a testament to the resiliency and adaptability of the US theater in the
Mediterranean.
One of the biggest changes within the Peninsular Base Section itself was the change of
its commander. On March 27, 1944, Brigadier General Pence had to relinquish command
due to poor health. Pence had firmly established the base section in Italy, but the job had
taken its toll on him. The War Department transferred Pence back to the US to serve as an
instructor at the Army’s Command and General Staff College. Replacing Pence was
another familiar name within the Services of Supply, Major General Art Wilson, formerly
of the Atlantic Base Section. Colonel Francis Oxx, the Chief of Staff, remained on within
the base section to provide continuity between the two commanders.
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While the Peninsular Base Section’s primary customer was Fifth Army, there were
other support organizations, which received their supplies and equipment from the base
section or direct from North Africa. Several of these organizations were responsible for
providing common items, such as food and fuel, to the Allied air forces.
In November 1943, AFHQ reassessed its plans and assumptions based on the stiff
German resistance encountered in Italy. Since Hitler was determined to oppose Allied
occupation in Italy, Allied planners adjusted the basing of aircraft. To cover the offensive
toward Rome, Eisenhower approved the buildup of six heavy bombardment groups in
Italy. These air groups belonged to the Strategic Air Force, but would be a critical
component in attacking German reinforcements, logistics, and the enemy’s rear area.
Establishment of these bases in Italy would also support future operations in central
Europe. 727
The Air Corps maintained two air commands in Italy. The Twelfth Air Force, which
provided close air support to Fifth Army, flew out of Foggia, Italy, supported by the III
Air Service Area Command. The Fifteenth Air Force, a strategic bomber force, stationed
itself at Bari along with the supporting II Air Service Area Command (Provisional.) The
XII Air Force Engineer Command at Bari provided construction and other engineer
support.
By the spring of 1944, the number of US aircraft stationed in Italy, Corsica, and
Sardinia totaled over 6,500. The Fifteenth Air Force was operating from 31 different
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airfields, while the Twelfth Air Force had 28. 728 This represented a tremendous
requirement for supplies, medical, transportation, ordnance, and engineer support necessities that competed with the needs of the ground forces and were just as important.
The basing of these groups would have a significant impact on the operations of the
Peninsular Base Section. Engineers and other service units had to refurbish or improve
supporting infrastructure, such as roads, rail, and phone lines. The airfields needed large
quantities of fuel, shipped by pipeline if possible, or truck if not. The transport of
munitions would require truck and rail support. Fortunately, Naples provided sufficient
port capacity to receive with the increased level of supplies, although the additional
demands stressed the base station’s ability to clear supplies from the port inland to dumps
and airfields.
One of the strategic reasons behind the Italian campaign was the need to establish air
bases on the peninsula that could provide the necessary range to hit targets in southern
Europe. The area that provided the most suitable terrain for such a purpose lay on the
eastern side of Italy, within the British area of responsibility.
North Africa had shown that British service units could not adequately support US
forces. Each nation’s systems, expectations, and equipment specifications were too
different. In a novel approach, the Services of Supply decided to form a service depot
from base section units and attach it to the Air Corps. This depot would operate within the
British sector to provide support to the Fifteenth Air Force, based in the Bari/Foggia area.
This was an experiment with little guidance to work from.
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Allied Force Headquarters attached the Adriatic Base Depot Group to the Army Air
Force Service Command effective October 17, 1943. The mission was simple – provide
the Air Force everything for which they could not provide themselves. Although the Air
Force was the main customer, the depot quickly became responsible for the sustainment of
all US units operating in east Italy, to include General “Wild Bill” Donovan’s Office of
Strategic Services (OSS) operations with Yugoslavian partisans. 729
The Adriatic Depot’s main port was Bari, a facility shared with British forces on the
eastern coastline of Italy, located at the intersection of the heel and boot of the peninsula.
Supply depots were located at Foggia, Manduria, Spinazzola, Goia, Cerignola, and San
Servero. Bari became a scene of widespread destruction on the cool evening of December
2 when approximately 30 German aircraft bombed the harbor. Antiaircraft batteries were
largely ineffective and the German attack damaged or sunk 25 Allied ships, including the
US Liberty ship John Harvey. Ammunition ships erupted, spewing gouts of yellow and
red flames into the air. Unknown to the units working the harbor, one of the bombed
ships, the John Henry, contained mustard gas artillery shells in its holds.
The bombing of the John Henry produced an unintentional chemical attack on Allied
troops that were either onboard ships or working to contain the damage. The lethal gas
seeped into the air and water, contaminating the harbor and many of the men. The
bombing at Bari produced over 1,000 casualties, besides destroying the Adriatic Depot’s
headquarters. 730
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Tragically, the Adriatic Depot had recently established five hospitals, but the
equipment and supplies for those hospitals had been loaded onto one ship – the Samuel
Tilden –now sunk in the harbor. The Services of Supply had to replace the lost equipment
and supplies from stocks on North Africa. 731
The Services of Supply closed the port at Bari until February 1944 while they
repaired the damage, with Allied service units relying on other lesser ports in the area to
conduct sustainment operations. However, despite the loss of Bari, no Allied soldier went
hungry and no plane became grounded because of a lack of fuel. 732 The support system
had proven its flexibility and resilience.
By the spring of 1944, the experiment of attaching the Adriatic Depot to Air Force had
become intolerable. Experience showed that service units needed a formal assignment to
the Adriatic Depot, not just an attachment for duty only. Additionally, the Depot needed a
formal, direct, relationship with the theater Services of Supply headquarters in order to
conduct business. The Air Force routinely downgraded Services of Supply requisitions in
priority and the decree to flow all communications through Fifteenth Air Force slowed
down communications. The Depot needed the same type of relationship that the
Peninsular Base Section enjoyed with the Services of Supply. Allied Force Headquarters
rectified this situation on March 15 when they assigned all Services of Supply service
units in the area to the Adriatic Depot and the Adriatic Depot began reporting direct to the
theater Services of Supply headquarters. This proved to be a more practicable
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arrangement and the Fifteenth Air Force, which was steadily growing to over 120,000
personnel, still received its support. 733
The Adriatic was not the only region seeing growth in support organizations during the
beginning of 1944; Services of Supply units were expanding west of Italy as well.
On October 28, 1943, AFHQ established the Allied Garrison Command with the
Tyrrhenian Base Depot Group on the island of Sardinia. This group had the mission to
provide base operations support for the US 42nd Bomb Wing. Italian troops staffed the
supply and maintenance depots, as well as operated the ports of the island. The Italians
were also responsible for ground defense of the island. The US garrison handled all
administration and supply of Allied forces in Sardinia, as well as the delivery of civil
affairs supplies destined for support the Italian military and civilian populace on
Sardinia. 734
The island of Sardinia required relatively little support, but Corsica required much
more materiel due to the major air base that was located on the island. Corsica had a
strategic location in the Mediterranean. Positioned just seven miles north of Sardinia,
planes departing from Corsica could range northern Italy, as well as southern France. The
island held few defenders after Sicily had fallen so the Allies chose to stage the 63rd
Fighter Wing on the island. 735 As in the Adriatic, the Air Force could provide for its own
unique item support, but needed assistance from the Services of Supply for common-item
support.
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The Services of Supply established the Northern Base Section on Corsica on January
1, 1944, to provide administrative support to the US and French air forces on Corsica, as
well as to assist in the mounting operation for Operation Dragoon, the upcoming invasion
of southern France. 736 Unlike the other base sections, there was no advance planning for
establishment of the Northern Base Section. A quartermaster depot headquarters operated
on the island since December 15, but the depot quickly became overwhelmed with the job
before it. The creation of a new base station was the only viable alternative.
Colonel John Ratay headed the new command. Although trained as an artilleryman,
Ratay had served with Patton’s Western Task Force in French Morocco and later with the
Atlantic Base Section. Arriving in Algiers on December 28, General Larkin informed
Ratay of his new assignment.
Ratay had to first work through the challenges of forming a new unit that did not have
the benefit of advance planning. For example, although the Northern Base Section
became active on January 1, the first enlisted man did not report until January 14. The
new headquarters had to scrounge for office supplies and borrow vehicles. The unit
existed on paper, but it was far from being capable. 737
Figure 32: COL John Ratay 738

Time was short – the base section had to assume the mission of
supporting all French, British and US ground forces, as well as US
and French air forces, on Corsica by February 15. The base section
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was to support Allied forces, while building up a 45-day reserve of supplies on the island.
739

Corsica had little agriculture and French pensioners provided the primary source of
income. Food rationing was rigid and the economy was in shambles. Retreating German
forces had adopted a scorched earth policy as they departed, so there was little usable
material on the island. Corsica’s pre-war economy rested on tourism and the available
work force had an abysmal attitude towards manual labor. 740 This meant that the base
section had to import any civilian labor designated for work in the ports and supply
dumps. Soon, some 5,000 workers arrived from the island of Sardinia, transported by the
Navy. 741 The Base Section formed these men into companies of roughly 200 men apiece
to serve as general labor for the different commands and technical services.
The priorities of the Northern Base Section on Corsica mirrored those of the
Peninsular Base Section in Naples: open the ports, get the railways operating, and
establish support facilities. By the end of March, engineers added a special rail spur to
relieve the pressure on the trucks from traveling the mountainous roads and an enhanced
pier stretched 750 feet out into the harbor of Vecchio. 742 Despite the improvements, rail
capacity remained small due to the steep inclines of the island. Locomotives could haul
15-20 rail cars on level terrain, but were limited to five cars in the mountains. 743
By May, the Northern Base Section had fully established itself and was working as the
main service headquarters on the island. Slavic laborers, trained as drivers, augmented
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Italian service units in transporting supplies over the treacherous terrain. Vehicle
accidents were common due to the combination of steep drop-offs and limited driver
experience.
Colonel Ratay established the base section just in time. Within a month, the Allies
would break through the German Gustav Line of defenses and quickly head for Rome.
Shortly thereafter, the Northern Base Section would be responsible for mounting forces
for the invasion of southern France. Corsica was about to become a very busy island, but
organizational changes were not limited to just the base sections.

Flattening the Communications Zone
Improvement of the theater did not always mean adding more organizations. The
overlapping command and control structures of the US Communications Zone, North
African Theater (NATOUSA), and the Services of Supply had become burdensome by the
beginning of 1944. The division of responsibilities had never been quite resolved and the
overlapping headquarters represented more overhead than was required. The War
Department simply could not fill all of the positions in all of the commands, as confirmed
in an inspector general’s special report. 744 Two days after the report’s submission, AFHQ
was considering changes to the structure of support headquarters.
All the theaters of war felt the shortage of service personnel. The War Department
Manpower Board called for an accounting of all Services of Supply personnel, while the
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US theater in the Mediterranean created a policy that froze theater overhead. Any growth
of the theater Services of Supply headquarters would come from the base sections. 745
The shortage of service force personnel was not just limited to senior ranks. Eight
officers from the War Department visited the Mediterranean in January 1944 to gain
insights on how the 2nd Cavalry Division and other combat arms units, some 20,000 men,
could best transition into service forces. 746 The nation’s priority had changed from filling
combat units, to filling the units that sustained combat. The lessons of the Mediterranean
were clear – an invasion force needed a capable support element and the War Department
did not have enough service forces for a cross-channel invasion.
The issue of labor and the consolidation of responsibilities was a contentious topic
within AFHQ. Major General Hughes, the Deputy Theater Commander and commander
of the Communications Zone, felt that there should be no reason why the communication
zone commands could not be consolidated under one officer. Others, such as the AFHQ
G3, argued that commanding the theater meant more than logistics and that AFHQ needed
several different commands to handle all the responsibilities.747
On February 24, 1944, Lieutenant General Devers settled the issue by abolishing the
office of Deputy Theater Commander. Additionally, he combined the Communications
Zone, Theater Headquarters, and Services of Supply under a single commander, Major
General Larkin. 748 There were still two different staffs: a US theater staff operating as

745

History, Communications Zone, volume I, 19.
Report on ASF Installations in NATOSA, 25 Mar 44 by Arthur Trudeau, COL Director of Training for Army Service
Forces. MHI. 3.
747
Memorandum, AFHQ G3 for Chief of Staff, dated January 3, 1944, subject: Organization of NATOUSA. NARA,
RG 492, box 127.
748
NATOUSA General Orders Number 4, dated February 24, 1944. NARA, RG 492, box 2901.
746

356

part of AFHQ, which set policy and priorities, while a Services of Supply staff
coordinated the execution of support. However, for the first time, a single general officer
oversaw the activities of each, ensuring that their efforts were coordinated and each was
working from the same guidance.
Larkin worked directly for Devers, the theater commander. The theater and Services
of Supply staffs, along with the base sections, worked for Larkin. Thomas Larkin found
himself one of the most powerful men in the Mediterranean. The new organization still
used the nomenclature SOS NATOUSA (Services of Supply, North African Theater of the
US Army) until October 1944 to eliminate confusion. The name was later changed to
COMZONE NATOUSA (Communications Zone, North African Theater of the US
Army), effective October 1, 1944, and a month later to COMZONE MTOUSA
(Communications Zone, Mediterranean Theater of the US Army) to match the naming
changes of the greater Allied theater. Having a single commander responsible for the US
rear areas eliminated redundancy, confusion, and represented a major improvement in the
functioning and coordination of support.

Limitations
Looking holistically, Italy had the unfortunate distinction of being a campaign, which
started as a priority effort for the Allies, but by late 1943, had become secondary to the
upcoming cross-channel invasion into France. On December 25, Eisenhower received
word that the President had nominated him to serve as commanding general, Supreme
Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF). This was the new Allied force
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headquarters, which would plan and run the cross-channel invasion of France later in
1944. Eisenhower planned to take two senior officers with him: Bradley and Patton.
Bradley had performed brilliantly in the Mediterranean and was destined for command of
the US 12th Army Group. The War Department had held Patton in limbo in Sicily since
August, still in command of Seventh Army, but without any troops. Eisenhower
recognized that Patton might still be an effective tactical commander and offered him
command of an army, which Patton gracefully accepted. 749 On January 1, 1944,
Eisenhower departed the Mediterranean for his new command.
The establishment of SHAEF also meant that the Mediterranean would soon lose those
units and ships designated to participate in the operations. The 82nd Airborne and 1st
Infantry Divisions, British XXX Corps, and convoys of LSTs all departed the
Mediterranean in early 1944 for refit and training in England. With their departure went
the Mediterranean theater’s ability to conduct large airborne or amphibious operations.
Shortages of ammunition occurred as the European theater was given priority for the
building of stocks. The War Department instituted a system whereby theaters had to send
requisitions for supplies and equipment 90 days in advance. Upon receipt, depots in the
states would fill what they could and then cancel any remaining balance. The reason for
this was due to a scarcity of supplies 750– a product of all the competing demands from the
various theaters of war combined with a lack of sufficient production.
Lieutenant General Somervell, the commanding general of the War Department
Services of Supply visited Italy in November to see the supply situation firsthand.

749
750

Eisenhower, Crusade in Europe, 215.
Sullivan Diary, November 2, 1943. Also see Interview with Robert Colglazier, 117.

358

Somervell told supply officers “the honeymoon for securing supplies is over for this
theater [the Mediterranean].” The 5th Army Quartermaster, Colonel Sullivan, noted:
“some other theater is to get most of the stuff.” 751 Planners, logisticians, and commanders
throughout the Mediterranean would have to adjust their thinking and expectations to this
new world order.
The area most affected by the change in priorities was the availability of large caliber
ammunition. The combination of high expenditure rates and low supply meant that the
theater had to impose restrictions on how many rounds each unit could shoot per day.
The shortage was not limited to just US formations, British units felt the restrictions as
well. By April of 1944, the situation had becomes so restrictive that General Alexander
visited London to make a direct appeal for an increase in ammunition resupply. 752 Eighth
Army had requested ten million rounds for the upcoming offensive to break the German
defenses, but they only received three and a half million rounds. Alexander was
successful in convincing the British Chiefs of Staff that the 15th Army Group could only
seize Rome if the forces in Italy received sufficient resources. 753 An increase in munitions
allotment had a direct impact on the Allied breakout a month later. Alexander noted that,
even with the shortages in ammunition, Churchill had still expected 15th Army Group to
break through the German lines and secure Rome as quickly as possible. The Prime
Minister never really understood, or at least never acknowledged to his generals, that
logistical considerations might delay offensive operations. While it is possible that
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Churchill did not understand the impact of logistics on strategy, it is more probable that
this was just an act used to break through barriers and to get things moving along. 754
Ammunition was not the only concern in 1944; there were other problems as well
which affected operations. Of all the Allied shortages from 1942 until the end of the war,
the most vexing was the shortage of landing craft, particularly the LST’s. Italy proved
that these craft were the true enablers of any sizeable amphibious operations. The vessels
were in demand throughout the Pacific, Mediterranean, and European theaters because
they supported both amphibious landings, as well as continuing sustainment operations. 755
The difference between supply and demand for LSTs was so great that this was not a
question of solving the shortages, but rather, of managing the shortages. Throughout the
war, the availability of these mundane craft dictated strategy options, and the President
and Prime Minister retained approval for their allocation.
One might ask why the Allies simply did not build more of these craft if they were so
important to the war effort. The answer is that LSTs were among a number of highpriority projects, which all competed for the same funding, materials, and labor. More
LSTs might mean fewer combat vessels, tanks, or aircraft. Additionally, stocks of metals,
such as aluminum and steel, were all tightly controlled and prioritized. In addition, it took
time to build these vessels. Productions lines were working as fast as possible and there
was not enough time to build additional industrial capacity. Delaying an invasion by a
few weeks or a month could provide additional LSTs, but others were constantly lost

754
755

Ibid., 24 and 38.
Administrative Planning , 46.

360

through enemy action, weather, breakage, and accidents. The Allies would have to invade
France short of the assault craft they desired.

Lessons Learned
As in other operations, Avalanche provided a wealth of experience and lessons
learned. This was a different type of operation: the enemy and terrain provided a different
situation than any operation previously encountered. Italy differed from North Africa or
Sicily in four main areas: first, Fifth Army encountered much stronger resistance along the
landing beaches. Second, Sicily and Tunisia were more or less pursuit operations
involving significant gains in terrain. Southern Italy, by contrast, contained a determined
enemy who fought to keep his ground and defended from a series of well-prepared
positions, which limited Allied advances. Third, the mountains of Italy were more rugged,
higher, and involved much more fighting. 756 Fourth, the advance to Rome required ten
months and covered four seasons, with heavy rains, flooding, snow, and heat. All of these
factors combined meant that Italy was a much different fight and officers had to keep any
lessons for the future in the right context.
The Salerno landings showed that the Allies had made much progress on running the
landing beaches, but, as in Sicily, the shore parties still needed better organization and
stronger leadership. The lack of a centralized transportation control agency contributed to
the congestion on the Salerno beaches, but part was also attributable to the shortage of
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field grade officers within the beach groups. 757 Sometimes there was nothing that could
solve a problem like an angry senior officer.
Contributing to the confusion was the fact that there were no transportation officers on
the beaches who had a detailed understanding of which supplies and equipment were on
specific ships and once units and equipment were ashore, there was no agency ready to
take control of the road, rail, sea, and water modes of transportation. Fifth Army
eventually assigned this to the Fifth Army G4; however, the need for such a capability
existed starting at the early phases of the operation. Had Fifth Army established its
transportation section earlier, they might well have avoided, or at least reduced, the
problems of poor traffic control and haphazard unloading.
Avalanche and its subsequent operations did prove that the Army’s doctrine dealing
with support of armies, corps, and divisions was about right. The army G4 and Peninsular
Base Section worked well together and the system of turning over army facilities to the
Services of Supply as the front lines moved forward proved to work as well. The Italian
campaign also compelled the Allied service forces to be adaptive and to rely on innovation
when situations changed into something unplanned or unexpected. Equipment wore out
faster than supply officers expected in the mountainous terrain, meaning that items such as
shoes, boots, and tires all needed replacement at rates greater than expected. The tactical
situation drove the requirements and the Services of Supply had to be able to react. An
inflexible or unresponsive supply system simply could not keep up with all the changes
thrown at it by the weather, enemy, and fate.
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Italy demonstrated that not all operations needed the same resources. Perhaps this
seems obvious, but to a large bureaucracy this can be a challenging principle to adapt to.
The quantities of munitions and fuel required for the Italian campaign were significantly
different from those needed in North Africa and Sicily. Planners expected one type of
war; reality provided another. The slow advance of the Allied armies meant that the
divisions needed less fuel, but more ammunition (especially howitzer and mortar
ammunition) to fight in mountainous terrain. The tonnage of bombs for this campaign
placed a significant demand on the theater’s transportation and ammunition storage
systems.
The Allies also had to make a major commitment to restoring services and providing
essential supplies to the populations of liberated areas in Italy, especially around Naples.
Coal, food, and water were all in demand – the same commodities needed for the military
forces. Base sections found that the limiting factor for logistics in Italy was not the port
capabilities, but rather, the limited ability to clear supplies from the ports and move them
to dumps and depots further inland. Restricted road networks and limited numbers of
trucks all served to hinder the movement of supplies. 758 Everything depended on
throughput - a lesson Eisenhower would later recall when deciding the landing locations
of divisions later during Operation Overlord.
Italy reinforced the lesson that commanders had to fully integrate civil affairs
operations into theater plans because a safe and happy civilian population presented fewer
problems and provided greater support of the Allied effort. AFHQ deployed civil affairs
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officers throughout the rear area of the Italian area of operations to coordinate public
health, food distribution, sanitation, and other areas vital to the security and health of the
local population. Without this peace, order, feel of security, and sanitation, the 15th Army
Group would have needed additional forces to protect communications, maintain order,
and protect support activities. As AFHQ found in Naples, unsanitary conditions could
quickly lead to the spread of dysentery and other diseases, which not only affected the
populace, but drained military resources away from the front lines and distracted the focus
of senior commanders. The lessons learned in conducting civil affairs helped inform
staffs for the more difficult jobs that would face the Allies in northern Italy, France, and
Germany. 759
The four months at Anzio showed, like Sicily, that the Allies could support a large
force over the beaches without use of a major port. Even more importantly, Anzio also
showed that a theater could support two different fronts for months at a time. This would
prove to be an important consideration as planners worked on the details of Overload and
the decision whether to incorporate an additional front coming up from southern France.
Anzio proved that the Mediterranean could probably support an on-going fight in Italy and
support a secondary offensive that would help take the pressure off any forces operating in
Normandy. This was the proof that Operation Anvil (later renamed Dragoon), the
invasion of southern France, was indeed supportable.
Anzio also demonstrated how an operation in one theater could influence the plans of
other theaters. European commanders had initially planned to transfer 68 LSTs out of the
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Mediterranean during January 1944, but the changes in plans and unforeseen delay in
breaking out of the bridgehead delayed the arrival of these craft by several months,
delaying planned training and precluded the other possible amphibious operations. 760
Transportation officers maintained close records of all supplies shipped to, and within,
Italy. The Italian campaign of 1943/44 showed that a typical infantry division needed 500
tons of supplies per day for all classes of supplies; 400 tons for a British Division. 761
Differences in size and equipment accounted for the differences. This would be an
important statistic for the planning of subsequent operations as logisticians struggled over
requirements, port capacities, and the need for service units.
The truck shortage in Italy forced a greater reliance on railways and fuel pipelines.
However, the Fifth Army G4 provided an extremely perceptive cautionary note that any
reliance on a fuel pipeline by a rapidly moving army invites trouble. 762 Rail lines and
pipelines took time, resources, and labor to build. In a pursuit, these are usually limited
and physics determines the rate of their development. This cautionary note would come to
fruition later in the fall of 1944 when the Allies would outrun their logistics on both the
northern and southern lines of communication in France as engineers struggled to keep up
with the advancing front.

Conclusion
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Testimony from the divisions showed just how far logistics support had come, even
compared to Operation Husky. The 3rd Infantry Division Quartermaster mentioned to a
Services of Supply officer that the Fifth Army system was “immeasurably superior” to
that of Seventh Army. Fifth Army had taken a firmer control of the rear areas and was
present from D-Day, operating in at least an advisory capacity.
Italy demonstrated that the service forces and combat commands had been paying
attention to the lessons of previous operations. In Sicily, the supply dumps tended to
remain near the beaches, which worked fine – for a time. However, as the lines of
communication lengthened, it took longer and longer to resupply the forces. In Italy,
however, the base section frequently pushed dumps forward to make supplies more readily
available to the divisions. 763 As such, the divisions did not require augmentation and there
was more confidence in the supply system.
The opening and improvement of the beaches and ports were not perfect, but they
were effective. This single fact allowed Fifth Army to flow in the necessary troops and
supplies to counter the stiff German counterattacks seen at both Salerno and Anzio. Had
these reinforcements not flowed in as quickly as they did, the battles could easily have
turned out quite different, which would have been a disaster. 764 Both sides were
reinforcing and it was a close race, but the lessons learned from Torch and Husky made
the difference.
The army headquarters had a fully integrated supporting base section for Avalanche;
the first time such a relationship had existed in the Mediterranean. Instead of acting as
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two separate headquarters from two different commands, General Pence and the
Peninsular Base Section started out as a sub-element of Fifth Army, leading to improved
relationships and trust, which carried forward once the base section reverted to Services of
Supply control. This was so effective that the Services of Supply would use same
technique later in August for the invasion of southern France.
Perhaps just as important, the campaign into Italy allowed the theater Services of
Supply to continue to improve systems and organizations associated with supporting large
formations conducting offensive operations. Not only were essential supply needs, such
as ammunition, met, but other tasks, such as supplying morale-building meals, became
standard practice. As an example: in November 1943, during the buildup of the theater
and the initial offensive towards Rome, the Services of Supply received and issued
340,000 tons of turkey for Thanksgiving meals. All US troops and US citizens serving in
Italy received an authorization of 18 ounces of turkey. The Island Base Section repeated
this for Christmas, and again for New Years day. Not only did the turkey make it as
promised, but an additional 90 tons of apples, as well as nuts and candy, accompanied the
turkey as well. 765 This was a sign of a mature support system, which was both capable
and functional – quite a change from the US experiences of the First World War.
By January 1944, the theater was very effective at providing support, but deficiencies
remained. Base sections had plenty of workers at the docks, but not enough leaders.
There was no program to train wounded combat troops in non-combat professions. On
any one day, there were almost 10,000 men available to the Services of Supply for
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“limited duty” assignments. 766 Riflemen could serve as cooks, truck drivers, or
mechanics, but along with this came the need for a formal training program. In January
1944, the replacement depot at Canastel contained over 5,000 men classified as “limited
service” due to battle wounds, but the theater lacked a system to train these men and put
them to useful service. The men became bored and the theater missed an opportunity to
put them to useful work.
In some cases, the Services of Supply had allowed skills to atrophy. For example, the
Services of Supply assigned eight port companies to the port of Oran; however,
throughout most of 1943 and 1944 French civilians and Italian prisoners of war did the
actual offloading and movement of supplies. To serve as part of the invasion of southern
France, these units needed retraining since many of their skills deteriorated while the units
were in Oran. 767
Despite the inefficiencies, the responsiveness of the Services of Supply did provide a
level of flexibility to US combat commanders that their German counterparts lacked. The
Services of Supply maintained large supply stocks in North Africa, which allowed them to
fill many Fifth Army requisitions within a week of submission. Air superiority and a
reduced German naval threat meant that the Allied enjoyed secure lines of
communication. Compare this to the German situation, which had to endure resource
restrictions, limited transportation networks, and interdictions by long and medium range
Allied bombers.
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On May 11, 1944, the 15th Army Group began a concerted offensive to break the
German lines. Fifth Army had stockpiled supplies and positioned units to make a push all
along the Italian front. The strategy worked. By May 23, elements of the 36th Infantry
Division at Anzio had linked up with the 91st Reconnaissance Squadron outside Terracina
– reuniting Fifth Army with the Anzio beachhead. The drive continued to the north and
on June 4, the first units of Fifth Army were on the outskirts of Rome. That same day, the
first Allied train pulled in to the city with the commanding general of the Military Railway
Service, Brigadier General Carl Gray, at the controls carrying a load of coal. 768 The
Germans had declared Rome an open city and then retreated north to the Pisa-Rimini
defensive line to prepare for the next fight. The battle for Rome was over, but the
campaign in Italy had 11 more months to go.
In retrospect, the capabilities and capacity of the US logistics system had undergone
nothing less than a transformation over the past nineteen months. Troops and their leaders
had experience in supporting a war in the mountains, as well in deserts. The services
fielded new equipment throughout the force, much of it based on the lessons of the
Mediterranean. Organizations had changed to reflect best practices.
This is not to say that there were not the occasional supply shortages. Food and
artillery munitions were perhaps the most pressing, but other shortages did pop up from
time to time. In February 1944, naval coal became short after the Services of Supply
diverted a large shipment for use in the Sardinian railways. 769 Perhaps the larger issue is
not whether there were shortages, but, instead, how the theater reacted to these shortages.
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Close and effective management of limited resources is a telling feature of a functioning
sustainment system and it appears that, by the spring of 1944, the Services of Supply had
indeed achieved a high level of proficiency. Throughout the Mediterranean, service units
quickly cleared cargo from ports and trucked to depots or, in some cases, direct to units.
Quartermaster, Ordnance, Supply, Engineer, and Medical units segregated, counted, and
recorded supplies. The Services of Supply instituted a semi-annual inventory program,
with critical items inventoried daily. The base sections had stored 30 days worth of
supplies for most items, with 45 days worth allotted for those items essential to the
fight. 770 The Mediterranean theater was as capable and prepared as it would ever be.
The first elements of Fifth Army, just a few jeeps, entered Rome shortly after 8 am on
the morning of June 5. Unlike Naples, Rome was largely intact. There were shortages of
water, fuel, and electricity, but these were relatively easy to restore because the Germans
had not destroyed the supporting infrastructure. Rather than an end, however, the capture
of Rome merely marked a waypoint in the Italian campaign. The Allies had captured the
capital, but politically little had changed. Germany remained the threat and Hitler was
still determined to yield as little Italian soil as possible.
The communications zone with its massive support capabilities was slowly shifting to
Italy. In North Africa, the Atlantic Base Section decreased from 33,620 in July 1943, to
only 2,200 a year later. The Mediterranean Base Section had deactivated. The Eastern
Base Section was down to an operating strength of 2,150. The Island Base Section on
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Sicily would close on July 15. The Peninsular Base Section and other support activities
around Italy had become the centers of US administrative support for the Mediterranean.
This was exactly what the Mediterranean theater needed to do. As the operational
theater morphed, so too did the support base. Service units transferred to meet developing
demands and discarded old installations. Just as the base stations worked to keep depots
and dumps near the combat units, so too did the theater move up the communications
zone. This would prove to be an important element in the final stages of the war.
Within three months, the Allies in Europe would be advancing toward Germany on
three different axes with the main effort a cross-channel assault into northern France.
Supporting efforts would include an attack coming north from the southern beaches of
France - Operation Dragoon - and a continuation of the drive north in Italy. All were
important, but resources would dictate the realm of the possible in terms of strategy and
movements. Prioritization and allocation of units and material would become issues for
the most senior leaders as the war of attrition wore on.
For the Americans, the preceding 20+ months provided a level of experience and
knowledge that had professionalized the military. Equipment, systems, and processes had
all been refined to deal with the nuances of modern, mechanized warfare. However, the
definitive test was about to start as focus shifted to the heart of Europe and to the bulk of
the German defenses. The Allies were entering the phase of the conflict where the war
could not just be lost, but won as well.

371

Chapter VIII: Operation Dragoon, The Invasion of Southern France
The difficulties of supply eventually forced a halt upon us when we
reached Germany, but the very rapidity of our advance across France had
made that inevitable.
-- General Eisenhower quoted in
Administrative Planning,
The British War Office, 1952

On August 15, 1944, Allied forces from the Mediterranean landed in southern France,
along the French Riviera. These landings-initially titled Operation Anvil (and later
changed to Operation Dragoon) would prove for the European theater to be secondary in
importance only to Operation Overlord, the landings in Normandy. Initially discounted as
a waste of resources by the British, Dragoon proved to be a critical component to the end
of the war in Europe.
Although Allied operations in the Mediterranean were steadily progressing throughout
1943, planners continued to look for other strategic options as it became increasingly clear
that the Allies needed to open up a second front in France to knock Germany out of the
war. American planners had always looked forward to making a landing operation in
northern France and now they believed that the Allies could meet all the requirements for
such an invasion and still have sufficient resources available to conduct a secondary attack
elsewhere in France, as well to as continue operations in Italy. 771 This became the concept
for the ending of the war in Europe.
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Allied leaders began discussing the options for the second front at the Quebec
Conference in August 1943, and continued these discussions at the Sextant and Teheran
Conferences later that same year.
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Although the proposed amphibious landings in

northern France was a primary topic of the meetings, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Stalin
agreed to include an additional set of landings into southern France-landings that would
give support to Operation Overlord, the amphibious assault in Normandy, and help seal
the fate of the German Army. Initially named Operation Anvil and later changed to
Operation Dragoon, the Allied leaders agreed, in principle, to stage a multi-division
landing along the French southern coast in coordination with Overlord. 773 This would
prove to be one of the more contentious decisions of the Second World War.
Indeed, the question of whether to invade France from the south, as well as from the
north, was a matter of debate among the Allies from the time of inception until the actual
landings and involved all of the senior leadership. Advocates, such as Marshall and
Eisenhower, argued that a secondary invasion route into France would take pressure off
the Allied armies landing in Normandy. Opponents, such as Churchill and General Sir
Alan Brooke, argued that due to restrictions in available landing craft, the landings would
come too late to help the Normandy effort and would serve only to divert troops away
from the main effort in the Mediterranean, the fight in Italy. Thus, carrying on with Anvil
meant limiting 15th Army Group’s ability to achieve a breakthrough north of Rome. Both
sides made convincing arguments that produced a dilemma with no clear solution. The
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Americans favored a second set of landings in France, while the British maintained that
the fight in Italy should be the priority of the effort in the Mediterranean. Stalin, favoring
the more direct approach, put his support behind the American proposal.
While the debate over Anvil raged on, planning for Overlord steadily continued. By
the spring of 1944, planning for Operation Overlord had been making progress for almost
two years and the Allies were now ready to initiate the plan. In preparation, Eisenhower
departed the Mediterranean in January to assume command of the cross-channel
operation, with British General Sir Henry Maitland “Jumbo” Wilson taking over from
Eisenhower as Supreme Allied Commander of the Mediterranean. The pieces were set for
the final chapters of the European campaign.
This chapter addresses the decisions leading up to the invasion of Southern France and
the strategic impact of Operation Anvil. Planning for the operation started in late 1944
and the Mediterranean portion of the operation effectively ended in February 1945 when
the two Allied lines of communication-one leading east from Normandy and one coming
north from Marseilles-joined together into a single communications zone supporting the
European theater. Up until the linkup in February, the Mediterranean handled all planning
and loading for the assault, as well as conducting the amphibious assaults and supporting
the initial drive north through France and into Germany.
To contribute to the debate on the importance of invasion of southern France, this
chapter argues, firstly, that Eisenhower needed a secondary line of communications in
order to land the required numbers of divisions and their associated supplies into France.
Without this increased capability, the Allies simply would not have had the ports, roads,
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vehicles, and infrastructure necessary to land the numbers of fighting units required to
deal with a weakened, but still viable, German Army.
Secondly, the Mediterranean’s experiences of the previous 21 months, which included
four major amphibious assaults, had matured the theater’s support units and systems into a
capability unmatched in northwest Europe. These units and their commanders, such as
Major General Larkin, possessed the skills and abilities needed to make the most of what
was, essentially, a secondary effort, with Normandy being the main priority. This level of
experience allowed both the combat and support units to make the most of the limited
supplies available for the campaign. They knew they were a secondary effort so there
were fewer tendencies to waste resources. Soldiers did not waste ammunition as readily
when they were not sure about the next resupply. Supply officers used lessons gained
from other operations to manage the resources on-hand more effectively. This level of
experience partly explains the levels of success achieved by the Sixth Army Group,
success that would not otherwise have been as easily or quickly obtained.
Thirdly, the addition of a second line of communications served to reduce risk for the
Allied forces working east from Normandy and it provided Eisenhower and his planners
with options. With the capture of Marseilles, the Allies had a second major port, one that
would eventually support an entire Army Group. This port and other associated
infrastructure allowed the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE)
commander to flex combat power between the north and south, which not only allowed
the Allies to react against German movements, but also, perhaps just as importantly,
forced the German Army to defend across a wider front. This prevented German
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commanders from consolidating all their available divisions in any one area, thus
dissipating the overall level of defense.
The US and British armies were not the only forces making gains in the summer of
1944. On June 22, the Soviet Red Army launched Operation Bagration, a multi-army
attack designed to retake Soviet territory and advance the front towards Berlin. Within
two months, the Soviet armies would decimate the German Army Group Center and clear
eastern Poland of German occupation. Operation Bagration, conducted in coordination
with the Allied attacks into France, forced Hitler’s generals to react to Allied strategy.
On paper, the Allies held a sizeable advantage in terms of readiness and material, but
physics determined the realm of the possible for Eisenhower’s strategy. In the late
summer of 1944, the beaches and ports of the Normandy could not support the amounts of
men and material programmed to flow into France. German resistance delayed the capture
of Cherbourg, one of the most capable ports in Normandy. Eisenhower simply could not
land all of the divisions and supplies as quickly as he needed them. The ports along the
English Channel did not possess the capabilities needed to supply the three army groups
that would eventually operate in France and the neighboring Low Countries. 774
The need for additional ports continued throughout the rest of the war. By the spring
of 1945, the Allies were ready to cross over the Rhine River with 68 available divisions,
but the most that the ports north of the Ruhr could support was 35. However, the ports in
southern France could support an additional 35 divisions. 775 Thus, the Allies needed the
ports of northern France as well as the southern French ports to carry the offensive into
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Germany. Without this combination, the Allies would have been able to support only half
of the combat force they otherwise would have had. The port at Marseilles ultimately
handled more American supplies than any other port during the war, testimony to the vast
capacity of the port and its strategic value. 776
A fourth consequence of invading France from the south is that this allowed General
Eisenhower to use the First French Army in France. This allowed French forces to have a
direct hand in liberating France and added to the size of the overall Allied offensive effort.
This was only possible with the use of a third army group in France-the French would not
have served under the command of either of the army groups operating in the north. The
northern army group commanders, Field Marshal Montgomery and General Bradley, were
both Francophobes.
Finally, the addition of a line of communications coming up from the south reduced
the potential for Allied failure. A single line of communications stretching from northern
France presented a ripe target for the retreating, but still viable German military. This
would become alarmingly clear in December 1944 when Hitler launched an attack towards
Antwerp, with the goal of cutting off Allied supplies.
Consequently, the southern line of communication not only enabled the drive into
Germany, it directly contributed to the shorting of the war. Without this additional route
and its ports, the war would certainly have been longer, perhaps by as much as two to six
months, and the Allied would have incurred much more risk while conducting the drive
across France. The invasion of southern France allowed the Allies to land a third more
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combat divisions and support them than they otherwise could have. Before the operations
could commence, however, Allied planners had the unenviable task of developing a
feasible scheme of maneuver for two major operations (Overlord and Anvil) while still
supporting operations in Italy.

Debating the Options
Although Allied political leaders had agreed in 1943 to conduct two sets of landings in
France, conditions in Italy during 1944 caused many involved in planning the operation to
reconsider the wisdom of the decision. When Italy removed itself from the war in
September 1943, many expected a quick capture of Rome. Instead, General Clark and the
Fifth Army were in a slow and hotly contested fight up the length of the Italian peninsula
through the spring of 1944. British generals, such as Sir Alan Brooke and Sir Henry
“Jumbo” Wilson, suggested that the strategic situation had changed and that the Allies
should cancel Anvil in order to dedicate more resources to the fight in Italy. Anvil, they
argued, required postponement until Italy had fallen. The British Chiefs of Staff in
London concurred with this line of reasoning; however, the American Chiefs in
Washington did not. For military leaders in the Mediterranean, Anvil represented a rival
operation to the fight for Italy, one that would only serve to deplete units and resources
while providing little strategic advantage.
The resources that Wilson and Clark needed were more than supplies. To keep Italy a
priority within the Mediterranean, AFHQ needed to retain all of the divisions earmarked
for Anvil, along with the associated support units, assault craft, merchant shipping,
ammunition, fuel, and general supplies that enabled the divisions to fight. Accepting the
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British recommendation to keep Italy as a priority theater would effectively preclude
Operation Anvil. A major Allied victory in Italy might put the Allies in a better political
position after the war due to the proximity of the Balkans, but this option would also
introduce more risk into Allied military operations in France. Due to constraints in men
and material, Allied leaders had to choose between two mutually exclusive options:
conduct a second landing on southern France, or continue to keep the Italian theater as a
priority.
The stalemate at Anzio in January and February 1944 strengthened the British
argument and led to a reassessment of the Allied strategy. The slowing of the Italian
campaign and the vigorous defense offered by reinforcing German units forced planners to
commit units and resources to the fight in Italy, resources that had been earmarked for the
invasion of southern France. Churchill recommended that the Allies continue with plans
for Overlord, but abandon the secondary sets of landings in France and instead concentrate
their effort in Italy as a means to help the Overlord landings. The problem was that the
Allies did not have the resources to conduct simultaneous operations in Northern France,
southern France, and Italy. Something had to give. 777
The debate over Anvil raged throughout the spring. The British favored focusing
efforts in Italy and cancelling Anvil. The US Joint Chiefs of Staff, led by General
Marshall, wanted to cease wasting resources in Italy, which they viewed as a secondary
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effort. In Washington, many planners recommended that the US pull its forces out of Italy
all together and leave the theater to the British. 778
The Joint Chiefs effectively cancelled Operation Anvil in April 1944 when the US
failed to provide sufficient resources to prepare for the operation. The shortage of assault
craft, especially LSTs, combined with the on-going resupply efforts required at Anzio,
prevented the reallocation of shipping resources for Anvil. General Wilson started
planning a spring offensive in Italy but he, too, had to do without all the amphibious
shipping he desired. Meanwhile, Fifth Army moved ahead with its summer assault toward
Rome.
However, the summer offensive of Fifth Army produced an unexpected breakout and
the capture of Rome on June 5, 1944 provided a new set of options for Allied leaders. 779
The US and British alliance could revive Operation Anvil, which would turn Italy into a
secondary effort, or they could focus their efforts on northern Italy. If they made it
through Italy, the Allies could choose to move west into France or east into Hungary, but
there would be no landings in France. Arguing that France had a more direct impact on
the war, the Americans won the argument and the British agreed to pursue the landings in
southern France, although Churchill had not yet given up on his quest for the Balkans.
Underlying the decision was Eisenhower’s arguments for making a secondary set of
landings in France. Initially, in 1943 and into the first half of 1944, Eisenhower and many
of the American planners saw the landings as a way to take pressure off the forces landing
at Normandy. By landing at two different locations, the Germans would have to focus on
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two distinct threats and would not be able to reposition reinforcing units already stationed
in southern France. While this was still true in June, Eisenhower modified his reasoning
for the landings, now arguing that, perhaps even more importantly, he needed the
additional port capacity that Marseilles and Toulon offered.
By June 17, 1944, Eisenhower realized that he needed additional French ports in order
to allow for the rapid deployment of additional American divisions into the European
continent. The advance in Normandy had bogged down and the failure to capture any
major port meant that the Allies needed to breathe new life into the operation in southern
France in order to flow in the 40-50 divisions awaiting deployment in the states and to
provide sufficient port capabilities for sustainment of the additional forces. A massive
storm that hit Normandy ten days after the Allies landed had wrecked the artificial piers,
known as Mulberries, which were vital to bringing supplies ashore over the assault
beaches. In a message to General Wilson and the Combined Chiefs, Eisenhower argued,
“Our most important consideration is an additional port to be used in assisting the
deployment of Divisions from the US. I consider vital the possession of another gateway
into France.” 780 Now, more than ever, the Allies needed to land in southern France. By
the middle of June, AFHQ was issuing orders for the transfer of units from Italy to Anvil,
an important action since any unit coming out of combat needed ten weeks to rest, refit,
and rearm. 781
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On July 2, the Combined Chiefs sent a message to General Wilson directing him to be
prepared to execute the landing in southern France on 15 August. 782 The purpose of the
operation was to establish a Mediterranean bridgehead at Toulonand Marseilles and then
achieve exploitation towards Lyon and Vichy. The initial force list consisted of a threedivision assault, followed by a rapid build-up of up to seven additional divisions. Allied
Force Headquarters tasked the Services of Supply to prepare and load all of Anvil’s
combat units already positioned within the Mediterranean. 783
An eyes-only message from General Marshall to General Devers and General
Eisenhower summarized the War Department’s attitude toward Operation Anvil:
Your Theater is now functioning so that you will not be burdened with a
great amount of administrative routine…If the Forces in Italy get bogged
down on the Pisa-Rimini line, we should not long delay putting Fifth
Army Divisions into the fight in Southern France...The important thing is
that we push Anvil to the utmost as the main effort in the
Mediterranean. 784

Marshall was clearly stating that, as least as the US was concerned, the upcoming invasion
of southern France had become the top priority for the Mediterranean. Perhaps even more
interesting is the stated belief that even though the Mediterranean would have to support
two major operations simultaneously, Lieutenant General Devers and his Sixth Army
Group would not have to burden themselves with the details of coordinating supply,
maintenance, and other administration. Marshall’s message implied that the
Mediterranean had indeed achieved a level of experience and capability among its support
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forces that would allow the army group commander to focus on the fight before him.
Devers could not disregard the physical limitations of constrained resources, but he could
leave the details of administration to other trusted officers, such as Tom Larkin.
Churchill was not happy with the decision to revive Anvil and even went as far as to
recommend that the plan be modified to bypass the ports of Toulon and Marseilles and
land at ports in Brittany instead, believing that these would contribute more directly to the
fight in Normandy. Alternatively, the Prime Minister argued further, the forces of Anvil
could go to Italy to prosecute the campaign up the Italian peninsula and eventually invade
the Balkans via the Adriatic. 785 The fight between Eisenhower and Churchill regarding
Anvil’s future went on for ten days.
This showed a lack of appreciation by the Prime Minister for the challenges
associated with such a proposal. First, the Brittany ports were 1,600 miles from the
loading ports in the Mediterranean and the many of the assault craft carrying troops could
not handle such a voyage. Additionally, the seas in this area were prone to storms and
high tides. Third, the assault area was beyond the range of effective air cover.
Additionally, landing at Brittany did not support any follow-on operations beyond western
France. 786 Finally, abandoning Anvil in favor of Italy and the Balkans meant exposing the
forces in Normandy to an unprotected southern flank and limiting the amount of Allied
divisions and supplies along the western front. Roosevelt and Eisenhower dismissed the
proposal out-of-hand.
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The argument for Anvil had transformed into one of additional supply and
transportation capacity. Eisenhower fulfilled his role as theater commander- working to
ensure that he could supply as many divisions and supplies as possible for the army group
commanders to employ. The reasons for the landings in southern France had changed,
focusing on logistics rather than the enemy. 787 However, with the on-again, off-again
nature of the decision, planners had little continuity of effort. By July 2, with the final
decision at hand, staffs at all levels went into high gear working to develop the plans
needed to load, move, land, and support a major amphibious force with the landing date
being less than six weeks away.

Planning the Invasion
The initial deliberate planning effort for Anvil had begun in January 1944 at the Ecole
Normale in Bouzareah, a suburb just north of Algiers. As with previous operations,
AFHQ formed a planning group from the army headquarters that would make the initial
assault. In the case of Anvil, Seventh Army provided the nucleus of the planning staff
under the title of Force 163.
Seventh Army had changed dramatically following its victory in Sicily. All of its
divisions had transferred to other armies, either in Italy or in England. Patton was still
nominally in command, but was due to rotate to England. Additionally, seven of the eight
primary members of Patton’s staff planned to depart for England as well. To confuse the
enemy, most of the army headquarters staff remained at Palermo while a small planning
787
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detachment under the lead of Brigadier General Garrison Davidson departed the island for
Algeria. 788
Included in the Anvil planning staff were eight officers from Seventh Army G4, four
from the Services of Supply, and six from AFHQ. Over the course of a few weeks, this
segment of the planning group established a second headquarters, named Rear Force 163,
and stationed itself near the headquarters of the Services of Supply NATOUSA in Oran.
This planning element produced the logistics plan for the invasion of southern France,
eventually growing to over 300 pages. 789
Expecting that the fighting in Italy would soon be over, the War Department selected
Lieutenant General Clark to be the Seventh Army commander after Patton departed. In
the spring of 1944, however, Clark was still fighting in Italy and had little time to devote
to the planning effort. As such, the Force 163 planning team had to work with little
oversight or guidance
Force 163 planned for a two or three division assault, followed by a sizeable buildup
of up to ten divisions. The French were willing to put the French First Army under US
command as long as the US provided all supplies, transportation, and other administrative
needs. The plan assumed that no ports would be available until at least D+25. Until then,
all supplies would come over the beaches. 790
Command of French forces had been a touchy subject ever since Operation Torch.
Britain and France had a history of stormy relations and this influenced the perceptions of
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many senior officers. The campaign in North Africa had shown both Montgomery and
Bradley to be less than cordial toward the French. The French most probably would not
have approved working for either of these commanders and the two army group
commanders would not have wanted the French anyway. However, the creation of an
army group under General Devers (a commander not known to have any prejudices
against the French) avoided this predicament. Devers appreciated the additional forces
and the French longed for a chance to be a part of the attack that would free their
homeland. Additionally, the separate line of communication provided Allied leaders the
opportunity to not only employ French forces on their own soil, but to do so in such a way
as to not tie up the already bottlenecked ports of northwest Europe.
Working jointly, planners from both the Army and Navy selected the Cavalaire-St.
Tropez-St. Raphael area as the best target to enable the capture of Marseilles and Toulon.
These beaches provided good gradients for the landing craft and deep-water access for the
larger ships. The beach defenses were not overly problematic and there were suitable road
networks leading inland. Once ashore, the Argens River valley provided the means to
rapidly move west and cut off the two port areas from German reinforcements. 791
By July, Eisenhower had identified four major objectives for the upcoming operation.
First, Anvil was to contain and destroy any German forces that could potentially oppose
Allied forces operating in northern France. Second, it would secure a major port to
facilitate the landing of Allied reinforcing divisions. Third, forces would advance north to
threaten the German southern flank and the German line of communications. Finally,
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Anvil would develop an Allied line of communications for support of advancing forces
and support of the reinforcing divisions. 792 Of the four objectives, three of them focused
on issues of support.
The plan for the landings was straightforward. The VI Corps, under command of
Major General Truscott, would head the invasion. The 3rd Infantry Division would land
on the left-most beaches near Cavalaire-sur Mer. The 45th Infantry Division would land in
the center near St.-Tropez. The 36th Infantry Division would land on the right, near St.Raphael. The provisional First Airborne Task Force, which consisted of one British
brigade and two US regiments, would drop into the areas beyond the beaches, near Le
Muy to augment VI Corps and the French 5th Division. The US VI Corps had a mission
similar that of previous landings: get ashore, establish the bridgehead, clear the ports, and
drive inland. The Allies were determined to drive north as fast and far as circumstances
would allow. Seventh Army would follow VI Corps ashore, later followed by Sixth Army
Group as additional units flowed into France. 793
Although senior leaders had been arguing about whether to proceed with the landings
on southern France or not, the Mediterranean theater had in fact prepared itself to support
such an operation. The Services of Supply established the Northern Base Section in
Corsica on January 1, 1944, under Colonel John Ratay to support all air operations
originating from the island, but the Services of Supply also tagged the Northern Base
Section with conducting much of the loading of troops and supplies for the upcoming

792

“Report by the Supreme Allied Commander Mediterranean to the Combined Chiefs of Staff on the Operations in
Southern France,” 25.
793
Final Report: G-3 Section, Headquarters, 6th Army Group. 1945. CMH. 5.

387

invasion of southern France. Additionally, when it became evident that the focus of the
war in the Mediterranean was shifting to the north, the Allied Force Headquarters,
NATOUSA, and the Services of Supply of NATOUSA all moved from North Africa to
Caserta, Italy.
On July 6, NATOUSA activated the Coastal Base Section under the command of
Major General Arthur Wilson, the old Western Base Section commander. Using insights
gained from previous operations where the support forces had arrived too late on the
beaches and took too long to set up operations, Wilson insisted that all personnel assigned
to the Base Section familiarize themselves with the details of the assault plan so they
could assume responsibilities for supporting the army as soon as possible after landing.
This time around, the Base Section would arrive early and take charge of the beaches as
quickly as possible.
Plans called for a phased buildup of supplies. Once the beaches in France were secure,
five days of supplies would land every three days. This would allow support units to
replace any consumed supplies, as well as slowly build up a theater reserve. 794 Physics
required the Services of Supply to preload 100 ships with supplies in order to make the
necessary timelines in France.
Compounding the planning effort was the requirement to support not only all US
forces attached to the Sixth Army Group, but the French First Army as well. The First
French Army in Italy numbered some 75,000, but planners expected this number to double
once the French divisions landed along the Riviera and had access to metropolitan French
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manpower. 795 Under the command of General De Lattre de Tassigny, much of the French
First Army came from North Africa. The French had an organic support unit, known as
French Base 901, but there were relatively few trained supply technicians or mechanics
within the French Base. From the beginning of the rearmament program, the French had
focused efforts on producing combat units with support units receiving the lowest
priority. 796 Using US planning ratios, the French should have had 112,000 service forces
to support their eight divisions. Instead, they never fielded more than 29,000. Just prior
to the invasion, the French First Army included only 12,500 service forces-ten percent of
the total requirement. 797 This forced French Base 901 to form a close working
relationship with the Coastal Base Section along with the stationing of several French
support liaison officers, although AFHQ prevented any formal liaison before July. 798
Once in operation, however, the two service headquarters formed a close working
relationship so beneficial to all involved that it lasted throughout the remainder of the war.
The magnitude of the task of re-equipping French units is hard to overstate. As of July
21, 1944, only 30 of 133 French units had at least a third of their authorized equipment. 799
The Joint Rearmament Committee and the Services of Supply worked to make up all
possible shortages from supplies within the Mediterranean and from the French LendLease account. Additionally, the high percentage of Muslims in the French First Army
meant that the Services of Supply had to accommodate special dietary requirements in its
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combat provisions. AFHQ G4 worked to coordinate unfilled requirements between
assault units and the Base Sections.
The theater ordered all supplies for the upcoming operation early in 1944, but
problems arose when the War Department cancelled many of the requisitions in April
when the future of Anvil appeared in doubt. The resurrection of the operation in July
forced supply officers to resubmit the orders once again, creating some shortages for any
items that were not readily available. Luckily, Services of Supply NATOUSA had frozen
the issuing of supplies identified for Anvil that were already in the Mediterranean on the
belief that the Joint Chiefs might resurrect the operation. This foresight prevented the
raiding of supplies by Fifth Army and meant that the War Department had to ship only a
limited number of priority items, such as ammunition, vehicles, and weapons systems
from the US. These items left New York in early July on ships instructed to arrive in
Naples “with hatches open and booms slung so that the Sixth Port could discharge the
cargo without delay.” 800
To prepare the invasion force, the Services of Supply had to re-equip the 175,000 US
troops pulled out of Fifth Army, as well as outfit 150,000 French troops. In addition, the
support units needed to build up enough supplies within the Mediterranean to support
450,000 troops for a 30-day period. Any items not already available in the Mediterranean
had to come from the US. 801
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The support relationship between the European and Mediterranean theaters was
largely one of separation and independent operations. For US forces, some supplies for
Mediterranean units did come from the United Kingdom, but these were the exception
rather than the rule. There was no formal relationship or authorities between the two
different support headquarters. 802
By August 1, planners had changed the operation’s name from Anvil to Dragoon for
security concerns and units finalized their plans. The Force 163 staff moved to Naples
and was absorbed into the Seventh Army headquarters. The plan called for a threedivision assault initially under the command of VI Corps, with command later
transitioning to Seventh Army and then Sixth Army Group. A force of 366,833 men and
56,051 vehicles were to be ashore on the beaches of southern France by D+30. To sustain
this, planners expected to move 277,696 tons of supplies over the beaches in the first
month of operations. 803
Once the landings began, each task force commander became responsible for the
resupply of his own troops. This responsibility transitioned to a Beach Group Control
Headquarters as soon as it was ashore and established. Planners assumed that the
Continental Base Section would be ashore and operational within five days of the capture
of a port.
If all this sounded familiar, it was because by this point of the war amphibious assault
planning had become, more or less, a matter of routine. Planning was still difficult and
involved a lot of coordination, but experienced staffs knew what questions to ask and what
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to expect. Systems and procedures that worked well in previous operations, such as
including support units and their equipment in early assault waves, carried forward to the
next operation, unsuccessful concepts did not. This is the main reason that Dragoon was
able to occur as quickly and effectively as it did. Planning staffs, especially in the
Services of Supply, could now anticipate problems and develop the means to deal with the
potential problems.
Planners never have all the facts they desire so they rely on assumptions to fill in the
holes of a plan and Dragoon was no exception. Key assumptions for the support of
Dragoon’s forces included the projection that the first port, Toulon, would not be open
until D-20 and could then handle 10,000 tons per day. Planners did not expect the port of
Marseilles to open until D+40. Based on experiences in Sicily and Italy, the Allies fully
expected both ports to have considerable damage from German sappers. Most
importantly, the plan stipulated that the assault force would not be able to support itself
more than 20 miles inland of the beaches until a port was operational. 804 The key to
Dragoon was the ports.
Toulon had been a large French naval base, but the French had scuttled much of the
fleet so the port had a limited capability. Marseilles, on the other hand, offered a large
discharge capacity that could support an entire army group. The location and capacity
made this port a primary objective.
Marseilles was a major port with ten primary basins and 13 miles of quays. Its
peacetime daily cargo discharge capacity was 20,000 tons per day, an important figure
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since the Allied planners expected that the Sixth Army Group would need 15,000 tons of
supplies each day. Connecting the port to the Ruhr Valley was a series of roads, rail
linkages, and canals. 805
To open the ports, planners increased the size of the divisions. The Army had learned
the lessons of previous amphibious assaults and now worked to add support units to the
assault formations in numbers that previously would have been unimaginable. For
Dragoon, planners increased the division slice (the part of each division not found within
the headquarters or brigades and regiments) from 25,000 to 45,000 men. Additionally,
each division’s truck allotment increased from 4,000 to 8,000 vehicles. 806 Planners and
commanders alike were determined not to make the mistakes of the past, such as what
happened in North Africa where the lack of service units and vehicles meant missed
opportunities.

Supporting the Assault
The Services of Supply handled the loading of men, supplies, and equipment from
bases in North Africa as well as Italy. Naval ships and assault craft were generally loaded
at Naples and Salerno, while merchant ships were loaded at Naples, Taranto, and Oran.
The Peninsular Base Section had the largest mission, needing to load the forces
destined for Dragoon, while also supporting Fifth Army in its fight up the Italian
peninsula. Consequently, the heavy out-loading of ships in Naples caused a temporary
backlog of ships awaiting discharge in Italy. The theater had to put a priority on the
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landing of perishable food and ammunition into Italy; other supplies were on hold until the
backlog cleared. 807
Naples, with its sizeable capacity, was the primary mounting port. As with the loading
of forces for the assault into Italy, the base section formed an embarkation group to plan
and conduct the loading of the ships. AFHQ established a Joint Loading Control officer to
coordinate among the different services and units. Oran served as the secondary mounting
port and handled most of the French follow-on forces. By leveraging all the experience
gained from past operations, all ships were loaded and ready to sail by August 8, right on
schedule. 808
To avoid excessive congestion in Naples, Admiral Hewett decided to embark French
troops already in Italy on the first follow-up convoys sailing from ports on the heel of
Italy. Fifth Army removed these units from the front lines, moved them to Taranto, and
then the Services of Supply re-equipped them for Dragoon.
Due to the experience gained from previous amphibious operations, every convoy
sailed on time with no reported major problems. In fact, experience was the hallmark of
the Dragoon force. Seventh Army had seen action in North Africa and Sicily. The 3rd
Infantry Division, now under the command of Major General John W. O'Daniel, had
landed in Morocco, Sicily, and Salerno. The 45th Infantry Division, commanded by Maj.
Gen. William W. Eagles, had made landings at Sicily, Salerno, and Anzio. The 36th
Infantry Division, commanded by Major General John E. Dahlquist, had made the initial
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assault at Salerno. All three divisions were part of the VI Corps, commanded by the old
3rd Infantry Division commander, Major General Lucian K. Truscott.
The naval task force, under Vice Admiral Kent Hewett, consisted of 902 ships and
assault craft, along with 1,200 other craft carried aboard ship. 809 The landings started in
the morning hours of August 15 and went largely as planned. Thirteen hundred aircraft
and 53 gunfire ships neutralized German defenses, allowing the assault to start at 8 am.
The landing beaches spanned almost 60 miles across, making communications
between the beaches difficult. For the first time, the Navy provided a liaison officer to
help coordinate the activities of the three naval beach battalions. Fortunately, the naval
force encountered few underwater obstacles so the landing craft generally had few
problems delivering their loads.
Learning from past mistakes in planning support of amphibious operations, the
Seventh Army G4 assigned port battalion crews against specific ships. These crews
loaded the ships and then rode the same vessel to the assault area to conduct offloading.
Since the crews knew the contents of their ship and the location of specific items, offloading occurred at new levels of efficiency and essential items could be quickly
located. 810
To help control the beaches, AFHQ and the Navy established a central Beach Control
Headquarters designed to work through the Seventh Army G4. The Army G4 controlled
the offload schedule, which prevented division commanders and their staffs from
changing supply offload priorities at the beaches-a problem experienced in past
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operations. The Army G4 and Beach Control Headquarters called ships forward for
unloading in accordance with the needs of the entire assault force; not just one particular
unit. 811
An additional improvement was the marking of supply ships. Unlike earlier assaults,
each supply vessel was clearly marked with the number corresponding to a master list of
supplies and equipment. The Army G4 called in ships based on demand, providing the
ability to meet immediate needs. This proved to be a critical factor in adjusting to
changing needs at the front lines as units achieved a breakout from the beaches sooner
than expected. The advance produced a critical shortage of fuel, with just 3,000 gallons of
gasoline staged on the beach. The Army G4 noted the change in requirements, adjusted
priorities from ammunition to fuel, and off-loaded over 400,000 gallons of gasoline
overnight. 812 This level of flexibility enabled the breakout to occur as quickly as it did,
but would not have been possible earlier in the war. Experience had honed the skills and
systems of the service units to a new level- one that not only could anticipate needs, but
could also react to unexpected circumstances.
Despite the improvements, there were still some problems in establishing the initial
supply sites. Planners had tentatively identified supply dumpsites by aerial
reconnaissance. However, upon landing in France, the Allies found that many of these
locations were heavily mined so alternative locations had to be quickly located or the
primary sites cleared of mines. Cargo nets proved to be critically short during the
landings due to a lack of labor at the supply dumps. Supply units needed this labor to

811
812

Ibid.
Ibid.

396

unload supplies at the dumps and quickly return nets to the ships. Additionally, there were
insufficient cargo trucks to receive supplies direct from the ships, and too many ships
discharged cargo simultaneously, overwhelming beach capacities. The Base Section used
Italian Service units, some 23,355 individuals, along with volunteers from over 50,000
German prisoners of war to compensate for a civilian labor supply that was limited and
largely ineffective. 813
As in Sicily and Italy, engineer shore regiments landed with the assault elements to
control the beaches and establish the initial supply dumps. For this operation, however,
the shore regiments did not retain this responsibility for long. On September 9, the
Continental Base Section assumed control of the beaches and dumps, allowing the
engineers to revert to army control for use on more traditional engineering projects. 814
Initially, planners had expected to fight up to 14 German divisions in southern France,
but three of the enemy divisions moved north to defend against the Normandy invasion.
Instead of Dragoon pulling divisions away from the north, as originally planned in 1943,
the timing resulted in Overlord pulling divisions away from Dragoon. To further help
matters, only three enemy divisions actively opposed the Dragoon landings because of the
expansive coastlines the Germans were trying to defend. 815 The result was a general lack
of strong resistance, which allowed the forces of Dragoon to move inland much farther
and faster than planned. This equated to a tactical coup, but one that placed greater and
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greater demands on a support structure that was struggling to support on-going combat
while also establishing itself ashore.
The offloading of supplies and equipment in the first few days of Dragoon went so
well that the Navy found it could deliver material to the beaches faster than the Army
could clear it. Although more support units and trucks had been included in the assault
convoys, the increasing depth of the battlefield stressed the ability of the service forces to
keep pace with the overall rate of advance. Quartermaster, signal, and ordnance units
established supply dumps further inland, to better supply the combat units. However, this
placed a greater demand on the limited numbers of trucks ferrying supplies from the
beaches to the dumps. 816
Planners had expected to use French civilian and prisoners of war to help clear the
beaches, but this never quite worked out. From August 15-20, the Allies could only find
approximately 1,000 Frenchmen and these consisted mainly of young boys and old menhardly suited for the back-breaking work of moving crates of supplies off the beach and
into trucks. Prisoners of war were available, but did not speak English and needed
constant guarding. The prisoners were generally quite willing to work, but few military
police or combat units were available for guard duty. 817
As planned, the 3rd Infantry Division landed on the left, to the southwest of St. Tropez
along the beaches in the Bay de Cavalaire and the Bay de Pampelonne. The division
quickly secured the left flank of the invasion then raced inland to capture St. Tropez and
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link up with the 45th Infantry Division, thus securing the St. Tropez peninsula by dark on
the first day of the landings. 818
The 45th Infantry occupied the center of the assault formation, landing on the beaches
running from Cape Sardineau to Point Alexandre, along the Gulf of St. Tropez. Steep
cliffs arose from the back of the beaches and only single road served as an exit.
Resistance was light because air and naval bombardment had already destroyed much of
the German defenses.

Figure 33: The Landing Plan 819
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The 36th Infantry Division landed along a stretch of beach ranging from the mouth of
the Argens River north to Antheor Cove. This area held the majority of the German
defensive units. The landings started on time and initially met with light resistance. By
late morning, however, parts of the division encountered firm opposition, delaying the
advance inshore. Strong defensive lines protected St. Raphael, including mines, booby
traps, anti-tank ditches, and artillery. A determined German defense along the Division’s
“Camel Red” beach, forced the 142nd Infantry Regiment to land at a different beach,
delaying the regiment’s arrival by six or seven hours. 820 Regardless, the 36th Infantry
Division achieved its objectives and by the afternoon of August 16, D+1, VI Corps had
advanced further inland than planners had ever thought possible. 821
Figure 34: LSTs Arriving in France 822

The French First Army began landing
on the beaches on August 16, D+1. Four
divisions quickly made it ashore and then
began working their way to the west
reaching Toulon on August 22. The
ports of Marseilles and Toulon
surrendered to French forces on August
28.
The drive inland produced an almost immediate shortage of fuel. Supply planners had
expected a hard fight on the beaches so almost three-quarters of the supplies
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accompanying the assault force was ammunition and very little fuel was loaded onto the
first waves of assault craft. The shortage of fuel on D+1 forced a revision in unloading
priority within VI Corps. Logisticians diverted DUKWs and LCTs to a merchant vessel
carrying 50,000 gallons of fuel. Beach capacity was not an issue, but operations had
deviated from the plan. [The offloading of thousands of tons of ammunition on the
congested beaches and slowed the movement of fuel.] By D+4, units were more than 100
miles from the beach invalidating the assumption that operations would be limited to 20
miles from the beach until a the base section opened a port. The three US divisions were
using more than 100,000 gallons of fuel per day, but as of August 21, only 11,000 gallons
remained in beach depots. This forces Seventh Army to prioritize the offloading of fuel
while also restricting fuel consumption. 823
The battle for Montelimar showed just how dependent Seventh Army was on fuel and
ammunition. In an effort to exploit the withdrawal of German forces and to try to prevent
the escape of the German Nineteenth Army, Generals Patch and Truscott created Task
Force Butler-a motorized infantry battalion reinforces with thirty medium tanks, twelve
tank destroyers, twelve self-propelled howitzers, and an assortment of armored cars and
trucks under command of Truscott’s deputy commanding general, Brigadier General Fred
Butler. The Task Force’s mission was to conduct reconnaissance activities ahead of the
36th Infantry Division and cut off the German retreat. 824
Departing north on August 19, the Task Force moved into Sisteron. On the evening of
August 20, the Division ordered the Task Force to move toward Montelimar. The 36th
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would follow the Task Force as soon as it could. By the evening of the following day,
August 21, Task Force Butler was on a hill near the town.
Although the Task Force was on high ground overlooking the route of the German
advance, it lacked sufficient artillery and tank destroyer ammunition to halt the German
retreat. On August 22, two battalions of 155 mm howitzers from VI Corps joined the
Task Force, but no units from the 36th had yet arrived. Ammunition stocks for Task Force
Butler were down to 25 rounds per gun and the Task Force needed supplies and additional
reinforcements from the 36th Infantry Division or they would not be able to stop the
retreating German columns. 825
The lack of reinforcements from the 36th was partly due to a lack of firm commitment
from the division commander, Major General Dahlquist, along with a shortage of trucks
and fuel. Recognizing the severity of the situation, Seventh Army put together a special
fuel convoy for the 36th and this, along with captured German fuel, allowed the Division’s
141st and 142nd Infantry Regiments to resume the march towards Montelimar on August
23. 826
Reacting to the threat posed by Task Force Butler, German commanders ordered the
11th Panzer Division to the front. However, the Germans had their own logistical
difficulties. Even though the German lines of communication were shrinking, there was
still a lack of resources in southern France because of the priority given to German units
operating in Normandy. Fuel shortages and crowded roads delayed the Panzer Division’s
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movement by at least a day. This allowed some ammunition to make its way to the
American Task Force; however, supply for Task Force Butler was still limited. 827
By August 25, the 36th Infantry and 11th Panzer Divisions had both arrived around
Montelimar and each sought to destroy the other. Fighting continued for 48 hours, but
each side found itself hamstrung by shortages in fuel, ammunition, and available roads.
Neither was able to destroy the other. Both sides penetrated the lines of the other, but
neither was able to exploit the situation because they each had become too weak. The 3rd
Infantry Division had moved forward by this time and sought to pursue the retreating
Germans, but also found itself slowed by persistent fuel shortages. 828 The lack of supplies
had cost each side an opportunity: the Americans lost an opportunity to destroy a German
army and the Germans lost the opportunity to eliminate one, if not two, of the US
divisions.
To remedy the fuel shortage, Seventh Army used the trucks of newly arriving units to
move fuel to the forward areas. Additionally, the Army opened a rail link between Frejus
and St. Maximin, leading to establishment of a forward supply dump for fuel, rations, and
ammunition. 829 An additional shipment of six million gallons of fuel arrived off the
French coast from Italy on August 28, which was good news, but it created a challenge in
moving the fuel from the beaches to the forward units. VI Corps created three provisional
truck companies to cover the 213 miles from the division areas to the fuel dump. Seventh
Army opened additional dumps on September 2 at Bourgoin, LaTour dePin, and

827

Ibid. 155.
Ibid. 162.
829
The United States Army Seventh Army Report of Operations: France and Germany 1944-194, 318.
828

403

Montelimar, which reduced travel distance to between 24 and 83 miles. This provided
only limited relief as units kept moving further into the interior, forcing quartermasters to
push dumps forward. 830 The pressure to deliver fuel forward was so great that VI Corps
had to restrict drivers to driving no more than 17 hours a day in order to prevent their
exhaustion. 831 Fuel and ammunition would remain in short supply until the Allies could
put the ports into operation and repair the roads and rail lines.
Within a week of the initial landing, the Navy realized that it needed an additional
means of delivering supplies to Seventh Army, one that bypassed the beaches. On D+10,
Admiral Hewett issued orders to open Port de Bouc as a means of providing this
additional capacity. Port de Bous was located west of Marseille and close to the mouth of
the Rhone River. Besides containing the usual port facilities, Port de Bouc also held a
sizeable capacity for receiving and storing fuel. Engineers started clearing the port at the
end of August and within ten days the port was in operation. The nearby Arles Canal
allowed supplies to be ferried 30 miles inland. Port de Bous served as the initial discharge
port for all of Dragoon’s forces and later developed into the primary discharge point for
Air Force fuel and other supplies.
Toulon and Marseilles both fell to the Allies on D+13, allowing Army and Navy
engineers to begin clearing the ports and to repair facilities. As expected, both ports had
been badly damaged by friendly bombing and enemy demolition. The Navy focused its
efforts on Toulon, while the Army handled Marseilles. German engineers had destroyed
most of the buildings and roads. Scuttled ships blocked berthing spaces and the harbors.

830
831

Ibid., 323.
Meyer, “The Strategic and Logistical History of MTO,” XXVI-22.

404

Using the lessons gained from previous efforts, such as at Palermo and Naples, the Allies
quickly rehabilitated the two ports. The use of prisoner labor and French arsenal workers
greatly aided the effort.
The destruction at Marseilles was thorough and efficient. Only one of the port’s 23
piers was serviceable. There were no operational cranes and other discharge equipment.
Mines were located throughout the port and in the harbor, including a marine mine that
was set to detonate after 63 days. The retreating Germans damaged or blocked all of the
121 piers. The damage at Marseilles was worse than the damage seen at Naples. The
enemy had noticed how rapidly the Allies had rehabilitated Naples, so at Marseilles, the
Germans not only scuttled vessels, but they did so in such a manner as to make clearing
the vessels as difficult as possible. Explosives broke ship’s backs before sinking. Vessels
lay up to three layers deep in the channels and at the piers. Thousands of mines rested
among the wreckage. 832 The Germans had sunk seven ships at the western entrance of the
harbor and scuttled another 65. In total, the Germans had sunk over 200,000 tons of
shipping, including four large ships lying across the main channel. 833 The ships sunk
alongside the quays lay in such a way that engineers could not lay piers over them as had
been done in Naples. By September 1, however, the first three Liberty ships entered the
port and were discharged using DUKWs.
Although planners had not expected to clear the ports until D+20 and D+40
respectively, by the second week of the operation both ports were in some stage of
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operation. The Germans had become adept at damaging ports, but the Allied engineers
and port units had become equally proficient at rehabilitating ports and port facilities. The
first discharges of cargo at a pier in Marseilles occurred on September 8, totaling a mere
1,219 tons. However, within a month after the landings, the ports could handle any
demands the Allies made upon them. By September 15, the ports were sending up to
10,000 tons of supplies up the Ruhr each day. 834 By Mid-October, the port of Marseilles
employed 11,000 men and discharged over 19,000 tons of supplies and equipment per
day. 835 In comparison, the port of Cherbourg-Eisenhower’s main port for supplying the
armies in the north during the summer and fall of 1944-could only handle 7,600 tons per
day two months after its capture. 836
The planners for Overlord had expected to use the ports of Cherbourg, Brest, and
Antwerp to supply the drive across France; however, this did not go according to plan.
First Army did not capture Cherbourg until June 26, 1944, 20 days after the initial
Normandy landings. Patton failed to put a priority against the capture of Brest and by the
time the port fell on September 19, the Army had advanced too far to the east and the
Germans had damaged the port to such an extent that it was of little use. Antwerp proved
to be the biggest challenge- Montgomery’s forces captured the port on September 4, 1944,
but did not clear the approaches of defending Germans until November 26, 1944. This
meant that at the time of the break out of Normandy the only operating ports were
Cherbourg and the British beaches, with Cherbourg not reaching full capacity until the
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middle of August. 837 Consequently, the European theater lacked the necessary port
capacities in northwest Europe to support a multi-army pursuit across France during the
last half of 1944.
The tremendous port capacity in southern France proved to be the center of gravity for
the Sixth Army Group-the single source of power that gave the Seventh and French First
armies the freedom of action needed to carry the fight into Germany. Even more
importantly, the additional ports reduced the levels of risk to Eisenhower’s northern
armies. With the vast capabilities of the southern ports, the Allied advance had less of a
chance of being stopped should something happen to the northern ports.
Due to the competing demands for shipping from around the world, the Mediterranean
had to use all available transportation resources as efficiently as possible. The Services of
Supply had to offload convoys as quickly as possible so ships could conduct faster
turnarounds. At Marseilles, one 17-vessel convoy was unloaded in only seven days and
17 hours, providing 82,017 tons of supplies and equipment for the fight. A second convoy
of 16 ships discharged 89,575 tons on six days and 18 hours. 838 From the opening of
Marseilles on September 8, 1944, until January 25, 1945, the port discharged over two
million tons. This represented a transformational difference from the port units that had
worked so ineffectively to clear the ports of North Africa two years earlier, compared to
skills and abilities of the units operating the southern French ports for Dragoon. Had the
Allies chosen to land in France in 1943, they would not have had these same skills and
abilities.
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The three ports, combined with a distribution network, proved to provide the capacity
that Eisenhower had sought. By the end of September, Marseilles could handle 16 Liberty
ships and 45 LCT landing craft. Toulon could unload nine Liberty ships and 31 LCTs,
while Port de Bouc had room for three Liberty ships and one tanker. 839 Added together,
the port discharge capacity exceeded the resupply rate for the advancing armies.
However, port discharge rates meant little if there was not a corresponding road and rail
network, combined with sufficient engines, rail cars, trucks, and operators to move the
forces and material forward. Along with the equipment came an increasing maintenance
requirement to keep vehicles running. The battle for the ports was about to transition into
a battle for the inland distribution of supplies.

The Drive Inland
The successful landings and the lack of a coordinated German defense presented an
opportunity for Seventh Army. Unlike southern Italy, retreating German units did not
possess the strength to delay the Allied advance for any protracted period. German
engineers were, however, able to destroy or sabotage critical infrastructure leading north,
such as roads, aqueducts, bridges, and rail lines. Nonetheless, Allied experience in
dealing with this type of obstacle allowed Army and Navy engineers to repair damaged
transportation networks as quickly as possible, although that effort did not always keep
pace with the advancing units.
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The first six weeks of the operation consisted of a relatively uncontested assault,
followed by a 400-mile pursuit up the Rhine valley. 840 Taking advantage of the situation,
Lieutenant General Patch urged his division commanders to move as quickly inland as
possible denying retreating German forces the opportunity to establish a prepared defense.
The demand for supplies, especially fuel, increased exponentially the father inland
Seventh Army raced. While the Allies were moving up into southern France, Patton’s
Third Army was pursuing its own breakout from Normandy and was soon approaching
Paris. These two forces each needed uninterrupted supplies of fuel to keep moving, which
put significant pressure on the service units supporting each army as they worked to keep
pace with the combat forces. 841
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Figure 35: Lines of Advance up the Rhone Valley 842
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At the end of August, D+15, combat formations in southern France were on a line of
advance that had not been programmed for capture until D+60, but there were only
sufficient service forces in southern France to support as area a quarter that size. 843 On
September 15, D+30, the Sixth Army Group established itself in France and Seventh
Army had advanced to the Moselle River, a point that planners had not expected to reach
until the middle of December, D+120. 844 This was good news for commanders, but
presented challenges to the supporting units. Service units were still flowing into southern
France and engineers could only repair or lay so many miles of rail or pipeline per day or
week. The French and American divisions were outracing their supply lines.
Fortunately, the Coastal Base Section had begun arriving on the initial assault and
worked steadily to increase its capacity to manage support operations. Operating under
the control of Seventh Army, the Base Section provided administrative oversight of the
beaches for all supply operations from the time of the landings, greatly improving beach
operations compared to the landings of North Africa or Sicily. On September 4, the
Services of Supply changed the name of the base section to the Continental Base Section
to reflect its mission, and Sixth Army Group established a communications zone that
stretched north to Moulins-Macon-Bourg-Geneva: the rear of Seventh Army. 845 Southern
France now held two zones-one for combat and one for support.
In an effort to maintain continuity of support to the advancing force, the Continental
Base Section decided to move its headquarters and service units forward in the area of
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operations. On September 18, D+18, Colonel Walter Tenny led a reconnaissance force for
Grenoble, a town centered on the Allied axis of advance. However, the armies were
already 120 miles past that point and it was apparent that the Continental Base Section
needed to extend its supply chain further north into the Rhone Valley. Dijon had fallen on
September 11 and was well suited for the Base Section’s needs. On September 18, the
Base Section established an advance element in the town. Within two weeks, the
Continental Base Section transferred responsibility of operating the ports and coastal areas
to the newly formed Delta Base Section and then, on October 1, 1944, moved its
operations to Dijon. 846
While the Continental Base Section was working to form a viable communications
zone, Allied armies were advancing further up the Rhone Valley. Weak German
resistance encouraged commanders to push combat units as far and fast as possible in
order to keep the Germans from establishing a planned defensive line. This was critical
because as German units pulled north and east they would find themselves with shortened
lines of communications. In other words, the closer the front came to Germany, the
German Army would have less distance to cover for shipment of supplies, while Allied
units would have a harder time supplying themselves because of the increased distance
between the front lines and the ports. To make progress, the Allies could not allow the
Germans to rest.
From the start, however, shortages of fuel and trucks became issues at all levels for the
Allied units. The War Department had formed Quartermaster truck companies with only
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one driver, but units needed assistant drivers in order to operate vehicles on a 24-hour
basis. Additionally, there was competition within the divisions for trucks to move combat
forces, as well as supplies. American infantry units were incapable of moving their entire
formations solely with organic truck units so additional transportation units were needed.
However, along with moving the men, truck and rail units also needed to move the
material of war: rations, ammunition, fuel, construction supplies, medical supplies, and
replacement equipment. 847 The demand for transportation exceeded the available supply
of trucks and rail throughout the campaign.
The experiences of the 36th Infantry Division illustrate the challenges in supporting
pursuit warfare. By the end of August, the Division had moved 270 miles inland, but the
rail lines were not yet in operation and Seventh Army’s truck units had not yet landed.
The division took all of its 20 trucks in its organic artillery units, along with 15 from the
divisional supply officer, to form a provisional truck company to move rations and other
critical supplies. 848 Maintenance also quickly became an issue for the advancing army.
Units resorted to cannibalism-taking parts off one vehicle to fix another vehicle-to
continue the advance. Tank and truck parts were in especially high demand.
Additionally, a shortage of SAE-50 grade motor oil forced mechanics to substitute SAE30, a lighter grade of oil. This produced fouled spark plugs and additional maintenance
problems, further compounding the transportation problem. 849
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Although the forces of Dragoon were among the most experienced in the
Mediterranean and European theaters, large-scale pursuit operations were a relatively new
experience for the American forces. Past battles in Tunisia, Sicily, and the mountains of
Italy offered glimpses of how difficult it was to support pursuit operations, but these
battles involved nothing on the scale faced now in France. In southern France, the enemy
was in retreat. This meant that as long as the Germans retreated, the Allies needed less
ammunition, but more fuel. However, planners had expected a more spirited defense and
therefore scheduled the landing of large quantities of munitions. Now, the theater had to
quickly adjust its priorities or risk losing the initiative.
Figure 36: Movements up to September 15, 1944
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This is not to say that that Seventh Army did not need ammunition. During the
breakout of the landing areas, the 36th Infantry Division expended most of its initial
munitions, causing a temporary shortage within the division. The base sections had
replacement supplies in France, but the sections had to locate and then transport these to
the front, a process that took time and transportation resources. A 200-mile pursuit to the
north followed the breakout, causing a situation where units needed fuel more than
ammunition. Then, facing a determined German defense, the division changed its priority
for supplies from fuel back to ammunition. After breaking through the resistance, the 36th
then advanced another 300 miles, once again relying on timely shipments of fuel to move
the division forward. 850 Although planners fought to anticipate future demands, the
enemy had a vote, which often disrupted plans. Fortunately, the lack of a German air and
artillery threat aided resupply efforts. This meant that 90 percent of resupply operations
occurred during daylight hours, allowing units to move supplies faster and with less
risk. 851
Scattered opposition and spectacular advances characterized the month of September.
By September 3, the French had captured Dijon, while VI Corps seized Besancon, just to
the east. The Allied armies continued advancing up both sides of the Rhone River. 852 To
illustrate the amount of fuel required for the drive north, consider the needs of a single
artillery battalion. One 8-inch artillery battalion needed 5,500 gallons of fuel to move 50
miles. A single long-base GMC cargo truck could haul 1,100 gallons of fuel in five-gallon
850
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containers, but there was a shortage of these containers in the theater. 853 Troops had to
find the containers, take them back to a central fill point, and then fill the containers by
hand if they were unable to swap the empty containers out for full ones. Then, drivers
reloaded the containers onto the trucks and drove forward to the battalion supply trains.
Multiplied across the front, this added up to a vast quantity of fuel, time, and troop labor.
The speed of the Army’s advance resulted in a doubling of the fuel requirement
compared to the planned forecast. The rapid shifting of priorities by Allied supply
officers, combined with use of captured German fuel stocks and use of a local French
refinery, helped meet the growing demand. Similar to what the Allies faced in Normandy,
the biggest challenge in fuel operations was transporting the gasoline from the port to the
forward units. Initially, trucks were the only means of fuel distribution because of
German destruction to rail lines and bridges. However, as base section engineers repaired
rail lines, the gasoline distribution system developed into an arrangement of short stretches
of rail line between destroyed bridges, then, cross loading the fuel into trucks for
movement where rail movement was no longer possible. The expanding distance between
the port of Marseilles and the combat units meant that it was almost as difficult in
planning how to refuel the convoy trucks hauling the fuel as it was in refueling the actual
combat forces. 854
To meet the increased demand for truck units, Seventh Army used the vehicles from
air defense units to form additional truck transport units. The Luftwaffe was not a real
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threat anymore so higher headquarters could use the resources of the air defense units
were available for tasks. Clerks, cooks, ammunition loaders, gun sergeants, and section
sergeants all abandoned their traditional duties and became truck drivers; drivers drove
alone and often drove with little sleep. One such driver, Technician Fifth Grade Charlie
Jones drove for four days and nights, averaging three hours of sleep a night in the cab of
his truck. Jones’ experience reflected the dedication of the service forces working to keep
the army moving. 855
On another occasion, Private First Class Mack Luke was in the process of delivering
two refrigerators and a mahogany desk for a general officer when his company
headquarters received a demand for more fuel from the front lines. Gaining approval from
his company commander, Luke left the desk and refrigerators on the ground, filled his
truck with gas containers, and drove north, up the Rhone Valley. Witnesses reported that
the general understood the change of priorities, but it is unclear whether these stranded
items ever made it to their intended owner. 856
The Allied supply lines did not begin to catch up with the forward combat units until
the end of September, six weeks after the landings. A stronger German resistance at the
Moselle River slowed the Allied advance, providing an opportunity for base section
engineers to improve the road and rail systems leading to the north. 857
While trucks provided the initial means of sustaining the advancing armies, rail
represented the most efficient means of moving men and material to the north. As in
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previous operations, the Military Railway Service provided the means to leverage the most
out of the available rail networks.
Lieutenant Colonel Benjamin Decker, executive officer for General Gray (commander
of the Military Rail Service), landed in southern France on August 16, D+1, and began
assessing the French rail infrastructure. Military rail cars landed on the beaches on D+2,
and on August 17, D+3, the first train ran from St. Tropez to Cogolin with eight rail
cars. 858 The distance was only nine kilometers, but this represented the first step toward a
rail system that would eventually move more than 14,000 tons per day out of
Marseilles. 859
The advance team under Lieutenant Colonel Decker soon found 12 locomotives and
80 rail cars northeast of Toulon and immediately placed these into service. Only ten
percent of the locomotives that were in southern France before the war were still there, but
the Allies did manage to find 200,000 of the original 400,000 freight cars. To increase
capability, the railway service shipped diesel-electric switch engines and oil-burning
locomotives to France from North Africa, along with 1,000 special purpose rail cars, such
as tankers and flat cars for moving mechanized equipment. 860 There was an initial
shortage of coal and fuel oil needed to operate the locomotives, but the Germans had not
been able to destroy the local power point before retreating. This allowed the use of
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electric locomotives along a line stretching from Chambery to Culoz, but engineers had to
shore up a number of bridges before the line could come into full operation. 861
The drive north demanded that rail lines extend as far north as quickly as possible to
keep pace with the advancing Allied armies and to relieve pressure on the limited numbers
of trucks available in the southern line of communications. As in Italy, engineers and rail
workers not only had to lay new track, but also had to repair bridges and other critical
infrastructure destroyed by retreating German units or past friendly bombing efforts:
A great number of bridges had been destroyed. In the valley of the
Rhone, from Marseille to Lyon, there were no connections between the
right and left banks of the river. In one viaduct, commanding almost all
the traffic of Western France, 22 out of 32 arches had been blown. To
the north of Lyon, the situation was no better. Bridges, tunnels, stations,
engine sheds, block cabins and freight sheds had been turned into rubble
either by Allied bombing or German demolition.862

A double-track rail, the Rhone Valley Railroad, served as the main means of
transporting men and materiel up the Rhone valley and a single-track line ran through
Grenoble and Dole. However, having the rail lines operational was no guarantee of
resupply. Supply levels during the first two weeks of October 1944 ran low again in US
combat units, partly caused by the shortfall in ground transportation, and partly due to the
actions of French Base 901, which was holding all empty rail cars around Marseilles for
the exclusive resupply of the First French Army. 863 Unsurprisingly, as soon as the
Services of Supply became aware of the situation, officers intervened to convince the
French to release their hold on the rail cars. There was little doubt of the outcome. The
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French held the cars, but the Base Sections controlled the supplies. The French agreed to
release the rail cars back to general service and the supply shortfalls for all units gradually
eased.
Ultimately, French rail workers and US troops rebuilt the lines that provided an
important means of transporting the materials of war up the Rhone Valley. The effort
included the rebuilding of 42 bridges and over 800 miles of track within a system of over
4,000 miles of rail. 864 The table below depicts the total port discharge and clearance
tonnage for September through December 1944, and illustrates how quickly the rail
capacity developed. 865

Total tons discharged

% cl ea r ed b y r o a d

% cl ea re d b y r ai l

% c l e ar e d b y w at e r

September

129,240

76

23

1

October

407,263

57

42

1

November

553,966

58

40

2

December

418,548

66

31

3

The Sixth Army Group headquarters established itself in France on September 15 and
immediately went to work organizing and directing the operations of the two combat
forces, as well as overseeing the communications zone. During the initial stages of
Dragoon, Seventh Army handled all logistic and administrative requirements of the force.
With the establishment of Sixth Army under Lieutenant General Devers, Lieutenant
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General Patch and Seventh Army could now focus on fighting the Germans in an everdeepening zone. The beaches, ports, and responsibilities for the French First Army were
now in Sixth Army Group’s hands.
Although Operation Dragoon was not flawless and units encountered challenges
supporting the unexpected drive to the north, Dragoon proved to be the smoothest major
amphibious assault of the European theater. Part of this is attributable to the lack of a
strong German resistance to the landings, but a greater reason lies in the experience of the
Allied units, gained from earlier operations. Unlike earlier landings, Dragoon contained a
more balanced mix of combat and service forces, although the preponderance of the force
was still combat-heavy. The loading of forces and supplies was complex, but went
efficiently. Units landed with the right equipment needed to perform their tasks. By
September 25, six weeks after the initial invasion, Seventh Army closed the beaches,
having handled the landing of 400,614 men and 68,480 vehicles. Three ports were
operating along the southern French coastline and the Services of Supply was building up
the communications zone. Eisenhower now had his second line of communications in
France, one that would allow for the introduction of additional combat divisions onto the
continent and eventually sustain a major part of the campaign effort.
While trucks and rail provided the initial means of moving supplies, efforts quickly
got underway as well to establish a viable pipeline network to move fuel north up the
Rhone. Every mile of pipeline freed up a truck unit that to haul something else.
The 697th Engineer Petroleum Distribution Company landed in southern France close
to San Rafael and immediately began installing pipelines, first to fighter bases in the local
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area, and then to the armies moving north. Fortunately, they found three French refineries
that had been unused in four years, but were largely undamaged and required only routine
maintenance to bring back into operation for storage of fuel. Historical documents do not
explain why the Germans never utilized these facilities, but infrastructure such as this
proved a critical resource for the Allied armies. This storage capacity of over two million
barrels near the port provided the ability to offload tankers quickly, but the base section
still needed the means to transport the fuel forward to the units. 866
By September, engineers were constructing a four-inch and six-inch pipeline north
from the petroleum storage areas of Port de Bouc. For planning purposes one engineer
petroleum distribution company had the capability of constructing 100 miles of pipeline in
30 days. Construction of the pipelines continued on a 24-hour basis, seven days a week,
and was a top priority. The maximum rate of advance was 10 miles per day, three times
the stated capability. Within three months, the pipeline extended all the way into the
Alsace region, at which point engineers temporarily halted construction because they had
come within range of enemy fire. Engineers in the Continental Base Section eventually
laid a total of 1,507 miles of pipeline in southern France, compared to North Africa where
three base sections laid only 731 miles. 867
Enemy sabotage, weather, and black market thieves all had an impact on the pipeline;
although in the larger picture, the impact was relatively modest. Cold weather and rains
during the winter slowed pipeline construction and in at least one instance, German
saboteurs were able to uncouple the pipeline near Avignon, causing the loss of 2,000
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barrels of fuel. Most common was the routine tapping of the pipeline by a pickax or other
sharp object by black marketers. Overall, the Continental Advance Section estimated that
only two percent of the fuel carried by the pipeline was lost to evaporation, thieves, and
sabotage. This was a small quantity in terms of percentage, but large when one looks at
the vast quantities of fuel transported on a daily average. 868
Although pipelines required extensive engineer resources to emplace, they proved to
be an important part of the transportation triad for Dragoon’s forces. Eventually, pipelines
laid by army engineers carried one-third of the total supply tonnage of the force, tonnage
that otherwise would have required trucks or rail tanker cars for movement. 869
The support of French forces posed special challenges for the Continental Base
Section. Although part of the Sixth Army Group, French troops required unique items not
routinely found in the US inventory. Unlike US units, the French First Army contained a
number of Muslim units, requiring the Services of Supply to establish two different types
of rations- the Muslim ration contained no pork products. French authorities augmented
the US rations with provided brandy, wine, and olive oil.
Clothing the French units also presented a challenge for the Services of Supply
because many French soldiers were smaller than their American counterparts were.
Quartermaster units issued uniforms, shoes, and individual equipment in unit sets based on
US sizing averages. A company issue of uniforms contained some a set number of each
uniform size. When applied to French units, this created shortages of smaller size items
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and excess of the larger sized items, requiring Quartermasters to arrange for an exchange
of the unusable items. 870
Additionally, there were different types of French forces requiring various levels of
support. French rearmament program units, such as in the First French Army, were
authorized US logistical support. Others, such as French Forces of the Interior and
Resistance forces, were not authorized support from the Continental Base Section, but
needed help to continue fighting the Germans. These non-regulation forces generally
received food in sufficient quantities, but clothing and equipment were more problematic.
As the Allies freed up more and more French territory, large numbers of French
reservists, Resistance forces, volunteers, and liberated prisoners of war came forward
requesting to join in the fight. French authorities estimated that as many as 400,000 men
and boys roamed the liberated territories of France, with half this number possessing
firearms. 871
The issue regarding development of an Allied policy towards clothing and outfitting
these forces raged throughout September and October. General Devers lacked the
resources needed to supply the 112,000 men that had already augmented the First French
Army or were operating along the Atlantic coastline. French officers were submitting
requisitions for clothing and supplies for these new forces to the Services of Supply. The
debate concerning the policy for this available manpower continued until the end of
December when the French, British, and US commands finally agreed to create 120
security battalions and eight additional French divisions by June 1945, with six of these to
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be equipped from French industry. 872 The decision to create additional French units
provided a means to provide for future French security, created additional divisions for the
war effort, and gave commanders a predictable requirement for resources.
As in Italy and Sicily, the civil populace presented another sizeable demand for
resources. Civil affairs planners recognized that much of the local food, fuel, and other
supplies would have been forcibly requisitioned by the German Army so three Liberty
ships in every convoy from D+10 to D+40 carried food and medical supplies earmarked
for French civilians. This number increased to four ships per convoy between D+41 and
D+80. Once these supplies arrived in France they were stored separately from other
supplies and then provided to French authorities for distribution to the populace. 873 This
means of relying on local French governments and workers for food distribution provided
several benefits. First, it allowed the base section to focus its efforts and limited
transportation on supporting the combat forces. Second, it provided jobs to local
Frenchmen. Third, the distribution of essential supplies helped reestablish the legitimacy
of the local French governments. Lastly, the supplies produced good will among the
French people and prevented any disruption in the rear areas. The benefits well
outweighed the costs and proved to be an essential element of the overall support effort.
Although foraging off the land and using captured enemy supplies could serve as a
means to lighten the supply load needed to move over the rail lines and roads, the Allies
were careful not to place too great a burden on the local French populace. A
memorandum form Eisenhower’s headquarters to General Wilson highlighted this aspect
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of the civil affairs effort, noting that the Germans typically removed all available supplies
from an area prior to evacuation. As such, the Sixth Army Group was not to requisition
local food, building supplies, and transportation unless it was to meet a military
necessity. 874

Approaching the Rhine: Slowdown, Missed Opportunity, and a Determined
Defense
The period from October to mid-November represented the next phase of Dragoon: a
period of slow fighting leading up to the Vosges Mountains. Compared to the earlier fastpaced pursuit, the fighting in the Vosges seemed more like fighting in Italy once again.
Supplies were still tight. Engineers had been working to expand the rail networks into the
Ruhr, but demand still outpaced capacity. As an example, for the period October1-7,
Seventh Army requested rail delivery of 4,485 tons of supplies. In contrast, the Sixth
Army Group G4 could only allocate half of that amount-some 2,270 tons. 875 Rail capacity
was increasing, but so was demand.
By the first week of October, Seventh Army was critically short of items such as repair
parts, batteries, communication wire, ammunition and some types of weapons. The
problem was not solely one of ports or distribution, but instead, traced itself back to a lack
of industrial production in the US. The worldwide demand for critical items such as
trucks, ammunition, and weapons systems surpassed what the War Department had
projected and it would take time to make up the difference. For many items, relief would
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take three to six months. 876 During the fall of 1944, the War Department allocated all
ammunition between the theaters and rationed the issuing of arms and major weapons.
The advance of the Sixth Army Group slowed in October and November due to a
number of factors. First, the supply lines were still struggling to keep pace with forward
units. Second, the hills, forests, and limited roads of the Vosges slowed movement.
Lastly, even though German units were still retreating, they still put up a fight before
moving back. In the final analysis, however, the Sixth Army Group noted that,
“logistics…continued to be our most formidable opponent.” 877
Figure 37: 6th Army Group Positions as of November 1, 1944 878

This operational slowdown did serve as an opportunity to build up transportation
networks and begin to stockpile supplies in the forward locations. For the first time,
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supply reserves began to appear near the front and the Sixth Army Group was able to
begin planning for a November offensive to push its way through the mountains and then
head towards the Rhine. Rather than hindering the operation, the slowdown allowed
logisticians to set the conditions for the next stage of battle. As such, this was
unavoidable for the prolonged health of the overall Allied campaign.
By the first week of November, the supply situation for both the French First Army
and Seventh Army had improved to a point whereby offensive actions were once again
possible. Devers, noting that the German defenses along the Rhine were relatively weak
in the Sixth Army Group sector, decided to take a chance and directed Seventh Army to
plan for a crossing of the Rhine before the end of December. To the north, both Bradley
and Montgomery were facing stiff resistance in their sectors. Patton’s Third Army, just
north of Seventh Army, was stalled and unable to make any headway. Devers devised a
promising, but risky plan to cross the Rhine near Strasburg and then swing Seventh Army
north, hoping to destroy the German Nineteenth Army and cut off the German First Army
positioned in front of Bradley’s Twelfth Army Group. Sixth Army had the right enemy
situation, forces, and supplies to make such an operation possible.
Enabling the strategy were the Services of Supply units that had caught up with the
advancing front lines. The October slow down allowed the rail lines to move forward and
supply units to build up supply dumps near the forward areas. Engineers stockpiled the
equipment and construction material needed to bridge the Rhine. By the third week of
November Seventh Army was ready to cross the river and make the first large incursion
into Germany from the west. Fate and a lack of awareness from the German High
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Command had provided Lieutenant General Devers with an opportunity seldom found in
war.
However, this was an opportunity Eisenhower chose not to pursue. While visiting the
XV Corps Headquarters on November 24, the SHAEF commander learned about the
planned river crossing and quickly ordered all planning for the Rhine crossing to cease.
Instead, XV Corps was to focus its efforts on advancing to the north to relieve the pressure
on Patton’s Third Army. In Eisenhower’s mind, the priority of the European Theater was
Patton’s advance into the Saar basin. 879 Devers, hearing of the change, challenged
Eisenhower on the wisdom of the decision following dinner at the Sixth Army Group
Headquarters later that night. Bradley, Eisenhower, and Devers argued over the theater
strategy and priorities until after midnight. The debate failed to change Eisenhower’s
mind and the orders to abandon a November crossing of the Rhine stood fast.
This episode showed that Sixth Army Group was, and remained, merely a supporting
effort in Europe, despite all the success it had garnered since landing in Southern France.
Seventh Army was the only Allied army along the western front to be in a position to
cross the Rhine, but Eisenhower was unwilling to alter the strategy for entering Germany.
Instead, Seventh Army was to reorient its effort to the north and focus on the Vosges
Mountains in an effort to help the 12th Army Group. Eisenhower wanted all his armies
moving into Germany, not just those in the south.
The historian David Colley writes in Decision at Strasbourg that failing to take
advantage of the opportunity afforded the Sixth army Group in November 1944 was a
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mistake with significant consequences. 880 Colley argues that Eisenhower’s decision
immobilized the Sixth Army Group, delayed the crossing of the Rhine by five months, and
cost 200,000 additional casualties. 881 The Seventh Army Engineer, Brigadier General
Garrison Davidson, wrote that a crossing of the Rhine by Seventh Army could have
occurred along a two-division front with movement afterward north to envelop the
Ardennes from the rear. This could possibly have eliminated the Battle of the Bulge,
saved some 40,000 Allied casualties, and shortened the war by “a number of months.”
Additionally, had the Allies crossed the Rhine in November, the terms of the Yalta
Conference might have been different because US and British forces would have
potentially been deep into Germany, thus influencing the makeup of the various sectors. 882
Historians and military experts can debate exactly what might have happened had
Eisenhower allowed Devers to cross the Rhine in late November 1944, but all should
agree that such an advance would have forced the Germans to react. Such a reaction
would most probably have had some impact on Hitler’s plans for the Ardennes offensive,
although the exact impact is difficult to determine. In any case, this opportunity did incur
some risk, but was in fact logistically supportable.
Why did Eisenhower fail take advantage of the opportunity presented before him?
One possibility lies in the relationship between the Eisenhower and the Army
Group/Army commanders. Bradley was clearly the favorite. Devers and Eisenhower had
never worked together before Dragoon and were not friends. Another possible
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explanation lies in how Eisenhower saw the European theater. With the two northern
army groups stalled, a deep advance in the south risked being cut off by a German reserve
that was still strong. Additionally, Colley argues that Eisenhower was not adaptable in his
thinking and, as such, found it difficult to react quickly to change. 883 Perhaps the actual
reason is a mixture of all the reasons listed above. In any case, the opportunity passed,
Seventh Army focused its operations to the north, and the Rhine would wait. The terrain
of the Low Vosges slowed down movement and favored the defending Germans.
Germany, meanwhile, chose to go back on the offensive.
The German counter offensive against the Allied armies in northwest Europe (the
Battle of the Bulge or Ardennes Offensive) forced Sixth Army Group to assume the
defensive in December 1944. German forces attacked through the Ardennes Forest on
December 16, 1944, and quickly penetrated fifty miles past the front lines. The goal of the
Germans was not merely to cut the US first Army in half and capture Allied supplies, but
to sever the northern line of communications and recapture the port of Antwerp. 884 This
was strategy devised by Hitler himself and, if successful, could have seriously delayed the
Allied advance into Germany. Hitler knew that the port of Antwerp was vital to the Allied
advance. By December, Antwerp was supplying 25,000 tons per day to the two Allied
army groups. 885
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Figure 38: Western Front, December 16 1944 to 30 January 1945 886

Eisenhower suspended any further offensive operations in southern France in order to
husband resources and meet the threat to the northern line of communications. Third
Army reoriented to the north. The Sixth Army Group also had to reposition units to
occupy the sectors left open as Third Army moved north to deal with the German
incursion, while the Allied forces in the Ardennes received the priority for all supplies and
equipment. 887
Supply officers used the pause to their advantage, as this was another opportunity to
resupply the army and move depots forward. The supply of K rations within the Seventh
Army had dropped from 12 days of supply on November 25 to 2.2 days worth of supply
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by December 21. 888 Fuel levels had decreased from over two million gallons to only
237,710 gallons. However, while the Seventh Army supply stocks had dropped, those in
the communications zone had built up. 889 Units had simply moved beyond the reach of
the supply bases. The temporary defensive period allowed the base section to shift stocks
as needed to resupply units and prepare for the next phase of the operation, although fuel
reserves continued to be a problem due to increased demands resulting from the cold
weather. 890
Sixth Army Group maintained what was essentially a static front from December 1944
until February 1945 as the German Army established a surprisingly strong effort in front
of the Rhine River. Hitler personally appointed Heinrich Himmler, the Nazi SS chief, to
oversee the defense of the Colmar region. 891 However, the Battle of the Bulge was not the
only German offensive in the winter of 1945-45, just the most famous. Hitler and his
generals, realizing that Eisenhower had weakened Seventh Army in order to defeat the
attack in the Ardennes, devised Operation Northwind- an attack down the Sarre valley and
through the Low Vosges Mountains set to start on January 1. Northwind’s objective was
straightforward: break through the lines of Seventh and French First armies and then drive
south to destroy the rest of the Sixth Army Group. Hitler knew that this line of
communication was a source of strength for the Allies and he sought to eliminate it.
The German First Army launched its attacks at midnight, New Years Eve, but the
Sixth Army Group was well prepared. Although the US commanders had been unable to
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determine specific German intentions, they had known that an attack was imminent.
Reports indicated a buildup of German units in the Black Forest and intelligence officers
could not locate 22 German Western-Front divisions. Reconnaissance photos revealed
new artillery emplacements. 892 All indicators pointed to an imminent attack.
Accordingly, service units had been working over the past week to position supplies
near the front lines. 893 Additional attacks soon followed, with five German offensives
occurring from January 1-25. The Allied armies suffered from a loss of experienced units
and lack of supplies, but they managed to repel all attacks. Both sides experienced a
shortage of resources and poor command decisions. The German offensive effort finally
ceased on January 26 when German commanders realized that their reserves were
exhausted and they were engaged in a battle of attrition-a battle they could not win. 894
This was the last major German offensive effort of the war. From this point forward, the
Allies would take the initiative, clear the Colmar pocket by the end of the first week in
February, and then slowly work their way east, across the Rhine, and into Germany.

Command and Control: Continuous Reorganization
Command arrangements for both the operational headquarters in southern France, as
well as for the supporting service forces, transitioned smoothly as Dragoon progressed.
Unlike earlier operations, Dragoon saw a logical and timely transition of headquarters
responsibilities, which allowed lower level units to focus on more immediate tasks before
them, while higher levels of command dealt with the challenges of developing the theater.
892
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To illustrate, the VI Corps, headed by Major General Truscott, was initially in charge
of the operation and handled the initial landings. VI Corps, however, retained overall
command for the shortest period of any of the amphibious assaults, handing
responsibilities for the beaches over to Seventh Army on August 17, D+2. This allowed
Truscott to take advantage of the tactical situation and drive inland in pursuit of the
German forces, a task that would have been difficult had VI Corps not been relieved of
any responsibility for managing the developing beaches.
Seventh Army accepted the responsibility for the rear areas almost seamlessly and
provided the right level of command to direct the reinforcing combat elements ashore, as
well as to develop the beaches and establish additional inland supply bases. This was also
the period in which the management and control of transportation assets was critical, a
mission for which VI Corps was not suited, but Seventh Army was.
The arrival of 6th Army Group in the middle of September came at an opportune time
as the Seventh and First French armies advanced further up the Rhone Valley. The
appearance of Lieutenant General Devers in southern France relived Lieutenant General
Patch of any communications zone responsibilities or issues of supporting the French.
Seventh Army now only had to worry the immediate mission - getting to the Rhine.
September 15 also represented a change in command relationships for the forces of
Dragoon. Up until this time, Seventh Army had reported to General Wilson, the Supreme
Allied Commander of the Mediterranean. As of the middle of September, however, the
forces in southern France, now led by Sixth Army Group, reported to General Eisenhower,
the European Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force (SHAEF) commander.
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The Mediterranean theater was still responsible for providing all administrative support,
but the European theater made the operational decisions. This allowed Eisenhower to
direct the movements of the force in southern France, without adding to the administrative
burden that was overwhelming the northern communications zone. Additionally,
Dragoon’s ports were in the Mediterranean and much of the supplies and equipment came
out of Italy. This split command relationship lasted until November 20, 1944, when the
northern and southern communications zones merged.
Prioritization proved to be a primary contribution of the Army Group headquarters.
The Sixth Army Group supply officer established priorities for critical supplies, such as
fuel, munitions, engineer equipment, and cold weather clothing. The Transportation
Division managed allocations for rail tonnage, rehabilitation of transportation routes, and
truck transfer operations. This allowed General Devers to maintain visibility on the status
of critical commodities and make informed allocation decisions that benefitted the overall
effort, not just one unit. 895 Although the work of prioritizing effort and allocating supplies
and transportation resources was not very glamorous, it was hugely important. The two
armies could handle the tactical fight, but Sixth Army Group was the only headquarters
that could manage the allocation of resources across southern France and provide direction
on prioritization.
The transition of headquarters responsibilities occurred within the support units as
well. As noted earlier, the Continental Base Section had begun coming ashore with the
initial assault elements and worked as a part of Seventh Army. On midnight of September
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8, the Continental Base Section assumed responsibility for the management of all beach
operations from the Engineer Shore Regiment and all supplies originating from the
Mediterranean came through the Peninsular Base Section. Its mission complete, the
Northern Base Section no longer supported Southern France.
In September, as the Allied armies were steadily advancing up through the Rhone
Valley, the logistic base remained at Marseilles. This proved to be increasingly
problematic due to the increasing distance from the ports to the front lines so Major
General Wilson proposed modifying the support structure in southern France. The single
base section could not simultaneously manage the operations of the ports, the
transportation of supplies leading to the north, and the resupply of the two armies. To
remedy the situation, Wilson proposed dividing his organization into two parts-a base
section at Marseilles and an advance element of the Continental Base Section further
forward, nearer the armies. 896
Larkin reviewed Wilson’s proposal and decided to implement it, although not quite as
Wilson had proposed. Rather than being the sole support unit in southern France, the
Continental Base Section would be one of three. Larkin directed the following changes to
the support organization effective September 26, 1944: first, the Continental Base Section
became the Continental Advance Section-an organization that would stay close to the
armies and provide all administrative support. Second, a new headquarters would manage
units operating out of the ports-the Delta Base Section. This new base section would
handle the reception of forces, equipment, and supplies into southern France and then
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transport them forward. Lastly, the effort in southern France had grown so large that the
Services of Supply of NATOUSA could not manage it from Italy. To provide a more
responsive system Larkin established a new headquarters element named “SOS
NATOUSA Advance” to oversee the Delta Base Section and Continental Advance
Section. This was a forward element of Services of Supply NATOUSA positioned itself
at Lyons France under the command of Brigadier General Morris Gilland, the Services of
Supply Chief of Staff. 897 The Services of Supply advance headquarters consisted of
approximately 1,500 men and served as the forward echelon of Services of Supply
NATOUSA, which was still in Caserta, Italy under the command of Major General
Larkin. 898 Services of Supply NATOUSA Advance worked with the sixth Army Group to
plan and manage support for the armies, but did not conduct the actual support operations;
they left these responsibilities to the Delta Base Section and Continental Advance
Section. 899
The Delta Base Section consisted of select elements of the old Continental Base
Section and Northern Base Sections, under the command of Brigadier General John Ratay,
the former Northern Base Section commander. The Continental Advance Section formed
on October 1 from the remaining parts of the Continental Base Section and stayed under
the command of Major General Wilson.
The mission of the Delta Base Section was to operate base depots near the southern
French ports, maintain the required levels of theater supplies, forward supplies to the
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Advance Section, and establish hospitals in the rear areas. 900 Units moved north while the
base section sent individual soldiers to replacement centers. Supplies and equipment were
stored in communications zone dumps and transported forward as needed. The Delta Base
Section also took care of the communications’ zone facilities, handled patient evacuation,
prisoners of war, and civilian relief efforts. The Base Section was a bulky organization
that had great capability, but little mobility in terms of relocating the unit and its facilities.
In contrast, the Continental Advance Section focused on the needs of the supported
armies, requesting replenishment from the Delta Base Section and positioning supplies in
dumps immediately behind the army area or delivering items directly to units as the
situation required. The Advance Section retained relatively few stocks on hand so it could
maintain mobility and move forward as needed. To maintain mobility and speed, the
armies maintained no more than five days worth of rations, fuel, and ammunition. The
Continental Advance Section maintained up to a 15-day level of supplies. The Delta Base
Section stored everything else. In order to limit the size of its stockpiles, the Advance
Section stored only those items that were commonly in demand and had a high turnover
rate. Other items with a slower turnover rate were stored by the base Section and
available upon request. 901
The reorganization of the support structure in southern France was a blow to Wilson’s
pride. Instead of being the senior support headquarters in the theater with a large
headquarters and correspondingly large area of responsibility, Wilson had a smaller staff,
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less responsibility, and now he had to report to a higher-level support headquarters within
France. 902 Instead of being a prime decision maker, Wilson was now an intermediary
between the Delta Base Section and the combat units. This was still an important mission,
but hardly one to guarantee promotion and advancement.
However, all the support organizations were vitally important and each had a role to
play. To determine the impact of the Delta Base Section and Continental Advance Section
one needs to look not at the size of the headquarters elements, but rather at the number of
units assigned or attached to each of the respective headquarters. As of October 6, the
Continental Advance Section had 86 separate companies and detachments; the Delta Base
Section had 133. 903 Together, these two entities supported Allied units across
approximately 64,000 square miles-a territory larger than the state of Georgia or Illinois.
To support the First French Army, French Base 901 also split its operations between
several locations. An Advance Section of Base 901 was located at Dijon on October 5,
which eventually developed into the main base, while a rear element remained at
Marseilles to supply French units operating in the rear and to coordinate with the Delta
Base Section. The separation of the two base sections (US and French) continued into
mid-October, but the situation grew increasingly cumbersome due to the growing
distances between the port and the forward element, in addition to the limited French
logistic capabilities.
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Base 901 suffered from a serious lack of equipment and workers. At the end of
September 1944, Base 901 contained only 1,200 men and 200 vehicles. The Base “was
snowed under with tasks entirely out of proportion to its still meager means.” 904 The
French were unable to support their own units, a fact that grew more evident as the
distance between the ports and combat units grew day by day. On October 22, General de
Lattre de Tassigny requested that the Continental Advance Section assume the majority of
Base 901’s responsibilities and provide all direct supply support to the First French Army.
Services of Supply NATOUSA agreed and subsumed part of French Base 901 into the
Continental Advance Section on October 24, with General Granier of the French Army
becoming the Continental Advance Section deputy commander. Select elements of Base
901 that dealt with purely French matters, such as the personnel, remained under French
control, outside of Continental Advance Section jurisdiction. 905
This was a blow to French pride and illustrated just how ineffective the French
logistics system had become. By asking the Advance Section to provide all supplies and
support, the French were admitting that they could not take care of themselves. Ironically,
this was a reversal of situation encountered 24 years earlier when the American
Expeditionary Force needed help from the French to resupply US forces along the
Western Front. This time around, the US military had the capacity and resources needed
to support the alliance. The French had needed material assistance ever since operations
in Tunisia, but they retained some semblance of a support capability. Such a capability
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was limited, however, and the demands of maintaining a mobile force up the Rhone valley
simply overwhelmed the limited French logistics system.
Support for the French forces remained a contentious topic throughout the war.
Although US commanders were glad to have the additional forces, the French held a
different attitude toward supplies, compared to US units. In France, most US units
understood the importance of conserving supplies, but the French tended to view the US
supply system as an inexhaustible source of material. French units tended to order more
supplies than needed, failed to maintain visibility of supplies under their control, and did
not enforce limits on expenditures. 906 Having dealt with the French in North Africa and
Italy, this was not surprising to the Services of Supply, but it did make the jobs of the base
sections more difficult.
More change occurred in October. On the 22nd, Lieutenant General Devers was
relieved of his role as Deputy Supreme Allied Commander for the Mediterranean. Up to
this point of the operation, Devers had been serving in two capacities: first, as commander
of the Sixth Army Group and second, as the deputy commander for General Wilson.
Lieutenant General Joseph T. McNarney assumed the role of deputy commander for the
Mediterranean, which then allowed Devers to focus on the fighting in southern France and
to report solely to Eisenhower while AFHQ could now focus solely on Italy. 907
As mentioned earlier, Devers did not enjoy the same relationship with Eisenhower as
the other three-star generals within the European theater. Eisenhower had not asked for
Devers as a commander. Marshall had originally proposed Devers as one of the
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Normandy Army Group commanders, but Eisenhower deferred and offered the position to
Bradley instead. Afterward, Marshall and the War Department assigned Devers to the
post US theater command post in the Mediterranean. Accordingly, Devers was not part of
the Normandy planning effort and ended up under Eisenhower’s command due to
circumstance, more than by design. Surprisingly, other than serving as a means to open a
new line of communication and to protect Bradley’s southern flank, SHAEF had no
detailed plans for the role of Sixth Army in defeating Germany.
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Whether this was

due to a lack of planning, an absence of vision, or the role of personalities is unclear.
Other changes occurred within the Sixth Army Group itself. On October 25, 1944,
Major General Truscott turned command of VI Corps over to Major General Edward H.
Brooks. Truscott performed admirably in southern France and left France to take
command of the Fifth Army in Italy due to the reassignment of Lieutenant General Clark
to Fifteenth Army Group.
The Services of Supply experienced perhaps the most change of all the major
organizations. On November 1, SOS NATOUSA Advance changed its title to
“Communications Zone Mediterranean Theater of Operations Advance” (COMZONE
MTOUSA Advance) to reflect the name change of its higher headquarters. Back in Italy,
AFHQ had consolidated the rear area headquarters into a single communications zone,
changing the name from the North African Theater of the US Army to the Mediterranean
Theater of the US Army. For the forces of Dragoon, there was no change in leadership or
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mission; this was simply a change in title. The Mediterranean was still responsible for all
administrative support.
This changed on November 20, when Communications Zone Mediterranean Theater of
Operations Advance became the Southern Line of Communications (SLOC). General
Larkin split the Mediterranean communications zone staff into two parts. One part
remained in Italy to coordinate support for the Fifth Army, while Larkin and the rest of the
staff moved to France and fell in on the Services of Supply advance headquarters at Lyon.
Larkin was now free to focus on the priority effort- supporting the forces of Dragoon,
while reporting solely to the European Services of Supply. 909
The Southern Line of Communication continued working on France until the middle
of February, when the two Allied lines of communication, one leading from the south and
one from the north, linked up to form a single communications zone behind the Allied
armies driving east into Germany. Major General Larkin took the Southern Line of
Communication staff and moved to Paris, where Larkin became the deputy commander of
the European Communication Zone. The Southern Line of Communication Headquarters
deactivated and members of the staff integrated into the European Communications Zone
staff. The Continental Advance Section moved forward to Nancy on February 20, 1945,
where they remained until the end of the war. 910
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Conclusion
To assess the true impact of Operation Dragoon, one needs only look at the cumulative
accomplishments of the Allied drive across France and Germany- from both the north and
south. A single advance from either of these directions could not have achieved the same
results; clearing France in six months and winning the war in Europe five months after
that. Dragoon was originally supposed to have diverted enemy forces away from
Normandy but, instead, the operation provided a larger benefit to the effort: giving the
European theater a secondary line of communication from which to pour additional
divisions and supplies into France.
The assumptions included in the invasion plan for Operation Dragoon show that the
Allied planners expected a firmer resistance, but the logistical plans also reflect the
restraints imposed by limited amounts of shipping, assault craft, and service units. Yes,
the Seventh and French first armies did experience problems with supplies, especially
fuel, almost from the initial landings, but this was caused by the pace of the operation and
the distances covered. Retreating German units were able to fall back on shortened supply
lines, while every mile advanced extended the Allied lines of communication.
Some critics might fault the Services of Supply for not providing more fuel and
transportation units earlier in the landings. Certainly, one can argue, these would have
enabled a more robust pursuit of retreating German divisions from the beaches and up
through the Vosges. Such a criticism, however, fails to consider the full context of the
situation facing planners in the summer of 1944.
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Intelligence reports indicated that there were up to 14 German divisions operating in
southern France. Any assault force had to be able to withstand an attack from such a
force, or risked losing the beaches. Additionally, the experiences of Sicily, Italy, and
Normandy all showed that Hitler had a habit of ordering his armies to resist any invasion.
Planners and commanders all agreed that the invasion force had to be ready to expect a
stern defense; as such, the force needed supplies, such as large quantities of ammunition,
to break through any resistance. Prudence required that the Services of Supply load the
vessels as they did.
What Dragoon does show is the remarkable level of capability, flexibly, and agility
that had developed in the Mediterranean forces after two years of fighting. For the first
time, the Services of Supply had to support two field armies, one of which did not use
English as a native language. Additionally, the operation was a primary effort for the
Mediterranean, but secondary in the overall war effort. This placed an even greater
importance on the management and prioritization of men, supplies, and equipment.
Concerning the larger effort in France, Dragoon proved to provide everything
Eisenhower had hoped. First, the southern communications zone eased the burden on the
northern ports by providing alternative beaches and ports to land divisions and supplies
that were unable to land in northern France due to the port congestion and the enemy
situation. As an example, in late September, Eisenhower was able to transfer the XV
Corps from Patton’s Third Army to Patch’s Seventh Army after Devers signaled
Eisenhower on September 22 that southern France could immediately handle three
additional divisions. Loaded cargo ships lying off Normandy awaiting discharge in the
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late summer of 1944 were redirected to Marseilles, where they were quickly offloaded. 911
During 1944, over 80 percent of the supplies for the Sixth Army Group came through
Marseilles. 912 The ports of northern France proved to fall to the Allies later and have less
capability than planned, while the ports of southern France came under Allied control
sooner and had greater capacities than planned. This heightened the importance of
southern France in terms of both operations and support.
Four years after the war’s end, General Marshall noted that the potential contributions
and importance of Dragoon were not readily apparent in the summer of 1944. Many
officers supported the notion of landing in southern France as a means to protect
Eisenhower’s right flank. However, the Overlord plans failed to anticipate just how
effectively the Germans could block the Normandy ports and do so for an extended
period. Officers had not fully appreciated the need for the additional ports in Overlord’s
planning, but the need became quickly evident as the operation went on. 913
Ever since the lost opportunities of Tunisia in December 1942, Eisenhower realized
that his role was not to fight the battles, but to flow as many forces and their associated
support onto the European continent as possible. This played out in the drive across
Europe. Churchill was optimistic of eventual success in the war, but had only limited
expectations of the size of the Allied force that could land on the continent. The Prime
Minister hoped to have 36 divisions standing on the Rhine by the winter of 1944, stating,
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“Liberate Paris by Christmas and none of us can ask for more.” 914 With the execution of
Dragoon, however, Eisenhower not only planned on using the 36 divisions Churchill had
mentioned, but added an additional 50 that could flow in from the south of France: 10
from the Mediterranean and 40 coming from the US. The critical element to Eisenhower’s
strategy during the European campaign was the theater’s ability to accept forces, move
them forward to the front lines, and then get them the necessary supplies and maintenance
needed to fight the battles. 915
Another commander that made a difference was the Seventh Army commander,
Lieutenant General Patch. Patch was the logisticians’ vision of a field commander.
Unlike Patton, Patch fully understood the limitations of resources, such as supplies,
equipment and shipping, and then modified strategies and plans to accommodate these
limitations. He did not have unrealistic expectations and he lived within the theater’s
limitations. This produced a force that took advantage of whatever resources were
available, was efficient in its supply operations, and did not over extend itself. 916 This
became evident throughout Dragoon. Seventh Army pushed forward as much as possible,
stressing, but not breaking the service forces. Arguably, Seventh Army made the drive up
to the Rhine as fast as possible given the limited available resources.
One officer that does not get as much recognition as he probably deserves is
Lieutenant General Devers. Devers took on the role of an Army Group Commander-a role
for which there was little specific doctrine-and properly established and operated a theater
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of war in southern France. Devers proved to be adept at pushing, but not overextending,
the limits of both his combat and support units. He forged two armies with different
nationalities and differing expectations into a cohesive fighting force. As such, Sixth
Army Group covered as much ground as it could, considering the available resources,
terrain, and level of German resistance.
Of course, the operation was not perfect, few military endeavors are. Some challenges
seen in previous operations repeated themselves in Dragoon. Seventh Army did not send
its ship loading information to the Navy until a very late date, but this was due to the late
final decision to conduct the landings. Priorities changed at the assault location, so ships
had to divert to different beaches and there was a shortage of labor on the beaches. 917
Much of this is attributable to the friction that the part of any major military operation.
The important aspect is that the levels of this type of disruption were less than they ever
had been on any of the previous major assault operations and that the service
organizations were able to react to the changes.
One of the criticisms levied against the Services of Supply during Operation Dragoon
was that the service forces stocked too much ammunition and not enough gasoline. On
average, 3,000 tons of munitions landed at Marseilles every day and stocks in base section
depots eventually grew to over 100,000 tons. 918 These arguments fail to consider the
larger picture and seemingly discount the fact that once the Germans decided to make a
stand, priorities for munitions quickly changed. The rapid advance in August and
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September placed more demand on speed, distance, and fuel than on destruction of enemy
units. However, when enemy resistance stiffened, as it did during October, demand for
munitions greatly increased, forcing the system to shift its priorities back to ammunition.
The result was that there were few large stockpiles in any of the forward locations, but
stocks were available in the rear.
The management of supplies and transportation was the only means to switch between
alternating priorities effectively. These are difficult tasks and something not taught or
experienced in peacetime. The simple facts were, firstly, southern France was a secondary
effort to that of operations in the north. Secondly, there were not sufficient truck units to
meet everyone’s needs-either in northern or southern France. Third, ammunition
expenditures increased whenever the retreating German units decided to make a stand and
this was something no planner could accurately predict. As such, supply managers had to
balance the needs of available munitions against the demand for fuel and work to find the
right balance for the situation as hand. That the base sections and Southern Line of
Communication did so, as effectively as they did, is largely attributable to the experience
gained from earlier operations.
Eventually, Sixth Army Group moved 900 miles inland in less than nine months.
Through the combined efforts of the Army Group Headquarters, the two armies, and the
Services of Supply units operating the communications zone, they collectively overcame a
myriad of logistic problems. The armies provided their requirements; the Army Group
furnished guidance on establishment of main supply routes and installations; and the
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Services of Supply developed detailed logistic plans off this general guidance. 919 Without
this team approach, a high level of experience, and spirit of cooperation, the operation
could not have progressed as well as it otherwise did.
The Southern Line of Communication faced several challenges. First, sustainment for
Sixth Army Group had to come initially from supplies and personnel in the
Mediterranean, a secondary theater that was also working to resource a major campaign in
Italy. Next, the service forces of Dragoon were under-resourced; however, the greater
experience levels of officers and men helped make up for these shortages. Finally, on
September 30, D+45, the southern line of communication was twice as long as logistic
planners had originally estimated. 920
While Sixth Army Group was facing the challenges of continuing the pursuit in
southern France, Fifteenth Army Group, now under General Mark Clark, worked to
maintain some semblance of offensive operations in Italy, but with fewer forces. The
large number of service units transferred out of Italy and sent to France meant that the
Allies in Italy could no longer maintain the same pace of operations or provide the same
level to support to the combat units that remained. Fewer service units meant that road
and rail lines deteriorated. Fewer items arrived in Italy, while many supplies were
destined for theaters with higher priorities. The port opening units and truck companies,
so vital to the success of Dragoon, came at the expense of the effort in Italy. As such, the
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buildup for the Allied assault on the German defensive line stretching from Pisa to Rimini
line noticeably slowed. 921
By the end of November, just three months since the initial landings for Operations
Dragoon, southern France had experienced a complete transformation. Planners had
expected a tough, slow fight up into the French mainland, but the circumstances proved
different from expected. The lack of resistance presented an opportunity to advance
further into France and Germany much faster than anticipated. To make such an
adjustment required a degree of mental and organization flexibility that did not exist in the
Allied force in late 1942, but did develop over time. Accordingly, the Sixth Army group
was able to take advantage of strategic opportunities, such as the rapid movement up to
the Moselle River in the early fall of 1944.
Although the base sections had to support both the US and Free French forces, the fact
that the headquarters did not have to operate with a multinational staff simplified the
overall effort. The French received US rations, equipment, and food. With the division of
French Base 901, the US support system simply treated the French First Army as another
customer-one that used the same items and received support under the same system. 922
This proved to be much easier than working to supply a similar size British force with its
differing supplies, standards of equipment, and processes.
Operation Dragoon did serve to illustrate the different attitudes toward support units
between the US and French forces. Indeed, the two nations almost seemed to be at
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extreme opposing viewpoints on the priority given to service forces. The French treated
support units as an afterthought, something to staff after the combat forces were fully
equipped and trained. The US, on the other hand, quickly developed a more balanced
approach to the fielding and deployment of service forces. The support units were never
on the same level as the combat forces, but US commanders generally recognized the
benefits of having a trained and capable rear echelon.
An indirect, but important, contribution to the effort in France came because of the
integration of select members of the Southern Line of Communication staff into the
European Communication Zone staff in November 1944. Lieutenant General Lee and the
European Services of Supply/Communication Zone staff had been under severe criticism
ever since the Normandy landings for a perceived mishandling of the sustainment effort.
With the integration of the two staffs, the Communication Zone now had a wealth of
experience to draw from. A study conducted by Major General Lutes of the Army
Services of Supply found that the European system of support relied on larger
organizations and headquarters staffs compared to those of the Mediterranean. The
service units of the Mediterranean had simply learned to conduct support operations more
efficiently over the years. 923 Lee now had a capable deputy-Tom Larkin-and the staff
sections gained the experience needed to coordinate the support effort for the remainder of
the war.
An illustration shows how experience made a difference between the two staffs. At
the northern ports, the European Communications Zone instituted a system of selective
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unloading. They brought in a ship, unloaded only priority items, and then sent the ship
back out only partially unloaded. This speeded the unloading of some essential supplies,
but limited the overall amount of supplies unloaded during a day and was extremely
inefficient. This meant that the northern communications zone held ships longer than
necessary and that a ship might make several trips in and out of a port before being
completely emptied.
In contrast, if a ship docked in southern France, the base section offloaded the entire
ship at one time and then another came in. This simple procedure was the product of two
years of experience. Yes, it required time to unload items that were not necessarily a
priority, but the system freed up merchant ships and increased daily port tonnages, thus
taking full advantage of the limited infrastructure. As such, the first act of the combined
north/south staff was to cancel the system of selective unloading unless Eisenhower
personally ordered it for a specific situation. This one change increased daily tonnage
volumes at the northern ports, which translated into more efficient and effective
operations. 924
The difference between the north and south support staffs was notable. The
Mediterranean Services of Supply had been conducting support operations for the past 24
months, while the European Services of Supply had been planning support of the crosschannel invasion for that long. While some officers moved back and forth between the
two headquarters, there does not appear to have been any extensive sharing of systems or
procedures. Each theater operated semi-independently and according to their
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commander’s priorities. This is probably largely due to the personalities of the support
commanders in the European theater, especially Lieutenant General John C. H. Lee,
Eisenhower’s communications zone commander.
Another difference between the two headquarters concerned the role of technical
service chiefs. Each technical service (transportation, quartermaster, and ordinance) had a
senior officer assigned to each of the theaters to provide advice to the theater commander
and to oversee the technical aspects of their respective operations. In the northern
communication zone, the chiefs were senior officers, typically major generals, with
established fiefdoms. The chiefs typically worked away from the main staff and
established essentially a separate chain of command within the service forces.
Within the Southern Line of Communication, the relationship was quite different.
Since the Mediterranean was a secondary theater, the chiefs of the technical services were
not as senior. Additionally, having had to support the force from the first day of landing
in North Africa, the chiefs had become more of an integral part of the AFHQ and Services
of Supply staffs. 925 This produced a situation in which the technical chiefs worked with,
instead of against, one another and the AFHQ staff, which ultimately allowed for better
support of the force.
The result, then, of the integration of the communications zones staffs is that the
nature of the European Communication Zone staff changed when it wrapped up Southern
Line of Communication into the organization. New eyes and new experience joined Lee’s
headquarters, which served to improve the systems that supported the Allied pursuit over
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the Rhine and into Germany. The integration produced a more mature and capable
headquarters to support the remainder of the war.
The integration of the two communications zone staffs, however, experienced a
number of tensions and challenges during the transition period from November 1944 to
February 1945. The War Department directed that Larkin and the Southern Line of
Communication staff would continue to handle support for the forces of the Sixth Army
Group, but senior officers in Lee’s headquarters insisted on bypassing Larkin and dealing
directly with the Continental Advance Section and Delta Base Section. Additionally,
there was no good system to segregate supplies as they left New York or as they landed at
Marseilles, so items earmarked for a particular unit may, or may not, have made it to the
right unit. Despite the challenges, the supply systems adjusted to the new arrangements
by the spring, enabling the final drive into Germany.
Perhaps the main advantage of the Sixth Army Group was that it had a trained and
efficiently organized communications zone-something that Europe did not enjoy. The
decisions and actions of the service units under Larkin’s command reflected maturity and
professionalism, allowing the support forces them to make the most of a challenging
situation. The scarcity of resources, combined with the long distances involved in the
pursuit up the Rhine Valley, would have challenged any support unit. The Sixth Army
Group communication zone managed to establish a base of support and extend it north at a
pace that would have been impossible even a year previously.
The integration of the two communications zones in France was a challenging effort,
but one that could easily be underappreciated. For all the complexity and problems
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involved with such a task, the two support staffs worked to blend the different
organizations and structures together in a manner that still supported the on-going fight at
the front, while limiting disruptions. Looking at the various war reports and personal
accounts of division and army commanders across France, most of the complaints about
supply problems occur before the two support organizations merge.
Planners had anticipated that the two communications zones would eventually unite in
Europe, but no one had predicted that the merger would occur so soon after the landings.
The two different communications zones operated with similar organizations, but there
were still differences that they had to sort out, such as how to prioritize shipping, allocate
transportation resources, and track supplies. 926 The establishment of the Southern Line of
Communication and the move of Larkin and his staff to France was an important
development to support the merge of the different organizations.
Lastly, the establishment of the southern line of communication and the landing of
additional combat divisions provided the additional combat power Eisenhower needed to
limit the risk to the forces operating out of northwestern Europe and win the war. As the
Battle of the Bulge proved-the German Army still possessed the strength needed to
conduct major operations through the end of 1944.
The additional line of communication allowed Patton’s Third Army to receive supplies
from sources other than the northern ports and provided forces that could fill in the Third
Army sector as Patton reoriented his army to the north. Had Seventh Army not taken
southern France, Eisenhower would have lacked this flexibility and additional capacity.
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Churchill had it wrong: the decisive strategic move was invading southern France, not in
keeping Fifteenth Army Group intact in Italy as the Prime Minister had so strongly
argued. What the Prime Minister missed in all of the debate over Anvil/Dragoon was the
decisive contribution the additional forces and support units would make in the battles of
eastern France and western Germany. 927 Churchill was right that Anvil/Dragoon would
have little immediate and direct effects on the efforts to break out of Normandy, but the
greater benefit occurred after the breakout-as the two theaters worked together in France.
Dragoon was the effort that led to a quicker ending of the war. Following Churchill’s
proposal to focus efforts in Italy would have required the Allies to clear Italy and then
move through the Ljubljana Gap into Slovenia and Hungary--a difficult proposal that
would have meant opening yet another theater and possibly delaying the end of the war. 928
From the time of the Teheran Conference in November 1943 and throughout 1944,
Churchill advocated a three-pronged strategy: First, support of the Overlord cross-channel
invasion. Second, consideration a secondary landing in southern France as long as it aided
the greater Overlord landings. Thirdly, strong support for the fight in Italy followed by a
right-handed turn out of the north of Italy along the Istrian peninsula and then head
towards Vienna. This would position sixty percent of the Allied strength in northern
Europe, thirty percent in Italy, and ten percent in the eastern Mediterranean. 929 Such a
move, the Prime Minister argued, could convince Turkey to enter the war, provide for
Allied dominance on the Black Sea, and provide a more direct supply link to the Soviet
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Union. 930 This also would have positioned Allied forces in the Balkans before the arrival
of the Red Army, providing a political as well as military benefit. Despite the Prime
Minister’s arguments, military considerations won out over political. Roosevelt and the
American military rejected any move into the Balkans, made the Western Front the
priority campaign, and continued the fight in Italy as a secondary effort.
Despite British predictions, Operation Anvil/Dragoon did not entirely stop the Allied
advance in Italy. Throughout the last half of 1944 and into the spring of 1945, Clark and
the Fifteenth Army Group continued to make advances up the Italian peninsula, tying
down or destroying divisions that otherwise could have reinforced the German defense in
France and Germany. One could argue that the weakening of the Fifteenth Army Group
in Italy meant the loss of a strategic opportunity; however, this argument does not fully
appreciate the difficulties the Allies would have had in exploiting any breakthrough north
of the Gothic line. Supplying the armies over the Alps would have been far more
challenging than anything yet experienced. The route into Germany from southern France
was far easier to support than its alternative from Italy and this, at the end of the day,
produced an earlier end to the war in Europe.
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Chapter IX: Unfinished Business in Italy, Assessment, and Conclusion

The last five months of fighting in Europe were merely a prolongation of the
inevitable. Operation Nordwind, Hitler’s offensive against the Sixth Army Group in
January 1945, was the last large scale attack by the German Army along the Western
Front; after this German forces retreated into the heart of Germany, while Allied forces
were advancing from both the Eastern and Western fronts. The war, although still ugly
and uncertain at the tactical level, became almost a routine at the theater level. The
combat divisions were pursuing the fight, while the service forces had established a
capable base of support and now only had to extend the lines of communications behind
the advancing armies. This was still a great effort, but by January 1945, there were
sufficient ports, roads, rail lines, pipelines, and service units to prevent any further general
shortage of supplies for the three Allied army groups. In short, by January 1945,
Eisenhower had a fully functional theater.
The US Army, in particular, had come far since the first landings in North Africa.
Commanders now had experience, equipment had improved, and tactics had evolved.
Perhaps the most significant change was one that has received little recognition from
historians- the US Army had learned how to establish an overseas theater of operations to
support large mechanized formations in modern combat. That is, the Army had learned
how to support a new type of warfare involving long distances, large numbers of aircraft,
mechanized divisions, and mobile artillery. The remarkable aspect of this is that the Army
in the Mediterranean not only learned to support its own forces, but was able to support
two separate theaters, local populations and other allied forces as well. The combat units
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did the fighting, but the theater and its service units made it all possible. The US Army
had established a new level of support never before seen, one that set the standard for all
future warfare.
The previous chapter addressed the campaign across France, but Italy was still an
ongoing effort despite the world’s focus on the European theater. This chapter will cover
the end of the fight in Italy and determine what, if any, impact Dragoon had on the
Fifteenth Army Group in Italy. Additionally, this chapter will evaluate what role the
Mediterranean had in shaping the administrative support systems used on Operation
Overlord. Thirdly, the chapter assesses why the US Army’s experiences in theater support
in the Second World War were so different from those of the First World War. In 1918,
the US theater system in Europe was on the verge of collapse. By contrast, in 1945, the
US European and Mediterranean theaters were supporting two US army groups and
performing at levels that would have been unimaginable 27 years earlier. What was
behind the change?
The reasons for this level of change were many, but foremost among them was the
development of an appreciation for the role of the communications zone in a theater of
war. A dependence on aircraft, tanks, and mobile artillery meant that the armies needed a
corresponding support element that could keep pace with the combat units, while also
supplying the quantities of fuel and ammunition so critical to modern warfare. However,
gas and bullets were just the start. Modern armies also needed food, water, repair parts,
construction supplies, medical supplies, and communications supplies, in quantities never
before encountered. The factories had to produce the materials of war, but there also had
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to be a means to get it to the right place and time in order to make a difference on the
battlefield. The communications zone and its associated support forces provided the
means to do just this. Never before had warfare been so dependent on supplies,
transportation, and maintenance. This was not widely appreciated at the beginning of the
war but successful commanders, such as Eisenhower, learned from their mistakes and
quickly gained an appreciation for the need to balance the force between combat and
support units. A look at the Allied drive north of Rome shows just how important the
communications zone was and illustrates just how proficient US service units had become
in sustaining the front lines. This is important because the levels of proficiency attained
by the Services of Supply in the Mediterranean communications zone had a direct impact
on the quality of support provided to Allied forces within the Mediterranean, while also
informing and helping to shape the support organizations and systems used in the June
1944 invasion of northwest France. Without this high level of performance by the service
units, the Mediterranean would have been unable to support offensive operations
simultaneously in both Italy and France and the European communications zone would
not have been as effective as it otherwise was. This would have had a direct impact on the
ability of the US forces to finish the war in Europe as quickly as it did.

Driving Towards the Po: The End of the Fight in Italy
While Seventh Army was busy building its forces in July 1944, preparing for the
invasion of southern France, Lieutenant General Clark and the Fifth Army were preparing
for the next stage in the battle for Italy: getting ready for the drive into the north of the
country, though the Gothic Line. To support such an operation required an adjustment to
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the US communications zone in Italy. The Peninsular Base Section was still operating out
of Naples, but as the army moved further north, the lines of communication lengthened,
stressing transportation networks. The base section needed to move forward as the army
moved further north.
The terrain north of Rome changed into a rolling plane that supported fast-paced
pursuit operations. The challenge in a pursuit is not the speed of the combat forces, but
the pace at which the line of communications zone can keep up with the advancing
formations. The pursuit depended on the establishment of bridges, roads, pipelines, and
bridges- all of which required tremendous effort and resources. The dependence on truck
transport increased as Fifth Army left railheads behind. 931 Every mile north increased the
distance from the port of Naples.
On June 8, 1944, Fifth Army captured the small port town of Civitavecchia, about 50
miles north of Rome and 150 miles north of Naples. Army and Navy engineers, along
with a force of some 500 civilian Italians, quickly went to work rehabilitating the port
facilities so that within a week the first Allied ships were discharging their cargo. The
port was of moderate size, offering a maximum discharge rate of 27,000 tons per week,
but it offered an alternative to Naples- a port already congested with the mounting of
forces for Dragoon. 932
By the end of June, Fifth Army was averaging an advance of eight miles per day and
the Peninsular Base Section needed to keep pace with the front lines. 933 Eight miles per
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day at first seems like a modest distance, but over a week, this meant an additional 56
miles between the combat units and the base section. Within a month, the front lines
would effectively outrun their supply base. To deal with this, on June 25, the Army
captured another small port located at Piombino- about 100 miles north of Civitavecchia.
Despite heavy damage and booby-traps, engineers quickly cleared the port allowing
discharge operations to begin on June 30. Piombino was larger than Civitavecchia,
offering a weekly discharge rate of 44,009 tons per week. 934 Both of these ports relieved
the pressure on Naples and shortened resupply lines to the combat units. However, Fifth
Army needed even more port capacity north of Rome to support a planned breakthrough
of the Gothic Line; the port of Leghorn offered such a facility.
Leghorn (Livorno) was a major port along the Tyrrhenian coast approximately 300
miles north of Naples. This was an attractive alternative to Naples; Leghorn was capable
of simultaneously handling eleven Liberty ships, six lighters, and one tanker. Under
guidance from Fifth Army, the 36th Infantry Division captured the port on July 19, 1944,
to the familiar scene of damage and destruction left behind by retreating German forces.
Engineers had to remove 25,000 mines from the harbor and its facilities as well as repair
all of the port’s cranes and other equipment. German engineers had blocked the northern
port entrance with eight sunken vessels; twelve more lay across the southern entrance. US
engineers worked in two shifts to blast damaged quays, fill craters, and construct berths. 935
Fortunately, most of the city’s 125,000 residents had fled the fighting so there was less
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demand for civil relief supplies and the support units could focus on opening the port.
Best of all, the port was only 35 miles from the front lines.
Figure 39: Italy

The first resupply convoy arrived at the port on September 3 and port capacities
steadily increased to a rate of 45,328 tons per week by the end of September. By the end
of November, all supplies for Fifth Army came into Leghorn and this became the new
base of operations for the Peninsular Base Section. 936 The communications zone had
successfully moved north and was ready to support the Gothic Line offensive.
The summer of 1944 proved to be one of transition for the Services of Supply in Italy
and the Peninsular Base Section. The theater was busy equipping US and French forces
for the upcoming invasion of southern France, while combat on the Italian peninsula was
transitioning from a war of attrition into a war of rapid movement. For the past six
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months, the tactical situation in Italy included slow movements and heavy demands for
ammunition. This had made supply planning and support a matter of routine. By
November, however, the nature of the fight had changed so radically that planners could
not accurately predict what the combat units might need. Brigadier General Joseph
Sullivan, the Quartermaster for Fifth Army, noted that during pursuit operations, “the
supply picture changed from day to day, hour to hour.” 937 This meant that the supporting
service units had to be ready for almost any eventuality.
In Italy, the demand for fuel grew exponentially as the pace of the pursuit increased.
In April, Fifth Army consumed 6,818,077 gallons of V-80 gasoline. By June,
consumption had increased to 11,947,986 gallons. 938 Italy was the first theater to learn
how difficult the support of pursuit operations could be; however, the Services of Supply
would soon find similar demands in northwest Europe and southern France. There was
not enough time to field additional units or new equipment- the base sections had to work
with the existing resources on hand.
The summer offensive took its toll on both men and equipment. A report from the 1st
Armored Division stated that the division had been in constant combat since May 1944
and was having problems with vehicle availability. Despite an intensive maintenance
program, only 15 of 172 medium tanks and 11 of 115 light tanks were serviceable, largely
for lack of repair parts. All of the Division’s 54 ammunition-carrier half-tracks needed
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replacement, along with 250 cargo trucks and 350 jeeps. 939 Fifth Army was tired and
needed refitting before advancing further north. Around July 20, General Clark approved
a pause in operations along the Arno River. This pause gave units the time needed to refit,
reequip, and prepare for the next major push across the Gothic Line and up to the Alps.
On August 31, Fifth Army resumed the offensive. The operation pause had
accomplished its objective- Fifth Army was refreshed and able to apply tremendous
firepower against the defending Germans. Allied bombers cut all of the German supply
lines leading into Italy. Although not certain, the battle’s outcome was favorable for the
Allies.
Attacking in concert with Fifth Army, the Eighth Army made good progress in the east
and quickly penetrated the Gothic Line by September 2, but failed to achieve a complete
breakthrough. Fifth Army also made good progress, but found stiffened German
resistance in the mountainous terrain surrounding Il Giogo Pass. Cleverly concealed
German defensive positions made of reinforced concrete slowed Fifth Army’s advance
and forced the 34th Infantry Division to resort to heavy artillery bombardments.
Ammunition ran low for several front line infantry companies, forcing commanders to dig
in at night, while porters carried supplies forward. A six-day battle for the pass required
all of the power Fifth Army could muster, but the plan worked. By September 18, the Il
Giogo Pass was in American hands and the Germans were abandoning the Gothic Line
defenses.
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Although Fifth and Eighth Armies had broken through the Gothic Line, neither had
been able to accomplish the primary objective of destroying the German Tenth Army and
advancing north of the Po River. The Allied Combined Chiefs realized that, due to
siphoning off units for Dragoon, the Fifteenth Army Group did not have sufficient units or
resources to achieve the necessary combat ratio of a three-to-one superiority needed for an
attack, so the likelihood of success in Italy was slim.
The loss of forces to Dragoon had three direct implications in Italy. First, there were
insufficient forces remaining in Italy to rotate fresh troops constantly on the front lines.
Second, the loss of so many service units slowed down the entire Allied advance. Third,
the loss of assault craft precluded options to conduct amphibious landings past German
defensive lines. 941 The two operations in France were the priority and the Allies would
not, and could not, divert resources away from the main effort. Italy was destined to
remain a secondary effort, able to tie up German divisions, but not necessarily defeat
them.
Modest advances with little strategic gain, other than continuing to engage the German
Tenth Army, characterized the remainder of the war in Italy. The fall campaign in the
Apennines Mountains led to a winter impasse. The fast pursuit of the summer regenerated
back to a slow fight in the mountains and the use of pack mules. Snow, ice, and fog
prevented any large-scale advance. All sides used the winter to rest and regroup, hoping
to return to the offensive in the spring. General Clark moved up to take command of the
15th Army Group in December, while General Truscott assumed command of Fifth Army.

941

Administrative Planning, 71-72.

468

The rail line that ran from Leghorn to the Po Valley and up to the Apennines
mountains operated off electricity. As with Naples, the retreating Germans destroyed all
electrical generation equipment, cut transmission lines, blew a foot long piece out of every
rail, and destroyed culverts, bridges, and tunnels. In addition, the Germans took all
locomotives and railcars with them. US Army engineers decided to rebuild the rail line
north of the Arno River and used a South African Mines Brigade from the British to open
tunnels. Construction materials came from local Italian mills such as the Tierne Steel
Works. Reconstruction of the line started on February 12, 1945 and finished on March 27,
three days ahead of schedule. The operation involved over 2,500 men to repair 44 miles
of damaged track, but provided a valuable link in the resupply network for the soon-to-be
advancing army. 942
Figure 40: The fight for Northern Italy, April-May 1945 943
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The final spring Allied offensive called for the capture of Bologna, an advance to the
Po River, and an advance on Verona and Lake Garda. 944 The attack began on April 9,
with Eighth Army; Fifth Army started their attack on April 14. British and US support
forces had resupplied both armies over the winter and now the 15th Army Group possessed
sufficient strength to break through the German defenses. By April 20, both armies had
breached German defenses south of the Po and were racing north into the Po River Valley.
Fighter-bombers engaged in an aerial pursuit of retreating German units. To support the
fight, the Peninsular Base Section extended a fuel pipeline to within two miles of the front
and within sight of the German force at Bologna. The force of the attack, combined with
German shortages of supplies, produced a campaign that lasted only two and a half
weeks. 945
Some units did experience sporadic supply shortages, but these were isolated and
quickly resolved. The 34th Division was attacking the Genghis Khan defensive line south
of the Po River in mid-April and found itself stalled because of a shortage of ammunition,
particularly for mortars. After the division sent word up the chain of command that
conservation was not going to achieve a breakthrough, Field Marshal Alexander lifted the
ammunition restrictions and within a few hours, the 34th had its munitions and achieved
the desired breakthrough. 946
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Strategically, the Allies were driving the Germans into the Alps. The Fifteenth Army
Group was pushing north from Italy, while the Sixth Army Group was now moving
southeast through Bavaria and towards Austria. Patton’s Third Army was moving south
down the Danube Valley. On April 22, the 10th Mountain Division made the initial
crossing of the Po River and began closing the escape routes in the northern part of the
valley. A week later, on May 2, the German surrender in Italy was complete.
In a series of questions put to German commanders following the war, Field Marshal
Kesselring noted that like the Allies, the key to German resupply was transportation. In
Italy, the German military used all means available to move material: roads, rail, ships,
and planes. Allied interdiction of one form meant a shift to other modes. For instance, if
the Allies interdicted the rail lines, the Germans shifted to roads and air transport to make
up the difference. 947
Allied air attacks on the German lines of communication were effective, but only for a
limited period. Attacks succeeded in halting resupply efforts, but German engineers
became quite proficient at quickly repairing damaged roads, rail, bridges, and tunnels.
In 1944, Hitler, like the Allies, considered the Mediterranean a secondary theater of
war. However, during large battles the German High Command viewed Italy as a major
theater and provided a corresponding allotment of supplies and other resources for that
specific engagement. 948 Partisan warfare represented a constant threat to the lines of
communications, especially during the period of withdrawal for Italy. 949 Most difficult
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was the resourcing of additional of German combat units, which were critically short
across all the fronts.
Surprisingly, the intense Allied bombing effort in Italy proved to have a negligible
impact on German logistics. Despite the level of air superiority that the Allies enjoyed,
they were never able to cut all of the different German lines of communications. The
redundant nature of the German system allowed Kesselring’s supply and transportation
units to shift between transportation modes, thus ensuring a constant supply flow - one
that could sustain defensive operations. However, the secondary nature of the theater and
the other demands for German units and supplies meant that the Germans could not give
Kesselring the resources needed to break through the Allied lines.
It would be unfair to characterize the Allied campaign in Italy as a secondary effort
and imply that it held little strategic value. Indeed, like the rest of the operations in the
Mediterranean, Italy did not win the war, but it contributed in important ways to the
overall war effort. Specifically, the fight for Italy forced Hitler to provide units, men, and
resources that the Germans otherwise could have diverted to the Eastern or Western
Fronts. Additionally, occupying Italy helped clear the eastern Mediterranean of any
German air or sea threat, thus allowing for secure shipments of Allied war material
between North Africa, Italy, and southern France. Finally, the efforts to seize, clear, and
develop seaports provided valuable experience that had a direct and significant impact on
later similar operations in northwest Europe and southern France. Italy provided the
training ground for establishing communications zones, a skill lacking during Operation
Torch and not necessary during Operation Husky. Italy did become a secondary effort in
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the Mediterranean after June 1944, but this is exactly what should have happened and does
not negate the important benefits that enabled the Allied effort across the European
theater. The fight in Italy, as in previous Allied operations, matured the force and allowed
the service forces to refine the systems, i.e. transportation and supply management, needed
to support a theater.

Learning Organizations
Statistics provide a means of illustrating just how capable the Peninsular Base Section
had become by the end of 1944. The Ordnance section of the Base Section established a
storage depot plant at Leghorn starting from scratch. This quickly developed into a fully
functional facility that could handle over 76,000 Ordnance items and consisted of 662,000
square feet of covered storage and over 6 million square feet of open storage. One heavy
maintenance company built a vehicle assembly plant (similar to the Twin Unit Pack (TUP)
operations of North Africa) out of a burned out hulk of a building that had no roof.
Engineers installed support trusses and a roof; mechanics installed lifts and cranes. This
one plant alone assembled 5,000 light and medium cargo trucks per month. To provide
construction materials, base section engineers operated 60 civilian mills with a monthly
output of five and a half million board feet of lumber. Outside Leghorn, Quartermasters
opened one of the largest depots of the war. The depot was two miles long and a half-mile
wide with nine miles of internal roadways. This facility was in full operation only a
month after the Fifth Army had seized the town. The Base Section contained 109
hospitals, which cared for 82,570 patients from October 1943 until April 1945 and
surgical units were located closer to the front lines than ever before. A laboratory at
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Bagnoli, one of two of its kind in the entire war, conducted advanced research on
infectious diseases and pioneered new treatments, such as whole-blood transfusions and
secondary wound closures, and studies on acute hepatitis. 950
The base sections of the Mediterranean had refined their organizations to such a level
that one organization under the command of a brigadier general could provide the supply,
maintenance, signal, transportation, and engineer needs of entire army-group of over
250,000 men. Base sections existed in the First World War, but were insignificant in
comparison to those that developed in the Mediterranean and European theaters a quarter
of a century later. Men such as Tom Larkin, Arthur Wilson, Arthur Pence, John Ratay,
and Francis Oxx (all base section commanders) provided the leadership and vision
necessary to meld these organizations into a holistic support system that could provide
supplies to the front, evacuate and care for the wounded, and repair everything from a tank
to a typewriter. These capabilities did not just occur - they developed over time. The
campaign in the Mediterranean provided the time needed to train and develop the force.
Conscript armies need time to hone skills and transform a group of individuals into a
viable team. America’s tradition of building large armies only in time of war meant that
in late 1942 and 1943 everyone in the Army had to learn a new job and operate with new
levels of forces. Inductees had to learn how to be a soldier. Existing soldiers had to learn
how to operate with increased rank and larger formations. Generals had to learn how to
work with other Allied nations. Everyone had to learn how to use and repair new types of
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technology and equipment. The early years of the war were a time of continual growth,
learning, and adjustment.
Unlike the experiences of the First World War, this time the US learned how to
resource, outfit, and use service forces. Combat units still tended to view communications
zone forces as second-class citizens, especially for colored units, but senior leaders now
had a better appreciation for the importance of maintaining a capable support force.
Whereas in 1918 the US could always fall back on its European partners for assistance,
this time there was no one to fall back on. France, Britain, Russia, and Brazil were all
relying on some level of US supply assistance. The communications zone and its
associated base sections provided the means to accomplish this support.
Other service units not assigned to the base sections likewise took pride in developing
the best support systems possible. The Quartermaster of the Fifth Army, Brigadier
General Sullivan, lamented that Fifth Army had developed an exceptional supply system
in Italy and that the Services of Supply was trying to infringe on Fifth Army’s territory.
Moreover, besides supporting US soldiers, the Fifth Army service units were working to
support up to 30,000 partisans as well by December 1944. 951 Rather than being a
traditional dumping ground for poor performing officers (as had been the case in the First
World War) , the service units in the Mediterranean were generally led by competent
officers and with a sense of professionalism. Some ineffective combat officers still did
find their way into the Services of Supply, but not to the degree seen in the First World
War. Official orders from the theater often cited the award of a Meritorious Service
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Medal to a service unit soldier- something that would have been unheard of in Pershing’s
day.
However, successful support operations depended on more than just competent
leadership. The base sections and other administrative units needed to learn from their
mistakes and develop innovative methods of confronting the challenges faced in
supporting hundreds of thousands of men. Adaptation and flexibility were two key
hallmarks of the Mediterranean service units. These qualities allowed support units to
become learning organizations, building on success, and eliminating any system or
process that did not work as planned. As an example, the War Department developed
Special Engineer Brigades in response to poor beach control operations during Operation
Torch. These groups ran the beaches in Sicily, but Seventh Army failed to manage them
effectively. By the time of the Italian invasion, doctrine had changed, allowing Fifth
Army to avoid the pitfalls uncovered in Sicily. First and Seventh Armies then carried this
doctrine forward for both the landings in Normandy and southern France, resulting in the
highest level of beach operations achieved to date.
The beaches of France still had some level of problems in the summer of 1944, but
nothing compared to what they would have looked like if the base sections had not gone
through this series of trials throughout the different operations. The Mediterranean
provided a safe means to develop the units and systems needed to support the invasion of
the European mainland. However, innovation and leadership alone did not make for
successful units.
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Relations among the various US units within the Mediterranean were generally
agreeable, having matured since 1942. There was a certain amount of tension and
occasional disagreement between the services, as well as combat and support forces, but
not to a level that impaired operations. Indeed, the relationships between combat and
support units in the Mediterranean were very different from those experienced during the
First World War. This was partly due to the shared hardships experienced during the
various campaigns, plus an enhanced appreciation for the role that each played on the
modern battlefield.
General Eisenhower set a common tone for the theater by approaching everything
from a sense of teamwork and cooperation. This applied to coalition relationships with
British and French partners, as well as to the different Army components of the theater:
combat, support, and Air Force. The fight for Tunisia convinced Eisenhower that each
element of the Allied force had a role, and his job as the overall commander was to make
each part work in concert with the others. This is a seemingly simple concept, but was
exceedingly important because it established the overall atmosphere of respect and
cooperation.
Major General Thomas Larkin was another important personality, but one that has
received little attention from history. Larkin proved to be the best support officer of the
theater, partly due to his level of professional competence, but also because of his amiable
personality. He received respect from combat, air, and service commanders across the
Mediterranean theater. Eisenhower had a high level of respect for Larkin and hoped to
take the Services of Supply commander to Europe with him for the European invasion.
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Responding to a formal request from Eisenhower, the new US theater commander in the
Mediterranean, Lieutenant General Devers, simply responded, “Cannot see my way clear
to releasing Larkin.” 952 Thomas Larkin had something that John C.H. Lee, the European
Services of Supply commander, did not: a personality that could work well with others. 953
The dissimilarity in commanders represents one of the most important differences
between the two communications zones. In Europe, Lee worked to consolidate power and
control all aspects of administrative support, often enraging other commanders. Larkin,
on the other hand, acted as part of a larger team and did not try to overextend the authority
of the Mediterranean Services of Supply. This is one of the main reasons that the
European support structure did not take full advantage of everything that US logisticians
had learned in the Mediterranean- Lee intentionally did not want to emulate the
Mediterranean support structure. To do so would have required a lessoning of Lee’s
authority and reach.
Larkin was a laudable commander, but he certainly did not work alone. Assisting him
was a proficient staff and experienced base section commanders. The theater staff worked
closely with the Services of Supply staff and, by 1944, everyone had worked out their
specific responsibilities. The technical service chiefs integrated themselves into the
organization and worked in concert with one another, as well as with theater and Services
of Supply staffs. In essence, the different operations of the Mediterranean allowed a sense
of respect and trust to develop across the entire support community-this took time to
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create and was not readily exportable to the European theater. The European Services of
Supply had to go through their own growing pains.

Assessment of Support Across the Mediterranean
Although the Allied leaders did not approach the Mediterranean with a long-term
strategy in 1942, or even 1943, several positive factors developed because of the
operations across Africa, Sicily, and Italy. First, operations in the Mediterranean provided
the means to store a vast quantity of supplies that could not only support the
Mediterranean campaigns, but later operations in France and Germany as well. Algeria,
Morocco, and Tunisia all became hosts of large supply depots to support the ground, air,
and sea forces. The stocks held in Africa helped support the move to Sicily. Africa and
Sicily supported the drive into Italy. Italy and Africa served as bases of operations for
southern France. Having these supplies stored within the theater meant that transportation
officers needed less ships to move the supplies, because the length of the trip was reduced,
compared to bringing in supplies from the US or Great Britain. Having locally available
supplies also meant that service units could react faster to the changing requirements of
combat units, as was seen in Italy and France. In short, maintaining a local source of
supplies provided more options and reduced the levels of risk for the theater commander.
To illustrate just how much material was available, in December 1944, there were still
100,000 tons of supplies in North Africa alone. 954 This allowed the War Department to
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focus most of its efforts on resupplying the European theater. The Mediterranean still
needed some level of supply from the US, but at a significantly lower rate.
Secondly, the Mediterranean offered senior US leaders the chance to discover the
implications associated with supporting large quantities of modern military machines.
Those commanders that had theater responsibilities learned to grasp the challenges and
subtleties of supporting modern warfare, such as the need for a commander to adequately
resource both the rear areas, as well as the combat areas, and to set priorities for resources
between units. Eisenhower never forgot the lost opportunity for a quick seizure of
Tunisia- the lesson stayed with him for the rest of the war and shaped all of his future
decisions regarding force composition. The concepts of landing a balanced force,
maintaining supply accountability, and providing accurate projections for resources were
not necessarily new ideas in warfare, but they all assumed a much greater importance in
the effort to resource a modern, mobile force. These elements gave US commanders an
edge over the enemy by allowing their forces to react more quickly and with greater force,
to opportunities on the battlefield.
Some commanders never spent much time worrying about the details of where their
support was coming from, only that it was there at the needed time. Patton provided
possibly the best example of this. When asked about Third Army’s gasoline situation
during the drive across France in the fall of 1944, Patton replied, “I got a guy that looks
after that.” 955 This is a surprising answer for a commander that clearly recognized that
fuel was the single commodity that enabled his movements and often determined tactical
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success. However, this is also evidence of how the US system worked. Tactical
commanders (army-level and below) focused on moving their forces and defeating the
enemy. Higher-level commanders (those at army-group and theater) dealt with the factors
that made the tactical commanders successful, such as providing supplies, replacements,
and additional units. During the drive through Europe, both Bradley and Devers were
personally making tonnage allocations among their assigned armies. The fact that tactical
commanders could leave the support details to others is testimony to the overall
effectiveness of the administrative system.
Although most of the senior logistics officers tended to remain within a single theater
during the duration of the war, there was some sharing of ideas and systems across the
Mediterranean theater and with the European theater. As an example, three months prior
to the invasion of southern France, supply officers from Seventh Army visited Fifth Army
in Italy to observe its supply methods as the army moved north, toward the Apennines.
Later, several members of the Fifth Army G4 joined the Seventh Army staff to assist in
the invasion of southern France. For Operation Overlord, supply planners began
conducting technical studies in October 1943, focusing their concerns on fuel and other
petroleum products. The Chief Quartermaster of the European theater, Major General
Robert Littlejohn, gathered usage data from North Africa, Sicily, Italy, and the South
Pacific to help inform the study. 956 Additionally, planners patterned the transportation
system for Overlord on the Fifth Army system used in Italy. 957 To control the local

956

Report of Operations, 12th Army Group, dated 31 July 1945. Volume XII. MHI. 178.
Press Release, “How Fifth army Won the War of Logistics.” Dated 2 December 1944. Located in the Joseph
Sullivan Diary, 2 August 1944 to 31 December 1944. Fort Lee.
957

481

population, civil affairs officers jumped into Normandy with the 82d and 101st Airborne
Divisions, as well as landed on the beaches. These efforts took advantage of the lessons
learned in the Mediterranean and occurred because many of the mid-level staff officers
assigned to First Army had experience in the North African, Sicilian, and Italian
campaigns and they took this experience with them to develop the logistical support plans
for the invasion of northwest Europe. 958 The II Corps Quartermaster, Colonel Andrew
McNamara, accompanied General Bradley to England. Unfortunately, on-going
operations in Italy and the upcoming assault into southern France meant that many
experienced officers needed to remain in the Mediterranean. As such, the European
theater did not receive as many experienced officers, as it needed.
The principal problem affecting operations during Operation Overlord was that of
ports and transportation. 959 This was a surprise to no one- these were the same problems
experienced in North Africa and Italy. One aspect that was new to the Allies was the
effort required in conducting fast-paced pursuit operations. American planners had
experienced small-scale pursuits in Tunisia and Sicily, but nothing prepared them for the
scales encountered north of Rome or in France. Commanders and planners alike expected
German defenders to contest every inch of ground so they planned for slow, constant
advances across France and into Germany. These assumptions proved false when the
Allies broke though German defensive lines and began pursuing the retreating enemy.
The speed of the advance in Europe quickly degenerated into a simple equation of how
much food and fuel the base sections could push forward to the armies. In the summer of

958
959

Report of Operations, 12th Army Group, dated 31 July 1945. Volume XII. MHI. 180.
Report of Operations, 12th Army Group, dated 31 July 1945. MHI. 21.

482

1944, advancing US armies outran the lines of communication in Italy, as well as northern
and southern France. Supply and transportation units were overtaxed and there was little
time or men available to build up reserve supplies. Commanders, such as Eisenhower,
Clark, Bradley, Patton, and Devers faced the difficult choice of keeping pressure on the
retreating Germans and outrunning the supporting lines of communication, or slowing the
rate of advance and allowing supplies to catch up. In every case, commanders elected to
push forward as far and fast as possible, knowing they would outrun their service forces,
and then pause operations only when supplies ran out, or when the enemy decided to make
a defensive stand. 960 Critics may make the claim that US support units failed to keep pace
with operations. 961 The truth is that commanders, such as Eisenhower and Bradley,
consciously elected to outrun their logistics and then paused to allow the base sections to
catch up. Supply planners knew even before the D-Day landings that the Allies needed a
one-month operational pause west of Paris to allow engineers time to build the rail
lines. 962 Bradley’s decision to disregard this pause placed an enormous demand on the
support forces, but offered the greatest rewards. Yes, the theater logistics structure in
Europe did cause some initial confusion, but the larger issue was that commanders
knowingly deciding to move faster than the base sections could support.
The resiliency of the US support system became evident during the Battle of the
Bulge. The European Services of Supply handled support for all the US armies, meaning
that the three army commanders within Bradley’s 12th Army Group (George Patton,
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Courtney Hodges, and William Simpson) did not have organic support forces. Rather, the
Services of Supply resupplied the force. This allowed Bradley to maneuver the armies
quicker than otherwise would have been possible because the movements made little
difference logistically. The Services of Supply could support a US army just as easily in
the 21st Army Group sector as in the 12th Army Group sector.
On December 20, Eisenhower agreed to shift the army-group boundaries.
Montgomery’s 21st Army Group gained responsibility for the US First and Ninth Armies,
leaving the 12th Army Group with Patton’s Third Army. The change in organization
allowed Montgomery to focus on the defense of the Ardennes salient, while Bradley dealt
with the area south of the salient. This made logical sense and required little change for
the Services of Supply.
The Allied air forces underwent a similar reorganization. The US IX and XXIX
Tactical Air Commands transferred to the British Second Tactical Air Force. Fighterbombers from the US IX Tactical Air Command transferred to the XIX Tactical Air
Command to support Patton’s upcoming counter attack against the bulge. 963 Commands
changed across the front, but the Services of Supply was able to adapt quickly to the
changes because of centralized oversight and management.
The Battle for the Bulge presented challenges that rivaled the Normandy landings.
During the initial phases of the campaign, First Army used 37 truck companies in 196
convoys to withdraw 250,000 men from the forward areas. Shortly thereafter, the
Services of Supply began planning for the destruction or evacuation of any supplies that
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fell in the German direction of advance. Near Malmedy, quartermaster units evacuated
over 3,217,000 gallons of fuel from 17-22 December 1944. 964 Simultaneously, the
Services of Supply had to adjust its supply lines to meet the new boundaries and changing
command structures.
The European Services of Supply performed a tremendous task in supporting First and
Third Armies, while also working to relocate supplies out of the danger areas. The fluid
situation forced a widespread transfer of service units among the armies as the Third
Army wheeled north to counter the German attack. As the Third Army swung north, the
Sixth Army Group adjusted its orientation and supply bases to occupy the vacant Third
Division sectors. The 12th Army Group’s Report of Operations noted, “Close coordination
between the European communications zone and the two armies was essential to
uninterrupted support.” 965 The relatively good supply situation allowed US commanders
to quickly defeat the German threat and then advance though the Siegfried Line. 966
Whether the US military could have achieved this same level of agility and responsiveness
a year earlier is arguable.
The main difference between the European and Mediterranean theaters appears to have
been the different approaches to support planning. The Mediterranean tended to have two
separate staffs: AFHQ with its US theater responsibilities managed the overall planning
effort, determined priorities, and made allocations for resources. The Services of Supply
in NATOUSA handled the execution of the support effort and only assisted with long
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range planning. This proved to be a viable and efficient system, which refined itself over
time and generally worked as designed. For operations, the Services of Supply planned
the mounting of forces, while AFHQ and NATOUSA worked out the support plan for the
assault and any follow-on movements.
In Europe, however, Lieutenant General Lee and the European Services of Supply
argued that they should have total responsibility for the logistics plan and execution. This
was an important distinction from the Mediterranean and it created a situation whereby the
European Services of Supply perhaps spent too much time planning for the landing phase
of the operations and not enough time working out the details of follow-on operations.
Confusion arose in Normandy when the European Services of Supply sent in a
headquarters Advance Section without clear responsibilities and authorities, forcing the
theater to enact a complete revision of the supply system between September and
December 1944. 967
Immediately following the war, the investigative General Board of the European
Theater found that the Services of Supply and the US European Theater Headquarters had
failed to define the relationships between the various levels of command within the theater
and had failed to clarify the relationships and responsibilities of the technical and
administrative services. 968 The Mediterranean theater avoided this problem because they
were engaged in supporting the war from the first landings in North Africa and had the
benefit of several campaigns to work out any problems. In Europe, however, combination
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of a lack of interaction between the different staffs, combined with a certain level of hubris
from General Lee and the technical chiefs, produced an atmosphere of confusion and
distrust. Tactical commanders initially had high praise for the Services of Supply, but by
September 1944 were cursing the widespread shortages and calling Lee and the
communications zone a failure; a criticism only partly deserved. 969
Besides seeing changes to the support system, the experiences of the Mediterranean
had a direct impact on how the theaters equipped individual soldiers for amphibious
assaults. Troops landing in North Africa carried two barracks bags that included such
extraneous items as wool blouses, extra leggings, and neckties; items hardly essential for
combat. 970 Soldiers tossed many of these items on the beaches, seeking to lighten their
loads as much as possible. In Normandy, combat troops carried a blanket roll with only
small items of personal clothing. Changes, such as these, lessoned the load on soldiers,
reduced supply requirements, and made the transportation system more efficient.
Perhaps no greater change occurred than in the feeding and care of soldiers.
Quartermaster units in North Africa initially had difficulties incorporating fresh fruits or
meat into the daily rations. However, research, new technologies, and additional service
units all combined to provide improved rations to the force, as well as fresh supplements
for the daily menu. By the summer of 1944, US soldiers were receiving a standard of
support never previously experienced in warfare. Fresh bread, meat, and eggs became
routine. Soldiers received new razor blades, cigars, and cigarettes in both the forward and
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rear areas, all contributing to morale. The base sections provided laundry services while
troops took a hot bath. Graves Registration units implemented a burial system that
resulted in a recovery rate and identification of 98 percent of the US war dead. 971 All of
this had a direct influence on soldier morale and was a product of the experiences obtained
in the Mediterranean.
One aspect of theater support that historians have largely ignored is the magnitude of
the depot-level maintenance capability that grew within the base sections. Base shops
built conveyor assembly lines to rebuild tank and truck engines. Ordnance units repaired
or rebuilt broken power trains and hydromatic transmissions. The salvage effort became a
major part of the theater’s responsibilities- every item salvaged and repaired represented
one less item that had to come from the US. Entire units focused on the repair of
typewriters, which were essential to the communications and administrative effort.
Specialized medical repair units took care of surgical instruments. Keeping up with the
flow of damaged and destroyed equipment meant tracking mechanics as well as repair
parts.
Supporting the fight meant not only taking care of the combat forces, but providing
essential supplies to local populations as well. The campaigns of North Africa showed the
importance of civil affairs forces and AFHQ had these lessons reinforced throughout
Sicily as well as Italy. By the time Rome fell, Services of Supply planners had learned to
conduct civil affairs planning in concert with the development of an operation’s overall
concept of support. Sicily, especially, had helped shape civil affairs planning due to the
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impoverished state of the local population and the lack of supplies to address the problem.
The experience of Sicily prompted Brigadier General F. J. McSherry, the European Civil
Affairs chief, to ask for 705,000 tons of food for civil affairs efforts in Europe; he got it. 972
Sicily showed the importance of providing food, Naples demonstrated the need for
medical support and fuel. Together, the Mediterranean campaigns each presented
different civil affairs problems, each of which informed the planning for Overlord. At the
theater level, the staff officer for civil government, the G5, prepared the estimates for civil
needs, while the logistics officer, the G4, insured these requirements did not adversely
affect military needs.
Some of the more memorable challenges for the base section commanders came not
from supporting armies of hundreds of thousands of men or entire civilian populations, but
rather from responding to special requests. General Arthur Wilson and the Atlantic Base
Section took care of all administrative requirements for Churchill’s recuperation from
pneumonia in Morocco, from December 26, 1943 until January 14, 1944. The shopping
list for the Prime Minister was extensive and hard to fill. With less than a week’s notice,
the base section had to find two dozen half-bottles of champagne, one dozen bottles of
Spanish brandy, four dozen bottles of light sherry, two dozen bottles of dark sherry, and
soda water. The Taylor Villa also required a French chef and “an able quantity of chicken,
partridge, and duck.” 973 Named “Operation Adult,” the Atlantic Base Section supplied
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the Prime Minister and his party with food and drink until Churchill’s departure from
North Africa.
As trivial as Operation Adult may seem at first, support missions like these played an
important role in the conduct of theater business. Just as soldiers on the front lines needed
ammunition, water, and fuel to do their job, the different levels of headquarters needed
everything from paper, to typewriters, to high-end food and drink to accommodate the
needs and demands of senior leaders. Warfare has a political dimension and items such as
scotch and French wines were just a part of the environment. Care for a national Allied
leader had the highest priority, even if it meant flying in special shipments of gourmet
items from across Europe. A happy Prime Minister was more likely to accede to a theater
commander’s desires and support proposed plans.
However, aside from learning to care for men such as Churchill and Roosevelt, the
Mediterranean Services of Supply learned a number of important lessons in providing
support to a deployed joint force- lessons that directly shaped future operations through
the end of the Korean War. In prepared remarks for the Air War College in 1951, General
Larkin provided the following observations regarding the major lessons learned from his
experience in the Mediterranean. First, quantities of supplies have little meaning if you do
not know what you have, as well as the locations of specific items. Second, every theater
needs a single organization in charge of the communications zone and this cannot be the
theater headquarters. Along the same lines, do not have a separate Services of Supply
headquarters and communications zone headquarters. Third, every man in the theater
needs to have a sense of supply discipline, meaning that everyone needs to take care of his
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or her own equipment and only order what the unit needs-no more. This is the only way
to deal with constrained resources and limited amounts of service forces. 974 The
underlying factor in all of this was the need to develop a sense of trust between the combat
and service units.
Larkin’s lecture notes that it took three months from the initial North African landings
until the formation of the Mediterranean Services of Supply. Interwar support doctrine
was simply inadequate for the situation and the theater needed to develop new
organizations and systems. The formation of the Services of Supply was just the start; the
Mediterranean theater would adjust its support systems and administrative headquarters up
until the end of the war. The Mediterranean Services of Supply of early 1943 was in its
infancy and needed time to grow. Had the Allies landed in France in 1943, there would
not have been sufficient time to develop, test, and mature a similar type of organization.
The operations of the Mediterranean served as an essential Petri dish for support doctrine,
which the European theater would need to defeat the German military.
Changes in the theater support structures provided a number of benefits to the force,
namely better management of supplies, improved utilization of service units, and more
responsiveness to changing conditions. For Operation Torch, the supplies loaded into the
first convoys were predetermined and the base sections were unable to make any changes,
even if the convoy had not yet sailed from New York. 975 By the time of Operation
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Dragoon, the base sections could change the unloading schedule of specific vessels and
make short-notice changes to any convoy that had yet to sail.
Allied operations in North Africa showed the many support problems that required
resolution before engaging in a fight for the European continent. As noted earlier,
packaging materials for many items were ill suited for a cross-ocean voyage or open
storage in a demanding environment. Systems seemingly as mundane as the marking of
crates needed complete revision by the War Department. 976 In short, in 1943 the US was
not logistically ready to fight the German military in a direct confrontation on the
European mainland.
An important outcome of the Mediterranean campaigns was a better understanding and
appreciation among planners and commanders of the other types of units (i.e. supply,
communications, port, etc.) needed to support the combat divisions. Simply put, a
division could not fight by itself; a division needed other units to help support operations.
Each subsequent operation helped inform the planners as to how many support and
administrative personnel needed to accompany the divisions, or follow in close support.
Adhering to such factors helped shape the balanced force that was important for long-term
operations. By 1944, planners and commanders, from the War Department down to the
divisions, had grasped the notion that the soldiers assigned to a division were just the start
of a more comprehensive package of forces for any operation. The name given to the total
of the division and its accompanying support forces was “divisional slice.”
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The divisional slice represented the most generic of planning factors, but proved very
accurate for planning any large-scale operation. The divisional slice had three main
components: the combat division, additional corps and army level combat forces, and
support forces that are not within the division. The divisional slice represented the total of
forces needed to employ each division. The following table shows the breakdown for a
divisional slice in 1944 and illustrates the broad differences each nation took regarding
army service forces.
Table 1: Analysis of a Divisional Slice 977

Average Division
Average nondivision combat
forces
Average nondivision service
forces
Total

United States

Great Britain

Germany

Russia

13,400

16,000

12,100

6,000

11,300

14,000

5,000

5,840

18,700

10,000

-

-

43,400

40,000

17,100

11,840

This table highlights several important differences among the various belligerents.
First, the US and Great Britain had to include service forces in their formations to support
modern, mobile warfare in overseas lands. Operation Torch proved that a division could
not fight long by itself and the service forces provided the means to move and sustain the
force in combat. However, despite the benefit, the overhead that accompanied each
division was a constant source of debate among Allied leaders. Men, such as Churchill,
General Marshall, and the commander of US Ground Forces, Lieutenant General Lesley
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McNair, complained throughout the war about having so many men tied up in service
units. Leaders in the states worked to reduce the number of service units, while
commanders in the theaters clamored for more. There was a constant tug and pull as the
War department struggled to balance of the demands for manpower. Over time, leaders
grew to recognize the need for service units, although they continued to fight to keep
numbers at the absolute minimum. Regardless, these support units were clearly essential
to supporting modern warfare and they were a large reason behind the Allied victory.
Germany and Russia chose a different approach to logistical support of their armies.
Instead of conscripting large numbers of service forces, these nations used interior lines of
communication, contractors, and civil authorities to move supplies forward from the
factories. Using interior lines of communication, Germany and Russia could use their
own civilian rail lines to deliver supplies essentially from the factory to the front. This
methodology worked while the battles occurred on the European mainland, but
campaigns, such as in North Africa, proved the ineffectiveness of this type system.
Rommel’s problems in Tunisia were a direct reflection of the lack of a capable German
support organization. The table is also a warning for those who compare sides based on
the total number of divisions alone, without considering how large or capable the divisions
were.
The table also shows that for every combat soldier, the Allied theater needed an
additional two to three soldiers to serve as administrative overhead. As a result, any
leader that focused solely on the combat forces missed the majority of the force needed to
operate a theater.
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The different approaches for support of the armies across the various combatants is
striking. The British seem to have had a relatively effective support system in place as of
late 1942. Their effectiveness is probably the result of lessons learned from the First
World War and the additional experience gained fighting in the deserts of North Africa.
The German approach placed much more emphasis on combat formations and less on the
supporting administrative elements. German generals often viewed logistics as the
responsibility of higher headquarters. As such, German combat theaters contained only
modest support formations, compared to those of the British and Americans. Likewise,
the Russians also appear to have placed more military structure into their combat elements
rather than in logistics units. Research is limited regarding German and Russian logistics
efforts, but available data does not indicate that their divisions held anywhere near the
number of corps and theater support units as those of the US and British divisions. For the
Americans and British, the campaigns of the Mediterranean showed that the divisions
simply could not effectively fight without a substantial number of corps, army, and theater
forces.

Conclusion
June of 1944 did not just happen. The success the Allied forces enjoyed in Normandy
and in the subsequent drive across France and into Germany had its foundation in the
experiences and learning that occurred in the Mediterranean since November 1942.
Indeed, the campaigns of the Mediterranean were essential to preparing the US military
for the cross-channel invasion. As such, the operations in the Mediterranean, specifically
the building and maturation of the military’s support capacities, played an indispensible
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role in winning the war in Europe. The Allies would not have found victory in Europe as
soon as they did had it not been for the development of the logistics and administrative
systems, organizations, equipment, and doctrine that occurred throughout the
Mediterranean campaigns. The Allies would build victory upon this foundation.
The work of the service units enabled the Allied divisions to be victorious in North
Africa, Sicily, and Italy. The southern line of communication in southern France proved
to be the sole practical means to land the French Army back on their home soil, as well as
bring in additional US divisions to the European theater and support a full one third of the
force operating in Europe. The Mediterranean allowed the US military to develop and
exercise new support concepts, organizations, and equipment. Perhaps most importantly,
senior commanders, such as Eisenhower, learned to appreciate the role that the
communications zone of the theater played in regards to long-term operations. The
Mediterranean was the laboratory in which the US military could learn, experiment, and
adapt, all with minimal risk.
A comparison of some statistics between the First and Second World Wars shows just
how far logistics doctrine and unit capabilities had developed. In December 1944, the
ratio of Services of Supply forces to combat troops in Europe and the Mediterranean
approximated that of the American Expeditionary Force in 1918: a ratio 1 to 2. However,
in the Second World War, US forces used nearly six times more supplies per man. These
supplies were also bulkier. The average ton in 1918 occupied 63 cubic feet of space. By
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1944, the average ton required 99 cubic of space. Modern warfare needed more supplies,
and many of these supplies required more space to ship. 978
There was a greater usage of artillery in the Second World War. In 1918, one round of
ammunition for every gun in the American Expeditionary Force equaled 102 tons. In
1944, one round per gun equaled 436 tons, a four-fold increase. Perhaps even more telling
is the number of vehicles used within the theater. In 1944, the European theater lost three
times as much motor tonnage as the American Expeditionary Force had in 1918. Perhaps
the best news was that medical care also drastically improved between the two conflicts.
In 1918, eight men out of every hundred died of wounds. In 1944, the rate was only four
soldiers per one hundred. 979 The service units of the second world war were handling
more supplies, transporting them further, and caring for the wounded better than ever
before in the nation’s history. This was not happenstance and took time and effort to
develop.
Allied strength in the Mediterranean theater peaked in October 1944. By then, the
theater had to support 918,000 US forces, 270,000 men of the Free French Army, and
21,000 men of the Brazilian Expeditionary Force- totaling over 1.2 million men. Added to
this was the need to provide supplies for the support of prisoners of war and civilian relief
efforts. 980 The theater was conducting operations in Italy, France, and planning for a
possible campaign in Yugoslavia. Not only was the theater supporting a large force in
several locations as once, but also the overall quality of support was unequalled in history.
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Ibid. 116-121.
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“Summary of Supply Activities in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.” MHI. 2.
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Never before had so many men and their equipment received such good care. The
Mediterranean Services of Supply and its base sections had set a new standard for
administrative support of a major land combat force.
The First World War proved that the US communication zone could fail. Indeed, if
not for the assistance received from France and Great Britain, the American Expeditionary
Force would have soon found itself unable to sustain combat. Likewise, many of the
challenges faced by Axis forces during the Second World War related directly to the lack
of an effective theater logistics system. The fact of the matter is that the US and Great
Britain invested in creating large service organizations while Germany did not. These
service forces consumed valuable manpower, but were vital to conducting attrition warfare
overseas. This difference gave the Allied powers the edge needed to win.
By January 1945, the European communications zone had matured to the point where
supply challenges were no longer the major problem they had been earlier that fall. The
European theater had assimilated the Sixth Army Group and the Southern Line of
Communication and the Allies were driving east into Germany. There would still be
occasional spot shortages of supplies until the war’s end, but these were isolated and did
not reflect any widespread shortage or any systemic breakdown. One can debate whether
this improved level of support is attributable to the growth of the lines of communication
in northwest Europe and southern France, the infusion of Larkin’s more experienced staff
into Lee’s headquarters, or simply the experience Lee’s organization gained from
supporting operations up to that point. Most probably, the result is a product of all these
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factors. Regardless, administrative support of the armies continued to improve and
complaints from commanders died away.
A conclusion that is not debatable is that the US military that invaded France in 1944
was very different from the force that landed in North Africa. Logistically, had the Allies
used the same planning factors and load plans for a cross-channel assault, as they did in
Morocco and Algeria, there is a good chance the landings in France would have failed.
The force simply would not have had the staying power to hold the beaches, faced with a
determined German defense. Units would have run out of supplies and there would have
been insufficient port and beach units to land the additional forces and material needed to
exploit any gains. Fortunately, the British recognized this risk and successfully kept the
Americans from pursuing such a landing early in the war.
Considering the alternatives, the Allied strategy of conducting operations in the
Mediterranean and then shifting the priority to the European theater proved the approach
that produced the shortest end to the war. This indirect approach to warfare provided the
time to train a conscript army and modernize the military. Most importantly, the Army
learned how to support ground and air forces deployed in an overseas theater.
Organizations learned from their mistakes and commanders gained an appreciation of how
to assemble a balanced force - one that could take a beach, hold it, and then make a
sustained drive inland. The lack of an effective communication zone in the First World
War was the weak link of the American Expeditionary Force. A quarter-century later, the
US communications zone was the enabler of victory.
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Perhaps the best argument to support this thesis is the fact that the US never lost a
battle in the Mediterranean or Europe due to logistics shortfalls. Rather, the
standardization of equipment and level of resourcing provided to troops on the front made
possible the unbroken series of victories across the campaigns. The enemy did enjoy
some occasional tactical success, but this was sporadic and ultimately accomplished little
other than to point out Allied deficiencies for correction. The combat forces had the task
of dealing direct with the enemy, but the service units made it all possible. The
relationship was mutually exclusive; one could not exist without the other. The men and
women of the Mediterranean and European base sections and Services of Supply deserve
recognition for the sacrifices they made and the role they played in the victory against
Germany.

Other Subjects Deserving Further Research
As with any work of this scope, a number of topics surfaced which deserve additional
research, but did not receive extensive study in this project due to time and length
restrictions. In an effort to cover all of the major campaigns of the Mediterranean within a
single volume, some subjects received only limited attention. Specifically, US support for
the Brazilian Expeditionary Force in Italy deserves additional research, as does US
logistical support for the Office of Strategic Services (OSS), support of the Air Force, as
well as support of French, Yugoslav, and Italian partisans. These diverse elements played
an important role in helping the Allies defeat Germany and, like any other unit; they
required administrative support to conduct their operations.
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There is also little written history regarding the role that minority units and the
Women’s Army Corps played in the US service forces. Additionally, the development of
the medical system in the Mediterranean is another field in which there is an abundance of
possible research. During the campaigns of Italy, battle fatigue, now known as posttraumatic stress disorder, had become a common problem in many combat units and the
Peninsular Base Section was a leading center of research into this illness. From the
lessons gained in the Mediterranean, the US medical system devised a system of patient
care that allowed soldiers to recover from the effects of battlefield stress within the
theater, allowing most patients to return to their units for continued service.
The topic of the civil affairs effort deserves additional research as well. Care of local
civilian populations was an essential part of the support effort and consumed large
amounts of resources. This effort pacified the rear areas, took care of those who had
suffered under German rule, and generated a level of good will that remains today.
Finally, the subject of military logistics in Germany and Russia warrants more
attention. There is little written analysis available on how these nations supported their
forces in the field. Memoirs by such men as Rommel and Kesselring offer glimpses as to
the German attitude toward logistics, but there is too much that remains unknown.
All of these potential topics are relevant because they each have important
implications for society, as well as the military. The service forces built the foundation of
victory, which enabled the combat divisions to do their mission. Specific elements of the
service forces were the individual bricks that made up that foundation, each contributing
its part, and adding to the strength of the whole. Each deserves to have its story told.
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Appendix A: Maps
Figure 41: The Race for North Africa, November 1942-Febriary, 1943 981

981

Source: Campaign Atlas to the Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean (West Point: US Military Academy
Department of History, 1979), 38. :
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Figure 42: Battle of Kasserine February 14-22, 1943 982

982

Source: Campaign Atlas to the Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean (West Point: US Military Academy
Department of History, 1979), 41.
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Figure 43: The Fight for Tunisia, April-May 1943 983

983

Source: Campaign Atlas to the Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean (West Point: US Military Academy
Department of History, 1979), 42.
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Figure 44: Sicily, 1943 984

984

Source: Campaign Atlas to the Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean (West Point: US Military Academy
Department of History, 1979), 45.
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Figure 45: The Invasion of Southern Italy- September 1943 985

985
Source: Campaign Atlas to the Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean (West Point: US Military Academy
Department of History, 1979), 47.
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Figure 46: Anzio-Cassino, January 1944 986

986

Source: Campaign Atlas to the Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean (West Point: US Military Academy
Department of History, 1979), 49.
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Figure 47: The Fight for Northern Italy 987
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Source: Campaign Atlas to the Second World War: Europe and the Mediterranean (West Point: US Military Academy
Department of History, 1979), 51.
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Figure 48: France 988

988

:

Source: Jeffrey Clarke and Robert Smith, Riviera to the Rhine (Washington: Center of Military History, 1993), 72.
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Figure 49: Operation Dragoon 989
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:

Source: Jeffrey Clarke and Robert Smith, Riviera to the Rhine (Washington: Center of Military History, 1993), 109.
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Figure 50: Western Front, November 1944 to January 1945. 990
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Source: Thomas Griess ed. Atlas for the Second World War, Europe and the Mediterranean (Wayne NJ: Avert Publishing,
1985), 75.
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Figure 51: The Western Front, November 1944 991
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Source: Jeffrey Clarke and Robert Smith, Riviera to the Rhine (Washington: Center of Military History, 1993), 350.
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Appendix B: Common Landing Craft 992

Figure 52: Landing Craft- Infantry (LCI).

The LCI was 155 feet long and could carry approximately 200 infantrymen over long
distances.

Figure 53: Landing Craft- Personnel (LCP).

The LCP ferried a platoon of 36 soldiers from larger transports to the beaches.
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All photos in this appendix come from Army Ordnance, volume XXVI, number 143 (March-April, 1944). APG. 309-315.
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Figure 54: Landing Ship- Tank (LST)

The LST was the largest assault craft, capable of carrying 22 tanks and over 200 men across
long distances.

Figure 55L Landing Craft- Tank (LCT)

The LCTs carried one tank, several trucks, cargo, or personnel across short distances.
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Figure 56: Landing Craft- Vehicle (LCV)

The Allies used LCVs to deliver medium and light vehicles, cargo, and troops to the beaches.

Figure 57: Landing Craft- Mechanized (LCM)

The LCM could handle medium tanks and other heavy equipment.
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Figure 58: Landing Craft- Vehicle and Personnel (LCVP)

The LVCP (shown alongside a larger LST) carried light tanks, trucks, cargo, and personnel
across short distances.
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Notes on Sources

The research material for this project came from a number of archives that, when combined,
provides a detailed story of how the logistics support effort in the Mediterranean occurred.
These sources also provide a glimpse into the reasoning that lay behind the decisions that shaped
the war. My profound thanks goes out to all of the archivists and historians that assisted me with
this project.

The United States Army Military History Institute, Carlisle, Pennsylvania (MHI). Repository of
individual papers, unit reports, and interviews.

The National Archives at College Park, Maryland (NARA). Official archives for unit and War
Department records and files from the Second World War.

The Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. (LOC). Holds the papers of George S. Patton Jr. and Everett
S. Hughes.

The U.S. Army Center of Military History, Fort McNair, D.C. (CMH). Army archive for official unit
histories, and manuscripts.

U.S. Army Quartermaster Museum and office of the Quartermaster Historian, Fort Lee, Virginia.
Repository for Quartermaster technical publications and papers of select Quartermaster general officers.

U.S. Army Ordnance Museum, Aberdeen Proving Ground, Maryland. (APG) Contains technical
Ordnance publications.

U.S. Naval History and Heritage Command, Washington Navy Yard, D.C. Holds the papers of the senior
US naval officer in the Mediterranean during the war, Vice Admiral Kent Hewett.
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